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NUCLEAR PAKISTAN : INDIA'S RESPONSE

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
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NUCLEAR PAKISTAN : INDIA'S RESPONSE

By PRADYOT PRADHAN*

US ARMING OF PAKISTAN

INDIA and Pakistan are two strikingly different countries. While India inherited an age-old and composite cultural heritage in the form of Independent India, Pakistan chose to be the homeland of one important element only, the Indian Muslims. Free India chose to be a parliamentary democracy while Pakistan slipped into a military dictatorship. India declared itself to be a secular state while Pakistan became a theocratic state by declaring itself an Islamic Republic. India, through its five-year plans, tried to improve the quality of living of its people, Pakistan's emphasis on creation of military power distorted such priorities. The Indian masses went through periodic electoral exercises, Pakistan is remained alienated from their rulers. In the realm of foreign policy, India preferred non-alignment and maintained friendly relations around the globe, Pakistan became a part of the grand American design and an active participant in the Cold War politics of the Super Powers. As far as economic growth is concerned, India developed an infrastructure for industrialization and self reliance, Pakistan's economy became more and more dependent on external assistance with an almost negligible indigenous base. The Indian experiment in parliamentary democracy, non-alignment and in economic development, by and large proved to be successful ; at the same time Pakistan's indulgence in military rule, alignment and elitist development have not only split the country into two but has also pitched its central authority against its own population.¹ As a result, India is an upcoming dominant power in South Asia, while Pakistan, on its own, can be classified as a mini- or a micro-state. Having a pervasive sense of national inferiority and weakness, the Pakistani leadership allied itself with Washington's global framework. Subsequent transfer of arms gave Pakistan a new impetus in the sub-continent and, "it enabled Pakistan to deal with the Indian Government on an equal basis— atleast that was the perception in Pakistan."²

All observations concerning any power balance between any two countries must be situated within the concerned nations' grand strategy. As far as India and Pakistan are concerned, their geography plays a vital role in defining their security doctrines, which in turn would decide the organization of their Armed Forces and the equipments that they must possess.

*Dr. Pradhan is Lecturer, Department of Military Studies, DAV College, Kanpur.

The partition of India in 1947 was executed mainly on religio-cultural lines with little or no regard for the future defences of the new states. With the appointment of Lord Mountbatten as the first Governor-General of free India, it was hoped that the security needs of both India and Pakistan would be managed under British aegis but mutual distrusts and noncommitments abandoned all hopes of peaceful co-existence, and since then, both, India and Pakistan found themselves vulnerable to mutual threats. The haphazard character of partition gave Pakistan a geographical configuration that being long and narrow and lacking physical depth, brought it within easy range of the Indian Air Force. India, in contrast, with a vast landmass and great physical depth, has a greater defence density as compared to Pakistan. The topographic disparity carried advantages and disadvantages for both India and Pakistan,

Pakistan's lack of physical depth exposed the core of its defence establishments, within an easy distance of the international border. If it retained speed and initiative, Pakistan could make sufficient damage in the Indian territory, gain in reaction time thus giving it tremendous advantages in a short war, while losing out on physical safety. India, on the other hand, because of its vast landmass, has its establishments dispersed all over the country. In case of a surprise attack, the loss of initiative and reaction time becomes particularly disadvantageous, because reserves have to be mobilized, transported and committed to a distant border. India has advantage only in case of a protracted war where its battlefield potential has time to develop and its superior industrial infrastructural capacities can be brought to the fore.³

The physical vulnerability of Pakistan had led to the adoption of the policy that attack is the best form of defence. The policy has, time and again, provoked Pakistan to launch preemptive attacks on Indian military targets to defend itself. Thus, its arms modernisation efforts exhibit its need for sophisticated hardware to arm it to the teeth for any D-Day attempts and to have a psychological edge over India. This aspiration of Islamabad, to have a psychological edge over India, has placed the sub-continent as a vortex of the Super Power rivalry. Secondly, Washington feels that by giving aid to Pakistan, it can have a proper base in the area for deployment of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) for any emergency in the Gulf region and that Pakistan can act as a policeman to safeguard the United States' interests in the area.

Tensions between India and Pakistan do not have any global repercussions. Such disputes are due to 'disequilibrium'. To achieve equilibrium, military and economic parity has to be maintained between the competing powers. Further, each of these countries cannot be allowed to develop indigenous capacities, for if it happens, the leverage of the Super Powers would be reduced. To achieve this equilibrium and to maintain the

leverage, arms on a certain scale should be provided to these local powers on attractive terms, or through treaties.⁴

Having acquired the indigenous base for the manufacture of armaments, India is the only country in the sub-continent to challenge this concept of equilibrium and is capable of redefining power relationships on its own terms and conditions. Allayed by New Delhi's achievements, the Reagan Administration sanctioned a US \$ 3.3 billion economic and military aid package to Pakistan for the period 1981-87. Under this deal, Pakistan is getting an unspecified number of M-113 Armoured Personnel Carriers, anti-tank guided weapon launchers, SAHIS helicopters and 144 RBS-70 surface-to-air missile launchers. In addition to this they have been supplied with about 40 F-16s, 32 Mirage Vs by the end of 1985. Pakistan is also acquiring 42 A-5 ground attack aircrafts from China, which is an improved version of MiG-19.⁵

The supply of F-16s is another matter of grave concern for India. They are equipped with latest avionics configuration, including ALR-69 radar. It is expected that the PAF is likely to be equipped with about 100 F-16s. To accommodate them, Pakistan, undertook the modernisation of 14 existing airfields and construction of 11 new ones ; some of these are located along the Makran coast.⁶ To improve the operational capability, the military command structure of the PAF has been bifurcated into — northern central and southern commands. For effective coordination of the three services and for perfecting a meaningful air support to land and navel forces, the Air Force Head Quarters has been shifted from Peshawar to Islamabad. All this has been done because the induction of F-16s into the PAF has dramatically altered its capabilities to deliver nuclear weapons.⁷

Initially the F-16s were not provided with bombing racks, but Washington, for future shipments, decided to provide one and these racks are capable of carrying two 2000 pound bombs over a range of 400 miles while performing a low-low mission. Called the "Fighting Falcon", the F-16, which is multi-role fighter plane, is equally effective in air-to-air combat and in a ground support role. Its range is 2000 miles and the speed is *Mach-2* plus. It is equipped with a 200 mm multi-barrel cannon with 500 rounds. It can carry upto six AIM-9 infra-red missiles, conventional air-to-air and air-to-surface munitions and electronic measure pods. Because of its small size and one smokeless engine, with a thrust of 25,000 pounds, it is difficult to detect it visually or with a radar. Its bubble canopy cockpit gives the pilot almost unlimited visibility.⁸

Recently, the Reagan Administration has given the green signal for supply of four DV-ID *Mohawk* battlefield reconnaissance aircrafts to Pakistan. These aircrafts are capable of seeing 20 to 30 kms beyond the most forward troops of the enemy. The DV-ID *Mohawk* is a high performance two-seater observation aircraft and is unique as far as battlefield surveillance is concerned. It has exceptionally short take-off and landing capabilities

and good low speed control. It is capable of operating even from rough, unprepared forward airstrips. It carries APS-84 Side-Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) and UAS-4 Infra-red Surveillance Equipment (IRSE). The SLAR is capable of automatic film processing, giving within seconds of exposure a permanent film record of the radar of the image on either side of the flight path. The radar coverage is 100 kms. The IRSE is capable of night photography under very dim light.⁹

With the use of *Mohawks*, the opponents' military dispositions, defensive positions and movements for supplies and reinforcements would be laid completely bare, depriving the opponent of any capability for tactical surprise. What is of even greater importance is that Pakistan would be able to alter the operational plans to exploit the changing situation to its advantage as the battle progresses.

During the recent visit to Pakistan, Casper Weinberger, the US Secretary for Defence, discussed and finalized a new economic and military aid package worth US \$ 4.02 billion for the period 1987-93. Under this package, Pakistan is to get about 60 F-16s bringing the tally to 100. Besides this, Weinberger, in principle, agreed for the supply of about 20-F-160's, which is the latest and more sophisticated version of the already supplied F-16s. The United States and China have also agreed to help Pakistan in their Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project. In this China will supply a modified version of F-7, also known as J-7, aircraft frames which will be fitted either with Pratt & Whitney 1120 or General Electric F-404 engines. This jet, which will turn out to be Pakistan's LCA, will also carry American avionics and armaments. The Reagan Administration has also agreed to supply Pakistan with Airborne Warning And Control System (AWACS). Casper Weinberger has stated that the United States considers the supply of AWACS essential for Pakistan and intends to provide this capability as quickly as possible. As part of security assistance to Pakistan, AWACS figured prominently in Weinberger's discussions with the Pakistani leadership during his recent visit to Pakistan.¹⁰

PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR AMBITION

Following India's Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in 1974, Pakistan also decided to embark upon nuclear weapons capability, but it was a very closely guarded secret. The first official announcement to the world about Pakistan's effort by Atal Behari Bajpai, then India's External Affairs Minister, came in the Parliament in April 1979. Following Bajpai's announcement, the Carter Administration announced that it was invoking the Symington Amendment, which disqualifies countries engaged in a nuclear weapons programme from receiving American aid, and cutting off all aids to Pakistan except food aid.¹¹

Although Pakistan launched its nuclear energy programme in 1955, it picked up speed in the sixties during the regime of Gen. Ayub Khan. Since

then it has set up the Pakistan Institute for Nuclear Technology (PINSTECH) in 1965, Karachi Nuclear Power Project (KANNUP), which went into operation in 1970, and nuclear research centres at Lahore, Tandojam, Jamshoro, Karachi, Multan and Dera Ghazi Khan. All these projects were progressing at snail's pace. Suddenly with the arrival of Dr A. Q. Khan in Dec. 1975, who is alleged to have stolen the bomb for Islam, Pakistan's nuclear energy programme gained fantastic momentum. For him a large uranium enrichment plant has been built near Kahuta, 25 kms from Islamabad. Side by side work also started on building a large plutonium reprocessing plant near Chasma in Punjab. Of all these projects, Kahuta is the most ambitious plant for Pakistan. Protected by air defence missiles and subject to tight security by two serving Major Generals of the Pakistan Army, Maj-Gen. Akbar Ali and Maj-Gen. Anis Ali Nawab, the Kahuta facility is using the centrifuge technology, the blueprint of which was allegedly stolen from URENCO plant, Netherlands by A. Q. Khan, who is Chief boss of this plant and who was formerly working at URENCO.¹²

For Pakistan's enrichment facility, some conversion of natural uranium ore to uranium hexafluoride gas for use in the centrifuge plant must occur (centrifuge or gravitational separation process is the same as used in cream separation. A container is given centrifugal acceleration so that the heavier components spin to the outside while lighter fractions concentrate on the inside). The necessary facility for such conversion has been constructed in Pakistan by a West German firm at Multan. Pakistan has also purchased a large quantity of uranium from Niger. It has been reported that Libya has provided financial backing for Pakistan's underhand nuclear explosives programme for production of the so-called Islamic Bomb.¹³ At the moment Pakistan is reprocessing plutonium at PINSTECH and the KANUPP reactors. Fuel rods have been subjected to low burn up in order to reduce Pu-240 contents in the spent fuel and to enhance Pu-239 content. All this lends credence to the fact that Pakistan is in possession of a sufficient quantity of plutonium (Pu), which can be used to fabricate a nuclear device. On the other hand Pakistan is also in possession of 6500 centrifuge tubes for its uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta.

About the pace of enrichment in Pakistan Dr Khan says that he and his colleagues are working day and night, 12 to 13 hours per day and even on holidays and have made Pakistan self-sufficient in uranium enrichment. About the fabrication of a bomb, Dr Khan said that Pakistan's nuclear program is for peaceful purposes. "But in his enthusiasm he could not hide the fact that, the talent that he has in metallurgy, electronics, mechanical engineering, it would not be difficult for them to accomplish anything. They have the capability," said Dr Khan but added, "it is a political decision and he and his colleagues would not disappoint the country and the nation if the President were to take this extreme step for the safety and security of the country".¹⁴ Dr. Khan has also pointed out that Pakistan is far ahead of

India in the enrichment of uranium. As a matter of fact Pakistan is years ahead of India. Pakistan, due to Dr. Khan's efforts, has started producing enriched uranium from early 1983 on a commercial basis and thus made Pakistan, one of the six countries, which have national uranium enrichment plants and first among the developing countries. The others are the USA, the USSR, China, France and Britain. Based on Dr. Khan's assertions that upto 90 per cent enrichment for uranium has been achieved at Kahuta, making the material suitable for bombs. The sources say that although the actual amount of such material made is difficult to assess, it could be adequate for several explosive devices.¹⁵

All this points to the bare fact that Pakistan is in a very advanced stage of uranium enrichment and uranium and pu is available in sufficient quantity, nuclear weapons capability is well within the reach of Pakistan. While speaking to *The Washington Post*, Rajiv Gandhi said, "what really surprises us is that they (Pakistan) are going ahead with their nuclear weapons programme and it is also clear that the United States Government knows about it and still do nothing."¹⁶

Washington is not selling sophisticated military hardware like F-16s, OV-10 *Mohawks.*, etc., to Islamabad merely for money but instead these supplies and a blind eye to its nuclear weapons programme, in turn, would give Washington facilities for deployment of RDF and to expand the US Electronic Surveillance System in South Asia. Pakistan has already extended the facility of Peshawar, Sargodha and Karachi airports to be equipped with electronic surveillance systems. However, all civilian American flights to Karachi airport have been withdrawn after the recent hijacking of the Pan Am flight at Karachi airport itself. Pakistan has been included and covered in one of the five Ground-based Electro-optical Deep Space Surveillance (GEODSS) system, which was slated to be established at Diego Garcia by the end of 1985. This gives quite a substantial weightage to the thought that Washington is providing Pakistan with a nuclear umbrella. Recently Pakistan has also provided rest and recreation facilities to US warships at Karachi and Gwador ports.

THREATS TO INDIA'S SECURITY

The main threats perceptible today to India's security may be classified as :—

- (i) a military threat from Pakistan in conjunction with some collusion from China
- (ii) a politico-military threat from China in conjunction with some collusion from Pakistan
- (iii) a combined military attack from China and Pakistan
- (iv) politico-economic pressure from one or both the Super Powers and

(v) Soviet presence in Afghanistan which is presently not a threat to India's security but coupled with a Sino-Soviet *rapprochement* in 1990s this may force a China-India nuclear contingency

Any country faced with the dangers of hostilities from neighbouring countries, on its flanks, must either eliminate atleast one of the threats or build its military strength to deter its enemies from attacking independently or jointly and, if they do so, to defend itself successfully. It would obviously be best if we could ensure peaceful relations with one, if not with both of our hostile neighbours, but we must also be realistic and be careful not to permit any wishful thinking to lead us astray. This possibility appears to be very bleak in the near future as far as Indo-Pak relations are concerned, in the sense that the Indian Government has not yet come out with any statement regarding Benazir Bhutto's movement and the alleged support that the terrorists and extremists are getting from Pakistan. On the other hand, friendly relations between Delhi-Moscow would not be satisfying to Beijing.

After the debacles of 1965 and 1971, Pakistan has greatly enhanced its capabilities to wage a decisive war against India. Right from the very beginning, since the formation of Pakistan in 1947 to be exact, the bone of contention between the two countries has been Kashmir and it will continue to be a matter of contingency in future also. The corridors of power in Islamabad have been concentrating on this aspect, especially after 1971, and have been frantically trying to beg, borrow or steal the high-tech from the West. Washington, to counter Soviet presence in Afghanistan, was more than willing to oblige Pakistan. The result was the massive arming of Pakistan through the US \$ 3.2. billion aid package, which included sophisticated gadgets like F-16s and equipping of the airfields of Peshawar, Sargodha and Karachi with ultra-sensitive radar stations, to name a few. Recently, the agreement to supply OV-10 *Mohawks* would render possible the adoption of the strategy to strike deep into the rear known as "follow-on-forces-attack" or FOFA by Pakistan. FOFA, based on long range surveillance, can be used in an offensive mode to launch a surprise attack, and knowing fully well the characteristics of the Pakistani leadership, Pakistan will have a great temptation to launch a pre-emptive conventional strike against India. One should not rule out the possibility that the initial success with FOFA would lower the nuclear threshold and it is in this context that the offer of "no-first-use" by President Zia becomes irrelevant.¹⁷

Through the untiring efforts of Dr. A. Q. Khan, Pakistan is acquiring nuclear capability in the near future or may have already acquired it, with the pace of enrichment of fission material at Kahuta and Multan reactors. This achievement lends credence to the fact that Pakistan is slated to explode a nuclear device in the near future. The prospect of nuclear Pakistan will bring in a qualitative change in the strategic environment of South Asia.

As far as conventional weapons are concerned, there exists a balance between India and Pakistan. Acquiring nuclear weapons capability would not only break this balance but would also bring in a competition in the arms race in the sub-continent. To cope up, New Delhi will have to increase its defence spendings and would be compelled to exercise its last choice of going in for nuclear weapons. It cannot be postponed for long, and with the expertise available in the country, it is well within its reach to acquire nuclear weapons capability. According to reports appearing in a section of the Press, Pakistan has taken delivery of *krytons* the electronic triggering device for nuclear warheads, from the US and has successfully tested it.¹⁸ Recently, a Pakistani delegation to Beijing, headed by External Affairs Minister Yaqub Khan signed an agreement with China on mutual cooperation in nuclear technology.¹⁹ This lends credibility to the fact that Pakistan has perfected a nuclear device and may test it in the near future.

Pakistan considers its nuclear capacity of vital importance and necessary for three reasons. First, it can regain the lost prestige of the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak conflicts. Secondly, it would neutralise Indian nuclear potential and would serve as a deterrent in any future conflict between India and Islamabad; Islamabad thus envisions that they can defeat the Indian Army in a limited war. Lastly, but most importantly, President Zia thinks that with a weak Indian leadership, not able to exercise its nuclear options, it may by a swift pre-emptive action decouple Kashmir valley from India to complete its identity. In this endeavour, Islamabad's special relationship with Beijing, the strategic importance of Karakoram Highway through Kunjerab and Mintaka passes could well play a significant role.

Pakistan has tested the bomb according to an American intelligence report. The tests were conducted between 18-21 September 1986. In fact, according to the intelligence report, the tests in September were the second of a series conducted by Pakistan this year. The report was quoted by the *Washington Post* in its lead story on 4 November 1986. According to the US law if any country, recipient of American aid, indulges in search for nuclear capability, the United States Government would invoke the Symington Amendment which disqualifies the concerned nation from receiving American aid. To keep a constant watch on such activities, the American President has to certify, at the end of every year, that the concerned country is not violating American aid laws. Inspite of the intelligence reports, carried by the *Washington Post*, President Reagan made the required certification for Pakistan on 27 October 1986.

The disclosures by the *Washington Post* that Pakistan has tested an implosion trigger device for its nuclear weapons programme and has enriched uranium (U-235) to 93.5 per cent, will come as a surprise to only those who have been wilfully looking away from the unmistakable evidence of sustained Pakistani efforts, to reach nuclear weapon capability. Pakistani efforts have involved many subterfuges and illegalities, both on its part as

well as the part of the nuclear technology-exporting countries. As a result of these activities, it has now developed, both complex engineering capabilities to produce weapons grade nuclear material and the ability to assemble the bomb in the basement, thus putting maximum uncertainty on India.

The primary justification for AWACS in Pakistan is sought to be based on the threat emanating from the alleged border intrusions by Afghan and Soviet aircrafts. President Zia, on the other hand, has conceded that he does not envision any security threat to Pakistan from either the USSR or Afghanistan. The issue, then, can concern only border violation by aircraft. In such a background the arguments given by Casper Weinberger, that he considers the supply of AWACS to Pakistan as essential, do not make much sense. The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan traverses rugged mountainous terrain, is mostly undemarcated on land and is even subject of dispute between the two countries. Secondly, the mountainous-terrain of Afghanistan would cast radar shadows on the monitor screen and this would allow Afghan aircrafts to operate without detection in most circumstances. If by any chance, the rebel aircrafts are sighted even then for a chance interception an investment of about US \$ 1000 millions for AWACS is a highly expensive investment. This, however, leads one to believe that Pakistan intends to use this acquisition against India, unless the supply is intended as a part of a grand American design to monitor the activities in the Gulf region, using Pakistani bases.

As and when Pakistan gets the supply of AWACS, it would help Pakistan build up a complete picture of the air defences of India, its strength and weaknesses. For an aggressor such information is of vital importance because it enables him to choose the time, place and method of attack. This capability, coupled with the testing of a second nuclear device, greatly enhances Pakistan's capabilities to wage a decisive war against India. There is no more time to lose. India has no options left except the nuclear one. By keeping away from nuclear weapons capability, India does not in any way makes itself credible in the fight against nuclear weapons. India should not waste time in diplomatic initiatives, for, external security threats can not be totally met by diplomacy alone. Nehru, after the debacle of 1962, was forgiven by the Indian masses, but now, more awakened and security conscious people will not forgive Rajiv Gandhi for his failure to visualize all eventualities to safeguard the much sought after concept of freedom and factor responsible for jeopardizing the national honour.

ALTERNATIVES FOR INDIA

It is very unfortunate that military education has not become a part and parcel of India's new national education policy, unlike that in many other countries as attack from China (1962) and Pakistan (1947, 1965, 1971) or newspaper reports about their defence preparedness and possible threats to

our security therefrom roused debates, which after a few months died down. Even the heated debates in the Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha suffer the same fate. The Hon'ble Members speak in sentimental voices to get a detailed front page coverage in the leading dailies and are satisfied with their efforts. In times of national crisis, the whole political system endlessly talks of national unity and support to the government, and after the end of the crisis start a post-mortem of the happenings and end up with a censure motion against the government.

Today, even after 39 years of independence, India needs to do serious thinking about its geo-strategic and historical role and has yet to define what its national security priorities are. India's thinking is a confused one. It wants to project its image in the world as a great apostle of peace, through the policy of peaceful co-existence and on the other it wants to become strong enough to meet all eventualities. Jawahar Lal Nehru's image as a visionary of global peace and founder of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) was completely shattered when India's panchsheel partner, China, attacked it in 1962. Propagator of "nuclear energy for peaceful purposes" and Chairperson of NAM, Indira Gandhi, fell to an assassin's bullet, said to be a hireling of Washington-Islamabad-Beijing axis.

This poses a very serious question about the format of India's destiny as a nation and how it arrives at it. Many people feel that New Delhi has to play a natural role in extending the climate of peaceful co-existence, by virtue of its national heritage, left to it by Mahatma Gandhi, who conducted the entire freedom struggle through non-violent methods. Nehru and his successors extended it through NAM, which has helped to reduce tensions between the Super Powers.

Free India decided to keep an army along the lines it was maintained by the British in the pre-independence era. This meant that India had decided that its armed forces will kill, if necessary, to defend the country, both from internal insurgency and external aggression. And since the soldiers have been licensed to kill, at the risk of their own lives, is it not the duty of the Government of India that the risk to their life is minimum? Given these conditions, any force would remain strong and discharge their duties with utmost sincerity. Keeping this in mind, India has been modernising its troops with latest military hardware and conventional weapons viz, *Jaguars*, *Mirages*, *MiGs*, and helicopters for the Air Force, T-72 tanks for the Army, submarines and destroyers for the Navy.²⁰ On the other hand, considering today's nuclear China and tomorrow's nuclear Pakistan, the two potential adversaries of India in this region, and the possible support that these two might receive from Washington in the global environment, will it not be suicidal for the Indian Armed Forces to face nuclear China and nuclearising Pakistan, knowing fully well that they have the ultimate weapon? Are the Government of India, the political, social, academic and economic elite, along with some percentage of the Indian population, ready to face theulti-

mate weapon in the open sky with the prayer of peaceful co-existence and nonviolence in their hearts.²¹ Today India is surrounded by nuclear weapon states—China and the USSR in the north, the United States' nuclear fleet in the Indian Ocean with a base at Diego Garcia. Tomorrow, it may have another nuclear neighbour, Pakistan. It is better late than never; it is earnestly hoped that India, under the stewardship of Rajiv Gandhi, decides, and rightly too, to become a nuclear power and starts the process towards manufacture and possession of nuclear warheads. Before deciding on this serious issue, let us weigh the pros and cons of India obtaining nuclear capability. In the elite of Indian masses, there are two very distinct classes—the nuclear lobby and the anti-nuclear lobby.

It is well known that Mahatma Gandhi was an ardent protagonist of the philosophy of world peace and peaceful co-existence. If this concept is accepted by all nations of the world, the bomb becomes irrelevant and India can denounce the bomb. This philosophy has been accepted by 107 countries of NAM, but the world powers having nuclear weapons are not convinced of this theory. Therefore, New Delhi should not carry the concept of its moral approach and expose Indian soldiers to undeserved risk and danger. Today, India has no Mahatma Gandhi who can undertake to convince the Super Powers of this philosophy. Today's self-appointed Gandhians write articles from their airconditioned cubicles, and genuine intellectuals, who are aware of the new and changing situations of the international environment, trot on dotted lines. The nuclear option will strengthen India's image of non-alignment and will make it one in the truest sense of the world. It will prevent India from being pushed around by any power bloc—the United States, or the USSR or China.

Sometimes a theory is advanced that possession of a nuclear arsenal will make the government authoritarian or that democracy will collapse. This is not true and as a matter of fact is an idiosyncracy in the minds of the anti-nuclear lobby. Did the possession of nuclear weapons change the character and ideology of the UK, the US, France, China or the USSR. History does not tell us that either Churchill or Roosevelt turned dictators. After winning the war neither the British became Nazis nor democracy in England collapsed. Islamabad had a dictatorial regime under Yahya Khan and, today, in the garb of duly elected people's government the Army has a upper hand in the administration. Possession of nuclear weapons does not make the government more authoritarian than it is with conventional weapons.

West-oriented politicians and even the economic elite advocate that the possession of a nuclear arsenal would incur very heavy economic burden for a developing country like India. One would agree with such arguments simply for the reason that defence spendings should not come in the way of raising the quality of life of a nation and to safeguard economic growth and stability. But can one afford this by endangering the security of the country, losing much sought after concept of freedom and become His

Master's Voice of one of the power blocs. Drained white economically, after World War II, England and Russia decided to go nuclear. If Pakistan, with much less resources and area to defend than India, can embark upon a nuclear weapons capability, why can't India. Krishna Kant a former MP, while delivering a lecture to the Ahmedabad Military and Rifle Training Associations on 19 February 1982, said, "a production reactor to produce plutonium for 15 bombs per year will cost Rs. 100 crores. A delivery system would cost about Rs. 4 to 5 crores each." On the other hand, he says, "Jaguar will cost more than Rs. 9 crore and a *Mirage* will be twice as expensive." As per the defence budget a provision of Rs. 1500 crores has been made to procure and equip the IAF with a squadron each of *Jaguars* and *Mirages*. These figures clearly indicate that the nuclear weapons will be much cheaper than the sophisticated conventional weapons that are being bought by India from the international market. The cost would be still less, if India converts the existing facilities of manufacture of plutonium, uranium and thorium to warheads, and for delivery systems, *Jaguars* and *Mirages* can be used, as is being done in Europe.

Today we are living in almost a lawless society. The Indian Constitution provides the rights of private defense. According to the Indian Penal Code, if someone is killed, it is an offence and a criminal act and the killer is liable for death sentence; but if the killing is done in self-defence, it is not a crime. If India possesses nuclear weapons, it should not use them for offensive purposes but only as a deterrent. It should be treated as a symbol of resistance to an attack on our cultural heritage, to our political freedom and to our economic growth. India, in all objectivity, should endeavour to become an independent centre of decision-making in the international strategic environment. Reagan had once said, "with such a mass of humanity and the bomb, China cannot be ignored." Then why should India be ignored with 700 million people and a bomb tomorrow. This will only be possible when India's strategic defence is strengthened and this includes strategic nuclear defence.

While nuclear capability may not promote peace, without it peace is impossible. A strategic defence capability, therefore, becomes a social overhead for economic growth. Indian nuclear policy which presently exhibits ambivalence, will have to be formulated in the context of the changing environment of the 1990s, and will have to address to the problem of nuclear weapons capability. Today there is no alternative to peace, and this being so, as Liddel Hart put it, "old concepts and old definitions of strategy have become not only obsolete but nonsensical with the development of nuclear weapons—to aim at winning a war, to take victory as your object, is no more than a state of lunacy"²²

India has the capacity to fabricate a bomb, what remains to be done is to integrate it into New Delhi's arsenal and to build up strategy and tactics around it. A security doctrine cannot be a static concept. It is

bound to change with the international strategic environment. Most of the developed countries have certain basic concepts which constitute a framework for their security planning. India becoming nuclear is neither an ambitious nor aggressive doctrine, but a practical one which shall not be taxing its resources, stage of development and values derived from its freedom struggle. It is essential that India's neighbours, potential adversaries and friends are aware of India's security doctrine. This would let the concerned nations know about New Delhi's stand on various issues, and what contingencies will evoke a violent reaction from it. New Delhi, to keep its cool must always remember that given the power of modern weapons, it is the primary task of strategic doctrine not to wage a war but to create alternatives less catastrophic than a thermo-nuclear holocaust.²³

If India is not to go nuclear, it will hereafter have to live with this humiliation from Pakistan as it did in respect of China in 1962. Nehru was forgiven but Rajiv Gandhi may not be forgiven for his failure to visualize eventualities which may endanger the nation's security. The second aspect of New Delhi's failure to exercise nuclear option will be that it will have to lean heavily on the Soviets, which will completely shatter its image of non-alignment. Non-aligned are not capable of intervening effectively in international affairs because they have failed to do their homework to challenge the conventional wisdom of the nuclear strategic ideology with their own logic. Once they are themselves nuclear powers, they would be heard with respect and would be given due weightage on any international forum. It is quite well known that after the PNE at Pokhran and establishment of a chain of nuclear reactors, India suddenly grew in stature and is now regarded as one of the leaders of third world nations. Therefore, the only option open to India, in the face of recent testing of a nuclear device by Pakistan, is that it should exercise its option. India going nuclear is just mobilising enough force, not to feel helpless to vindicate national self-respect and honour, in the face of an attack by a nuclear neighbour and adversary. No nuclear war has yet been fought, how such a war might begin? How it would proceed and how it could be terminated? the answers to all these questions lie in the area of pure conjecture. Nevertheless, a composite country like India, placed in an adverse situation and surrounded by existing and potential nuclear powers, would have strong incentives to acquire nuclear defences to safeguard the 39-year old republic. The requirement for India is a nuclear weapons capability, capable of deterring nuclear threats, which are being extended towards it in the form of China, Pakistan and the Super Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean. This would involve the development of a full panoply of nuclear weapons, comprising the nuclear triad of landbased nuclear missiles in hardened silos or in mobile mode or long both, range aircrafts with strategic air command and ballistic missile armed nuclear submarines, capable of presenting a reasonable blue-water deterrence to Beijing.

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FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN AFRICAN POLITICS REVISITED : THE PARADOX OF AFRICAN SELF-DETERMINATION

By KOLA OLUGBADE*

INTRODUCTION

TWO commemorative conferences were simultaneously held in Europe from 6-9 February 1985. The common objective of the conferences was the centenary of the Berlin West African Conference of 15 November 1884 to 26 February 1885, which laid the foundations for the *balkanisation* and subsequent occupation of most of the African continent. It was at the said Berlin Conference of 1884/85 that the then European Powers, with the aid of coloured pencils and ruler, arbitrarily and artificially divided the African continent among themselves and for their selfish interests.

Arbitrary and casual as the colonial boundary arrangements have been, they have come to determine in perpetuity the destiny of whole peoples and countless individuals. In spite of their indisputable attributes as arbitrary and artificial lines of demarcation, the boundaries have had to be accepted as legal alignments of the territorial framework of the post-colonial nation states.¹ The various conflicts and crises associated with this unfortunate exercise of 1885 are still with us in Africa to date.

The continent remained in this precarious position when the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established in 1963. As a result of the existing conditions brought about by the Berlin Conference of 1885, the newly established organisation had little or no option than to opt for the principle of the inviolability of borders inherited from colonization. This meant, most unfortunately, both endorsing serious anomalies and seeking to suppress sources of instability. But as Gerard Chaliand, pointed out, it did not suppress ethnic or territorial problems,² and these problems, generally were again to lead to external interventions in the continent.

It is not our intention in this paper to discuss the usefulness or otherwise of the Berlin Conference since we are aware of the numerous existing literature on it. There is therefore the need to establish the purpose and point of departure of this paper.

*Mr. Olugbade is Lecturer in Political Science, St. Andrews College of Education, Oyo, Nigeria.

The objective of this exercise is to revisit foreign intervention in Africa in the context of its weakness and extreme dependence (both politically and economically) on the Super Powers as well as other European Powers. The paper will attempt a brief discussion of the African situation, the types and nature of intervention and the reasons for the various types of intervention with an enquiry of whether foreign intervention is inevitable or not in Africa.

It is necessary to point out at this juncture, lest I am accused of leaving out vital details, that this paper will not consider the details and forms of intervention from each intervening country. Before we discuss the types and causes of intervention, it is necessary to consider the African situation to which we now turn.

THE AFRICAN SITUATION

Most African states are adrift. The present situation is difficult. Africa is dominated and fragile. The fragility and dependence of the continent in economic matters are a theme that many experts have stressed for about two decades. The discussions and debates are so enormous that we do not need to repeat them here.³ Suffice it to say that at the end of two decades of independence, behind the rhetoric and the speeches, whether revolutionary or not, the balance-sheet in terms of the development and improvement of the living conditions of the people is extremely meagre.

Contrary to the foundation myth of the OAU, all inter-African organizations launched during the last twenty years have collapsed. There remains perhaps the economic community of about sixteen Francophone states which draw their unity from France, as well as ECOWAS, that is yet to fully stand firmly. The typical conditions of the vast majority of African states at present are : decline or only slight development in agriculture ; general economic stagnation or decline for the overwhelming majority of countries ; monetary, economic, even political dependence ; an almost universal fragility and very unequal distribution of monetary incomes.⁴ African leaders try to face the challenges through the acceptance of the western-inspired ideology of development.

The acceptance of the ideology of development by African leaders helps to perpetuate Africa's under-development. As Claude Ake rightly noted, there can be no development when those who are to bring development are themselves part of the structure of imperialism.⁵ Nor can there be development as long as class contradictions persist and grow. Any approach which makes the achievement of development in Africa compatible with the maintenance of the present exploitative relations of production and with the links to imperialism can only hinder Africa.

Consequently, there have been series of pressures in the continent. They are pressures against the maintenance of the existing exploitative class relations and hence pressures against the very survival of the African bourgeoisie. These pressures arise from (i) the desperate poverty of the African masses ; (ii) the sharp and highly visible differences between the rich and the poor ; (iii) rising expectations associated with 'modernization', (iv) the example of developed countries ; (v) the politicization of the popular consciousness by the nationalist movement and by the dynamics of contradictions between the metropolitan bourgeoisie and the African bourgeoisie.⁶

The African bourgeoisie use the strategy of depoliticization to suppress the pressures, legitimate wishes and aspirations of the majority of the people. Depoliticization entails reducing the effective participation of the masses and of non-hegemonic factions of the ruling class, and preventing some interests and points of view from finding political expression.⁷

The process of depoliticization has made African countries political monoliths. Every African country is in effect a one-party state in the sense that every regime in Africa assumes its exclusive right to rule and prohibits organized opposition. Military regimes are in this respect similar to one-party systems. Most importantly, the process of depoliticization has made African politics particularly brutal and vindictive. It is this unhealthy situation that partly accounts for the degree of foreign intervention in the political process of African states.

The condition in Africa is harsh. It is precarious. There is only one nurse for every 3,000 Africans, one doctor to every 21,000 Africans whereas in the USA, there is one nurse for every 140 people and one doctor for every 520 people. Life expectancy is an average of 49 years in Africa as compared to 75 years in industrial societies.⁸

One of the major problems of the present and of the future is the food situation. Twenty-five years ago, sub-Saharan Africa was virtually self-sufficient in food. In 1962, food requirements were almost entirely covered by domestic production. Food production has fallen behind population growth. If all the food available in Africa, including imports, were divided equally, it wouldn't be enough to meet minimum per capita calorie requirements. Today, there is a shortfall of about 20 per cent. If as everything seems to indicate, the present trend continues, this figure will be on alarming increase. The continuing menace of drought is a pointer to this assertion. I can't help but to agree with Chaliand that all the trends indicate that more and more cereals will be imported into Africa.⁹ It is vital for serious efforts to be undertaken to promote and maintain food self-sufficiency for the masses. Whether states will succeed in making such an adjustment may be doubted, for reasons that are political and sociological.

Despite these horrible and precarious situations, waste, corruption and inefficiency have been the experience of most African states, whether they claim to be revolutionary or not. Rather than spend the meagre resources

for developmental purposes, they loot the Treasury, proceeds of which they take to Swiss and other European and American banks. Such deposits are used to develop these other overseas banks with the majority of our people in Africa living under serious economic and political deprivations and under sub-human conditions.

Disappointingly, in about 25 years, the prices of manufactured products imported by Third World countries have increased proportionately much more than the prices of African raw materials, mineral or agricultural. It is not very encouraging to produce more to receive less.

In the case of mineral ore production, a greater percentage (except petroleum) is produced by South Africa. The case of South Africa needs some elaboration so as to bring out clearly the complexity of events in Africa and why external forces will always be interested in the continent.

South Africa is strategically placed in Africa and the world as a whole.¹⁰ Using per capita production as a measure, South Africa ranks as the world's third leading producer of mineral ores after the United States and the USSR. With Namibia, South Africa is the world's leading producer of diamonds and gold. Also South Africa is the world's largest producer, and contains the largest known reserves, of platinum. Its coal, the only source of energy represents 80 per cent of total African reserves (and 4 per cent of world reserve). It also produces copper and iron ore in large quantities. Among strategic minerals, South African reserves represent about 70 per cent of world reserves. It also has the largest known reserves of manganese, of which it is the second largest producer after the USSR. The world's largest vanadium reserves are in South Africa, which supplies 40 per cent of world production. Other ores extracted in South Africa include lead, zinc, amosite, crocidolite, asbestos, phosphate, vermiculite, antimony (largest world reserve and production), chrysolite, fluorspar and other lesser ores.

This brief exploration of South Africa's mineral ores coupled with the fact that it is the only regional power (with its advanced technology) shows why the Western Powers are interested in a perpetual hold on the region. It might be necessary to mention in passing that the position of South Africa is particularly privileged because it shares with the USSR a quasi-monopoly in several ores.

The situation in South Africa is not the same as in other parts of the continent.¹¹ Even when the ores are available, they do not know its use or the technical know how for it. Thus they are unable to dictate the price to the exploiting western countries. The condition is critical. The Sahelian region appears condemned to poverty or even to total impoverishment. There is nothing to suggest, in the worsening crisis facing the West, that the terms of North-South trade will improve in coming years. On the contrary, it is likely that stringency will be the order of the day, as the crisis develops and the sources of instability and disequilibrium grow in number.

Despite the availability of some mineral deposits (and the expanse of land) it is sad to note that thirty¹² of the world's fifty poorest states are in Africa. Among these there are many states which had negative growth rates in the period 1960-76. Even more had economic growth that was less than the rate of population increase. There is nothing to suggest that these trends will change before this decade runs out. More than half of the continent's population is suffering from either direct starvation or one kind of undernourishment or another. In addition, Africa has the highest number of illiterates in the world (this number is likely to be on the increase because of the present situation in the continent). Its products suffer perhaps from the most volatile vagaries in international markets. What seems likely is that there will be an increasing deterioration in the overall conditions in most African states. This process is bound to involve sudden convulsive changes which will be increasingly violent.

In reality everything goes to suggest that for the overwhelming majority of African states, taking into account an average population growth rate of nearly 2.5 per cent, the major consequences of the world crises, the political shortcomings of government and the low productivity of the working population, Africa will, with a few exceptions (if any), oscillate between stagnation and decline.

The raw materials of Africa are vitally important for the economies of industrial countries, especially in Europe. Access to and control of these deposits are one of the decisive reasons for the western presence in Africa. Besides the military and strategic considerations, control of raw materials in Africa vital to the West is a subject of concern at the present time and will continue to be so in the coming decade. Such is the stake in Africa ; a stake for Powers external to the continent. But it would be wrong to look at the strategic and military importance of Africa separately from the raw material importance. The mineral stake is inseparable from the geo-political stake in Africa.¹³

This explanation of the African situation puts into proper focus African powerlessness, its political and economic vulnerability as well as the opportunism of elite leadership. It is in this context that the rest of this paper can be properly understood.

NATURE AND TYPES OF INTERVENTION

It is not terribly difficult to imagine all sorts of conditions that could bring foreign intervention in African affairs, especially if past and present trends are projected into the future.¹⁴

Given the susceptibility of Africanists, African writers and African leaders to African nationalist sentiments, it is relatively easy to fall into the trap of viewing all foreign intrusions into Africa as being against African interest. But this is not always the case. For example, the case of

Cuban military intervention in Angola since 1975 suggests that it is possible for some foreign intervention to be in support of largely African interests even if there is no unanimity of opinion about the desirability of such intervention or its scope and comprehensiveness. Since 1975, Africa has become a part of the global strategy of the Great Powers. The two Soviet initiatives in Angola and Ethiopia, with the use of Cuban troops, marks the end of a period : the period when Africa was a Western preserve.

What is clear is that every act of foreign intervention is often based on (i) the diplomatic and national interest calculations of the intervening foreign power(s), (ii) the configuration of foreign interests and strategic balances represented within the particular African region or country, (iii) the configuration of elite power-groups in the African country and the dynamics of their economic, political and ideological confrontations. These provide the context for foreign powers and groups to take sides in what may be largely domestic disputes.¹⁵

For example, France has been directly involved in military operations in Chad and Western Sahara, and in the removal of Bokassa. In Angola, the USSR, with Cuban participation, gave assistance to a legal government whose very existence was threatened by South African troops. The Western Powers were involved in *coups* in Benin and the Comoros.¹⁶

On the whole, it is on the balance of the efforts of intervention and not the simple fact of it that one must judge the merits of the act of intervention. And whatever may be the case, although the issue is not vital for the United States or the USSR, Africa has indeed become one of the areas of conflict and contention, probably permanently.

In this connection, as explained by Chaliand,¹⁷ the Soviet Union's overall strategy is designed to extend its influence by reducing that of the West and limiting as far as it is possible, the growth of China's. Helped by the fact that it stands side by side with the liberation struggles, the Soviet Union raises its prestige among those seeking change, and strengthens its influence by showing that its aid is effective both militarily and politically. On the contrary, the Western, particularly American, strategy has been that of imperialism and subversion. The USA has a long, documented and consistent history of military subversion in Africa. According to Professor Kumar, CIA operations in Africa have included among others : (i) the overthrow of the Government of the Congo in 1961 ; (ii) the assassination of Lumumba in 1961 ; (iii) the invasion of Congo by South African, Rhodesian, West German and anti-Castro Cuban mercenaries, organised by the CIA ; (iv) the overthrow of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah's Government in Ghana and the installation of a military regime in 1966 ; (v) organising the mercenaries in 1967-69 to aid the secessionists of Biafra in their effort to split the Nigerian Federal Republic ; (vi) the aid given in 1968 for the

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Government of Modibo Keita of Mali ; (vii) the support given for the assassination of Amilcar Cabral, the leader of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands ; and (viii) the large-scale support given to the FNLA and the UNITA in Angola in 1975 against the MPLA which finally emerged victorious and formed the government in the aftermath of the civil war.¹⁸ This list is endless. France also employs the same strategy as the United States in the subversion of African states.¹⁹

There is the tendency to perceive as intervention only those direct and indirect, overt and covert acts of subversion that foreign powers undertake in their dealings with Africa. There is no denying the seriousness of such clandestine or direct military interventions or their tendency to prop up bad, dictatorial, corrupt and tyrannical regimes in Africa. But these should not be viewed as the only types of intervention.

There are some other interstate interactions that may have the effects of causing internal changes that would otherwise not occur were the country in question left entirely to its own internal processes in the determination of event-outcomes. One of such is the structure and configuration of foreign penetration of domestic structures, institutions and patterns of exchange with resulting value judgement placed on either the positive or negative consequences on the African societies involved. The economic penetration of the African economy with the consequences fall into this category.²⁰

One can justifiably say that a new kind of imperialism, more subtle than the crude version of the neo-colonialist thesis, is now apparent in the nexus of the unequal international exchanges which Africa is facing today. This newer form of imperialism has been termed intervention by remote control. The use of Cuban troops, apparently by the USSR, in Africa falls into this category. We need to quickly note that Cuba's African expeditions go beyond this framework and must be placed in the context of a political will to play a role in the global relations of force. In fact, contrary to what it may seem, Cuba has become less dependent on the Soviet Union since it has had troops in Africa. For it is henceforth difficult for the Soviet Union to do without the Cuban striking force in Africa ; nor will it be easy for it to abandon its Cuban ally, even if some differences of view do appear.²¹

Another form of intervention by remote control is in the technological sphere. Technological innovations and their rates of development, adaptation and application to new production, distribution and storage systems constitute the indubitable hinges of external control and determination of internal domestic outcomes in Africa. It is the very pervasiveness of these patterns and processes that complicate the evolution of authentic or genuinely indigenous and autonomous development in Africa.²²

One should hasten to add that not all things change so rapidly. Foreign intervention (and imperialism) is one of such things. Another is neo-colonial dependency. There is also lack of Africa's unity. One could also talk of the eternal problem of absolute powerlessness in terms of self-determination at home especially in South Africa, the Horn of Africa and the Western Sahara, and in terms of competitive international exchanges, linkages and influence. In fact, it is this state of absolute powerlessness that provides the environment for disunity, incapacitation of self-determination and the exercise of arrogance by foreign powers in their competition over what the choices must be in the African geo-political nexus.²³ This was the background for understanding the avalanche of concern in Western Europe and North America for the Cuban and Soviet presence in Africa.

Why Foreign Intervention in African Politics ?

Foreign intervention is Africa's chief legacy of its encounter with Europe which took place for over 500 years. All forms of intervention have taken place, the latest being overt and covert military intervention. This new cooperative-competitive imperialism involves African leaders directly as participating agents of choice.

The conflicts in Africa, south of the Sahara, have one peculiar trait compared to other regions of the third world : this is that battles are still fought there through the agency of foreign expeditionary corps. Decisions are imposed from outside, and that again shows the weakness of Africa. These conflicts, for which an explanation is sometimes sought in narrow ideological terms, obviously cannot be understood in this frame-work alone. The Soviet Union dropped Somalia with a cynicism that was more obvious than usual and in a manner that could not be explained in strict ideological frame work. Inspite of French humanitarian declarations claiming that it was only interested in saving the lives of European technical assistants, only the most naive would be unaware of the economic interest at stake.²⁴

Algerian support for the POLISARIO Front is not due to an exaggerated respect for the right of peoples to self-determination. How can Israeli support upto 1977 for the Ethiopian regime, which claimed to be Marxist/ Leninist, be explained other than in terms of Israeli interest in not seeing the Red Sea become an Arab lake ? Mao Tse-Tung's China (an acclaimed-communist state) supported the FNLA and UNITA, supported by the United States and Zaire, because these two movements opposed the MPLA supported by the USSR. It is thus indisputable that state interest determines policies.²⁵

But it is still true that ideologies play their role and have their function. It is no accident that the national liberation movements have, almost always and even more certainly if they are radical ones, found themselves

confronted by Western imperialism. The west has always been suspicious of revolutionary movements even when their objectives were no more than nationalist.

Thus foreign intervention especially Super Power intervention in Africa focuses on six interrelated geo-political considerations.²⁶ The six considerations are (i) the continuation of the pressure and armed struggle for complete decolonisation in Southern Africa especially in Namibia and racist South Africa ; (ii) the turbulent crises and confrontations in the Horn of Africa; (iii) the involvement of the North African Arab States in the Middle East crises ; (iv) the American-Soviet geo-political confrontations in Africa and the Indian Ocean (this is linked with economic prospects in Africa); (v) the burgeoning militant anti-capitalist pro-socialist ideological stance of increasing number of African States which threatens the historical hegemonic domination of Western capitalist countries in Africa ; and (vi) the never-ending intra-state and inter-state military, ethnic, religious, *irredentist*, boundary and hegemonic conflicts in Africa which do bring increasing "invitation" to various foreign countries to intervene.

The first four consideration are linked directly with Super Power competition and hence involve competitive imperialism. The last two considerations are closely linked with internal upheavals and potentially disruptive confrontations which are endemic to African political, social and economic structures.

These days, there is hardly any foreign power that intervenes in Africa without some "invitation" to do so by some African Heads of State or some nationalist group. If the old competitive imperialism was blatant in its complete disregard for African interests and desires, the new imperialism is bound up with paradoxical duplicity on the part of African leaders. This is why the new imperialism cannot be fought with the old rhetoric of pan-Africanism. The present intervention in Africa produces a paradox ; it is the African leaders and nationalists who condemn foreign intervention in the continent that 'invite' their allies to act on their behalf. The political and geo-strategic context of the new imperialism therefore makes for chronic division, jealousy and rivalry among African states themselves. It covers the entire ideological spectrum from the extreme right to extreme left, thereby exposing black Africa's political and economic vulnerability, opportunism of elite leadership and the structural powerlessness of the OAU.

The likelihood of civil disturbances arising from this kind of situation within African states is thus a powerful additional reason for military expenditure.²⁷ In a way, the new wave of foreign intervention in Africa reflects the growing battle for and against the preservation of existing world order. The battle involves a confrontation between the rich and poor nations, capitalist and socialist states of the world and between racist and non-racist countries in Africa.

Unfortunately, there does not seem to be any way of resolving these problems without implicating extra African interests. The case becomes more hopeless with the strategic and vital position of South Africa with its abundant mineral resources. South Africa's geo-strategic position takes into account the whole of Southern Africa.

South Africa's great advantage remains of course its economic strength, and in particular its mineral wealth. South Africa's mineral wealth (excluding oil) places it third in the world after the United States and USSR. It extracts 40 per cent of all Africa's minerals excluding hydrocarbons, and its GNP represents a quarter of the whole of Africa's.

TABLE I

*South Africa's Position in World Mineral Production
(as a Percentage of Western and World Production)*

Mineral Product	West		World	
	Rank	Percentage of Production	Rank	Percentage of Production
Platinum group metals	1	85	1	47
Gold (metal content)	1	75	1	59
Vanadium (metal content)	1	56	1	47
Chrome Ore	1	41	2	27
Manganese Ore	1	39	2	22
Kyanite and related minerals	1	35	1	30
Vermiculite (crude)	2	44	—	—
Antimony	2	25	3	16
Diamonds (gem and industrial)	2*	22	3*	17
Asbestos (fibre)	2	14	3	8
Uranium	3	14	—	—
Fluorspar	3	9	6	6
Phosphate rock	5	2	7	2
Coal (anthracite and bituminous)	6	4	8	2
Nickel (metal content)	7	4	9	3
Copper (metal content)	9	3	11	3
Iron Ore	10	3	12	2
Tin (metal content)	10	2	12	1
Silver (metal, primary)	13	1	16	1
Zinc (metal content)	14	3	20	1

* South Africa is the largest producer of gem diamonds.

Source : Gerard Chaliand : *The Struggle For Africa (Conflict of the Great Powers)*, London, The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1982, p. 84.

No country on the continent can threaten South Africa. South Africa is far and away the richest part not only of sub-Saharan Africa but of the whole continent. There can be no doubt that, in the hierarchy of conflicts, those convulsing Southern Africa are easily at the top of the list. In the final analysis, South Africa's greatest strength lies in the weakness of its opponents. With vast resources, an industrial economy, a modern agriculture, a powerful army and a nuclear capacity, and controlling the strategic Cape route, South Africa would seem to be secure for the coming decade and perhaps beyond.²⁸ Western Powers would consequently be interested in

the events and their outcomes in this part of the continent. They are, and they will continue to protect their selfish interest and their 'pet baby'—apartheid.

It is in the light of this international cooperative competitive imperialism that African powerlessness and disunity must be viewed. Majority of the French-speaking African States are aligned to the West, with France as their moral and diplomatic leader. The 'radical' states have socialist ideological orientations and inclination that push them toward the East while the 'moderates' are in the middle of the continuum. As the OAU Foreign Ministers and Heads of State Conference (of Sudan in 1978) indicated, the debate over foreign intervention²⁹ has exposed OAU's structural vulnerability, African disunity and the paradoxical use of African states as agents of competitive foreign penetration of the continent.

From the foregone discussions and analysis we wish to conclude the present enquiry with a view to determining whether foreign intervention is inevitable in the African continent.

IS FOREIGN INTERVENTION INEVITABLE IN AFRICA ?

We wish to state from the outset that the prevention of the six different problems identified earlier will put an end to foreign intervention in African politics. But since all indications are that these problems will not disappear soon in Africa, the continent seems destined to experience a disconcerting continuation of more foreign intervention in the future. Given its weakness, sub-Saharan Africa is and will continue to be the place where foreign troops will be sought, from both sides of the ideological divide.

As African leaders and governments face increasing challenges to their power and positions from rivals, both rulers and rivals are likely to escalate their "invitation" to foreign powers to assist them in achieving their objectives.

But no matter how the competition for power and control shapes up in circumstances like these, the East-West ideological confrontations would get imported into African politics. Sometimes, it may even be convenient for rivals to deliberately adopt the ideological preferences of their would-be-supporters even when the leaders themselves may have no particular ideological convictions beyond the desire to capture power or retain control of power already gained.

Also, in as much as there is colonialism in some parts of Africa, and there are determined efforts to fight it out, foreign intervention will continue. As Nyerere graphically put it, "no citizen of Africa can live in the comfort of his own self-respect while other African citizens are suffering discrimination and humiliation for being born what they are."³⁰ He rightly concluded that "colonialism must be wiped out in Africa before any post-colonial independent state can feel secure."³¹

As of now, the drive for African freedom and self-determination remains perilously in the hands of external forces that supply the commitment to die, if possible, in order for Africans to assert their human rights. This cannot continue for ever, just as African and Soviet-Cuban national interests cannot remain in convergence for all time. In the end, Africa must justify its right to freedom and independence through its own children's commitment to blood and tears, and if necessary, to the efficacy of death, in order that racial enslavement be finally terminated. This is the escapable reality for the African future.

Most unfortunately, this reality may be hard to come by for obvious selfish reasons of some Africans. In a situation where the Europe America Meeting (Paris, 1978) agreed to sponsor an African Force that could go anywhere to "deter" aggression in Africa,³² where African leaders are willing participants in the exploitation of Africa because of their power ambitions to engage in fundamental betrayal of their countries in the name of personal gains and fortunes ; where the OAU Heads of State endorsed the sovereign right of each African state to invite any foreign power to help it whenever the need arises, where then is the ability to keep out foreign intervention and the road to peace in Africa ?

The West with its political, economic, cultural, technological and educational influences and overwhelming control on Africa needs no external proxies to maintain the status quo or to carry out occasional military interventions. Much of the leadership of African bureaucracies, military, business and intellectual elites can easily be bought cheaply to accomplish that purpose. The current economic travails in the continent can be a catalyst to foreign "invitation." In a situation where population growth in Africa is higher than anywhere else in the world coupled with decline in food production ; where food crisis has led to an overthrow of a government ; where economic malaise has contributed to mounting political instability ; where global recession had accelerated the process of economic decay in the continent and where the drought menace is on the increase ; it is certain that African states will be ready to accept aid no matter the implications and the ideological differences if only to remain in power at all cost. The example in Sudan where the long overdue repressive and dictatorial Nimeiry Government was overthrown over food is going to be a pointer for his ilks to clinch to power using all available dirty and oppressive means.

When a number of African Heads of State were named as CIA paid agents ; when the military clique in a progressive African state could be paid 1-5 million dollars to overthrow the government of their country, when Morocco, Senegal, Ivory Coast and Gabon could be persuaded to supply "Africa" troops to act on behalf of Western interests in Western Sahara or Shaba province in Zaire ; when a Biafra could take military aid from *apartheid* South Africa ; and Roberto and Savimbi of Angola could

do the same to wage war against their own people ; then it must be obvious to all who care to explore the dynamics of dependency and Western competitive imperialism in Africa that the West is certainly not in need of external proxies to advance its penetration objectives on the continent. What it needs only is to supply abundant covert financial support and covert military aid. One could also add that in as much as there are ethnicity, corruption, political intolerance, ideological differences, irredentist claims, economic and technological dependency, drought, food shortage and all other such problems in Africa as well as people who want foreign aid in the form of external "invitation", Africa may not look forward (at least in the near future) to a prevention of foreign intervention. Even if the Great Powers keep aloof, selfish Africans will always invite them. It will be an illusion therefore to think that peace is forthcoming in Africa in the near future.

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AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND INDIA : COMMERCIAL AND TECHNICAL UNDERCURRENTS 1938-1946

By R.C. JAUHRI & HARINDER SEKHON*

WHILE the interest and half-hearted behind-the-scene role of the United States Government to help India's cause for independence from the British during the Second World War has attracted widespread scholarly attention in both the countries,¹ the commercial and technical aspects of their relationship during the war years have escaped the attention of scholars. The interest of the senior author was aroused during his last visit to the United States National Archives at Washington D.C. in 1981 where he came across an unpublished secret memorandum entitled "Curbs on United States Trade by Government of India" dated 20 June 1945 in the old files of the Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, R. & A. No. 3249.² The paper is an attempt to highlight some aspects of the economic and commercial-technical facets of American diplomacy towards India.

Historical ties between India and the United States date back to the year 1492 when Christopher Columbus stumbled upon America on his intended voyage to India. However, officially "India's relations with the United States and vice versa started when General George Washington commissioned a Consul to Calcutta."³ American consuls played an important role in developing and strengthening commercial links between India and the United States.

It is well-known that commercial interests have strongly influenced the evolution of American foreign policy. The consular relationship with India was no exception. Indo-American trade relations commenced in the last quarter of the eighteenth century as the newly independent nation wanted to tap new and more profitable markets, having been cut off from its traditional trading ports in the West Indies. In a short span of time, trade between these two countries was established upon "a broad and profitable basis."⁴

Direct Indo-US trade began in 1785 and the pioneer in Indian trade was the Salem merchant, Elias Hasket Derby's vessel *Grand Turk*. Indo-US trade received a tremendous boost with the signing of the Jay Treaty in November 1794. By this Treaty, the United States obtained the most-favoured-nation status in Indian trade from Great Britain. As a result of the signing of the Jay Treaty, thirty-one Salem ships cleared for ports in

*Dr. Jauhri and Ms. Sekhon are in the Department of History, Punjab University, Chandigarh.

India during 1795-1796, whereas earlier only fourteen ships carrying cargo sailed for Bombay and Calcutta between 1790 and 1794.⁵

The outbreak of war in Europe in 1812 proved harmful to the American commercial interests and led to the closure of all American consulates in the Far East except the one at Canton. But with the end of hostilities in 1815, trade revived quickly and commerce with India continued to flourish at least till 1860 when the outbreak of the American Civil War once again caused a temporary setback. US exports to India increased from \$ 449,594 in 1849 to \$ 767,629 in 1856. During the same period, US imports from India rose from \$ 2,036,254 to \$ 7,005,917.⁶

The period following the end of the American Civil War witnessed rapid industrialization and the United States of America soon emerged as a serious rival to Great Britain in world trade monopoly.⁷ However, upto the end of the century, the British industrialists, with the backing of the East India Company, successfully and effectively kept the Americans out of the Indian market. This was especially true in the sphere of cotton trade.⁸ In the early years of the twentieth century, "Anglo-American competition in world trade became acute....In spite of British resistance....the United States was able to increase its share in India's imports from 1.7 per cent to 3.8 per cent between 1900 to 1911, and to 7 per cent by 1919."⁹

The First World War gave a great impetus to Indo-American trade and the US emerged as the second largest trader with India. Americans invested heavily in the jute and aluminium industries in India. Ford, General Motors, Firestone and the National Carbon Company opened branches in India in the late 1920s.¹⁰

Great Britain took a serious view of the stiff American competition in India and tried to halt its commercial expansion with the aid of the British Imperial Preference Agreement. According to this agreement, the signatory countries¹¹ agreed to deposit all their non-sterling currency, including dollars, with London thereby reducing the dollar reserves of member states. At this juncture, the outbreak of the Second World War proved a great boon for American shipping. England was unable to maintain its normal trade relations and started relying very heavily on the American merchant marine. Moreover, growing American consciousness about the strategic position of India in the impending Second World War led to a change. Attempts began to be made to overcome hurdles and establish direct and closer commercial, consular and diplomatic ties between the two countries.

Towards the middle of 1938, USA started making serious endeavours to negotiate a treaty of commerce and navigation with India. The aims of the proposed treaty were to accord the "businessmen and merchants of either one (each) country permission to enter, travel in, and reside in the country of other with the purpose of promoting trade between the two."¹² Prior to this, Indian businessmen and merchants could enter the United

States only under section 3(2) of the Immigration Act of 1924, whereby they were classified as "aliens visiting the United States temporarily as tourists or temporarily for business or pleasure."¹³ Indians could not reside in the United States for more than one year and the Government of India naturally sought to remove this disability. Feelers were sent to the American Government and the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull reciprocated by declaring in a letter dated 12 May 1938: "the United States Government is prepared to meet the wishes of the Indian Government...through the conclusion of a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation which would provide *inter alia* for appropriate guarantees to American businessmen in India and for the admission of Indian businessmen into the United States...."¹⁴

The Secretary of State took a keen interest in the matter and was convinced that a "modern and comprehensive" treaty of commerce and navigation would be beneficial to the two countries. Therefore, a draft of a "treaty of establishment of commerce, navigation and consular rights between the United States of America and India,"¹⁵ was prepared and sent to the British Government for approval through its Ambassador in Washington.¹⁶ Among other things, the Treaty sought to grant "on a most-favoured-nation basis, right to travel and to engage in professional, commercial and other work,"¹⁷ to the citizens of both nations. The outbreak of the war disrupted the negotiations which were revived next year.

On 10 April 1940, R. Walton Moore, writing on behalf of the Secretary of State to the British Ambassador, Lothian, submitted a revised and enlarged draft¹⁸ for approval by Great Britain "in order to facilitate the conduct of problems of mutual interest."¹⁹ Moore also wrote about the need for including an article relating to the "acquisition of land and buildings for governmental purposes which customarily appears in treaties of friendship, commerce and consular rights and consular conventions of the United States"²⁰

India was also equally interested in signing an agreement with the United States. Sir Feroz Khan Noon, High Commissioner of the Government of India in London, visited the United States in March-April 1941 and called at the Division of Near Eastern Affairs to discuss matters relating to the draft of the proposed "Treaty of Establishment, Commerce, Navigation, and Consular Rights Between The United States of America and India." Sir Feroz Khan desired that this treaty be concluded as soon as possible so that Indian nationals visiting the US for business purposes could be granted "treaty/merchant status under section 3(6) of the Immigration Act of 1924."²¹ He also suggested that any controversial or irksome issue could be shelved for the time being and satisfactorily adjusted at a later date.

The early conclusion of such a treaty was desirable and essential as Sir Feroz Khan felt it would result in an increase in the sale of American products in the Indian market, among other things by facilitating business contacts between individuals and companies in the United States and

India. Unfortunately, once again the matter was shelved in early 1942 as "the British indicated that they preferred that discussions on the treaty be suspended until after the war. . . ."²²

Nevertheless, the Department of State contemplated "assigning to New Delhi Frank S. Williams, Foreign Service Officer of Class III with a view to his performing functions usually undertaken by a Commercial Attaché."²³ It was also proposed that he was to be placed under the *Chef de Mission* for coordinating the work of the various American civilian agencies in India with the designation 'Counsellor of Mission for Economic Affairs', provided the Government of India approved.

In April 1943, Clayton Lane, the Consul at Calcutta, was assigned to New Delhi to coordinate, under the supervision of the Mission, the work of the various American civilian agencies then operating in India. The State Department wanted Lane to be designated 'Commercial Attaché', but this idea was dropped as it might have created unfortunate impressions and speculations about American economic penetration. Lane was therefore to be known as 'Secretary' with the additional title of 'Director of War Economic Operations'.

After Pearl Harbour, the United States also made attempts to industrialize India rapidly by providing economic assistance and technical know-how. "If by technical assistance and supplies of machine tools and parts, the Indian Army was increased, America would effect a considerable economy and build defensive and offensive striking power in the Far East,"²⁴ a region where it was vitally necessary. Prolonged deliberations were held and arrangements worked out for the despatch of a technical mission to India. "In March 1942, the President appointed Henry F. Grady, Former Assistant Secretary of State to lead an economic mission to India to study the sub-continent's needs."²⁵ Henry F. Grady was specifically asked to report on "the possibilities of American assistance in developing the industrial resources of the country for the war effort"²⁶ as the Americans felt that "any considerable increase of India's war effort is dependent in considerable degree upon the United States."²⁷

The Technical Mission proceeded to India at the invitation of the Government of India and under the auspices of the Department of State. The function of the Mission was to make on-the-spot investigations and recommend measures by which the US could assist in augmenting India's war potentialities. The work of the Mission was "directly related to the common war effort of the United Nations" and in no way had anything to do with post-war industrial and commercial questions.²⁸ This statement set at rest all rumours that "American imperialism was endeavouring to replace British imperialism in India."²⁹

The Technical Mission arrived in India in April 1942 and spent about five weeks in the country—travelling, investigating and conferring with Indian businessmen and interested government departments including

those of Supply, Commerce, Communications and Defence in Delhi, Calcutta and Bombay. It received full cooperation from the Indian Government and Indian industrialists during its visits to Calcutta, Jamshedpur, Bombay and Delhi.

The final report of the American Technical Mission was submitted by its Chairman, Dr. Grady, to the governments of India and the United States. Though the complete report of the Mission was not published due to the confidential information it contained, a press release was handed out on 11 September 1942 by the State Department, listing some of the important recommendations contained therein. The Report was said to contain much factual data concerning the production of essential war materials in India and the Mission's suggestions for the expansion of such production.

The Governments of both India and the United States were greatly impressed with "the comprehensive character of the Mission's Report" and found its advice "both constructive and timely."³⁰ Vigorous steps were taken by the Indian Government to implement the Report with assistance in equipment and material from the United States and Great Britain.

Meanwhile, "war reduced the capacity of England to supply many of the commodities required by India." On the other hand, "the industrial productivity of the United States and her capacity to absorb a large quantity of imports were attractive to India."³¹ It was thus natural for India to turn to the United States for the expansion of its trade. Till 1937 the United States was engaged in carrying on a highly lucrative and profitable trade with Japan. But once Japan embarked upon its open conquest of China, "the American public became actively antagonistic towards Japan and American policy became increasingly firm;"³² the US enthusiastically responded to the overtures made by the Government of India.

While there was considerable extension of India's trade with the US as well as general Indo-American connections during the war, there was a simultaneous development of wartime controls which tended to keep the interchange largely in official channels and gave evidence of continuous restrictions in Indo-American exchange in the post-war world under Britain's programme of extensive and expert political management which was devoted to summoning the utmost from the Commonwealth and Empire, while conserving Britain's position of pre-eminence and control.³³ But President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to change this. He had always been a very vocal advocate of free trade and the breaking down of international trade barriers. Especially since 1933 the United States Government had "taken the lead in the promotion of trade agreements between the nations of the world,"³⁴ as the trade agreement policy was regarded as an essential part of the general American programme for economic recovery within the country following the crash of 1929.

The United States wanted to make reciprocity in international trade the cornerstone of its economic policy; it got its chance when America

became a full belligerent in the Second World War. Reciprocity then became an underlying condition of all lend-lease agreements that were signed between the United States and the various co-belligerents "for the elimination of all forms of discrimination in international commerce, and for the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers. . . ."³⁵ Under lend-lease the recipients of aid now agreed to pay the United States on the principles of the New Reciprocity and not in cash or kind. Lend-Lease Settlements also led to an increase in the number of nations with which the United States had negotiated reciprocal trade agreements from twenty-three in 1942 to forty-one by 1 December 1949.

Lend-Lease was devised by the United States to keep the "British Isles afloat" and to create an "adequate arsenal of democracy" to effectively combat the Nazis in their aim of world domination. It became the prime mechanism through which the United Nations pooled all their resources and expanded the productive capacity of the United States for the building of guns, tanks, planes and ships to effectively challenge the Axis Powers. India, with its real and potential wealth reserves became crucial to the Allies during the Second World War³⁶ and Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, William L. Clayton wrote, "Having done business in India for many years, having visited the country and knowing a little something about it, I certainly agree... there are enormous possibilities there for American capital and brains."³⁷

India emerged as a supplier of raw materials for the highly industrialized United States of America and had great potential as a major provider of "coal and petroleum, iron ore, manganese ore, chrome ore, gold, bauxite, salt, magnesite, mica, gypsum, various gemstones, monazite and certain refractory materials."³⁸ India's vast reserves of high grade coal were exceeded only by those of China, USSR, Poland, Germany, England, Canada, and the USA. All this coupled with the possession of several ferroalloys, which were necessary for the manufacture of good quality steel, made India indispensable.³⁹

In 1938 the Government of India set up an Office of Trade Commissioner in New York to motivate and enhance Indian exports to the United States. Being advocates of the "New Reciprocity" in world trade, the US felt it would be in the interest of both nations to "assist one another in their mutual problem of finding new outlets for products formerly sold to warring nations of Europe."⁴⁰

During the Second World War Indo-American trade expanded enormously and by 1944-45 even outstripped Anglo-Indian trade in volume. In 1938 India's exports to USA were valued at \$ 58,374,000 and its imports at \$ 33,441,000 leaving it a credit balance of 24,933,000. By 1944, however, the exports from India rose to \$ 144,898,000 and its total imports were 777,253,000 (20 times the pre-war figure), leading British businessmen to express concern over this expansion. All but \$ 50,383,000 worth of these

Indian imports were handled through lend-lease channels, although \$ 369,279,000 (ten times the pre war period), represented the value of non-military imports for the US. This war-time expansion of trade with India meant a rise from a little more than 1 per cent to 5.5 per cent of total US exports (though exports for cash had risen only to 1.7 per cent) and a rise from 3 per cent to 4 per cent of total US imports. For India it meant a rise from between 6 and 7 per cent to approximately 17 per cent of total Indian imports and from 8.5 per cent to 18 per cent of total Indian exports.⁴¹

According to the Lend-Lease Agreement signed by Great Britain in February 1942, "Great quantities of war materials were shipped to India by the United States for the use of the British and Indian military forces and also for bolstering the civilian economy."⁴² The Government of India extended reciprocal aid to America by liberally supplying large amounts of stores to American forces in India and by shipping raw materials to the United States needed for war production in that country.

"The biggest item in the Lend-Lease exports to India was munitions valued at \$ 1,288,498,000. The remainder was accounted for by petroleum products, \$ 161,721,000; industrial materials and products \$ 494,673,000; and agricultural products, \$ 183,911,000."⁴³

Most of the material lend-leased to India was for the use of British troops stationed here and of no direct value to India as such. By a special lend-lease agreement of June 1944, the United States agreed to supply India 226 million ounces of silver, ostensibly "to maintain an adequate supply of coinage for the large numbers of United Nations forces there and for India's expanded war production, and to help keep prices stable in this important United Nations supply base and war theatre."⁴⁴ After the end of the war the Government of India was to return this silver back to the United States on an ounce-for-ounce basis.⁴⁵

Lend-Lease was said to have become a major source of leverage for America. Great Britain had signed the Agreement out of necessity, and due to its utter dependence on American support the United States managed to gain a certain amount of control over the Indian economy. As a result, the United States benefited greatly from reverse lend-lease aid supplied by India. By way of reverse lend-lease America received "aviation gasoline, motor gasoline and lubricating oil and lesser amounts of other petroleum products from the Indian Government for use by American forces."⁴⁶ In addition, the United States' Army personnel were given "postal, telegraph, and telephone facilities, water and electric power, furnishing for buildings, and items of clothing including mosquito and gas proof outfits."⁴⁷ India also provided large quantities of rubber, tea, mica, manganese and other raw materials.

In May 1945, the US State Department decided to cut drastically lend-lease aid to England. With the defeat of Japan, the evacuation of the US

Army from India began. A "final settlement with India for lend-lease, reciprocal aid and surplus war property located in India, and for financial claims of each government against the other arising as a result of World War II,"⁴⁸ was therefore signed in May 1946.

It was agreed by India and the United States that since equal benefits had accrued to both nations from this "interchange of mutual aid, which aggregated over a billion dollars in value,"⁴⁹ no payment would be made by either government for lend-lease and reciprocal aid items provided to one another. "All obligations arising out of lend-lease were balanced against each other and cancelled."⁵⁰ The settlement, however, did not alter the obligation of the Indian Government to return to the United States the 226 million ounces of silver transferred under lend-lease. India owed the United States \$ 178.4 million as on 31 March 1949 as a result of the settlement.⁵¹

The Indo-US Settlement of May 1946 was significant as it was the first formal agreement to be signed between these two countries. It was hoped that its harmonious conclusion, despite initial complications, would be an auspicious beginning for further friendly relations between India and the United States. Both the contracting parties wanted this agreement to act as "a prelude to increasing cooperative and cordial peacetime relations between the United States and India."⁵² America, thus looked forward to mutually advantageous economic relations with a stable, peaceful and friendly India. The Department of State wanted to impress upon the Government of India the desirability of concluding a mutually beneficial Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the United States once India attained independence. With this in mind, in January 1947, Samuel H. Day was appointed Counsellor for Economic Affairs at the American Embassy in New Delhi to strengthen America's official economic representation in India.

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The stumbling block so far had been the "commercial safeguards" sections of the Government of India Act of 1935 under which India was governed till 15 August, 1947. These "commercial safeguards" guaranteed extensive privileges to British commercial and professional interests in India and India could not therefore grant "most-favoured-nation" treatment to the United States, or to any other foreign country. The United States desired that it be accorded "most-favoured-nation" status in any treaty that was signed with India.

AFRICA AND NON-ALIGNMENT

By K. MATHEWS*

THE 8th Summit Conference of the Non-aligned Countries held in Harare, Zimbabwe, in September 1986, which brought together heads of states and other political leaders from over a hundred countries of the Third World, of which more than half are African, should go down in history as having signified Africa's qualitative as well as quantitative dominance of the movement.¹ However, the special role of Africa in the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) is not limited to the Harare Conference. An attempt is made in this paper to analyse the nature and dialectics of Africa's role and specificity in the movement.

HISTORIC SETTING

Historically, both independent Africa and NAM came into existence in the early 1960s when the East-West rivalry was at its worst in international politics. As one African country after another became independent, a duty envisaged for each of them was that of helping to moderate the tense relations among the Great Powers. Moreover, the "wind of change" which swept across Africa in the early 1960s brought about tremendous consequences for colonialism. The newly independent African countries soon discovered that their liberation from Western colonial yoke did not mean that they wanted to become anybody's satellites. Thus the rejection of bloc politics and the genuine desire to create a new society made the newly independent African countries move in the direction of non-alignment.²

Since NAM was started as an anti-colonial coalition, and at the same time Africa being the biggest colonial nest, the testing of this movement's principles was therefore much more promising on the African Continent. For centuries Africa has suffered from the worst of colonialism—slavery and racism. If one carefully examines the general characteristics of non-alignment as understood by its proponents, one sees it as an active policy designed to exploit the cold war for those who accept it as their foreign policy. Thus Kwame Nkrumah, one of the leading African advocates of non-alignment, could declare in 1961 that "we have strictly adhered to our policy of positive neutralism and non-alignment and whatever we have done, we have always placed Africa first."³

* Dr. Mathews is Senior Lecturer in Political Science and International Relations, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria.

According to the proponents of non-alignment, the benefits which this movement presumably brings, range over a wide area. It has been justified as :

- (a) ensuring freedom and independence ;
- (b) keeping small Powers out of larger conflicts of no concern to them ;
- (c) a means of avoiding alliances which make local problems more difficult to solve ;
- (d) a means of preventing the diversion of scarce resources to military obligations ; and
- (e) as a means of obtaining aid from both sides.⁴

It was no wonder that during the growth of African nationalism and from the beginning of their existence as independent states, African countries saw non-alignment as the logical ideology capable of directing the continent in the international arena in an endeavour to secure a favourable atmosphere for the realization of their nationalist goals.

It may be pointed out here that African nationalism and pan-Africanism, whose efforts culminated in the establishment of the OAU in 1963, had a non-aligned component. For example, the fifth Pan-African Congress held in Manchester, England, in 1945, in their "Declaration to the Colonial Peoples" affirmed the right of all colonial peoples to control their own destiny.⁵ They categorically declared that "all colonies must be free from foreign imperialist control, whether political or economic." This declaration further called on the colonized people all over the world to fight with all the means at their disposal to achieve their freedom.⁶ Naturally therefore, it was not surprising that when the Non-aligned Movement started, it considered Africa to be its topmost priority. The well-known Bandung Conference in 1955 (18-25 April) attended by 24 Asian and African countries⁷ had provided a significant forum for meaningful discussion of Africa's primary concerns such as decolonization, racialism, self-determination, economic, cultural, social cooperation and development. The Bandung Conference declared that "colonialism in all its manifestations" is an evil because it constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights and contradicts the aims and objectives of the UN Chapter. Operating within a world dominated by the two Super Powers, the Bandung Conference sought to highlight the issue of political independence, the elimination of the last vestiges of European colonialism, the development of national economies and the establishment of liberation movements.⁸

Thus it was at Bandung that the Afro-Asian countries started the anti-colonial Third World movement, now popularly known as non-alignment. For Africa, the Bandung Conference was both historic and significant in

the sense that it had created all the necessary conditions for speeding up the independence struggle. Undoubtedly, Bandung gave the necessary leadership and guidance to the growing awareness of Africa's role in world politics. Then it was left to the newly independent African countries to decide how to play their part in the international arena. Soon after Bandung launched non-alignment, Ghana, the first black African country to achieve independence in 1957, paved the African path adopting non-alignment as its foreign policy strategy. Kwame Nkrumah, one of the founding fathers of NAM, took the initiative.

In 1958 (April 15-22) Nkrumah organized the first Conference of Independent African States (CIAS) in Accra, which brought together all the eight then independent African countries (except South Africa) i.e. Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia. They had hopes of realizing their positions in international politics. They discovered that they needed a collective foreign policy strategy so that they would be able to play a vital role in international relations. They also realized that a correct foreign policy for Africa would help the continent to become much more effective in world affairs. Conscious of the implications of the bi-polar global system and the antagonistic bloc (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) politics the African countries attending the Accra Conference decided in favour of non-alignment and adherence to the principles of friendly relations enumerated at the Bandung Conference.⁹ The Accra Conference affirmed its conviction that all participating governments should avoid being committed to any action which might entangle them to the detriment of their interests and freedom.

At the first Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference held in Cairo, Egypt, from 26 December 1957 to 1 January 1958, President Nasser, another pioneer leader of African non-alignment, declared :

We the Egyptians...believe that by adopting this attitude (non-alignment) we are dis-entangling ourselves from the spectre of war and are working for a *rapprochement* between the two blocs and are creating a vast zone of peace which is imposing itself little by little on the whole world. Neutralism, to which we adhere, implies that we have to stand aloof from bloc politics while striving for their reconciliation¹⁰

At the Second Conference of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) held in Conakry, Guinea, from 11 to 15 April 1960, Frantz Fanon asserted :

We Africans declare that we intend to destroy one after the other all the chains of imperialism and colonialism.¹¹

Growth of Nam

By 1960, Africa was already in a state, psychologically and politically, to participate in the first Summit Conference of the Non-aligned Countries which met in Belgrade (Yugoslavia) from 1-6 September 1961. Among the 25 full participating countries at the conference, 11 were African constituting 44 per cent of the total membership. (see Table 1 below) This conference which was held under serious threats to international peace and security laid down the following objectives of non-alignment :

- (a) resistance against bloc divisions and pressures ;
- (b) intensification of the efforts to find ways overcoming bloc confrontation ;
- (c) determined and principled struggle for peaceful and just settlement of all disputes and international problems ;
- (d) refusal to put up with the status quo on a world scale ;
- (e) increased active efforts to eliminate all forms of imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and all forms of hegemonism and foreign domination ;
- (f) as well as demands for the full, consistent and universal respect for and assertion of the right of all peoples and countries to self-determination to unrestricted and unconditional sovereignty, independence and equality.¹³

At the Belgrade Conference, Africa, though not then numerically in majority, made a forceful entry into the movement. The non-participation of some independent African countries (there were 27 independent African states in 1961) could be explained by the fact that the continent was undergoing a serious convulsion as a result of the on-going Congo crisis and the Algerian War of Independence. However, it is pertinent to note that all African states had by then declared non-alignment as the basis of their foreign policy even if the commitment to that policy varied from state to state. Thus in 1963, the Addis Ababa Summit of the African Heads of State and Government which founded the OAU, had no difficulty in embodying the principles and objectives of non-alignment in its Charter. It is pertinent to note that unlike any other Third World regional organization, the OAU, among its seven paramount principles includes, "an affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs" (Article III, 7).

TABLE 1
African States at the Nam Conferences

Year	Conference	Total Participants	African States	% African
1955	Bandung Conference	24	6	25%
1961	Belgrade Summit	25	11	44%
1964	Cairo Summit	47	28	59.6%
1970	Lusaka Summit	53	32	62%
1973	Algiers Summit	75	41	54.7%
1976	Colombo Summit	86	47	55.0%
1979	Havana Summit	95	51	53.5%
1983	New Delhi Summit	100	51	51%
1986	Harare Summit	101	51	50%

Apart from the fact that the African Heads of State included non-alignment as one of the cardinal principles of the OAU Charter, special attention was also given in both the Charter and the Special Resolutions adopted at the Conference to the aims and objectives of non-alignment. These include, a determination to support peace and security in the world, declaring Africa as a nuclear-free zone, the adoption of an appeal to the African states to initiate talks on the cessation of military occupation of African continent through the liquidation of military bases and the cessation of nuclear tests. Besides, a special resolution on decolonization was adopted while plans to rid Africa of racism and *apartheid* were spelt out.¹³ Further, when the OAU Council of Ministers held its Second Ordinary Session in Lagos in February 1964, it adopted a resolution on non-alignment which recommended the coordination of their foreign policies, especially in the non-aligned approach vis-a-vis the existing world bloc powers, as an acceptable safeguard for African freedom, stability and prosperity. It also called for the removal of any commitment, as soon as possible, which would militate against a consistent policy of non-alignment.¹⁴ Furthermore, at the first summit of the OAU Heads of State and Government held in Cairo in July 1964 a general appeal was made urging all African Heads of State and Government to take part in the forthcoming Second Non-aligned Summit also held in Cairo, on African soil in 1964.

As a result, as many as 28 African Heads of State and Government were present at the Second Non-Aligned Summit in Cairo on 5-10 October 1964. The massive presence of African states, constituting nearly 60 per cent of the total participants, in Cairo established the dominance of Africa in the movement, delegating Asian representation to the background.¹⁵ A spokesman of the OAU expressed satisfaction that the conference was held in Africa. A notable victory of African diplomacy at the conference was that it had prevented Moise Tshombe, the so-called Congolese Prime Minister, from participating. This demonstrated the unity of African non-aligned

struggle against the forces of imperialism and neo-colonialism in Africa.¹⁶ Tshombe's collaboration with the colonialists and western monopolists during the Congo Crisis is well known.

Addressing the conference, the then Secretary-General of the OAU, Diallo Telli, assured the delegates that the policy of non-alignment was totally in conformity with the interests of the African peoples whose struggle against imperialism and racial discrimination would continue until final victory was achieved. Discussing the role of the OAU he stated :

Non-alignment has been written into the OAU Charter as a positive principle to guide the external policy of African governments. Thus a concept that could have been at best elaborated into a policy is elevated to the level of a principle. The significance of this can hardly be overemphasized. It was born out of a deep conviction that if Africa is to contribute to the maintenance of peace it can do so only by effectively insulating itself from the cold war. There is also a sincere belief that the essentials of the cold war have nothing to do with present problems.¹⁷

In his own address Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana said :

We who claim to be non-aligned must have the right to choose the political and economic philosophy for our rapid development and advancement.¹⁸

In fact, by the end of the Conference African states had succeeded in giving non-alignment an African outlook and the influence now exerted by Africa on the Non-Aligned movement can be seen from the emphasis accorded to its African Programme in Cairo. In a special resolution, the Conference noted with satisfaction that African states had "unreservedly adhered to the positive policy of non-alignment in relation to all great blocs" as adopted in the OAU Charter. The Conference asserted that "the establishment of the OAU was an important contribution to the strengthening of world peace, the triumph of the policy of non-alignment and the fundamental values laid down by this policy."¹⁹

At the Third Non-Aligned Summit, also held in Africa, in Lusaka, Zambia, on 8-10 September 1970, 62 per cent (or 33 out of 53) of the participants were African. In addition the Secretary-General of the OAU, Diallo Telli, five African liberation movements were present at the Lusaka Summit.²⁰ The most significant aspect of the Lusaka Conference was the growth of African non-alignment in particular and the whole movement in general. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, the host, in his opening address to the Conference declared :

We must move non-alignment out of what critics consider mere political and idle rhetoric. We must work out and agree on common

action to give substance to the movement not only in the political field but in the economic and technical fields, which will add to our unity and strength.²¹

This clearly indicated the dangers facing a movement without an economic base. Besides *apartheid* and decolonization, fundamental African concerns were given topmost priority in Lusaka. Among others, the Lusaka Summit had agreed to provide greater and more efficient material aid to liberation movements through the OAU.

At the Fourth Summit of NAM, also held in Africa, (for the third time consecutively) in Algiers on 5-9 September 1973, the number of African countries had increased to 41 from 33 in Lusaka (see Table 1). It was the first non-aligned Summit attended by all the independent African states.

The Algiers Summit, apart from dealing with the problems of African decolonization and *apartheid*, emphasized the crucial issue of the economic plight of Third World countries, Africa in particular. The oil crisis of 1973 and the realisation by African states as well as other non-aligned countries that efforts made during the first Development Decade (1960-1970) and the early years of the Second Development Decade had failed to bridge the ever-widening gap between them and the industrialized countries forced the Conference to devote more time to economic problems. The seriousness of this situation had been highlighted by the Tenth OAU Summit held in Addis Ababa on 26-28 May 1973. It is pertinent to note that most of the statements and resolutions adopted at this OAU Summit found their way into the resolutions and declarations of the Algiers Summit of the Non-Aligned Countries held three months latter.²²

As indicated in Table 1 above, African participation in the next three non-aligned summits, held outside Africa, i.e., in Colombo (Sri Lanka) on 16-19 August 1976; in Havana (Cuba) on 3-9 September 1979 and in New Delhi (India) on 7-12 March 1983 consistently increased as all the newly independent African states were admitted to the movement. A glance at the documents of these Conferences would show that African problems, particularly the question of Southern Africa and the deepening economic crisis on the continent, received greater attention. At the Colombo Conference in 1976, for example, the bitter experience of the developing countries particularly during the UNCTAD IV in Nairobi in May 1976, forced the participants to be more than ever preoccupied with economic matters and the issue of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). These conferences, particularly the 6th Summit in Havana in September 1979, were the clearest manifestations of the basically anti-imperialist character of the Non-Aligned Movement.²³ They called for total decolonization and firmly opposed destabilization and other tactics of imperialism.²⁴

The 8th Summit of NAM, as noted earlier, was held in Harare (Zimbabwe) on 1-6 September 1986 and was attended by all the 51 African countries. This Summit which coincided with the 25th anniversary of the founding of NAM in Belgrade in 1961, highlighted the historic role of Africa in the movement. Not surprisingly crucial African problems, the critical economic situation [in Africa, the situation in Southern Africa—the question of *apartheid* in South Africa—dominated the speeches, resolutions and declarations at the conference.²⁵ Perhaps the most positive outcome of the Summit was the emergence of Zimbabwe's Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, as an authentic and authoritative leader of the movement. Mugabe put all the focus on sanctions against South Africa. In addition to proposing a Non-Aligned "Solidarity Fund" for the Southern African Liberation Movements, there was also discrete canvassing for a Southern African Defence Force, which, at the disposal of Zambia and Zimbabwe particularly, would provide the muscle to resist South African invasions. In brief, the Harare Summit clearly testified to the weight and significance of Africa in the Non-Aligned Movement.

It may be said that the four (out of eight) Summit Conferences of the Non-Aligned Movement which were held on the continent of Africa (Cairo 1964; Lusaka 1970; Algiers 1973 and Harare 1986) were a clear demonstration of the greatest concern this movement had shown to the problems and concerns of Africa. In fact with the sheer weight of their numbers African states have made the Non-Aligned Movement more representative and broad based than it had been in the early 1960s.

CONTRADICTIONS

However, Africa's adherence to the policy of non-alignment is fraught with a number of contradictions. It is pertinent to point out that at the founding summit of the OAU in Addis Ababa in 1963, the conference had issued a declaration to the effect that the presence of military personnel of any non-African Power on the territory of any independent African state was incompatible with the objectives of non-alignment. But a year later, the OAU Council of Ministers adopted a resolution which almost nullified the earlier declaration.²⁶ In particular, it deleted any express reference to the necessity for removing military bases from the African soil.

The flexible attitude of African countries also encouraged them to pursue divergent goals in their foreign relations. Some states professed non-alignment even as they became closely integrated with the defence strategies of external Powers. This is particularly the case with most Franco-phone states which retained French military bases in their territories in order to secure larger economic benefits from France. Some even pleaded for active French intervention to defend and preserve their own national integrity.²⁷ Some African states offered military facilities to the Super Powers.²⁸ Thus, Angola and post-revolutionary Ethiopia turned to Soviet

Union and stationed large number of Cuban troops to defend and guard their territorial integrity against foreign invaders. This caused the neighbouring states to turn to American and Western sources for countervailing military assistance. The United States extracted naval facilities from Somalia and Kenya before offering them a large amount of economic and military assistance. The cases of Egypt, Morocco, Liberia, Zaire, etc., are well known. Many of these countries could be, strictly speaking, disqualified from membership in the Non-Aligned Movement. It may be said, in the process of increasing its own ranks, the movement has maximised membership at the expense of non-alignment.²⁹

Moreover, at the economic level, Africa's integration into the world capitalist system and increasing dependence on external (Western) Powers continues to be crucial. Despite the OAU's Lagos Plan of Action and the call for collective self-reliance, few African countries have shown the capacity to move out of their dependency on the major Western economies. Africa's association with the European Economic Community (EEC) under the Lome Conventions (1975, 1980 and 1985) show that for trade and economic cooperation African countries have turned more and more to the same quarters which they have otherwise condemned as neo-colonial.³⁰ African states have also gone on borrowing from Western sources resulting in an external debt of over \$ 170 billion in 1985, a six-fold rise over the 1973 figures.³¹ In short, many African countries, for economic reasons, were for a long time tied to the apron-strings of the Western Powers.³² Many African countries, in fact, have decided to compromise some of its non-alignment for the sake of economic advantage.³³

CONCLUSION

Undoubtedly the NAM reflects a clear understanding of the realities and deformities in the contemporary international system. It is primarily an attempt by weaker nations to combine their strength to develop a critical counter-force potent enough to promote their common interests in the face of opposition by the powerful nations. The weak nations cannot do much about the critical aspects of their weakness without combining their strength. This is particularly true of Africa which is decidedly the weakest and most marginalised region in the world system.³⁴ Among the major problems and deformities which Africa hopes to overcome with the help of non-alignment are those associated with its colonial past, and neo-colonial present which shape and reshape Africa's socio-economic conditions, even after 25 years of its political independence. It is colonialism which formulated the national question which has contributed to Africa's disunity, genocidal conflicts and other crippling problems. The effects of this legacy have been compounded by the continuing economic and political domination of the continent by the former Colonial Powers and other neo-colonial masters. For instance, the World Bank and the IMF together have influenced

development strategies of most African countries more than any other factor.

Naked colonialism still continues in Africa. The most strategically and economically important country in Africa (South Africa) is still fighting for its liberation. So is Namibia. In the meanwhile, the Frontline States of Southern Africa are constantly harassed by the proxy imperialism of *apartheid* South Africa. Africa has to fight the colonialism and imperialism of *apartheid* South Africa and its Western allies. One major attraction of the non-aligned movement for Africa is the possibility of strengthening the anti-colonial struggle through the solidarity of other Third World countries such as India, Cuba, etc.

Another equally compelling attraction of the Non-Aligned Movement for Africa is that it offers some potential for the redress of economic imbalances and inequities in the present world economic order. In this regard Africa's interest in non-alignment is more in tune with the major thrust of the movement in recent years. Nothing has shaped the solidarity and the profile of contemporary NAM as much as the economic question. The doctrine of non-alignment has itself undergone critical changes in recent years. While the emphasis in the earlier days was on military disengagement, non-alignment since the 1970s has become predominantly a doctrine of economic liberation. The role of NAM in the Third World struggle for the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) during the past decade or so illustrates this point.

Undoubtedly no other region of the world establishes more sharply and starkly the need for a New International Economic Order, as does the continent of Africa.³⁵ It is therefore to be expected that the continent, with the most to lose in the continuation of the existing economic order, would be the most vigorous in working towards a new economic order. No wonder, Africa has been at the centre of the Third World struggle for NIEO through the forums of the UN, NAM, Group of 77, UNCTAD, the North-South dialogue, etc. In some senses Africa is well served by the aims of NIEO, particularly the demand for fairer and more stable commodity prices, the reduction of expenditures on arms in favour of world development, protection against poor nations and for easing the burdens of adjustment arising from the crisis of the world financial system which has so far been placed in the poor nations.

In short, the old days of wanting to keep out of Western and Eastern military alliances have been supplanted by a wave of economic nationalism in the Third World. Since early 1970s the term "disengagement" in the Third World has come to mean "economic disengagement" rather than military and the implications of economic disengagement were in the direction of loosening the ties which bound small poor countries to the world capitalist system. The fight against multinational corporations and other forms of external control of domestic resources in the Third World, had by that

time got underway. Africa and the Third World, linked together by the bonds of shared underdevelopment, have to continue to fight against the ties which bound them to the world capitalist system.

Briefly, Africa's specificity puts it in one polar extreme of the Non-Aligned Movement and its singular contribution to the movement lies in addressing fundamental questions relating to Africa's struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism. In conclusion, it may be said that the realities of the African situation dictate a strong vested interest in the Non-Aligned Movement and a strong commitment to it.

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- 4 See Ernest Lefevre, *Nehru, Nasser and Nkrumah on Neutralism and Non-Alignment*, (Ed.) : Lawrence Markin (New York, 1962) p. 95.
- 5 For details see K. Mathews, "A Polemical Note on the Growth and Decline of Pan-Africanism," *Nigerian Journal of International Studies* (Lagos), Vol. 5-7, 1981-83, pp. 45-61.
- 6 For text see Colin Legum, *Pan-Africanism : A Short Political Guide* (New York, 1962), pp. 137-38.
- 7 The following six African countries attended the Bandung Conference : Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, Liberia, Libya and Ghana. For details see, Carlos P. Romulo, *The Meaning of Bandung* (University of North Carolina Press, 1956) ; G.M. Kahin, *The Afro-Asian Conference, Bandung, Indonesia* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1956).
- 8 See Keesings *Contemporary Archives* 7-14 May 1955, pp. 14183-4.
- 9 The following are the ten principles of international relations enunciated at the 1955 Bandung Conference :
 - (i) Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the United Nations ;
 - (ii) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations ;
 - (iii) Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations, large and small ;
 - (iv) Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country ;
 - (v) Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations ;
 - (vi) (a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the Big Powers ;
 - (b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressure on other countries ;
 - (vii) Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country ;

(viii) Settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations ;

(ix) Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation ;

(x) Respect for justice and international obligations.

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11 Ibid.

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15 See *Africa Research Bulletin* (London), Vol. I, No. 10, 1-31 October 1964.

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18 See Scott W. Thompson, *Non-Alignment in the Third World: Record of Ghana*, *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Vol. II, 1968, p. 1235.

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20 The African Liberation Movements represented at Lusaka included ANC of South Africa ; ZAPU of Zimbabwe ; SWAPO of Namibia ; FRELIMO of Mozambique ; MPLA of Angola and PAIGC of Guinea.

21 See *Africa Research Bulletin*, 1-31 November 1970, p. 1879.

22 For details see, A. Ajala, n. 12, p. 110.

23 For details of the 6th Non-Aligned Summit in Havana see, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), Vol. XXX, no. 702, 1983 (Special Issue).

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28 For details see Arthur Gavshon, *Crisis in Africa : Battleground of East and West* (London, 1982), pp. 258-85.

29 See H. Haveen and P. Willets, "The Practice of Non-Alignment : On the Present and Future of an International Movement," in Y.A. Tandon and D. Chanderana (Eds.) *Horizon's of African Diplomacy* (Nairobi, 1974) p. 28.

30 Anirudha Gupta, n. 26, p. 182.

31 See *West Africa* No. 3586, 26 May 1986, p. 1105.

32 See Douglas Anglin, "Nigeria : Political Non-Alignment and Economic Alignment," *Journal of Modern African Studies* (Cambridge), Vol. 2, No. 2, 1964.

33 See Ali Mazrui, *Towards Pax-Africana* (London, 1967) p. 173.

34 See Claude Ake, "Non-Alignment in the Contemporary World : An African Perspective," *AAPS Newsletter*, July-September 1986, pp. 8-9.

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BOOK REVIEWS

INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

A Review Article

FEW books have come out in recent times comprehensively covering the subject of India's foreign policy. The volume* edited by Professor Surendra Chopra has drawn immense academic attention because of its intrinsic value in presenting a wide spectrum of this vast subject. The editor has pointed out in the Preface that the book is the result of a compilation of papers presented at two seminars : "India's Foreign Policy : New Challenges and Opportunity" and "India and Her Neighbours: Foreign Policy Perspectives and Cooperation for Development." It is generally not possible for an individual scholar to prepare a comprehensive book dealing with a multi-dimensional subject like the foreign policy of a country. Team work or a seminar on the subject can afford to make a thorough survey of the wide variety of a complex phenomena like India's foreign policy and its relations with different countries. To that extent the book under review serves greatly the needs of scholars and researchers on the subject.

Professor Chopra, besides compiling the papers of the two seminars in thematic order, has rightly incorporated two other relevant—but already published papers—one on "China As a Factor of Indo-Soviet Relations" by Vijay Sen Budhraj and the other on "Indian Ocean Politics : An Asian-African Perspective" in order to fill up the gap that otherwise would have detracted from the comprehensiveness of the volume.

The 30 papers included in the book examine a wide variety of topics and many of them have covered fresh ground. It is not possible to review each and every paper thoroughly for the obvious reasons of space; therefore, a brief note on the papers, taken on a thematic basis, could be worthwhile. Most of the papers supply a wealth of data on the topics; here an attempt will be made to introduce the core of the papers supplemented by a very brief commentary.

On the theoretical plane, K. S. Gill throws light on the wider panorama of India's foreign policy covering particularly the Nehru era. His paper on "India's Foreign Policy : New Challenges and Opportunities" focuses on the inherent weakness of uncertainty and infirmities in evolving a definite framework of foreign policy. Since it was an introductory note, one cannot expect it to be highly informative and conceptualised. A.P. Rana's

* Surendra Chopra (Ed.) : *Studies in India's Foreign Policy* Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, 1983, 564p.,

note on "Paradigmatic Dilemma of Contemporary Non-alignment" is an exercise in finding alternative options of non-aligned and developing countries like India in dealing with the rich and developed countries of the North. Robin Alison Remington's article entitled, "The Non-aligned Context : Problems and Prospects" is a general approach towards the conceptualisation of the Non-Aligned Movement as a whole within the framework of politics of coalition. Viewed from this angle it can be argued that unlike the aligned world's dominant and dependent structure, the non-aligned world has no dominating country, and therefore, it is possible and also natural that the politics of coalition constitutes the operative dynamics of the movement.

Three specific articles have been devoted to an analysis of India's foreign policy during the Indira Gandhi and the Janata period. Vijay Sen Budhrajs article "Indian Foreign Policy : The Indira Gandhi Era" presents the rationale behind India's option for closer relations with the Soviet Union which became inevitable after Indira Gandhi's first visit to the United States as the Prime Minister failed to deliver goods to the national interests. Manorama Kohli, in her article "Foreign Policy of the Janata Government" projects the continuity and change in India's foreign policy during the Janata period, and argues that the overall framework of India's foreign policy did not undergo any change during the Janata rule. Whatever changes or shifts were attempted by the non-Congress and non-Nehru government were merely minor adjustments in the context of the global and regional environment. In the article "Janata Government's Foreign Policy", Harish K. Puri conceptualises the lack of perspective in the Janata Government's foreign policy, which can be attributed to the incoherent, faction-riddled power structure of the party and the Government. Inconsistency, ignorance of world affairs and lack of direction in foreign policy made a mess out of everything. He concludes that whatever attempt the Janata Government made to change India's foreign policy was characterised by vacillation, lack of proper direction and absence of long-term goals.

India's relations with Super Powers find a proper place in the volume. Four articles have attempted an assessment of the multi-faceted problems relating to the subject.

Leela Yadava's article deals with "India's Reaction to the US Military Aid to Pakistan" ever since 1954 and also covers the recent inflow of American weapons after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In this well-documented article the author has highlighted the nature of New Delhi's historic fear of the possibility of Pakistan using these weapons against India and has argued that US military policy towards Pakistan would not only force India to join this arms competition but also would greatly harm the process of normalisation of Indo-Pakistan relations. Narendra Pal Singh's article on "Indo-US Relations ; Problems and Pros-

pects" is a general account of India's relations with the United States. Here the author observes that the irritants in the relations are so pronounced that the prospects of the improvement of the relations between the two countries in the near future still remain obscure.

Indo-Soviet relations have been studied from two different angles. Surendra Chopra deals with "Kashmir as a Factor in Indo-Soviet Relations" and argues that the issue of Kashmir has brought the two countries closer, because both had common interests involved in this issue. Similarly, Vijay Sen Budhrajan in his article "China as a Factor in Indo-Soviet Relations", tries to show that the India-China border war and the Sino-Soviet rift served as the contributory factors to the progressive growth of Indo-Soviet friendship. Both the articles have filled up a notable gap in the less researched dimensions of Indo-Soviet relations.

Mohit Sen examines the "Character of Post-Mao China", a topic of great interest among the academics. It is noteworthy that many of Mao's ideas have been rejected by the new rulers, yet Mao's important thesis on the "three worlds' differentiations" and his concept of "Soviet socialist imperialism" still guide Chinese foreign policy. One can refer in this regard to Deng Xiaoping's own assessment of Mao on his 10 death anniversary which appeared in *Beijing Review*, 8 September 1986. Sen's article, if detailed with data and analysis would have been of immense value. Shanti Swarup's article "A Brief Note on India's China Policy", as the title signifies, needs greater elaboration and proper analysis with data. Manorama Kohli's paper on "China Factor in Indo-Bhutanese Relations" is an interesting contribution. It is an exposure of the developments in the Indo-Bhutanese relations in which the China factor can play a crucial role in neutralising Bhutanese overdependence on India. Such a trend had been visible in 1985 when China and Bhutan had a series of negotiations on the border issue.

Two articles have been devoted to Indo-Pakistan relations from two different points of view. Surendra Chopra, in his paper "Indo-Pakistan Relations : A Study of New Challenges and Opportunities", makes an exhaustive analysis of the avenues of cooperation between India and Pakistan that had been thrown open since the conclusion of the Simla Pact of 1972. His concluding prediction about the prospect of restrained behaviour on the part of the two countries has been proved correct recently when they signed an agreement to reduce tension created along the border. O.N. Mehrotra, on the other hand, presents a statistical picture of the "Arms Build-up in Pakistan and India" till 1980. The competition between the two countries in acquiring more and more sophisticated weapons from the arms-selling countries has been generating persistent tension in the region, and such a picture can be derived from the tables so meticulously presented in this paper. Lawrence Ziring addresses his article to pinpoint "Dissonance and Harmony in Indo-Pakistan Relations" in the context of

changing power relations in Asia and Africa, coupled with external and local environment. While examining the major irritants in Indo-Pakistan relations, he also identifies the areas of cooperation.

The recent developments in Afghanistan have laid significant impact on India, most notably, the inflow of arms to Pakistan from the United States and China in response to the Soviet intervention has released grave security consequences in the region. In the article entitled "Recent Developments in Afghanistan and their Impact on India's Security", Kulwant Kaur analyses such consequences arising out of the transformation of the sub-continent to a theatre of demonstrating military might. Vijay Sen Budhraj, in his article on "India's Response to the Crisis in Afghanistan", discusses the nature of India's response to the Soviet intervention and answers the query as to why did India not take a 'hasty decision' in responding to the intervention.

India's relations with three other neighbours, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka have also been adequately covered in three articles. Ramakant and M.D. Dharamdasani, in their article "India's Attitude towards Nepal", have identified the internal factors like geography, economy and socio-culture together with external issues like cold war and relations with China playing a crucial role in the relations between the two countries. They have made the contribution extremely valuable by presenting the rationale of Nepal's call for "Zone of Peace" in order to ward off some of its anxieties. D.M. Prasad deals with "Indo-Sri Lanka Relations" in the context of making common approaches towards resolving mutual problems. He has also highlighted the basis of Sri Lanka's historic fear of a strong India. S.S. Bindra has dealt with Indo-Bangladesh relations from the angle of the "Farakka Agreement."

Two other important and well written articles—"India and West Asian Crisis" by Bharat Kumar and "India's Africa Policy" by H.S. Chabra have added to the academic importance of the book. While examining the "Nuclear Policy of India", K.K. Pathak finds a continuity of Nehru's peaceful nuclear programmes in Indira Gandhi's PNE programme embedded with ideas of scientific development and futuristic technology. He argues that such a sound policy had undergone a shift during the Janata rule mainly due to the lack of proper understanding of different contours of the programme. However, the PNE regained its momentum after the dramatic come-back of Indira Gandhi to power in 1980. He has made this article quite absorbing and academically rewarding by examining other related issues like the US-Canadian policy towards India in this context.

Surjit Mansingh has made an in-depth study of the concept of South Asian regional cooperation in her article entitled "Regional Cooperation in South Asia : Imperatives and Obstacles" in the context of the recent developments and also the inherent problems associated with the framework of regional cooperation as against the prospects of its projected

future. B.N. Mehrish has written on "India and the New International Economic Order" and has outlined the imperatives of the developing countries like India to stress the needs of the NIEO in view of the discriminatory and contemptuous policy of the rich countries towards the developing countries of the South. The article has become a piece of academic interest as it covers the issues and themes of the NIEO, the problems of technology transfer and India's approach to the problems and issues of the Order and the South-South dialogue. This article has been supplemented by Santosh Taneja's article "New International Economic Order : India's Role in Its Emergence".

Satish Kumar's article on "Indian Foreign Office : Structure and Working", Rama Puri's "Development of the Law of Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone in UNCLOS III : India's Role", K.P. Misra's "Indian Ocean Politics : An Asian-African Perspective" and finally Gurnam Singh *et. al.* on "Survey of the Source Material on India's Foreign Policy" have further added to the academic importance of the book.

After making this brief survey of the articles of the volume, one is entitled to the comment that the editor has taken great care and toil to collect as many as 30 papers covering the great variety of topics on India's foreign policy, and thereby, making it a milestone in the studies of the subject. One gap, however, has been felt—a paper on India's relations with Burma would have enriched further this intellectually satisfying volume.

Abu Nasar Saied Ahmed*

*Dr. Ahmed is Reader, Department of Political Science, Dibrugarh University, Dibrugarh, Assam.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

K. SUBRAHMANYAM (Ed.) : Nuclear Proliferation and International Security. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, 1985, 310 p., Rs. 150.

THIS is a collection of essays written by K. Subrahmanyam, Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses and three of his able colleagues. The purpose of the book, as explained by Subrahmanyam in his useful introduction, is to focus public attention in India as well as in other countries and especially non-nuclear weapon states, on the inequities built into the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 1968. As Subrahmanyam has described it, this Treaty is "for all practical purposes a worthless piece of paper." It is worthless indeed, because the declared objective of the treaty, namely to prevent proliferation, is not being furthered by the 'nuclear haves'. On the contrary, they, and in particular the Super Powers, are utilising the treaty as an instrument for perpetuating their own dominance by continued build-up of their own stockpiles of these weapons.

The strategy of one Super Power to retain, and to the extent possible widen its margin of superiority over the rival is, not surprisingly, viewed with apprehension by the other which has endeavoured to reinforce its own nuclear arsenal in order to reduce the perceived gap between itself and its economically and politically stronger rival. Each Super Power can now destroy the other and the rest of the world, many times over. Thus while trying to selectively enforce NPT on the 'have nots' the United States and other 'nuclear haves' and their *surrogates* are indulging in proliferation. It is this race that is at the root of the world's troubles in many ways. To the Third World, particularly the non-aligned states, the strategy of the dominant Super Power to continue to pile up its nuclear armaments and carry the arms race to space, has ominous portents. US strategists have stated with perfect candour that he who dominates space will be able to dominate the earth. Once the second ranking Super Power's nuclear weapons are rendered ineffective, the latter would be unable to restrain the dominant one from destabilising nations seeking to pursue an independent policy.

Basically the United States has sought to escalate the arms race whenever it suspected that the one power that can stand up to it might attain near parity in strategic arms. The various arguments put forward from time to time by the preeminent to preserve its nuclear dominance have been clearly recounted and discussed by Subrahmanyam in the first two essays of this volume. In his concluding essay "Fighting the Nuclear Cult", he has pointed out that "for nations genuinely committed to non-proliferation, the NPT has a significance that differs totally" from the perceptions of nuclear weapon Powers and their crypto-nuclear allies. While the

first group, are anxious to free the world from nuclear terror, to the others the NPT is an instrument to perpetuate their own dominance and prolong the political, technological and economic insecurity of the developing and non-aligned Third World. His arguments are supported by an analysis of US and NATO war fighting doctrines.

In two interesting and informative essays, Air Commodore Jasjit Singh has discussed "Eroding Thresholds" and "Insecurity of Nations." The main theme of the first essay is that certain recently developed "conventional weapons" are as destructive—indeed in some respects even more devastating—than low yield nuclear weapons which in the fifties had been developed for 'tactical' or battle field use and were placed in the hands of forward troops. The ostensible purpose of this deployment in West Europe and the decentralisation of command and control over nuclear weapons that such deployment implied, was to 'deter' a hypothetical Warsaw Pact attack with conventional forces on NATO countries. Deterrence (for deterrence, read terrorisation of potential adversaries) worked so long as US enjoyed overwhelming nuclear might. After the mid-sixties, when the Soviet Union began reducing the gap between itself and the US, the futility, not to say the danger to West Europe of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, slowly came to be realised in West Europe. But the United States was reluctant to withdraw the weapons, and so long as NATO had them the Soviet Union and its allies could not afford to withdraw theirs either from forward positions. The point that Jasjit Singh has made is that there has been a significant erosion of the 'nuclear threshold' that is the gap between the nuclear weapons with the last destructive potential and that of some recent conventional high explosive weapons has narrowed down to negligible levels. Indeed in some cases it may be said that by the proper selection and use of weapon delivery systems some of the conventional weapons now available may prove to be more destructive and have greater battle field utility than the tactical nuclear weapons of yesterday. This does not mean that the latter have been taken out of the United States' weapon stock piles.

His second essay deals broadly with the threat perceptions of certain countries and their motivations for equipping themselves with nuclear weapons. Nations feel insecure because of the military, technological and economic might of some other nations and more importantly because of the latters' strategy of coercing and intimidating countries that are seen as weak or without powerful allies. A point worth noting is that junior members of an alliance with a dominant power are as much subject to coercion by the dominant partner of a military alliance as adversaries and neutrals.

P.K.S. Namboodiri in the chapter on "Nuclear Winter" has succinctly summarised the assessments of physicists and environmentalists on the possible consequences of detonating a large number of nuclear devices such as could be expected in a nuclear war. A 1975 study by the US National

Academy of Sciences had suggested that a "large nuclear war would produce irreversible adverse effects on the environment and the ecological system." A subsequent study (1980) under UN auspices had also examined the subject of possible environmental changes in the wake of a nuclear war and had drawn attention to the likelihood of stratospheric heating caused by the depletion of ozone. This in its turn would alter temperature conditions in the troposphere leading to unpredictable effects on the climate on the earth's surface. The UN Report however, had hoped that global climatic changes following a "large nuclear war" would only last for a few days.

The most recent study on the possible consequences of an intense nuclear war (the TTAPS Report, basing its conclusions on a number of studies, observations and extrapolations of phenomena observed following earlier atmospheric nuclear tests, has indicated that the consequence of detonating a large number of nuclear devices would be the raising of dust storms over wide areas, the spread of clouds of carbon dioxide which would cut off sunlight from the earth and bringing 'nuclear winter' on earth. The ecological damage would be severe and widespread. A study group set up by US National Research Council after further studying the subject broadly agreed with the TTAPS findings, but opined that temperature reduction of 10° to 25°C lasting for weeks could occur over wide areas of the northern temperate zone. And subnormal temperatures could persist for longer periods. The ozone depletion effect could be quite serious, since ultra violet radiation would penetrate to the earth causing unpredictable damage.

All told, there will certainly be no winner in a nuclear war. Such a war will not only wipe out millions of people and most of the earth's plant and animal life but also perhaps irreversibly alter the earth's features and climate.

In his other chapter "The Mirage of Nuclear Defence" Namboodiri discusses the implications of President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) or 'Star Wars' programme as commonly described. The President in announcing his intention to ask his defence planners to initiate R & D on SDI had also declared that SDI systems would render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." In fact, the objective of USA's SDI is to render the rival power's nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete while enabling USA, hopefully, to position a sufficient number of orbital platforms carrying laser and other beam weapons with which the rival powers' orbital systems could also be 'killed'. This would ensure USA's absolute dominance. Even USA's NATO allies do not seem to relish this prospect.

Raja Mohan, the other contributor to this study, has examined "Global Nuclearisation" and "Uncontrollable Weapons." The spread of nuclear weapons across the globe primarily by the nuclear weapon Powers, and in particular by the principal nuclear power, has been described clearly tracing the sequence of development of weapons and means of delivery and

their deployment around the world. That USA maintains its nuclear forces on the alert in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Ocean confirms beyond doubt that USA's strategic doctrine hinges on the threat and the possible first use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, developments in electronic data acquisition, processing and dissemination systems and ready availability of vital information to USA's defence intelligence and command posts vastly reinforces their nuclear war-fighting capabilities. Given the complexity of the command, communications and intelligence structures, the wide dispersal of air, undersea, sea borne and land-based nuclear weapons and the discretion enjoyed by those in charge of such widely dispersed units, there is a high probability of accidental nuclear strikes (and responses in kind from nuclear armed adversaries as well as allies) whether as a result of human or instrumental errors, miscalculations or loss of nerve on the part of political or military leaders. This danger of a nuclear war erupting by accident, miscalculation or in a bid to preempt the rival power would be heightened by the deployment of space weapon systems.

Altogether this collection of essays will be useful to all students of nuclear strategy and contemporary affairs and the authors deserve to be commended for their work.

New Delhi

R. RAMA RAO

S. K. KAPOOR : A Text Book of International Laws. Central Law Agency, Allahabad (Fifth edition), 1982, 704p., Rs. 60.

IT has long been a persistent problem for the teachers of Indian Universities to recommend a text-book on International Law by an Indian author to the students of post-graduate classes, opting for International Law as one of their papers. It is not that such text-books are commercially in short supply, not available in the Indian market. On the contrary, their numbers are galore. But, what is striking is that those texts are so poor in contents, so weak and inadequate in their presentations and approaches that no responsible teacher can recommend them to their students with confidence. No doubt there are competent Indian scholars on International Law but their works, being highly scholastic, are primarily meant for those advanced students and researchers who do not require initiation in the subject. Competent Indian scholars seem to be extremely reluctant to write text-books for their students, the result being that the texts by western authors still occupy a large part of the Reading List on International Law in the Indian Universities. In this context, Kapoor's endeavour in presenting a text book on International Law, though primarily

written for the candidates appearing at different competitive examinations in India, is a welcome one.

In rather a voluminous book consisting of more than 800 pages, divided into 65 chapters and four appendices, Kapoor has more or less covered the entire field of the subject and discussed the important legal issues in a fairly exhaustive manner.

His method of presentation of the subjects incorporating the different viewpoints on the matters and citing the authorities on International Law, both from India and abroad, is not only commendable but will greatly help the interested students in pursuing matters further. Particularly praiseworthy is his attempt to deal with certain recent international events involving the question of International Law (Appendix 3), like the legal aspects of Falling Skylab, Legality of India's Nuclear Testing at Pokharan, Legal control of International Terrorism, Convention against Taking of Hostages, etc. Brief discussions of well-known leading cases in International Law have enhanced the importance of the book to the students of Law, preparing for their first degree.

But the main flaw of the book lies in the fact that it has totally failed to project the central theme of International Law. Though a book primarily written for ordinary graduate students, it ought to have communicated to the initiators to the subject in unambiguous terms what International Law stands for ? What it seeks to control ? What hinders International Law from developing itself into a sound legal system like the Municipal Law ? The author has touched upon these questions but in a very perfunctory manner. In the Introductory Chapter where he seeks to discuss the questions in the sub-headings 'Dynamism and Crisis in International Law', Kapoor has extensively quoted the views of some western writers on the goals and objectives of International Law, not fully disclosing his own views on the matter.

And, in the midst of these quotations and citations, the students will get lost and will surely fail to comprehend what International Law is for. As a matter of fact excessive quotations and citations in the book from different sources might give the impression that the work is merely a compilation, not the result of any original thinking.

The book suffers from another limitation. The Laws of War have not been adequately dealt with. For example, an important issue like the compulsive means of settlement of international dispute has been discussed within three pages. Another important subject, Laws of Submarine Warfare, occupies a very little part in the chapter on the Laws of Maritime Warfare. The problem of definition of aggression and the UN effort to define the term find no place in the book. These apart, there are innumerable grammatical errors and printing mistakes, which do not speak very highly about the production of the book. It would be of great help to the

students if the lapses in production are taken care of in the next edition of the book.

On the whole, the book will be a useful one to those for whom it is primarily written.

University of Burdwan
Burdwan (WB)

B. N. GOSWAMI

GEORGE H. DANIELS AND MARK H. ROSE (Ed.): *Energy and Transport: Historical Perspectives and Policy Issues*. Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1982, 287p., \$ 28.

THIS book is a collection of contributions made by several scholars in order to link energy and transport to elucidate their vital relationship with business, economic and urban affairs, politics and technology. It is intended to provide factual data and theoretical frameworks for framing future policies, for the buildup of two vital infrastructures of an industrial economy, namely, energy and transport. The need for such a work arose in the wake of the oil price hike of 1973. The one-stroke four-fold hike in oil price in 1973, suddenly demolished the prevailing myth that fuel abundance was the natural order of economic affairs requiring no particular systematic action by either private or public agencies. Because of this myth prevailing in the earlier decades scholars were concerned only with the policies of transport and energy in order to understand the administration and legislation affecting prices and delivery. Only rarely did an assessment of consumption and its source of supply enter into this picture. The upshot naturally was fragmentary policy and fragmented scholarship rendering impossible the task of coordinated planning and the achievement of a sense of the whole even by academic scholars.

This collection of contributions by several scholars is an attempt to provide a basis for a holistic approach to the task of policy framing on transport and energy. For reasons explained more fully in the sequel the book under review is far from providing clues how to achieve this very ambitious, though very laudable, goal.

One reason for this shortcoming is that the book is a collection of essays by different scholars, each essay dealing with only an aspect of the problem without thematic unity between the collected pieces. The holistic approach to policy issues will therefore have to be provided by the careful reader himself.

Consider, for instance, the first essay by George Basalla. He argues that Americans have historically believed in certain energy myths for the past two centuries since the advent of the Industrial Revolution. According to

these myths any newly discovered source of energy—be it coal, oil, nuclear or solar—is assumed to be flawless, “infinitely abundant and to have the potential to affect utopian changes in society. These myths persist until a new energy source is developed to the point that its drawbacks become apparent and the failure to establish a utopian society must be reluctantly admitted.” His plea that world energy resources are limited and no solution of the energy problem is round the corner, though pessimistic, is valid for the foreseeable future.

In the next piece titled “Cars versus Trains,” Warren Belasco also deals with only one aspect of differing energy/transportation forms. He shows how in the early twentieth century certain social/cultural factors led to a movement away from mass, collective transportation by rail towards personal travel by automobile.

In the third piece—Martin V. Melosi provides a historical review of energy transitions in the United States during the nineteenth century. He uses energy transitions not merely as a way of periodizing and evaluating the development and use of energy sources over a longish period. He also uses it as a historical tool in a broader sense to provide a necessary focus for understanding the evolution of human material culture, economic growth and development as well as, to some extent, social organisation. He shows that there occurred two major energy transitions in the USA during the nineteenth century. Till the middle of the nineteenth century the USA relied on “renewable” fuels (wood, windpower, waterpower) when the shift to non-renewable fossil fuels (coal, petroleum and natural gas) began. The first shift from wood to coal evolved slowly over a period of several decades, the second from coal to oil occurred in a more revolutionary way. The earlier evolutionary transition was a consequence of the slow attrition of forests which raised the price of wood and removed its sources further and further from the emerging centres of population and industry. The second occurred more rapidly in the wake of the transformation of the country from a rural, agrarian, decentralized society into urban, industrial, national culture. He thus uses energy transition as “part of the flow of history” in the same way as Karl Marx on a grander scale used the “materialist interpretation” of history to explain the transition of human societies from their earlier phases to contemporary capitalism.

There are other pieces on a variety of topics like rail-road smoke control, petroleum refining and transportation, federal management of fuel crises between the two world wars of the present century, Nixon Administration and the 1973 energy crisis following the oil hike of the last decade, state management of petroleum resources, urban planning and technological development, household energy consumption, agricultural technology and sex roles. An alternative title of the last mentioned piece written by Corlann Gee Bush is worth reproducing. It is: “The Barn is His, the House is Mine.” In this study she narrows her focus by

collecting data from the Palouse region of eastern Washington and Northern Idaho. She argues that changes in energy and transportation technology have dramatically different effects on men and women, at least, in rural settings. On the *farms* the transition to modern energy and transportation technologies has resulted in making a woman's traditional role less "crucial" to the survival of the family unit while man's traditional role has become more crucial.

The aforementioned twelve studies will be of limited interest to scholars concerned with future planning of energy and transport infrastructures in other countries, developing or developed. The reason is that they are all historical reviews of certain aspects of energy/transport transitions in the United States only. The sole exception is the last study titled "Energy Regimes and the Ideology of Efficiency" by Langdon Winner. The relevance to planners in other countries stems from the fact that it is a critique of the prevailing modelling methodology for determining energy choices in future.

Langdon Winner observes what he calls the "grand consensus" among contemporary energy analysts in the USA. They examine "all possible alternatives to discover those which give the most energy per dollar. It is possible to fiddle a bit with the specific definition of efficiency one employs. .. But suggestions of that kind do nothing to change the fundamental nature of the discussion. One still puts BTUs or kilowatt-hours in the numerator and dollars in the denominator and worships the resulting ratio as gospel."

In giving an overriding priority to "efficiency", the experts give short shrift to all questions about the quality of human associations as affected by the social organisation of energy. As a result they ignore the social and political dimensions of the structure of energy systems. This is a valid criticism in that each new energy system involves a partial reconstruction of society. For example, "two proposed energy regimes now on the drawing boards—those associated with breeder reactors on the one hand, and solar energy on the other—present very different possibilities. Liquid-metal-fast-breeder reactors, if introduced on a large scale, will certainly bring with them a set of drastically repressive social conditions.... In contrast, it appears that a regime of solar energy has good chance of being a feasible, forgiving, humanly agreeable setting under which to live." Winner's main conclusion, therefore, is "that the obsession with efficiency, economic growth, and lowest cost energy alternatives simply ignores what is most important in decisions before us now. To retain a democratic form of society means, among other things, that we seek to develop energy systems compatible with the continued existence of a free society. If we simply attend to questions of cost and efficiency, it may happen that we will create energy regimes so monolithic, powerful and vulnerable that they present hazards to liberty." Amen !

New Delhi.

INDIA

ROBERT I. CRANE AND BRADFORD SPANGENBERG (Ed.): *Language and Society in Modern India* (Essays in Honour of Professor Robert O. Swan). Heritage Publishers, New Delhi, 1981, 155p., Rs. 175.

THE seven essays of this volume presented to Professor Robert O. Swan, who has given a new dimension and a new depth to Hindi and Indian studies in the United States, deal with some of the most important questions regarding the social scene in modern India. Each of these essays has been written with a very high degree of competence and what gives them their authenticity is the fact that their authors have handled their literary sources in original. From this point of view they are a fitting tribute to Dr. Swan who stressed the need for knowledge of Indian languages for a proper study of Indian society. A good deal of English work on modern India is so poor because it is based on English sources, printed or manuscript, which constitute but a small fraction of the material one must examine for a thorough investigation of the subject.

The opening essay—“In Search of Identity : Scholarship and Authority Among Sikhs in Nineteenth Century Punjab” is by Dr. N. G. Barrier whose *Sikhs and their Literature : A Guide to Books, Tracts and Periodicals (1849-1919)* (1970) has already established him as an authority on the subject. Dr. Barrier’s essay in this volume has a significant bearing on our current thoughts on the Sikh community in its relation to our republican polity, and its readers will value it as a fair presentation of the whole question of Sikh identity in our country’s larger multi-religious society. ‘The concern of Sikhs in the last half of the century, Dr. Barrier rightly observes ‘focussed largely on issues such as what constituted Sikhism, what were the basic elements within the tradition, how should Sikhs act, what were appropriate relationships with other Indian communities, and finally how could Sikhs survive and prosper in a society undergoing rapid change?’ What we call Sikh orthodoxy or Sikh fundamentalism today is essentially a manifestation of this legitimate concern. There was a time when Hindus used to take upon Sikhism as a sect of Hinduism. And even European scholars writing on the subject would so treat this religion which is no more a sect of Hinduism than Buddhism or Jainism are. What would we say to a follower of Judaism if he claims that since the Old Testament is a part of the Christian Bible, Christianity is but a sect of the Jewish faith. In his introduction to his English version of a part of the *Adigranth* published in 1877, Ernest Trumpp wrote ‘Sikhism is a waning religion that would soon belong to history.’ A remark such as this obviously annoyed the Sikhs ; but there was no strong protest at the time because the Sikh Church was not then a powerful institution sustained by its Augustines and Aquians. But gradually Sikhs organized themselves to voice their own opinion of the nature of their faith and to counter the Arya Samaj.

view that it was but a Hindu cult. It was Max Arthur Macauliffe's six-volume—*The Sikh Religion, Its Gurus, Sacred Writings and Authors* (1909)—which established the identity of the Sikh faith, explained its theology and presented the whole story of its emergence as a religion. But Macauliffe, nevertheless, observed that 'Hinduism has embraced Sikhism in its folds ; the still comparatively young religion is making a vigorous struggle for life, but its ultimate destruction is, it is apprehended, inevitable without state support.' History of Sikhism since then is well known. What is not understood is that nothing will be more pleasing to the Sikh than responsible, liberal Hindu learning making a significant contribution to Sikh studies affirming that Sikhism is not a cult or sect of Hinduism. Barrier has shown how we should proceed in that very important task.

Dr. Richard P. Cronin's "Language and Nationalism in Late Nineteenth Century and Early Twentieth Century India" is a well-documented and well-argued presentation of the subject with reference to the consequences of the substitution of Hindi for Oriya as the court language of Sambalpur district in what was then the Central Provinces. The Bengalis who dominated the services, both government and private, in the Oriya-speaking areas, were not only indifferent to the development of the regional language, they insisted on the use of their language in schools. In 1873, Cronin points out, 'the Bengal Government gave the Commissioner of the Orissa Division discretion to exclude Bengali from the schools and make Oriya the sole medium of instruction.' The Orissa Association which was also known as the Utkal Sabha of Cuttack urged the government to promote Oriya as the language of civil and judicial administration of the Oriya-speaking areas; amongst the exponents of the idea was no less a person than Madhusudan Das, a distinguished Congress leader. But the government issued an order in 1895 abolishing Oriya as the court language of Sambalpur district 'to substitute Hindi in its place.' It is indeed strange that a change such as this affecting the sentiments and convenience of the Oriya-speaking people of the district was announced only by a Resolution of the Commissioner of the Central Provinces dated 15 January 1895. The reason for the change, the Commissioner explained, was that Sambalpur was an Oriya-speaking district in a Hindi majority province. Representatives of the Oriya-speaking community voiced their protest against the Commissioner's decision : the Government of India did not listen to them and sanctioned the change on 8 November 1895. This so disappointed the people that they asked for a separate administrative unit for the Oriya-speaking people. The movement succeeded in restoring Oriya as the court language of Sambalpur in February 1903. Cronin concludes his essay with the significant remark that, 'the Government of India conceded the legitimacy of Oriya nationalism (with the exception of the Madras territories) while denying the legitimacy of Bengali nationalism.'

Barbara W Flynn's essay "Cows and Music" is exceedingly perceptive on Hindu-Muslim riots as an instrument of political mobilization. Dr. Flynn first points out how Mahatma Gandhi made the Khilafat question a national issue 'in order to bring the Muslim minority into the movement and to show the Muslims the Hindus' good faith and sincerity.' From this she argues that Mahatma Gandhi introduced 'a new idea—that of using a political movement to redress a religious grievance.' According to Flynn, 'this created a model for the politicization of religion which would influence political action between the communities rather than against the British.' The communal riots caused by music before mosques and cow slaughter in Hindu areas raised the question.—'Who would inherit the British mantle and what tradition—Hindu, Muslim or secular—would inform the government.' That the question led to the partition is outside the theme of this essay.

Dr. Heather T. Frazer's "The Council of India and the Formation of British Policy" is a study of the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909 which the author says, 'were cast out of a number of compromises between Minto, the Government of India, Morley and the Council of India.' Frazer brings out the background of these compromises in all its details which are collected from relevant state papers. In the analysis of the forces which determined the shaping of Britain's Indian policy, Frazer says, that 'the Council of India's presence was certainly felt in the drafting of the reforms scheme; as an institution it cannot be ignored when analyzing the formation of Britain's policies in India.'

Dr. C. S. Jossan's, "Hindi Short Story and the *Nayi Kahani* Writing" deals with the literary controversy around the *Nayi Kahani* (New Story) Movement in Hindi literature in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1956, Dr. Namvar Singh, whom Jossan calls a Hindi critic with decidedly Marxist-progressive leanings, 'contended that after India's gaining freedom in 1947 there were new forces of uplift and meaningful rising expectations working in the rural areas.' According to Namvar Singh, these new forces in rural life led to the emergence of a new kind of short story depicting life in the villages. 'How can a meaningful depiction of city life be done if that life itself seems meaningless.'

Several distinguished writers of short story, and Mohan Rakesh was among them, disagreed with Namvar Singh and argued that, 'the writer who looks at life as a total entity does not divide it into village-town-city partitions.'

Before long the *Nayi Kahani Movement* stood for the new writings of the younger generation to be distinguished from the older writers like Jainendra Kumar and Agyeya. But the controversy led to a good deal of inconsequential sophistication in Hindi criticism and as Jossan rightly observes, 'there were perhaps more pages written on the short story than the total number of pages the stories under review could possibly fill.'

Jossan nevertheless admits that, 'under the impact of this movement Hindi fiction acquired a new direction.' But he does not think that this really elevated Hindi fiction to the level of Russian and French fiction.

Dr. William W. Reinhardt's "Marijuana in British India" is a study of the British policy towards hemp drugs, that is *ganja* as it is called in Bengali and Hindi. Reinhardt considers the importance of British policy regarding drugs in India as something in which any country facing problems of drug smuggling should be interested. That policy is embodied in the *Marijuana Report of the Indian Drugs Commission 1893-94* published in the United States in 1969 with an introduction by John Kaplan, Professor of Law at Stanford University. Reinhardt concludes that, 'if ever there was a case study of the sensible, no-nonsense approach and methods of Victorian Englishmen, the Commissions' Report is it.'

The last essay in the volume, Dr. Bradford Spangenberg's — "Sectarian Hinduism and the Quest for Social Reform in Modern India" is a plea for a reformist programme to be initiated by the Hindus as a precaution against unenlightened orthodoxy. In his view 'if modern religious movements in India abdicate any continuing role as prophets of social reform, then their major contribution to modern India will be eclipsed.'

The volume gives us a very cheering idea of the quality of US scholars' research in modern Indian history and it is particularly heartening to see that this research is based on Indian language sources. The contributors to the volume have paid fitting tribute to Dr. Swan who urged acquisition of Indian languages for studies in Indian society.

Calcutta

R. K. DAS GUPTA

N.A. SARMA : International Environment and India's Economic Development. Published by Abhinav for Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi, 1986, Rs. 60.

NO economy, however autarchial, is today an island to itself. Even the centrally planned economies of East Europe have found it difficult to keep outside influences at bay. High tariff walls, strictest restrictions on imports and exports and comprehensive planning of every sector of economy have had their limitations. In recent times new influences have subverted national control mechanisms ; communications technology and informatics, environmental hazards not the least of which concerns nuclear power plants and movement of manpower highly qualified, skilled and semi skilled. Even in the heyday of protectionist and nationalist fervour after independence Indian economy was far less immune

to the changing international environment than many of the closed economies, both among the developed and developing countries.

In India, the importance of export promotion on a massive scale was realised as early as the sixties with the establishment of export promotion councils, export incentive schemes and financial subsidies. The main effort and interest in international economic relations were, however, towards obtaining concessional financial flows to speed up industrialisation. Augmentation of international commercial investment in the Indian economy was circumscribed by the self-denying policies influenced by memories of the colonial era. The success stories of a number of South East and East Asian countries which have followed an open economy ideology were considered irrelevant to our continental-size economy. Our interest in the study of experiences of some of the large economies of Latin America—Brazil, Argentina and Mexico—was marginal. I do not find convincing enough explanations of this lacuna in our study of international economic relations, as India and these Latin American countries have many common problems in managing internal and external economic challenges. In the seventies we pinned our hopes on the creation of a New International Economic Order. With the benefit of hindsight one may be forgiven to say that these hopes were misplaced. Together with the great majority of countries, India was caught unprepared in the worst ever international economic storm created by manifold increases in prices of crude oil products, twice within the decade of the seventies. Indian economy steered through the storm better than many of the developing countries of Africa and Latin America. This should give us a degree of confidence as we face the international economic flux of the eighties.

Dr. N.A. Sarma's little book on international environment and India's economic development is a timely contribution to the understanding of inter-actions between our current domestic economic developmental issues and a much too rapidly changing international economic environment of the eighties. Sarma's credentials for dissecting our body economy, identifying its ills and prescribing remedies for them are impeccable. To me an outstanding feature of the book is that it is free from the ideological fashions of the day, a very rare thing. There is a robust and a down to earth analysis of our new economic policies of liberalisation of the controls under which our domestic and international economic policies have so long functioned. The first effects of the new direction of our economic policies are now becoming visible and are having their impact on our trade balance, financial flows, debt servicing, both internal and external, and comparative rates of economic growth. The book is for the serious and informed public keen to understand India's economic strengths and weaknesses in their international setting during the next few years of rapid transition. The reasoning and analysis of the main issues are sound and

logical, supported by just the right dose of statistical tables. There is a welcome absence of economic jargon and rhetoric.

India has been described as a 'poor-rich' country; poverty-ridden and yet rich in resources. The 'poor-rich' concept has another dimension. Out of the total population of 800 million, nearly 250 million people in India are economically at the take-off stage. They have the necessary technological and managerial skills, recourse to financial resources at home and abroad and have a secular approach to social-economic problems. They are ready for modernisation and liberalisation of the Indian economic system and the complex and involved relationships with international economic forces which is implied. The rights and aspirations of the urban and rural poor, numbering the vast majority in India, often seem to be in opposition to greater integration of the Indian economy with the international market forces. The huge unemployment problem with its concomitant work ethics and efficiency, large scale ecological degradation, severe strains on basic civil services, including law and order, have to be tackled if the Indian economic system is to remain afloat in the storms and squalls of the open seas of the volatile and often hostile international economic environment. With these objectives in view, Sarma calls for an early review of the Seventh Plan strategy and necessary course correction.

New Delhi

K.L. Dalal

SAMAR GUHA : The Mahatma and the Netaji : Two Men of Destiny. Sterling, New Delhi, 1986, 244 p., Rs. 125.

THE book under review deals with the contribution of Gandhiji and Subhas Chandra Bose towards the attainment of India's independence. Gandhiji is associated with the propagation of non-violence, while Subhas followed the path of revolution to achieve the common end i.e. the freedom of the country from the British.

The author has made an earnest attempt to discuss the basic nature of the political and ideological relations between the two. He has tried to present the personal faith, political contributions and ideological missions of Gandhiji and Subhas in a detached manner, without ignoring the shades of differences they had in this regard. He proves by argument that Gandhiji and Subhas were nearer to one another in respect of their basic concepts and their personal philosophies. There is no doubt that Gandhiji's concept of non-violence had a wider appeal as compared with the revolutionary approach of Subhas, still both played a dominant role in India's struggle for freedom.

After giving a description of their family background, the author goes on to describe convincingly the twin trends in the Indian freedom struggle and follows it up with a fascinating account of conflict between these two men of destiny, which culminated at the Tripuri Congress to the parting of the ways between the two. The next chapters are devoted to the escape of Subhas to Europe, his appearance in South-East Asia, the exploits of the Indian National Army under his leadership and the impact of the trial of the INA on the British. Towards the end, the author makes a comparative study of the political views and ideological thought of these two great men and concludes that they were rather close to each other in these respects. Both had the vision to evolve for the country and the people a view of the society in which the human spirit should flourish unbridled. There is no doubt that both strove to evolve a national ideology for the people to follow, though whether this was followed or not it is very difficult to say. Both were dreamers and idealists, but no one can deny that Gandhiji left a deeper impact not only on India but the whole world, while Subhas' influence was limited.

The present work is a welcome contribution to the existing corpus of knowledge on Gandhiji and Subhas. By and large, the book deserves praise for presenting the study of these two men of destiny in a new light.

T.R. SAREEN

Indian Council for Historical Research,
New Delhi.

CARL BRIDGE : *Holding India to the Empire : The British Conservative Party and the 1935 Constitution*. Sterling, New Delhi, 1986, 220 p., Rs. 125.

IN many ways the Government of India Act 1935, has been a controversial piece of legislation. While the admirers of the British rule in India have found in it the *basis* of India's 1950 Constitution, many of the nationalist historians have criticised it as being responsible for sowing the seeds of partition. Others have variously described the Act of 1935. The Congress called it a "*charter of slavery*"; the British Government considered it as a basis of dominionhood. To Winston Churchill, this was a misconceived recipe for British withdrawal from India. Against this broad frame of reference, in the book under review, *Holding India to the Empire*, the author, Carl Bridge seeks to analyse the basic motivations behind the Conservative Party's framing of the Government of India Act of 1935. The study is structured around eight chapters. The first two chapters

spell out the rationale behind the Conservative Party's acceptance of the *Montague-Chelmsford Reforms* of 1919 and deal with the efforts of Lord Irwin, Viceroy of India and Sir Simon John, British Home Secretary, to tackle India's problem during the *inter-war* period.

In the two following chapters the author analyses the different facets of the First and the Second Round Table Conferences. In this context he spells out the federation scheme of the Conservative Party. The author asserts, this scheme was conceived in terms of safeguarding British political and economic interests in India.

In Chapter Five, Carl Bridge outlines the right-wing Conservative challenge against the various reforms conceived in this scheme. The next chapter studies the predicament of Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State for India 1931-35, who was the principal framer of the India Act of 1935 seeking to set up an All-India Federation that was designed to include for the first time Indian princes. Here the author makes some significant observations. There is an element of paradox involved in the observations made here by the author. While to Churchill and the right-wing Conservatives the federation scheme implied withdrawal from India, the liberal historians conceived the 1935 Act as the last major achievement of British rule in India. In fact, as Carl Bridge points out in the preface that even Jawaharlal Nehru considered that the 1935 Act formed the basis for India's 1950 Constitution.

Chapter Seven, "From Paper to Practice" is a narrative of the working of Government of India Act of 1935. In the concluding chapter, Carl Bridge dwells on the various ramifications of the federation scheme and the diverse pulls and pressures that it had to experience.

For one thing every British proposal for giving *self rule* to India on an incremental basis was conceived more as a matter of expediency to tackle the immediate Indian *demands* for independence. And for another, these schemes were designed to preserve the British rule in India. The rationale behind such an approach seems to have been influenced by the oft-repeated dictum : "a single concession postpones the revolution by hundred years." In the present context the British efforts had been complicated by the outbreak of World War II. The Government of India Act of 1935, was overtaken by the external events set into motion by the Second World War. Thus, to the extent Britain was unable to recover from the shock of the war, it found it difficult to retain its control over India.

The author should be congratulated for having highlighted certain impelling factors—though at times overlooked—pertaining to the last phase of the British Raj. Though Britain was a member of the victorious coalition in 1945, it was hardly left with surplus strength to rule India as its colony. The Conservatives knew this. But they were happy that the task of withdrawal from India fell on the Labour Party.

The study under review has been published under the auspices of the Asian Studies Association of Australia. While the publication demonstrates the *development* of strong academic interest on South Asia in Australia, in a more specific sense it raises some basic questions as to whether the British Government really sought to give self-rule to the people of India on a time-bound basis. A definitive answer to this question calls for greater scholarly attention to this area,

Indian Council of World Affairs,
New Delhi.

SHIVAJI GANGULY

P. H. MAMMEN : Communalism Vs. Communism : A Study of the Socio-religious Communities and Political Parties in Kerala 1892-1970. Minerva Calcutta, 1981, 237 p., Rs. 76.

MAMMEN'S study of Kerala politics traces the historical origins and evolution of the main socio-religious communities in the state as well as the shifting political alignments which have characterised the politics of the state in the post-Independence period. Covering, as it does, a span of a hundred years the study offers no more than a brief survey of developments but it presents some useful and interesting information, carefully put together. The tables, at the back of the book, also provide useful reference material.

The first section of the book sketches in the main socio-economic features of each community in the late medieval period. There is also a brief analysis of how each community responded to the socio-economic changes which took place in the early years of the twentieth century. This is followed by a study of how reorganisation of the state and the challenge of democratic processes affected communal alignments. With this background filled in, the rest of the book presents a somewhat linear account of party politics and electoral results after Independence. The rise and fall of leaders and cabinets, the formation and dissolution of coalitions, the future of individual politicians and parties all find a place in this account. Mammen chose how all parties, including the Communist parties, have relied on communal groups for support. This makes one wonder about the aptness of the title of the book.

The framework of Mammen's study is provided by development and modernisation theories. Both these theories are now somewhat discredited because of their thinly concealed celebration of Western institutions and practices and their links with conservative political ideologies and US

world interests. Development and modernisation theories of the 50s and 60s upheld the primacy of the goals of political stability and economic development. They also assumed that the socio-economic changes which would be generated in traditional societies by the processes of industrialisation and urbanisation would provide a secure base for liberal democratic institution and that such institutions were the best guarantee of political stability. Since stability was seen as a goal by itself, even authoritarian regimes could be tolerated in 'the short run' provided they tried to modernise their societies. Criticisms of modernisation theories are of course now wide spread but it is interesting to see from the book that Phd. theses in American universities are still influenced by the paradigm.

However, it must be said that Mammen's book has avoided some of the cruder aspects of modernisation theories. In spite of that, he functions from familiar premises — the opposition between modernity and tradition, the view that commercial development, industrialisation, urbanisation and literacy form a package which together generate processes of modernisation, that modernising changes are the necessary basis for a stable democratic system. His implicit value premise seems to be that 'modernised', mobile societies in which class replaces caste as a factor of social integration and in which traditional values are replaced by more individual and secular ones, are best suited to bring about political stability and economic growth. To support the view that Kerala politics may be moving forward in the approved direction, he suggests that communal groups are getting sucked into pluralist, democratic processes. Whether or not they become secularised in the process will depend upon the extent to which stable coalitions which can promote economic development are able to survive in the state.

While these assumptions form the framework of the study there is only an uneasy fit between them and the largely descriptive account of the political alignments of the three communities which is put forward. Which is perhaps a good thing. For, to make too much of a stability defined mainly in terms of the life of cabinets might have led Mammen to conclusions which would have been difficult to sustain. It might also have conflicted too sharply with the general perception of contemporary Kerala politics as characterised by volatility, unsavoury political deals and mounting economic problems.

Modernisation theories have drawn attention to the close links which exist between economic developments, social changes and political events, but they have not generally been able to conceptualise the links between these different aspects of society. Explanations therefore tend to remain at a somewhat simple level. Thus the book presents interesting and perceptive comments regarding the demographic spread and economic resources of the different communities; there is also an analysis of the sectoral and class-wise distribution of resources and income. But this analysis

remains somewhat separate to the discussion of political developments. The concluding analysis relates to the prospects for the future developments of the state. Mammen's suggestion that if good economic performance is achieved the communal basis of politics may be undermined may find some supporters although the experience of other parts of the country tends to raise some questions about this thesis. His view that the present pattern of coalition politics offers hope since it makes Kerala a problem-solving state is more problematical. In many respects the existing political coalitions seem to be a solution only to the problem of sharing power and privilege among ruling groups. And it is this, among other factors, which has fuelled the more aggressive recent forms of communalism which have emerged.

Kerala politics presents many unusual features and fascinating contradictions which have attracted the attention of political analysts. The most that any one study could achieve would be to locate the important questions and identify trends of development. Mammen's book raises a number of interesting questions, particularly in the very title of the book. He also offers some interesting material which could help to answer those questions. Somewhere along the way however, the enquiry gets derailed and description of political events takes over. For all that, it is an addition to the literature about the state.

New Delhi,

S. JOSEPH

M.V. KAMATH : Behind the By-line—A Journalist's Memoirs. Vision Books, New Delhi, 264p., Rs. 100.

WE are accustomed to reading journalistic memoirs that dilate upon the author's triumphs and conquests—but keep out of the narrative the travails gone through in producing them, evidently under the notion that they are irrelevant if not uninteresting. And yet there is often an even greater story behind those stories that deserves to be told—that have turned into great movies like "All the President's Men" or novels like Evelyn Waugh's "Scoop."

As the title underlines, M.V. Kamath's "*Behind the By-line*" is about not only the wide range of international events and powwows in Brussels, Geneva, Paris and Belgrade he covered and the personalities he came across during a span of over two decades but also about the labours that went into the production of those stories. As the narrative moves on, personalities like Krishna Menon, M.C. Chagla, Nawab Ali Yavar Jung,

T.N. Kaul and others flash across the screen. Kamath has also interesting things to say about Nixon's Presidency and the "President's Men".

It is apparent from Kamath's book that a foreign correspondent's assignment is no picnic, demanding much physical and mental stamina, besides encyclopaedic background knowledge at the tips of his fingers as also a gift to make friends and cultivate special diplomatic news contacts.

Until Kamath came on the scene in the fifties, the Indian 'Foreign Correspondent'—based in London, and occasionally also in Washington—belonged to the category that came to be known as the "Chairborne Brigade with a Magic-carpet dateline" that largely depended on scissors-and-paste to lift from the British press news items of Indian interest and cable, and often airmail, them to their newspapers. Their favourites for the purpose were *New Statesman*, the *Guardian* and *Economist*. There were of course hand outs available at the Indian High Commission. A weekly airmailed Newsletter containing a miscellany of pickings from the British Press topped the fare. They even covered news developments from European capitals unashamedly plagiarised from Fleet Street publications. Hence the phrases "Chairborne Brigade" and "Magic Carpet dateline".

Kamath won his spurs as a foreign correspondent when he accepted an European assignment from the *Times of India*, with Bonn as his base and the entire Europe as his beat. And he got the rare opportunity of reporting first-hand the awesome spectacle of a war-ravaged Europe struggling to its feet under the ominous shadow of the Berlin Wall and overhanging dark clouds of the East-West Cold War. Thus while the *Times of India* readers got from Kamath an Indian-angled, well-backgrounded, analytical coverage on the Cold War and Europe's travails, the rest of the Indian newspaper readers had to be content with Western news agency coverage which was largely pro-West-biased and inadequate.

Earlier Kamath did a stint at the United Nations as PTI correspondent—his very first and most irksome foreign assignment, with the redoubtable Krishna Menon serving as his constant pain in the neck. Apart from his nagging demands and expecting Kamath to pay daily obeisance to him at his apartment early morning, Krishna Menon proved highly uncooperative even where publicity for himself and India was invaded. Krishna Menon invariably refused to supply in advance to the PTI correspondent the full text of his speech and insisted on delivering impromptu marathon orations, while PTI and the Indian Government, as well as newspaper readers, looked up to Kamath to offer them the full text of the Indian delegate's speeches. Kamath however, passed the supreme test even though much blood, sweat and tears went into the effort.

Menon seemed more interested in wagging his walking-stick at the American reporters in full views of new photographers and hogging headlines in the United States Press than feeding the Indian news agency. But,

alas Krishna Menon was news, whether Kamath liked it or not. The PTI man had to groan and bear it !

There is an element of poignancy in Kamath's narrative about his early days with Sadanand's *Free Press Journal*, Kamath's journalistic *alma mater*, for which he continues to nurse a sentimental attachment. Young and a bachelor who could subsist on Irani's *cup-of-chai* and *kharabiscuit* plus a burning patriotic idealism, Kamath concluded that journalism would be the right profession for him and *Free Press Journal* the ideal place to begin. He hero-worshipped Sadanand and lapped FPJ's no holds-barred nationalist outpourings.

And Kamath literally gate-crashed into FPJ, forced himself into Sadanand's presence and wrested a job out of him, and then proved his worth by producing a scoop on his very first assignment. Salary was of secondary consideration for bachelor Kamath; the opportunity to make good in his chosen profession was all that mattered. Sadanand heaped on him plenty of the latter and was gratified that his new find did not insist on appropriate financial recompense.

Young Kamath was soon found writing learned edits, special articles and political columns, besides editing copies on the news desk, to the utter delight of his boss. It was however not as though Kamath did not have his quota of Sadanand's tantrums, but he held his guru in too high an esteem to react adversely.

Patriotic fervour and journalistic zeal were the hallmarks of FPJ, which endeared it to young people like Kamath. FPJ's coverage of the historic Indian Naval Mutiny at the close of the War was a typical specimen of FPJ journalism, and Kamath revelled in it.

I hope Kamath will some day write a biography of S. Sadanand. He was a remarkable man and a great patriot and journalist. It deserves to be written by one who not only admired him but also worked closely with him and knew him intimately, warts and all.

The book under review however suffers from the flaw of poor copy-editing and is overpriced.

New Delhi.

D.R. MANKEKAR

ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH FOUNDATION : Agricultural Exports Strategy Problems and Prospects Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1986, 349p., Rs. 150.

WE find the government's new economic policy is guided by a spirit of liberalization of various restrictions on economic activities of the private sector. Now vigorous attempt is being made to boost sales abroad with special attention to vital sectors, which include processed foods, jewellery, iron-ore, marine products, tea and cereals. Now we can hope for some decline in the imports due to suspension of purchase of fertilisers and the advantages of lower prices of crude petroleum products.

While the decline in the Indian share of the world market is reflected very well in case of several export items, e.g., tea, spices, leather, cotton, fabrics and unmanufactured tobacco, there has been marginal increase in case of exports of pearls, precious stones, fish, iron-ore and leather.

This study tries to identify the agricultural products for which there is a market in foreign countries. Now agriculture contributes to 40 per cent of G.N.P. and also accounts for 30 per cent of total exports while our share of the agricultural exports in total exports has declined for various reasons. Still there is significant scope due to the fact that in the area of manufactured exports, no main thrust could be achieved. Since our trade deficits has exceeded Rs. 5000 crores, it is very imperative to explore new markets and new commodities to sustain the tempo of exports. Really one way out could be the possibility of export of agricultural items.

This study tries to review the past trends and structure of India's exports of selected commodity groups, identify commodities which have 'additional' export potential, identify major importing markets, examine the import policies of major buyers of these items, and look into the cost-benefit of selected commodities along with some policy measures for promoting exports.

The basic question is whether we have enough surplus production over domestic consumption of several 'sensitive' items for export. Here the case of the entire group—oil seeds, vegetable oil and oil seed cake meals is a pointer, since domestic absorption of those commodities has gone up significantly.

In the next chapter trends in volume and value of selected items like fruits, vegetables, oil seeds, oil cakes, edible oils and fats, spices, meat and meat products, cereals are analysed with great care. The identification of important markets importing these items along with changes in the direction of trade of these items over the period is also provided.

India's major competitors of several agricultural items in international markets is the focus of analysis later. So far as export of cattle is concerned, India is a new entrant on the international scene and so far trade followed erratic behaviour. Really India has two advantages over competitors—

- (i) geographical proximity to markets,
- (ii) preference for Indian meat due to lower fat content.

In case of cereals, two items, viz., rice and wheat flour are important. In the oil seeds group, India exported only groundnut and oil seed cakes.

The horticultural processing industry is analysed exhaustively by product and by origin. While over the last decade consumer attitudes changed, fruit juices now have replaced beverages ; orange juice being the most popular. So also there is a market preference for import of bulk raw materials due to freight considerations.

Moreover, for several items, the unit value realization has declined as in case of jute, tea, tobacco and cashew-nuts. Most of our exports face various adverse factors, e.g., high cost of inputs, uneconomic size of production, low productivity due to outdated technology, poor marketing, poor quality of products, etc. A vigorous growth in the export of fruits and vegetables can be achieved if prices are stabilized with assured supply. If appropriate measures are taken, exports of cereals, fruits and vegetables can easily exceed Rs. 500 crores in the next five years.

Hence a balance between exports and imports should be brought about within a period of five years and this is really an uphill task which requires adequate infrastructure, along with various promotional measures with a view to remove cost disadvantages and also boost the marketing efforts. While India's share in world agricultural trade is less than IPC, it does not follow that possibilities for future growth are not there. It appears that by 1990, total exports of agricultural items can rise from the present level of less than Rs. 2500 crores to about 5000 crores.

With a view to pin-point exportable surplus, we have also to see comparative levels of productivity in India and other countries. Low productivity here is due to the following reasons : (i) the input of various factors, like water, fertilizer, seeds per hectare is much lower than other countries ; and (ii) due to pressure on land low productivity lands have been cultivated. Since the quality of agricultural items is not always within control of the producers and trade contracts and surplus needs to be built over a long period some sort of corporate form of organisation in export forums is suggested so that exports could be raised to the level of \$ 35 billion by the year 2000 A.D.

Institute for Social & Economic Change,
Bangalore.

RAMESHWAR TANDON

ASIA

GILBERT ETIENNE : *Rural Development in Asia : Meetings with Peasants*. Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1985, 276p., Rs 140.

THIS book by Prof. Gilbert Etienne, who teaches in Geneva, was originally published in french in 1982 and was translated into english in 1985. It is based on the materials collected by the author during his tour of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, India and Pakistan which together account for nearly one third of the world population. The author declares that his main concern is to find the way out of poverty for the vast population of these countries so that it is able to meet their basic needs.

The author has tried to stress certain common aspects of the prevailing situation and historical experience of these five countries, though the detailed findings vary from country to country. While he attempts to focus his attention on the transition from traditional cultivation techniques to modernisation of some sort in Afghanistan and on water management in Bangladesh, he is more concerned with imbalances in India. He has thrown light on the thinking of peasants and their approach to problems of development they encounter.

As it happens in such works that are written more as travelogues than as serious analytical studies, this book is impressionistic. The author has gathered data but has failed to analyse them and integrate them with what he gets by way of interviews.

His conclusions are naive and seem to have been arrived at even before the field trips were taken. He stresses the need for accelerating the rate of growth without giving any heed to distributional aspects. He believes in the theory of trickle-down. If overall production increases, the people below the poverty line will also get some benefits. He also does not seem to be worried about the need to make the pattern of production so as to cater to the needs of the people. He is not enthusiastic about various poverty alleviation programmes.

He pleads for economic liberalisation, i.e., removal of all controls and centralised planning. The package of policy which he advocates for India includes : "a greater care for efficiency, pragmatism, liberalisation of the system, growing links with the external world ; all of which can speed up the overall economic process of development and also have a positive impact on the poor."

He advises the Asian countries to concentrate their attention on improving their economic and social situations through a more efficient administration and population control. He does not talk of socio-economic institutional changes. He is oblivious of the consequences of the colonial past of these countries and the present day ravages by neo-colonialism.

This book is worthless for a serious scholar and quite superficial for general readers for it is not even an interesting piece of journalistic writing.

New Delhi

GIRISH MISHRA

West Asia

THE KARP REPORT: Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington. D.C., 1984, 90p., \$ 3.95.

THIS slim volume represents the findings of an Israeli Government inquiry into settler violence against Palestinians on the West Bank. It may be recalled that the Israelis occupied the Palestinian territories of West Bank and Gaza in the course of the June 1967 War thereby completing the subjugation of entire Palestine. Situations such as this are normally governed by the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, concluded way back in August 1949. Article 27 of the Convention lays down that persons belonging to territories occupied in course of a war "shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence of threats thereof." Other articles provide for safeguards against deportation of the protected persons and expropriation of their lands and properties. But Israel has flouted all such established norms subjecting the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to savagely inhuman treatment reminiscent of the practices commonly ascribed to the racist South African regime.

In July 1980, fourteen law professors from Tel Aviv and Hebrew universities submitted a petition to the Israeli Attorney General expressing concern about irregularities in law enforcement in the occupied West Bank and cited numerous cases in which violence committed by Israeli settlers against Palestinians had not been thoroughly investigated, and others in which investigations were conducted but the suspects rarely indicted. After much dilly-dallying the Attorney General appointed, in April 1981 a Commission of Inquiry headed by Yehudit Karp, after whom it was named. As was to be expected, the Commission encountered endless difficulties in its work caused mainly by the non-cooperative attitude of military administrators, police officials and the Israeli settlers who had forcibly grabbed Palestinian agricultural and pasture lands with official connivance. The Commission submitted its report in about a year's time; but twenty months were to pass before the cumulative pressure built up by the public, the media, and the Knesset (parliament) compelled the government to publish what admittedly turned out to be an edited version of the Commission's findings.

Though a bowdlerized document, the *Karp Report* goes a long way to confirm charges of ambivalence, duplicity and dereliction of duty on the part of Israeli authorities already widely reported in the world Press and by fact-finding panels periodically set up by various international bodies. A perusal of the report drives one to the sad conclusion that while occupation is excruciatingly painful for the Palestinians it has done no less damage to Israel's self-image.

M. S. AGWANI

Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi.

ARTHUR R. DAY : East Bank/West Bank : Jordan and the Prospects for Peace. Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1986, 166p., \$ 17.50.

THIS is a well thought out book by an expert of long standing who had the advantage of knowing the complex matter not only from the angle of the State Department in Washington but also from the region while he was posted there. The book is published under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, and is in keeping with its standards of scholarship and objectivity.

In this extensive study the author has tried to highlight the interaction of the East and the West Banks in Jordan's domestic and foreign policies. Jordan is a small state in terms of population, territory and resources. Yet, it plays a crucial role because of its geo-political location. It commands the access to the Eastern Mediterranean and also the Gulf. Moreover, its geographical proximity to Israel has also enhanced its strategic importance.

The Arab-Israeli conflict has affected Jordan in more than one way. While it gained the West Bank in 1948, only to lose it in 1967, its Palestinian legacy has often led it into confrontation not only with Israel but also with the Palestinians themselves, especially the radical groups among the *fedayeen*. The presence of a large number of Palestinians has often posed problems of regime security for King Hussain.

The author has discussed in detail these variables and their impact upon the society, economy and polity of Jordan including the armed forces and the institution of monarchy. Lack of economic resources has in fact forced Jordanians to work harder to catch up with the neighbours, with the result that Jordan today has a vast reservoir of trained manpower and a dynamic commercial base. The Iraq-Iran War has also indirectly helped Jordan by making it an economic rear base of Iraq. The Jordanian

armed forces were always the best trained in the Arab world and they have maintained that tradition despite the fact that their weapons are not always the most modern.

Major socio-political and economic questions that affected Jordan are connected with the Palestinian problem. By incorporating the West Bank in the erstwhile Trans-Jordan in 1948, the ruling dynasty in Amman has inherited a legacy that has not been always beneficial. The Palestinian Question has become central to the Jordanian system. Even the fate of the West Bank or a 'Palestinian State' is closely linked with it. That had brought the monarchy into direct and bloody confrontation with the PLO in 1970-71. Now that the PLO has been weakened due to internal rivalries, King Hussain has once again regained the initiative that he had lost in the Rabat Conference in 1973 when the Arab States had accepted the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians.

The author has also analysed United States' policy towards Jordan and the related problems. He believes that the USA should support Jordan so that Jordan could play a constructive role in the region. Such a policy, however, has little chance of success because of the strong Zionist lobby in the USA that sees Jordan as an enemy of Israel. It has successfully prevented not only the transfer of US economic and military aid to Jordan but also has pre-empted any change in US policy towards the Palestine Question.

The book is very easy to read. It carries good details. It also has a small but select annotated bibliography. The book can be recommended to experts and laymen alike.

Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi.

K.R. SINGH

INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By Ashok Jambhekar

The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and students as well as libraries a compact bibliography of such current Indian publications in the field of social sciences as are received from publishers, but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness, it is hoped that this section, together with the review section of this journal, does list publications of importance useful for libraries and research workers in the social sciences.

ADISESHIAH, Malcolm S. *Mid Year Review of the Economy 1986-87* (Madras Institute of Development Studies Working Paper, 76). Madras Institute of Development Studies, Madras, 1986, V.P. paper.

The Government introduced some important policy changes in economic policy and outlook, in fiscal policy, in industrial policy, trade policy, etc., during the year under review through the new thinking brought in by the introduction of MODVAT, Long Term Fiscal Policy, Sukhomoy Chakravarty Report, Abid Hussain Committee Report, New Education Policy, etc. This study makes a critical analysis of these and discusses whether these changes have affected the course of development.

BAXI, Upendra *Environment Protection Act : An Agenda for Implementation*. N.M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd. (On behalf of Indian Law Institute), Bombay, 1987, 87 p., Rs. 30. (Paper).

A meeting of experts was convened by the Consumer Education and Research Centre and the Indian Law Institute on 22-24 August 1986, to consider the ways in which the Environmental Protection Act, 1986 (EPA), may be effectively implemented. Social activists, environmental and legal experts, representatives of consumer movement and the industry, academics, social scientists, media persons and the Chair Person and Member-Secretary of the Law Commission of India participated in the meeting. This publication contains general observations which emerged from the discussions on the tasks set before the meeting, these were to suggest ways and means for effective implementation of the EPA and to propose the substance of the rules to be made under the Act, to enable to realise national environmental policies embodied in the EPA. The appendix section provides text of the Environment (Protection) Act 1986, Order of Transport Commissioner, Maharashtra State on the transportation of dangerous/hazardous substances by road dated July 1986 and Notification of Environment (Protection) Rules 1986 issued by Ministry of Environment & Forests.

CHAUDHURI, Asim Kumar (Ed.) : *Indian Socialist Panorama*. Socialist Movement Golden Jubilee Celebrations Committee, Calcutta, 1986. xi, 119 p., Rs. 30. (Paper).

1984 marked the Golden Jubilee year of the Socialist movement in India and to mark the event a celebration committee was formed in West Bengal which was inaugurated on 17 May 1984 at Calcutta. It was inaugurated by Gangasaran Singh and first Secretary of the Congress Socialist Party of Bengal (undivided) Atul Krishna Basu addressed it as the Chief Guest. This collection presents a panoramic view of the movement and includes articles on socialist luminaries namely Acharya Narendra Deva, Jayaprakash Narayan, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, Ashoka Mehta and Anil Roy who by their views enriched the movement. An editorial of *Janata "Socialist's Movement"* appeared in its issue dated 23 October, 1983 and the policy statements adopted by the National Conference of the Praja Socialist Party held at Gaya in 1955, which emphasised on the cultural and morality content of the movement, are also included with a view to explain the ideological foundations of Democratic Socialism.

GUHAN, S. *State Finances in Tamil Nadu : 1950-85; A Review of Trends and Policy* (Madras Institute of Development Studies Working Paper, 77). Madras Institute of Development Studies, Madras, 1986, 158 p., (Paper).

This study discusses structure and growth of the overall receipts, revenue transfers from the centre, growth, structure and broad impact of taxes, non-tax revenues relating them to indirect subsidies and to the operations of public sector enterprises including the State Electricity Board, structure of expenditures and the levels and patterns of plan outlays, debt and the financing of capital formulation, aspects of fiscal policy and of fiscal policies in the state based on the trends discussed ; the data is presented in terms of the five quinquennial periods.

HEPTULLA, Najma *India's Progress in Science and Technology: Continuity and Change*. Oxford & IBH, New Delhi, 1986, xiv, 117 p., Rs. 95.

The author who hails from an illustrious family, and herself a scientist and well-known public figure, presents progress of science in India historically and its achievements during the last thirty eight years. The book contains scientific thoughts of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi who both realised the relationship between the progress of science and technology and India's progress, and found in it answers to the problems of the common man and for achieving self-reliance. She has critically analysed the science policy and made suggestions for making it more vigorous and effective. The appendix part includes documents namely Scientific Policy Resolution, Draft Resolution on Science and Technology adopted by the Indian National Congress in 1969, Technology Policy Statement and Ocean Policy Statement.

INDIA, LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT *Background to Evolving a National Information Policy*. Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1987, v, 39 p., Rs. 12. (Paper).

Based on published sources, it describes the various laws affecting the press and the guidelines issued from time to time to the official media units by Government; serves as background material for Members of Parliament ;

JOSHI, B.K. *Impact of Industrialization on the Social Ecology of the Hill Areas of Uttar Pradesh*. Giri Institute of Development Studies, Lucknow, 1987, 74 p., (Paper).

Economic and socio-ecological dimensions of impact are analysed. In the economic impact, it focuses on the backward and forward linkages of the industrialisation, employment and income generation. The sociological impact concerns with the changes in occupational pattern and attitudes, housing, development of infrastructure facilities like banking, communications, education, health, etc., and the cultural and environmental consequences of industrialisation. The study considers six units : i) Almora Magnesites Ltd, ii) Saraswati Woollen Mills Ltd., iii) U.P. Digitals Ltd., iv) Teletronix Ltd., v) Venus Cement Ltd., and vi) A P R Wools Private Ltd. It is sponsored and financially supported by the Industrial Development Bank of India.

KELKAR, Govind *Women and Development Programmes in Contemporary Rural China and India* (Occasional Papers on History and Society, 36). Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, 1987, 122 p., (Paper).

The study examines the women's question as reflected in the rural development strategies in China and India and effects of these strategies on women in terms of destroying class and gender-based disparities and patriarchal bases of power involving the masses of rural women and men in decision-making processes at all levels of social, economic and political activity as well as in planning and implementing development programmes. It also examines response of women's organisations to their question and problems, and liberation of women.

KHILNANI, Niranjan M. *India's Road to Independence 1857 to 1947 : (Panorama of Struggle for Freedom)* Sterling, New Delhi, 1987, viii, 150 p., Rs. 90.

The ninety years' story of India's struggle for freedom beginning from the great uprising of 1857 is replete with heroic endeavours of blood, tears and toils and also inspiring achievements in the field of nation-building, and the contribution to this national endeavour made by many great and outstanding men in every field which is unparalleled in world history. It describes the significant events of the non-violent struggle for freedom—the birth of Indian National Congress, Jallianwala Bagh tragedy, Swarajists' fight for emancipation from within, Salt March, Gandhi-Irwin Pact, Quit India Resolution 1942. It also discusses impact of India's freedom struggle on the freedom movements in other countries of Asia and Africa. It is also a history of the Indian National Congress.

LOGHANI, Usha *Violation of Freedom of the Press : (A Compendium of Adjudications Rendered by the Press Council of India)*. N.M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd., on behalf of the Press Council of India and Indian Law Institute, Bombay, 1986, xxviii, 142 p., Rs. 60. (Paper).

This is the second part which relates to adjudications and principles in matters falling under section 13 of the Press Council Act 1978. It deals with various aspects of interference with freedom of press under the heads : "Pressurisation and Harassment of Newsmen," "Accreditation and Freedom"; "Advertisement and Freedom;" and "Freedom of the Press" (Miscellaneous.) It contains text of section 13 of the Press Council Act, 1978 and the Press Council (Procedure for Inquiry) Regulations, 1979. It also provides list of complaints adjudicated by Press Council of India and quantitative breakdown of Press Council decisions in respect of the aspects dealt with in this book.

MAJUMDAR, Sarajit *Social Formation and Internal Structure* (Madras Institute of Development Studies Working Paper, 73). Madras Institute of Development Studies, Madras, 1986, 58 p. (Paper).

This study deals with social formations in order to capture the historical movements and their diversities. The cases discussed are the South African formation, Colonial Kandyan Formation of Sri Lanka, and the fishing community in Sakthi, Kerala.

MEHTA, G.S. *Consequences of Migration—Characteristics and Its Effect on the Pattern of Income Distribution* (Giri Institute of Development Studies Working Paper, 92). Giri Institute of Development Studies, Lucknow, 28 p. (Paper).

A case study of rural areas of district Almora and Pithoragarh in Uttar Pradesh and the villages chosen are Farsali Palli and Jarti, and Uparda respectively. Results of effects of migration on income distribution are derived from a sample of 205 migrant households.

MISHRA, G.P. *On the Question of Relationship Between Agricultural Surplus and Economic Development* (Giri Institute of Development Studies Working Paper, 91) Giri Institute of Development Studies, Lucknow, 20 p. (Paper).

It discusses three theoretical formulations, namely Physiocratic scheme, Classical Analysis and Marxian framework on the relationship between surplus agricultural produce and development which highlight the importance of surplus produce in the social process of economic development and mode of surplus generation and extraction.

NANDA, Bikram Narayan and Mohammad Talib, *Power, Protest and Symbols : Social Reality of Factory Rules* (Occasional Papers on History and Society, 35) Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, 1987. 37 p.

Narration of experiences of a suburban village Meethapur in Delhi and through this it discusses the dialectics of power and protest in the contemporary society.

SHARMA, Dhirendra (Ed). *The Indian Atom Power & Proliferation ; A Documentary History of Nuclear Policies, Development and the Critics : 1958-1986*. Philosophy and Social Action, on behalf of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, New Delhi, 1986, v., 166 p., Rs. 75.

It is a handbook which examines nuclear arguments for India's energy policy. It provides the full text of Atomic Energy Act 1962, and the plan for development of atomic energy, space and electronics; based on official documents and selections from independent critics. Anti-nuclear movement in India, inter-relation of 'peaceful' atom and nuclear weapons and social and political consequences of nuclear policy for a developing society are also discussed. It includes brief information on Pakistan's nuclear policy.

SHARMA, Suresh K. and Sartaj A. Abidi (Eds.): *Twentieth Century Indian Social Science Writings : Survey of Indian Review and Modern Review 1900-1980 : Vol. I* Gitanjali Publishing House, New Delhi, 1986, xxv, 387 p., Rs. 200.

This is an index to the two most important journals: *Indian Review* (1900, Madras) and *Modern Review* (1907, Calcutta) of which the founder editors were G.A. Natesan and Ramanand Chatterjee. Volume One covers five subjects : viz. Biography, Gandhiana, Nehruana, Education and Geography. It is arranged subject-wise and provides cross references. The physical location of the volumes of these journals in various libraries of India is indicated separately as an aid to search of material.

SINGH, Y.P., etc. *Prospects of Cotton Cultivation : A Global View with Special Reference to India and Uttar Pradesh* (Giri Institute of Development Studies Working Paper, 88) Giri Institute of Development Studies, Lucknow, 42 p. (Paper).

It deals with the area, production and yield under cotton crop in the states in India, position of Uttar Pradesh as a cotton growing state and the situation in cotton growing districts of Uttar Pradesh. It also discusses a situation of cotton crop at the global level and India's share in world markets, in production and yield. Farmers' viewpoint regarding cotton crop *vis-a-vis* other cash crops is also dealt.

SUBRAMANIAN, S. *Poverty and Inequality in Tamil Nadu* (Madras Institute of Development Studies Working Paper, 74) Madras Institute of Development Studies, Madras, 1986. (Paper).

Study of phenomena of poverty and inequality in relation to the categories of consumer expenditure, nutritional intake and income-earning assets. It finds that the head-count ratio which measures the proportion of people in poverty, has been consistently high in both the rural and the urban areas in the state. Inequality in the distribution of consumer expenditure is worse in the urban areas than in the rural as measured by the Gini Ratio of concentration. Trends in the nutritional deprivation are disquieting and the analysis of the occupational incidence of poverty shows that the industrial and agricultural workers are most prone to deprivation. It also shows high inequality levels in the distribution of assets and of land. There is an urgent need for formulation of a coherent policy and its proper implementation.

SUBRAMANIAN, S. *Some Notes on the Measurement of Inequality, Poverty, Welfare and Discrimination* (Madras Institute of Development Studies Working Papers, 65-68) Madras Institute of Development Studies, Madras, 1986, V.P. Paper.

Contains four papers on-generalization of Gini based on Lorenz Symmetry consideration, index of poverty and an index of inequality, standard-of-living related index of aggregate welfare and brief note on constructing an index of discrimination respectively.

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CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF DEVELOPMENT

By MAN MOHAN SINGH*

The basic idea expounded in this presentation is refining of linkages between development and culture. A semantic point has been raised to the effect that the word "dimension" may be a limiting factor. In this context traditional flourishing of arts and culture has been related to the village community with reference to the institutional changes brought about by breaking up of village communities. The role of tradition has been defined in terms of technological changes. The relevance of traditional values particularly in the context of conservation concerns has been duly stressed. In yet another sense, the institutional implications of cultural dimension have been concretely illustrated in terms of Indian experiences and formulations. In an elaborate reference to "Plan of Action relating to Cultural Perspectives" as a part of "New Education Policy," various concepts and their concretisation in grassroot schemes and projects have been illustrated. The initial clashes that result from technological impacts have been highlighted though at the same time it has been suggested that over a period of time cultural perceptions of a people will overcome tensions produced by technological changes.

CULTURE, as an anthropologist put it most articulately, is the personality of a people writ large. It is very difficult to define the culture of a people and to say, this is what it is, this is what we are and this is what we shall be. It is the entire range of a heritage infinitely and exquisitely rich and varied, as also the creative impulses that transmute experiences and dreams into works of art. Rabindranath Tagore related the creative process to the *Divine Joy, Ananda*, that created the Universe and works of art too.

Yet in all debates one has to arrive at some level of semantic refinement and precision. That the process and dynamics of development have been sought to be viewed in terms of their imperative cultural dimension in the four objectives of the Cultural Decade for Development, is quite a retrieval of a drifting situation. The cultural dimension has been perceived, asserted and acknowledged in the Draft Plan of Action.

This Plan of Action highlights as it should have, a sub-objective too of "Integration of Culture into Development." The fact that there is a cultural dimension to development has acquired quite a cultural currency.

* Mr Man Mohan Singh is Joint Secretary, Department of Culture, New Delhi.
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It, however, raises a few questions as any conceptualisation must inevitably do. The cultural dimension is viewed as one of the many unnumbered, and undefined dimensions of development. Presumably, these dimensions relate to many aspects like distributive justice, choice of technology, centralised or grassroot planning, controlled or free market mechanisms. Literally then as a dimension, is culture the length, the breadth, the thickness or just an extension to the shape and process of development?

While this dimension is very triumphantly asserted, is it a sequenced priority dimension? Culture in the process of development at a given point of time is larger than a specific stage of growth. We could perhaps interpret cultural dimension as either the breadth, the length or the thickness of the totality of development. It should more logically be viewed as a dimension that pervades like a brooding overseeing presence of a cultural canopy. In fact, the implication of this emerges from the relationships acknowledged in the Plan of Action between development and "way of life of the people concerned." My basic contention is that in the dimensional interpretation, we should view culture eventually, over a period of time, as a supreme question of direction and destiny that a people envision for themselves.

The impact of induction or transfer of technology would produce cultural turbulence in the immediate context. These tremors produced by technology would travel ripple-like in a pervasive way even over the "way of life of the people concerned." In terms of specific Indian experience, public support to arts and crafts has tended to undergo an institutional change. Once upon a time, and this is not a fable, public support to arts and crafts was part of the village existence itself. There were painters and sculptors, jokers and jesters, craftsmen and creative cranks who were supported in terms of the totality of the economic and social life of a settlement. In this harmonious existence, each one of them drew out of the total produce of the community the bushels of grain that he deserved as a basis for existence and perpetuation. It is not really true that such a community support produced bad works of art or that it had no place for the creative outsiders. The Acropolis of Athens, the Sistine Chapel as also Konarak and Khajuraho illustrate how magnificent works of art were produced by institutional, religious and princely patronage. In fact, it helped perpetuate a certain traditional style, unlike the fiercely individualistic and ruthlessly self-conscious contemporary works, at times of doubtful artistic integrity.

It is therefore relevant that we find new institutional solutions to changing cultural contexts. Those traditional times can perhaps never be retrieved. No more are settlements self-sufficient. The break up of joint family and a cohesive community has transformed basically the context in which an artist finds himself today. In fact, the very community itself was then a large, pervasive, sprawling joint family with shared beliefs,

styles, fears and fables. Today, support to arts is a question of expert committees, academies procedures, rules, files, budgetary allocations and, of course, the utilisation certificates. That creativity should nevertheless be visible and manifest in such a vast amazonian jungle of rules and regulations, is a symbol of human defiance as much of creative transmutation of some deep urges, abysses and dreams. The steam and piston, the roar and thunder of engines has not obliterated the creative impulse and articulation of the image and the metaphor.

The theme of "combination of tradition and innovation" highlighted in the Plan of Action needs to be viewed in the context of traditional cultural values and their contemporary significance. This brings into sharp focus the question of tradition and its continual renewal. Indian civilisation has survived centuries of changes and shocks and has assimilated these changes into a new and assertive imagery of continuity. Let us first come to terms with the basics in the theme of the uninterrupted relevance of the past to the present. This raises the fundamental question of interpretation of time and space. The basic difference between the Orient and Occident is in the concept of time. A contemporary authority on religions, Spiegelberg, once said that the basic symbolism of the Orient was a circle and that of the Occident a cross. Whereas the circle revolved in an interminable continuity, the vertical thrust of eternity was intercepted by the horizontal intersection of time thereby containing and arresting continuity in the symbolism of a cross. This is the most fundamental conceptualisation of time and eternity and of tradition and continuity. In the Indian context the *chakara* is, therefore, an articulation of the relevance of tradition to the present.

I think that one of the profoundest statements on cultural heritage was made by Carlos Fuentes, a Mexican novelist. He said that without the culture of tradition, we would not have the tradition of culture either and that we would be like orphans of imagination. This image "orphans of imagination" is the very core of modern and contemporary crisis and in fact the reason for the "schism in the soul" itself. Very often we see disruptive manifestations of sheer physical energy. This is the consequence of culturally uprooted people who are in a state of drift, who like "facing bothways", know not which way to turn. The meaning and role of tradition is that it gives one a base and a vantage point to stand upon and to view one's options and directions within the framework of certain basic values. If one is not stable and rooted in the past, one would be floating with the erratic winds that blow from all the directions. The objective of life is to strive, to aspire and to reach with a sense of direction and to arrive with a clear perception of one's avowed goals and objectives.

Tradition in its manifestation in the world, within the world without is a question of a physical and metaphysical reality. It is only by relating himself to the past that man can belong to the present and project himself

into the future. In the Indian conceptualisation of tradition and continuity man is manifest in the inner and outer world, a symbol of "eternity present in time." This is evident in the Hymn of Man in the *Rigveda*.

Man, shining light in the city
 Has a thousand heads, eyes, and feet.
 He covers the earth on all sides,
 Rules supreme over inner space.

It must however be stated categorically that the question of relevance of traditional values to the contemporary situation is a very sensitive proposition. One can always take that one perilous step from the sublime to the ridiculous. In suggesting the linkages between the past and present, between the traditional values and development, one just cannot advocate a situation of revivalism. That brings into sharp focus the basic question, of creative transmutation of tradition. The question concerns tradition and individual talent. The question that arises : Is creativity a transformation of a whole set of imagery assimilated from one's traditional heritage ? Is tradition deadwood or a living, throbbing reality ?

One of the serious concerns, and in fact the very imperative of our times, is the situation of environmental degradation. In this context, some of our traditions concern living in harmony with nature. These are relevant to the contemporary challenges of application of technology without polluting and disfiguring our natural and cultural heritage. The theme of conservation in Indian art imagery for instance, is one of the most exquisite traditions of preserving and yet progressing. There are certain distortions which we need to correct in the interpretation of folklore and myths. While we need not revive these myths, we can yet imbibe their inner essence. Many of these myths and images of folklore celebrated respect or fear for living forms like the birds, animals, reptiles, plants and rivers. In those days when knowledge and experience were transmitted orally, the peasant's earthy perceptions of ecology were transformed into song and superstitions, fables and folklore. That illustrates my idea of highlighting the cultural essence rather than reviving interest in the dross and dust that these basic perceptions of harmony with nature gathered in the process of time. The question of interpreting the relevance of traditional values to development is one of peeling off layers of unnecessary material that conceals the inner core of truth. Many hundred years back we did not have the kind of environmental vocabulary that we have framed for ourselves now. But the cultural essence of those times and practices is relevant to us as we face today the challenges of technological progress without disrupting our bridges with the past.

Many economists, particularly concerned with theories of growth, have now advocated traditional technologies. That is why small has also been

considered to be beautiful. Today our greatest challenges is application of technology and keeping pace with a fast moving world. That is why the concept of "technology with a human face" has come to dominate discussions on contemporary challenges. There cannot be any true progress unless it has a sense of distributive justice to it. Nor can we allow wealth to accumulate in a situation where values decay. All over the world people have now started revolting from relentless pursuits of materialism. They are experiencing a sense of spiritual void. It is in this context, that traditional values of truth and simplicity of sharing the suffering are relevant.

It is necessary to conceptualise in some detail the role of tradition and heritage in always evolving situations of integration and synthesis, of creativity in progress. This takes one back as it were to the institutional dimension of cultural dimension. In our country we recently had a national debate lasting for more than a year in which new educational visions were perceived and finally embodied in a concrete 'Programme of Action'. One of the profoundest assertions in the basic 'Policy Document and Programme of Action' related to linkages between culture and education in the context of economic development. This is defined in the policy document in absolutely unmistakable terms. The existing schism between the formal system of education and the country's rich and varied cultural traditions needs to be bridged. The preoccupation with modern technologies cannot be allowed to sever our new generations from the roots in India's history and culture. Deculturation, dehumanisation and alienation must be avoided at all costs. Education can and must bring about a fine synthesis between change-oriented technologies and the country's continuity of cultural tradition.

In the Seventh Five Year Plan document of the Planning Commission of the Government of India, the role of culture in development has been asserted with an equal measure of significance. The very opening paragraph states that "to say that education is fundamental to economic development is a truism. To draw attention to the fact that development without culture is a machine without direction or a human being without a soul, is to state the obvious." This tends to correct distortions which had crept into our educational system in the colonial interregnum.

The traditional linkages and fusion that subsisted between education and culture were disrupted leading to emphasis on professional development in education and its dissociation from our cultural heritage. This schism led to the wilting and withering away of many of our folk and traditional art forms. In any basic policy reorientation of the educational system we will have to reassess and restore linkages between education and culture in a rounded development of creative and professional capabilities.

The synthesis is based on the profound assumption that a productive human being would tend to achieve within himself an integration of the values of culture and the values of science. This focuses on the new dim-

ension of human resource development viewed thematically and structurally as an integrated process with culture as a catalyst in the awakening and sharpening of individual capabilities that contribute to the corporate consciousness and to the socio-economic national goals. This concept views people of the country in terms of a valuable resource, in fact the most valuable resource at that. In this approach, science and aesthetics, law and values, shall impart the entire gamut of development a new meaning in one unified pattern.

In this Plan of Action cultural perceptions would be sensitised in terms of work experience and crafts. These personal experiences of the cultural kind will be through singing, painting, sculpture and a myriad manifestations of arts and crafts images. This would be based on the child's right to play as also to express his dreams. In the formative years, in the first important step towards realisation, this would require form and content changes in education at the pre-primary and primary levels. These curriculum changes would be based on work experience with cultural orientation. This would be achieved by free play of creative impulses. The important aspect of these exposures through textbooks would be to integrate the awareness of our heritage including our natural environment. At the primary level it would also be necessary to arouse in the student an awareness of their environment and through this awareness build up a foundation of conservation values enshrined in our myths, folklore and creative imagery.

In yet another important way, linkages between culture and development would be expressed in programmes relating to development of theatre and talent for acting including practice of such arts as puppetry and clay sculpturing in schools. The idea is to begin with the building up of a process of linear and vertical cultural development in each individual. Starting with practice in various art forms it would mature into sensitive perceptions and lead to an eventual discovery and articulation of creative potential among the students. The emphasis would be to make optimal use of institutions and facilities by working out community cultural complexes. The idea is to evoke and strengthen cultural responses by interfaces between the community and educational institutions in terms of expositions, exhibitions and performances. A special emphasis in cultural curriculum highlights the need to create awareness not only of the richness of our heritage but also of the imperative need to preserve it. This is sought to be encouraged in the participative sense by linking institutions with archaeological and historical sites. This would be achieved by involving students in maintenance, cleaning and guarding of cultural sites as a part of their Socially Useful Productive Work.

In the 'Cultural Decade Plan of Action' there is a recurring reference to the role of women, particularly, in the productive processes. In the conceptual and institutional sense this has to be reflected in National Policy on

Education. It highlights the fact that education has to be used as an agent of basic change in the status of women in order to neutralise the accumulated distortions of the past. The new policy seeks to play an interventionist role in increasing their access to vocational training. This has been viewed as an act of faith and of social engineering. The spectrum of programmes which is being implemented ranges from removal of women's illiteracy to their larger participation in non-traditional professions and in the emerging technologies.

These may perhaps be random contours of an emerging landscape. Development in the ultimate analysis cannot be perceived in terms of ascent of technology and descent of man. Eventually developing countries will have to have a cultural policy but with a difference. Cultural policy is not akin to or something like an economic policy or employment policy or for that matter policy regulating imports and exports. A carefully and sensitively conceived and implemented cultural policy is an issue of unleashing of the creative power of a people in terms of creation of an atmosphere that is conducive to creativity. This has to be a conscious and concerted programme of action that pulls culture from its backseat to a higher priority. Cultural expressions of a people are as important as the other necessities of life. In the alliterative sense a cultural policy has to focus on preservation, promotion and projection of a people's heritage, their contemporary concerns and dreams. Perhaps, it would be necessary eventually to acknowledge the cultural dimensions of development as much as to work out a profile of a policy that unfolds its pragmatic and institutional implications. These would vary from people to people, from one country to another. But somewhere along the line the cultural rootedness of a people would eventually help them shape their destinies in the midst of mind-boggling dynamics of change.

The process of integration between culture and development would come only over a period of time. That is why an important part of our development plan is aptly captioned as "Cultural Perspectives." In the beginning the technological gadgetry of culture may bring its own machines and exotic music, but eventually a culturally oriented and rooted people will blend these technological innovations in the genius of their own soils. The act of balancing will require all the strength, vitality and creativity of living cultures to come to terms with technological changes. Perhaps, one day projects, currently being cleared from the financial, environmental and legal angles will also be cleared from cultural angles.

It is impossible in the expanding frontiers to visualise a world where cultures would protect themselves by closing in or insulating themselves against external impacts and influences. Rabindranath Tagore in a metaphor of great beauty said that the traveller must knock at all doors before coming to his own. He must have wandered far and wide to reach at last the most secret shrine. The meaning of Tagore's condition is equally eloquently

uttered by Mahatma Gandhi. He said, "I do not want my house to be walled in on all sides and my windows to be stuffed. I want the culture of all lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible but I refuse to be blown off my feet by any of them."

DIPLOMATIC APPRENTICESHIP : PRE-INDEPENDENCE ORIGINS OF INDIAN DIPLOMACY AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR THE POST-INDEPENDENCE FOREIGN POLICY

By T.A. KEENLEYSIDE*

Over the decades of the Indian struggle for independence from Britain Indians had an opportunity, unique in length and scope among peoples emerging from colonial rule, to engage in nascent diplomatic activity. With an organized and articulate movement for independence in place by the 1880's, a sophisticated leadership that engaged in frequent international travel, opportunities afforded to Indians for many years prior to 1947 to work in various departments of the British Indian Civil Service that touched on matters of an international character, and with Indians attending sessions of the League of Nations and Imperial (Commonwealth) Conferences, a variety of means were available to them to gain experience at the international level over an extended period prior to independence. As a result, India emerged from colonial rule with both a reservoir of diplomatic talent and an incipient orientation for its diplomacy, including a range of general foreign policy goals. It was thereby better prepared than perhaps any other country which acquired its independence after World War II to take a prominent place on the global stage quickly and forcefully, and to influence the diplomacy of other countries that were in time to constitute the Third World. It is the purpose of this study, first to set out the nature of Indian participation in both unofficial and official diplomatic activity prior to independence and, then, to examine the implications of this experience for post-independence Indian foreign policy.

PARTICIPATION AT AN UNOFFICIAL LEVEL

FROM the beginnings of the independence movement late in the nineteenth century, Indians persistently attempted to develop contacts with other countries with the object of obtaining sympathy and support for political reform in India. Thus, international activity in the form of unofficial overseas diplomacy was an important adjunct of the Indian National Movement from its inception and predated the development of a regular and independent interest in foreign affairs generally. As early as 1889, the newly founded Indian National Congress established an associated agency in England to present to the British public the views of nationalist India and win favour for the programme of the Congress.¹

* Dr. Keenleyside is Professor Department of Political Science, University of Windsor, Canada.

Subsequently, efforts were also made to organize nationalist Indian propaganda centres in Germany, France, Japan, and especially the United States where expatriate Indians founded a number of information agencies and publications during the period before and after World War I.²

In addition to the activities of overseas nationalist Indian bureaus, the numerous journeys of Indians to England, continental Europe and North America were also of importance late in the nineteenth and early in the twentieth century in promoting knowledge abroad of, and interest in the Indian political struggle. Indeed, even such distinguished Indian travellers in this period as Swami Vivekananda and Rabindranath Tagore, who were not directly involved in the national political movement, unconsciously became a part of its unofficial diplomatic effort, for in the eyes of their foreign hosts they were regarded as representatives of the new, renascent India³ and, hence, by their own eminence they raised the stature of nationalist India in the international community. However, the development of foreign contacts by nationalist Indians was characterized by waves of activity and troughs of inertia, and in 1920, with the inauguration of the first non-cooperation movement, a period of comparative quietude in unofficial Indian diplomacy descended. The Congress closed its British Committee and discontinued publication of the Committee's Journal—*India*⁴—while other propaganda centres in the West, lacking support from India at this time, also stagnated. It was not until 1927 and 1928 that extensive support emerged for the first really vigorous effort at overseas diplomacy by the Indian National Congress. There were five main reasons for the revitalized activity.

Need for Foreign Contacts

First, by the late 1920's, interest in international politics in general was becoming more intensive in informed circles in nationalist India. In particular, a group of young radicals was emerging within the Indian National Congress whose members, inspired by socialist ideals, concerned themselves with international as well as domestic political developments. It became a persistent theme of these Congressmen, and eventually a view tacitly accepted by the Congress as a whole, that the domestic Indian problem of subjection was only part of the world problem of imperialism and that it was, therefore, perilous for nationalist India to remain isolated from the outside world, since political developments elsewhere affected the Indian struggle, just as it in turn affected events in other dependent countries.⁵

Second, and related to the above, in the late 1920's Indians began to argue that it might be possible for dependent countries to cooperate in a joint challenge to imperial rule. Many Indian nationalists, therefore, became attracted to the idea of developing contacts with other independent

dence movements and with sympathetic organizations in the imperialist countries as an essential prerequisite to the attainment of the more ambitious goal of anti-imperial unity.⁶

Third, during 1927 and 1928, a number of influential Indian leaders, most notably Motilal and Jawaharlal Nehru, Vithalbhai Patel, Rabindranath Tagore, Srinivasa Iyengar and Sarojini Naidu, undertook lengthy trips to Europe and North America. Travel abroad inevitably had a broadening effect on the Indian nationalists and this, coupled with the awareness it brought of the ignorance in other countries of political developments in India, tended to convert these Indians to the need for developing foreign contacts.⁷

Fourth, the new wave of interest in international contacts resulted from a growing feeling among Indians that they were the victims of a "vast propaganda of misrepresentation"⁸ deliberately instigated in other countries to discredit the independence cause. In particular, Indians were perturbed by the publication in 1927 by the American writer, Katherine Mayo, of a book entitled—*Mother India*⁹—a tendentious attack on Indian society and on such beloved leaders of renascent India as Mahatma Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore. As a consequence, it was "increasingly felt in all Congress circles" that India could no longer "sit with folded hands and sealed lips while the enemies of her freedom" carried on "a world-wide propaganda to damage her reputation abroad."¹⁰ A counter-effort appeared necessary.

Finally, the new interest in developing foreign contacts was prompted by the announcement of the British Government in 1927 that a Royal Commission for initiating constitutional reforms, the Simon Commission, was to visit India and make recommendations for political change. This development prompted a desire on the part of many nationalist Indians to make known in Britain their resentment about the unrepresentative character of the Commission as well as their views regarding the shape of the proposed constitutional reforms. The intensification

The intensified, unofficial diplomatic efforts from the late 1920's on had essentially four components : the establishment of a Foreign Department by the Indian National Congress; the encouragement of Congress-affiliated and other pro-independence agencies abroad; participation by nationalist Indians in various non-governmental international conferences and travel abroad by Indian leaders that entailed giving lectures and media interviews

Congress Foreign Department Established

It was at the annual session of the Indian National Congress in Calcutta in 1928 that a Congress Foreign Department was established, with the object of getting "into touch with all such organizations and all such peoples" as were in the same position as India on that they might as far as possible cooperate with each other to combat... Imperialism.¹¹ This

initial effort at establishing a kind of Congress "Foreign Ministry" was, however, relatively paltry and short-lived. The Foreign Department engaged in only spasmodic correspondence with other countries and was not itself involved in organizing overseas offices to promote nationalist Indian interests. By the time the non-cooperation campaign of 1932 to 1934 was launched, the Foreign Department had fallen into abeyance for that campaign fully absorbed the energy and interests of nationalist Indians and also led to the imprisonment of the majority of Congress leaders. However, following the cessation of non-cooperation in late 1934, the All India Congress Committee began distributing a newsletter to sympathetic foreign organizations and individuals in some 20 different countries.¹² Then, at the Lucknow Congress in 1936, the Congress Working Committee was authorized to organize a new foreign department with the purpose of creating and maintaining "contacts with Indians overseas, and with international, national, labour and other organizations abroad with whom cooperation" was possible and was "likely to help in the cause of Indian freedom."¹³ A Working Committee meeting following the Lucknow Congress, authorized the expenditure of Rs. 2,000 for the organization of the department,¹⁴ a rather paltry sum for a propaganda effort which was to encompass a number of countries. In May 1936, the Congress Foreign Department began functioning with Dr. Rammanohar Lohia as its head. By the end of 1936, it was in touch with a total of over 400 individuals, journals, political, cultural and Indian organizations throughout the world. The newsletter, first initiated in 1934, became the centrepiece of the Foreign Department's activity and by the end of 1936, the department had despatched ten such letters, issued a series of statements to the domestic press reviewing the international situation and published a brochure on the Palestine Question.¹⁵ Until the outbreak of the Second World War, the Foreign Department persisted with this same programme, but at that time, with the imposition of press censorship and the resignation of Dr. Lohia the department became inoperative.

Role of Overseas Nationalist Bureaus

In so far as the operation of overseas nationalist Indian bureaus was concerned, Britain and the United States were the primary targets with the revival of this activity in the late 1920's. In June 1928, some 60 Indians resident in London met under the chairmanship of the Congress leader Srinivasa Iyengar, to form an organization to provide more active support for the nationalist cause, and more immediately, the Indian boycott of the Simon Commission.¹⁶ At the Calcutta Session of the Indian National Congress in December 1928, the London body was made an affiliate branch of the Congress. However, left after the Calcutta Session to function on its own without any real support from the Foreign Depart-

ment, it never assumed a central role in the propaganda effort in Britain. In fact, that function had already been usurped by the older Commonwealth of India League, initially established by the theosophist leader, Dr. Annie Besant, as the Indian Home Rule League. At the time the Congress branch was just being established, the Commonwealth of India League was already actively engaged in publishing pamphlets, supplying information to interested parties and producing *The India News*. In addition, it had organized 27 branches throughout England.¹⁷ After V.K. Krishna Menon assumed the secretaryship of the League in 1929, it began to associate itself more closely with the Indian National Congress (although it remained an independent institution). During 1930, for example, Menon launched the Commonwealth of India League on an intensive propaganda campaign in support of Congress non-cooperation movement in India.¹⁸ Further, in 1931 it handled many of the arrangements for Gandhi's visit to London for the Second Round Table Conference on constitutional reforms,¹⁹ while, following the collapse of the Conference, it adopted the Congress demand for complete independence for India and, accordingly, changed its name to the India League.²⁰ The League attracted to itself a number of prominent Britons, including Bertrand Russell, Harold Laski and Kingsley Martin, who gave it greater publicity than it might otherwise have obtained and no doubt helped to augment attendance at its public meetings. The Congress branch, by contrast, divorced itself from such advantageous publicity and from British labour by limiting its membership to Indians. It was further weakened by a lack of effective disciplinary control from India and in time became infiltrated by Communists.²¹ As a result, in August 1931 the Congress Working Committee chose to disaffiliate the London organization.²² That did not, however, leave the India League as the unchallenged mouthpiece of the nationalist cause in Britain, as there were a number of other bodies pursuing roughly the same object of eliciting public sympathy and support, including the Friends of India Society, the National Congress League, the Gandhi Society and the United India League.²³ This fragmentation of the propaganda effort, together with the collapse of the Congress branch, were at least partly responsible for the failure of Indians in Britain to win much support for the independence cause, especially where they most expected to find it—i.e. in British Labour Party circles. In fact, during the second government of Ramsay MacDonald, the India League never succeeded in attracting to its membership more than 23 Labour members of the House of Commons and, in any event, many in that group did not oppose their government's cautious policies towards India and failure to accede to the demands of the Congress.²⁴ After Labour's disastrous defeat at the polls in 1931, the prospect of nationalist efforts in Britain being able to effect a change in British policy largely dissolved.

The United States was deemed the second most important locus for nationalist Indian information activities because of its close economic ties with Britain and its capacity, therefore, to influence British opinion and policy.²⁵ Thus, a recently established unofficial bureau of the Congress in New York was made an affiliate of the Congress in 1928 at the same time as the London Branch. However, like its British counterpart, its impact on the propaganda effort was limited. Perhaps its most notable achievement was the arrangement in December 1929 of a direct cable service between Lahore and the United States so that the American Press was able to give extensive and informed coverage to the important Lahore Congress of 1929 that preceded the second non-cooperation movement.²⁶ However, since Sailendranath Ghose, President of the Congress Bureau, began advocating independence for India by any means including violence,²⁷ in March 1930, the All-India Congress Committee disaffiliated the American branch for carrying on "public propaganda against the declared policy of the Congress and directly contrary to the Congress creed and methods."²⁸ A new organization, the India Independence League, established by Indians and Americans disillusioned with Ghose, was initiated in 1930, but it never linked with the Congress in India and before long it became largely an American body for the promotion of Indian independence. Thus, direct Congress involvement in the information effort in the United States ended.

In Germany, the Indian Information Bureau, associated unofficially with the Indian National Congress, was established in Berlin in 1929 under the direction of A.C.N. Nambiar, but it was never a large or particularly active body. In addition, an Indian Institute was founded in October 1929 as a branch of the German Academy in Munich, with the object of promoting cultural relations between Germany and India. However, in July 1931 the Congress Working Committee decided to close the Berlin Information Bureau²⁹ and shortly afterwards Nambiar was deported from Germany by the Nazis. An unofficial Congress Committee was also formed in Kobe, Japan in 1928. From a mere handful of supporters at the outset, its membership rose to around 100 by 1933. Guided by A.M. Sahay, it held regular meetings and published a monthly newspaper—*Voice of India*—in both English and Japanese. During the 1930 Non-Co-operation Movement, the branch raised money which was remitted to India for national political work.³⁰ However, the Kobe Committee was composed mainly of Indian businessmen, concerned primarily with their own economic welfare in Japan. As a result, it did not broach political questions directly with the Japanese authorities, thereby eschewing any real influence on official Japanese policy towards India. In any event, by the 1930's, most nationalist Indians did not support the notion of cultivating support wherever it would be found, including the Fascist Powers, so that Germany, Japan and Italy were not accorded the attention that Britain and the United States received as loci of unofficial Indian diplomacy. One

important critic of this approach was Subhas Chandra Bose who argued that in "the domain of our external policy, our own socio-political views or predilections should not prejudice us against people or nations holding different views, whose sympathy we may nevertheless be able to acquire."³¹ Bose was thus a persistent critic of what he viewed as the circumscribed efforts of the Foreign Department and the Congress official and unofficial overseas bureaus at garnering support for Indian independence.³²

Participation in Non-Governmental Conferences

Another outlet for nascent nationalist Indian diplomacy was participation in a number of non-governmental conferences and related organizations over the years preceding independence. One of the first prominent conclaves of this nature was the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities, held in Brussels in February 1927, and attended by Jawaharlal Nehru. Some 175 delegates from 37 countries participated, including representatives of a number of Asian and African national political movements, labour leaders from Europe, and delegates from left wing groups in the United States and Latin America.³³ The object behind the gathering was to consolidate the various national liberation movements and achieve cooperation between them and European labour organizations in the joint struggle against imperialism.³⁴ Nehru used the meeting essentially as a platform to publicize Indian grievances against British rule and win assistance from sympathetic organizations. With this aim, he introduced a resolution according the support of the Brussels Congress to the Indian National Movement and trusting "that the peoples and workers of the other countries" would fully cooperate in India's struggle for freedom.³⁵ On Nehru's recommendation, the Madras Session of the Indian National Congress, in December 1927, passed a resolution recognizing the Congress as an associate member of the League Against Imperialism, the permanent organization founded at the Brussels meeting.³⁶ Nehru, who became one of the five honorary presidents of the League and a member of its executive committee, attended the organ's committee meetings until his departure from Europe in December 1927. Thereafter, he remained only "in distant touch"³⁷ and Indian representation passed through several other hands. Relations with the League Against Imperialism, which from the outset had had a strong Communist orientation,³⁸ began to sour in 1929 due to the League's criticisms of the moderate policies of the Congress.³⁹ Finally, in March 1931, Nehru was expelled from the League for agreeing to the Gandhi-Irwin Pact, which temporarily ended civil disobedience and paved the way for Congress cooperation with the British at the Second London Round Table Conference on constitutional reforms in the summer of 1931. Following the demise of Congress participation in the League Against Imperialism, nationalist India was next represented at an international con-

ference in August 1932; the venerable Congress leader, Vithalbhai Patel attended the Anti-War Congress in Amsterdam. About 2,000 delegates representing various labour and left wing organizations in Europe and America assembled to adopt a manifesto declaring their opposition to war.⁴⁰ Patel however, refrained from voting on the manifesto, although he tacitly agreed to it; his presence was not a product of his adherence to the views and aims of the other delegates as much as it was of his desire to win support for the liberation of India.

In September 1933, two Congress leaders—Subhas Bose and Bhulabhai Desai—attended an International Conference on India at Geneva. The Geneva Conference was the mouthpiece of the International Committee on India, which had been established by Europeans in 1932. It had as its object the dissemination of authentic news about the Indian situation to counteract alleged misrepresentation of Indian affairs by the British Government and the international press in the West. The Geneva Conference, attended by representatives of affiliated organizations of the International Committee on India in eight countries, passed a number of resolutions pertaining to Indian affairs, one of which, *inter alia*, declared India's right to complete independence.⁴¹

The Indian National Congress was also represented at the Brussels World Peace Congress in September 1936, and at the subsequent meetings of the International Peace Campaign, the permanent organ of the Brussels meeting. The Peace Congress, organized by British and French supporters of the League of Nations, was designed to restore and strengthen the powers of that body and the commitment of its member states to the principles of the Covenant. Five hundred delegates, representing organizations in 35 different countries, participated in the conference.⁴² An invitation to attend was extended to Krishna Menon, the Secretary of the India League in London, and Menon was granted permission to participate as the official representative of the Congress.⁴³ Once again, Congress attendance was used to raise the issue of Indian subjection, as Menon's speech to the gathering focused on the relationship between the liquidation of imperialism and the creation of world peace.⁴⁴ At its Faizpur Session in December 1936, the Congress resolved to associate itself with the permanent organization of the Peace Congress, the International Peace Campaign,⁴⁵ and Menon represented the Congress at subsequent meetings.⁴⁶ Further, in July 1938 along with Nehru, he attended the Paris Conference on the bombardment of open towns organized by the Peace Campaign. While Indian participation was partly out of genuine abhorrence for the aerial bombings in China and Spain, nonetheless, once again the conference was used principally to expose the iniquities of British rule in India.⁴⁷

Apart from the above, over several decades prior to independence, Indians participated in a number of regional and non-governmental con-

ferences designed in one way or another to promote the notion of pan-Asian unity, especially in the struggle against imperialism. Some of the earlier such gatherings included the Soviet-organized Baku Conference of 1920, the First Pan-Asiatic Congress at Nagasaki in 1926, and the Pan-Asiatic Conference at Shanghai in 1927.⁴⁸ Several later meetings were a result of specifically Indian initiatives: the All-Asia Education Conference at Benares in December 1930; the All-Asian Women's Conference at Lahore in January 1931; the Pan-Asiatic Labour Congress at Colombo in May 1934; and finally the Asian Relations Conference, held in New Delhi in 1947 on the eve of Indian independence.⁴⁹ All this unofficial diplomatic activity *via* international organs was, however, inevitably of only limited utility in advancing nationalist Indian aspirations because of the absence of delegations representing sovereign states and the tendency of the participants to be those already sympathetic to the Congress' goals.

Personal Diplomatic Initiatives

Perhaps of greater importance than any of the above activities in attracting international attention to the Indian situation were the individual trips abroad of prominent Indian leaders, even though these were essentially personal diplomatic initiatives rather than trips taken under the official auspices of the Congress. Among those of particular significance, following the renewal of the Congress's interest in foreign contacts, in the late 1920's were visits by Sarojini Naidu and Rabindranath Tagore in 1929 and 1930 to North America;⁵⁰ by Mahatma Gandhi to England and continental Europe in 1931;⁵¹ by Vithalbhai Patel to the United States, Ireland and Switzerland in 1932 and 1933;⁵² by Subhas Bose to Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Italy, etc., between 1933 and 1935;⁵³ and by Chaman Lall to the United States in 1936. Several Indian leaders also made it a point on various occasions of visiting Cairo on their way to or from Europe and of declaring their support for the complete independence of Egypt,⁵⁴ thus establishing ties between these two subsequent leaders of the non-aligned countries.

Especially noteworthy over the latter years before the outbreak of World War II was the unofficial diplomacy of Jawaharlal Nehru. In 1936, he spent 12 days in London during which he delivered a number of political speeches and had discussions with old acquaintances.⁵⁵ In 1938, he spent a month in London and continental Europe, undertaking a heavy programme of public meetings and interviews on Indian affairs.⁵⁶ In Paris, he made a radio broadcast in which he expounded the ideals of the Indian nationalist movement and appealed for "the goodwill of the French people. . . the torch-bearers of liberty" in the Indian struggle for freedom.⁵⁷ Nehru did not, however, confine himself to winning support for Indian independence but also expressed emerging nationalist Indian

views on international questions in general. Thus, along with Krishna Menon, he visited Barcelona for five days where he met a number of Republican leaders and associated himself, and indirectly the Congress, with the loyalist cause in Spain. In London, he conferred with some members of the British cabinet and other prominent politicians about the political crisis in Europe, making clear his anti-fascist and anti-Nazi views.⁵⁸ Later, he visited Czechoslovakia and, following his trip, indicted Britain and France for betraying their small and powerless ally.⁵⁹ In Asia also, Nehru began to play a diplomatic role in the late 1930's, visiting Burma and Malaya in 1937 and Ceylon and China in 1939⁶⁰—visits that in particular reflected the Congress concern to counteract anti-Indian sentiments in fellow Asian states.⁶¹ Nehru's personal missions abroad represented the apex of the Congress efforts at unofficial diplomacy before the outbreak of war and the renewal of non-cooperation ended this activity until the eve of independence.⁶²

OFFICIAL INDIAN DIPLOMACY

Participation in the League of Nations and Commonwealth

Despite its political dependence on Britain, India was formally represented in most of the governmental international conferences and organizations that evolved during the inter-war years. For example, India participated in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the Washington Conference on Naval Armaments of 1921, the London Naval Conference of 1930, the Disarmament Conference of 1932 and in the annual conferences of the International Labour Organization. In addition, India was represented in two important international organizations of the inter-war period—the League of Nations, of which it was a founding member, and the British Commonwealth, in whose deliberations it was included from 1917 onwards. For a variety of reasons—in particular the fact that Indian delegations to these organizations were not representative of national opinion—Indians involved in the independence movement disassociated themselves from and were critical of official Indian diplomacy conducted through such bodies and attached greater importance to the non-governmental organizations discussed above in which the voice of nationalist India could be fully heard. Nevertheless, in several modest ways official Indian participation in the League of Nations and the Commonwealth reflected national Indian opinions and concerns and presaged elements of independent Indian diplomacy *via* such bodies as the United Nations and the Commonwealth.

Even after Indians assumed leadership of Indian delegations to the League of Nations in 1929, their capacity to reflect independent Indian concerns remained limited. The delegates were, after all, appointees of the

Indian Government, and as such continued to receive their instructions from the India Office in London. Thus the expression on political matters of opinions different from Britain was precluded by the responsibility of Whitehall for the policies of the Indian delegations to the League.⁶³ Nevertheless, in the non-political area of League affairs it was possible for Indian delegations to give special attention to matters which were of particular interest and concern to Asian countries and more specifically the Indian sub-continent. Thus, India was especially active in the campaign for the abolition of slavery and traffic in women and children,⁶⁴ in the League's efforts to control the manufacture and sale of opium and other drugs,⁶⁵ in the attempts to achieve economy in League finances⁶⁶ and to improve international standards of health. One particular area in which Indian delegations imparted their own character to League affairs was in their emphasis on the non-European role of the League—on its obligation to combat international tension incited by racial feelings and to raise the status of dependent territories and of the peoples of Asia and Africa generally. In emphasizing these functions, Indian delegations reflected national Indian opinion, for one of the persistent nationalist criticisms of the League was its neglect of the welfare and concerns of non-European countries.⁶⁷

Apart from the official Indian role at the League, it was possible for other Indians to exert a modicum of influence on behalf of the nationalist cause through the specialized agencies of the organization in which not all representatives of India had to reflect Government of India policy. For example, at the annual sessions of the International Labour Conference, one of the three delegates from India was always a representative of Indian workers and both in private and public these workers' delegates criticized the failure of the Government of India to provide adequately for the welfare of Indian workers and occasionally championed the cause of Indian self-government.⁶⁸ Another agency that provided an opportunity for diplomacy more in tune with nationalist India was the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, on which India was represented from 1931 to 1939 by the illustrious Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. On several occasions, he appealed for greater international understanding of the Indian situation and spoke of the obligation of nations to bring moral pressure to bear on imperial powers to end their exploitation of colonial peoples.⁶⁹

Limited Freedom at Imperial Conferences

There was less freedom of initiative for India's delegations to the Imperial Conferences of the Empire than for its delegations to the League, tightly circumscribed though the latter were. At Imperial Conferences the Secretary of State for India was always the head of the Indian deputation

and Indians were appointed by him simply to assist at the conferences.⁷⁰ As a result, there was rigid British Cabinet control over the Indian delegation so that its status at the conferences was vastly inferior to the dominions, which were represented by their own prime ministers. Further, unlike the League, there were no subsidiary agencies through which Indians could give expression to views which approximated nationalist opinion. Finally, the Indian delegates chosen for Imperial Conferences were, with some exceptions, less representative of nationalist India than those Indians who served at the League, as well as considerably fewer in number. Accordingly, there was less intrinsically Indian character to its representation in the British Commonwealth than in the League.

Nonetheless, on the one vital question of the welfare of Indians resident in the Empire, an issue which exercised all Indians, official Indian delegations did reflect moderate opinion and attempt through diplomacy at Imperial Conferences to fulfil the widespread Indian ambition of alleviating the conditions of overseas Indians. According to an Indian Government estimate in 1936, there were approximately 2,458,000 Indians resident abroad, of whom 2,358,000 were living in the colonies and dominions of the British Empire.⁷¹ India agreed to the Imperial War Conference Reciprocity Resolution of 1917, by which the communities of the British Commonwealth were entitled to control the composition of their populations through immigration restrictions.⁷² However, in all of the dominions and in some of the colonies, Indians who had previously emigrated were being subjected to political, economic and social strictures that relegated them to second class citizenship and violated the principles of Commonwealth equality and solidarity. While Indian delegations to the Imperial Conferences accepted British policy on international questions, on this domestic, inter-imperial issue they demonstrated their affinity with national Indian opinion. From the Imperial War Conference of 1917 onward, Indian delegates frequently raised the matter of dominion and colonial treatment of Indian emigrants, warning of the possible consequences for the future of the British Commonwealth of neglect of this problem.⁷³ In addition, the Indian Government also engaged in considerable bilateral negotiations with other members of the British Commonwealth on behalf of overseas Indians. With respect to the dominions, the most notable instances were the two Cape Town Conferences of 1926-27 and 1932 between the Indian and South African Governments, which were primarily concerned with land discrimination against Indians in South Africa and reduction of the Indian population in the dominion. With respect to Indians in the colonies of the British Empire, the Indian Government frequently corresponded with the Colonial Secretary about the problems they faced. Further, on occasion, the government despatched representatives to investigate their conditions and to make representations to the British Government for improvements. Thus, on the specific issue of the

welfare of Indians abroad, which troubled the Indian Government as well as the public,⁷⁴ official Indian diplomacy through Commonwealth conferences and bilateral discussions reflected, at least to some extent, national Indian opinion and indicated the existence of an Indian diplomatic interest which was distinctly different from the concerns of Britain and which was to be of continuing duration after independence

IMPLICATIONS FOR POST-INDEPENDENCE FOREIGN POLICY

While the resolutions and statements of the Indian National Congress and the writings of its spokespersons in numerous journals, newspapers and books provide the principal sources for identifying elements of independent Indian foreign policy that are traceable to the pre-1947 period, both unofficial and official Indian diplomacy during the nationalist struggle also helped to set the tone and establish the content of future Indian diplomacy. Most obviously in this regard, nationalist Indian participation in the various non-governmental conferences and organizations of the inter-war period affirmed India's commitment to decolonization, an inevitable component of the foreign policy of independent India, as of other newly emergent states. The Congress of Oppressed Nationalities and the League Against Imperialism that evolved out of it were by their very nature centrally preoccupied with the liquidation of imperialism and Congress participation in those bodies thus demonstrated, right from the debut of its international participation, the nationalist movement's adherence to this goal. The Brussels Meeting, too, encouraged the feeling among the delegates that they were united by the common experience of subjection and that, consequently, they could work in concert for the attainment of their common objective.

While most of the other international gatherings in which nationalist Indians participated were less centrally preoccupied with imperialism, nevertheless, as indicated earlier, Indians used these occasions to focus on their own political subjection and to champion the anti-imperialist cause. At the various anti-war congresses in particular, the Indian delegates, drawing on the Leninist precept of an interrelationship among capitalism, imperialism and war, emphasized the connection between Western colonialism and the current threat to peace in Europe. At the World Peace Congress of 1936, for instance, Krishna Menon told the delegates that peace depended on the liquidation of imperial rule. "Free peoples liberated from domination and thus themselves averse to conquest are", he said, "the best guarantees of peace."⁷⁵ Similarly, at the Paris Conference in 1938, Nehru declared that the Great Powers of Europe were incapable of alleviating the European crisis instigated by the Fascist Powers "because their hands and feet" were "tied by their past and present imperialist policies."⁷⁶

Anti-imperialism was, then, a persistent theme of pre-independence Indian diplomacy, and belief in the efficiency of a collective assault on imperialism became a nationalist principle. That was evident in the efforts of the Congress Foreign Department to establish contacts with other oppressed peoples and anti-colonial organizations with the purpose of achieving unity and joint cooperation in the anti-colonial struggle. Essentially, however, the attainment of imperial unity was a policy for the future, to be pursued vigorously when cooperation became feasible - that is when some of the countries which expounded this ideal had themselves achieved independence and could cooperate practicably in applying pressure on the Imperial Powers and the international community as a whole to speed up the process of granting independence to the remaining non-self-governing peoples. This, in due course, independent India was to do *via* an assertive anti-colonial role in such bodies as the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the periodic meetings of the non-aligned countries.

More narrowly, nationalist Indian diplomacy emphasized the unity of Asian peoples in the anti-imperialist struggle—a unity allegedly founded not only on the bond of opposition to colonial rule, but on ancient ties of friendship and similarities in religion, culture and thought. For instance, Nehru's long-lasting interest in and sympathy for China commenced with his participation in the Brussels Congress of Oppressed Nationalities where he met a number of Kuomintang leaders. He helped draft a joint Indo-Chinese Resolution that recalled the ancient friendship of the two countries and appealed for a resumption of the traditional personal, cultural and political relations between the two peoples.⁷⁷ As well as meeting the Chinese delegates Nehru also talked with Asian nationalist leaders from Egypt, Persia, Syria, Annam, Korea and Indonesia.⁷⁸ Following the meeting, he wrote to the Congress that a "very strong desire" for a "closer bond among Asiatic countries" emerged at the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities.⁷⁹ The various pan-Asian conferences, held over the decades preceding independence, were also occasions for expounding the theme of 'Asian unity'; none more so than the Asian Relations Conference of 1947, where in the heady atmosphere of impending independence for several former Asian colonies, there was much optimism about Asian solidarity and leadership in international affairs. Gandhi, Sarojini Naidu and Nehru all spoke to the assembled delegates about "the essential unity" of Asia and its special international message of spiritual enlightenment.⁸⁰ In his concluding address to the Conference, Nehru declared that it was "time that Europe and America opened their eyes and ears to the message of Asia," which, he believed, conveyed "something of enormous value for humanity."⁸¹ This notion of pan-Asian unity and spiritual leadership, born during the independence struggle, persevered as an element of Indian diplomacy for several years after 1947 with sometimes adverse consequences for Indian foreign policy. In particular, it was responsible for the develop-

ment of an unrealistically sanguine assessment of the state of India's relations with its neighbours, especially China, and, hence, for a lack of preparedness for the clashes in interest that were eventually to emerge.⁸²

Elements of Indian non-alignment, the centrepiece of Indian foreign policy after 1947, could also be foreseen in unofficial Indian diplomacy prior to independence. The releases of the Congress Foreign Department, for example, declared that the Congress was "determined to detach India from the domination of British foreign policy."⁸³ However, rather than explicit references to India's avoiding entanglements in power blocs that precipitate friction and war, a more common theme was the simple characterization of India as "peace-minded" in contrast with the bellicose nature of Western states. Nascent Indian diplomacy thus conveyed the strong message that the foreign policy of an independent India would be ethically superior to that of other states and that the sub-continent was destined to play, *via* its non-alignment, an important, creative role in the preservation of world peace. This tendency had its origins in the rhetoric of India's philosophers and religious leaders who, when they travelled abroad, emphasized the spiritual and pacific qualities of Indian civilization, allegedly derived from the sub-continent's Buddhist and Hindu heritage. Late in the nineteenth century, for instance, Swami Vivekananda perceived his foreign travels as a revival of the pre-Christian diplomacy of Asoka, who had created missions in Asia for the spread of the pacific Buddhist gospel.⁸⁴ "This must be our eternal foreign policy," he wrote, "preaching the truths of our *Shastras* to the nations of the world."⁸⁵ Rabindranath Tagore also regarded it as the special destiny of India to convey to other countries by overseas diplomacy universal spiritual principles. In a speech in Rangoon in 1924, he said that the only message which was worth carrying across the deserts and seas was "the message of the 'Supreme Person'" who gave "reality and truth to all personalities" and who lived "forever in the hearts of all. . . . We are the custodians of this light which burns (for) all time and for all men."⁸⁶ Initiated by India's savants, this idea of a special Indian spiritual mission abroad was sustained by Indians more closely associated with the movement for political emancipation. Mahatma Gandhi, not surprisingly, in his overseas travels disseminated the gospel of non-violence which he regarded as a panacea not only for India's ills, but for those of the international community.⁸⁷ Sarojini Naidu, during her trips to the United States, spoke frequently on the theme of India delivering to the West a message of peace and brotherhood.⁸⁸ On one occasion in Germany in 1929 she declared: "Give us our flag, and then India will be the deliverer of the whole world."⁸⁹ Even Jawaharlal Nehru, who rejected non-violence as a precept for Indian foreign policy, nevertheless, often seemed to accept the idea that India had a special moral mission internationally. For instance, he referred to Tagore as "India's internationalist par excellence" who was carrying

"India's message to other countries,"⁹⁰ while his own speeches abroad conveyed the impression that the Congress was detached from the immorality that pervaded European politics by dint of its commitment to idealistic principles. Throughout his 1938 trip to Europe, he chided the Great Powers for their moral dereliction, implying that India did not share their ethical shortcomings. Following Neville Chamberlain's address to the British House of Commons, just before leaving for the Munich Conference, Nehru declared: "there was no talk of high principles, of freedom, of democracy, of human right and justice, of international law and morality, of the barbarity of the way of the sword."⁹¹

Nationalist Indian diplomacy at the various international conferences of the inter-war period reflected this same emphasis on ethics in international politics and the hiatus in outlook between the Western Powers and those peoples struggling for emancipation in the rest of the world. Thus, at the 1936 World Peace Congress, Krishna Menon asserted :

We the people of India, in common with the countless millions of the rest of the Asian continent and peoples of Africa, have no desire for aggression or conquest. To the progressive forces of the world our ready cooperation is always at hand and whatever the years to come may bring we shall continue to strive ceaselessly to make our contribution to world peace effective.⁹²

At the Paris Peace Conference of 1938, Nehru spoke in a similar vein :

We have associated ourselves with the work of peace most willingly because of the vital urgency of the problem. Also, because, in any event, our past background, and our civilization, would have urged us to do so. For the spirit of India for long ages past. . . has been a spirit of peace.⁹³

Even official Indian diplomacy at the League of Nations contributed to the image of India as a uniquely idealistic and pacific country. For example, Sir K.V. Reddi told the League's Sixth Committee in 1928, that India long ago had realized the "stupendous folly of waging war" and had, therefore, framed the law '*Ahimsa Paramo Dharma*'—Non-violence is the Supreme Law."⁹⁴ In 1930, the Maharaja of Bikaner declared at Geneva that India was inspired by a will for peace and ever would be. "Should anyone doubt it," he added, "let him read her philosophy, with its embodiment of the most complete and consistent code of pacifism in the world."⁹⁵

Thus, unrestrained by the realities and responsibilities of power, Indian diplomats became, as Rammanohar Lohia once put it, "merchants of the high-minded phrase,"⁹⁶ developing as well "a habit of virtuous depreciation, which comes easy to distant onlookers".⁹⁷ These were practices

that were not easy to shed in later Indian diplomacy so that India after 1947 often appeared, in the words of K.S. Murty, to "set itself up as a moral monitor of the world."⁹⁸ In this way, Indian foreign policy, and especially the practice of non-alignment, tended to be presented as imbued with ethical qualities not present in the foreign policy of other states.⁹⁹ The inevitable consequence was considerable international disillusionment and criticism when India failed in its disputes with other countries, including Pakistan, China and Portugal, to live up to the high expectations engendered by the rhetoric of its diplomats both before and after independence.¹⁰⁰

On a more positive note, India's League of Nations experience had some constructive implications for post-independence Indian multilateral diplomacy. The concern of Indian delegates to the League that the organization become less Euro-centric found an echo in independent India's role in the United Nations in the development of the Group of 77 to enhance the cohesion of the developing countries and counter-balance the influence of the Western industrialized states. Likewise, India's active role in arms control and disarmament talks, its participation in UN supervisory and peacekeeping functions, its encouragement of the economic and social activities of the United Nations family of institutions for the purpose of raising the living standards of the peoples of developing countries and its support for decolonization and racial equality, all followed from nationalist concerns, which prior to independence, had made most Indians negatively disposed towards the League because it had failed to deal with these issues effectively. India thus, demonstrated after 1947 a commitment to make the United Nations work in ways the League, dominated by the European Imperial Powers, never had. Pre-independence nationalist criticisms on the League, accordingly, presaged India's assumption of an important role in the post-war clustre of UN organs.

While India's role in Imperial Conferences was less important as a harbinger of its post-independence diplomacy, nevertheless, the preoccupation demonstrated with the welfare of Indians residing elsewhere in the Empire was sustained in its post-1947 efforts on behalf of the Indian community in South Africa in particular and its general advocacy of racial equality at sessions of the United Nations and the Commonwealth.

Finally, the unofficial and official diplomatic activities of Indians prior to 1947 had long-term consequences in that they provided India with a preliminary pool of personnel for the establishment of its Foreign Ministry and overseas missions. It had been Jawaharlal Nehru's expectation that the development of unofficial international contacts would enable nationalist India to "build up a trained body of experts in international matters" from whom would emerge India's "diplomatic corps of the future."¹⁰¹ While this hope was certainly not fully realized, nevertheless, a number of Indians did receive international experience in the pre-independence period—both

in unofficial and official capacities—that was of value to independent India in the establishment of its foreign relations, placing it at the outset in a stronger diplomatic position than most other newly emerging states. First, several Indians who engaged in unofficial diplomacy for independence assumed important positions related to Indian international relations after 1947. Jawaharlal Nehru himself, who derived his initial diplomatic training from his extensive overseas travels and participation in non-governmental conferences between 1927 and 1947, became of course, independent India's first Minister for External Affairs. Krishna Menon, the Secretary of the India League in London and a participant in international conferences on behalf of the Congress, was named India's first High Commissioner in the United Kingdom. Later, he served as leader of the Indian delegations to the United Nations from 1953 to 1962 and Minister of Defence from 1957 to 1962. Chaman Lall, an Indian labour leader who had undertaken unofficial diplomatic missions to Britain and the United States, became India's first Ambassador to Turkey. The philosopher, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, who espoused nationalist ambitions on frequent trips abroad and who also participated in the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation from 1931 to 1939, was made Ambassador to the Soviet Union as well as serving at the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) where he became Chairman of the Executive Board in 1948. There were also several Indians prominent after independence who before 1947 obtained experience in unofficial capacities as non-governmental delegates to the International Labour Conference. N.M. Joshi, who was a workers' delegate to the ILC on four occasions, became a member of the governing body of the ILO after independence; V.V. Giri, a workers' delegate to the International Labour Conference of 1926, was leader of the Indian delegation to the Asian Regional Conference of the International Labour Organization in 1950 and High Commissioner to Ceylon from 1947 to 1951; and B. Shiva Rao, a delegate to the International Labour Conference of 1929, was after independence a member of the Indian delegation to the United Nations General Assembly in 1947 and 1948.

Similarly, on the official side, a number of Indians acquired experience in the Indian Civil Service and in the Indian governmental delegations to the League of Nations and Imperial Conferences; they were important in furnishing India with trained diplomatic personnel when independence came. Perhaps most noteworthy among these was Girja Shankar Bajpai, who after 1947 became the first Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs as well as a member of the Indian delegation to the UN General Assembly in 1947 and 1948. Bajpai had received his initial training as head of the Department of Education, Health and Lands, which was responsible for the welfare of Indians abroad, as a member of the Indian Government's deputation to the South African Round Table Con-

ference of 1926, as a delegate to the League in 1930 and to the Imperial Conference of 1937, and as the first Indian Agent-General to the United States. Three other Indians who held important positions after independence also derived their initial training principally in the Department of Education, Health and Lands: K.P.S. Menon, one time Agent of the Department of Education, Health and Lands in Ceylon and later a government envoy to Zanzibar, became independent India's first Ambassador to China and later Ambassador to the Soviet Union; Sir Benegal Rama Rau, the department's Agent-General in South Africa from 1938 to 1940, was after independence Indian ambassador to Washington from 1948 to 1949; and Sir Maharaj Singh, Agent-General to South Africa from 1932 to 1935, was a member of India's delegations to the UN General Assembly in 1946 and 1947. Further, in addition to Bajpai, the Indian delegations to the League also furnished for the independence period Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, a member of the 1938 delegation, who later represented India in the Economic and Social Council of the UN in 1947 and 1948,¹⁰² while from the Indian trade commissioners' service, launched in 1930, came H.S. Malik, who, after receiving training in the pre-independence period in Britain, Germany, the United States and Canada, became India's first High Commissioner to Canada and later ambassador to France.¹⁰³

In a variety of ways, then, the character of future Indian foreign policy was shaped by unofficial and, to a more limited extent, official Indian diplomacy over the decades that preceded Indian independence. Equally importantly, this apprenticeship helped equip India with trained personnel for its debut on the world stage as a sovereign state. A struggle for political freedom is never really a happy one and, as indicated above, the legacy derived from the incipient international activity of the nationalist movement was not without its limitations and drawbacks for independent India's foreign policy. Yet, by and large, India benefited from the decades of unofficial and official foreign contact that preceded independence, emerging with a clearly defined international personality and competence to engage in the complex art of diplomacy.

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- 2 These organizations included the Ghadar Party, the Friends of Freedom for India, the India Home Rule League of America, founded by the veteran Congress leader, Lala Lajpat Rai and the Young India Association. For further details See M.V. Kamath, *The United States and India 1776-1976* (Washington : Embassy of India 1976).
- 3 Vivekananda, for example, when he visited the United States for the Chicago Parliament of Religions *Public Domain Images Collection, Handwritten*

America", suggesting that Americans identified him with the whole of awakened India. See the Rev. C.C. Everett in *Prabuddha Bharata* (Calcutta), August 1896, p. 3. Tagore, during his 1924 trip to China, was given the name "Chu Chen-tan", meaning "Thundering Morning of India", a reflection of how the Chinese associated Tagore and his ideas with renascent nationalist India. See *The Far Eastern Times*, 10 May 1924.

4 *Report of the 35th Session of the Indian National Congress*, Nagpur, December 1920, p. 94. Ostensibly, the reason for closing the London bureau was Gandhi's contention that foreign propaganda would be out of keeping with the non-cooperation movement, but it also seems likely that the decision was prompted by the tremendous cost involved in operating the bureau and the journal, which from 1893 onward cost the Congress Rs. 60,000 annually, and because of the problem of maintaining discipline over the bureau's activities. See *Report of the 34th Session of the Indian National Congress*, Amritsar, 1919, pp. 161-2.

5 See for example, *Indian Quarterly Register* (Calcutta), 2, 1927, p. 373; Jawaharlal Nehru, "India and the Need for International Contacts," *New Era* (Madras), Vol. 1, no. 1, October 1928, p. 23; Taraknath Das "World Significance of a Franco-German Accord," *Modern Review* (Calcutta), 47, no. 1, January 1930, p. 112; Jawaharlal Nehru, "Whither India? *The Leader* (Allahabad), 14 October 1933.

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7 See *Hindu Weekly*, 2 June 1927; 5 January, 9 February, 30 August 1928; *Modern Review*, 52, no. 4, October 1932, p. 471; 53, no. 5, May 1933, pp. 600-1; *The Leader*, 6 May 1929.

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10 *Indian National Herald* (Bombay), 9 February 1928. See also Taraknath Das, "India in the Eyes of Europe," *Calcutta Review*, 26, no. 2, February 1928, pp. 181-2; "Wanted Indian Propaganda Abroad" (Anonymous), *The Hindustan Review* (Allahabad), April 1928, p. 233; *Hindu Weekly*, 5 July 1928.

11 *Report of the 43rd Session of the Indian National Congress*, Calcutta, 1928, p. 91. 12 *Report of the General Secretary of the Indian National Congress*, April-December 1936, p. 7.

13 *Indian Annual Register* (Calcutta), 1, 1936, p. 248.

14 *Ibid.*, p. 254.

15 *Report of the General Secretary*, pp. 29-31.

16 See *Hindu Weekly*, 21 June and 12 July 1928.

17 *Indian Affairs* (London), July 1931, p. 46.

18 See T.J.S. George, *Krishna Menon, A Biography* (London, 1964), pp. 61-3. For details of the activities of the League at this time, see also *The Bengalee* (Calcutta), 2 April 1930; *Hindu Weekly*, 18 May 1930.

19 *Indian Affairs*, October 1931, p. 34.

20 *The Leader*, 7 December 1931.

21 For evidence of the Communist influence in the London Congress branch, see *The Leader*, 13 November 1929, 1 December 1930; *The Bengalee*, 21 September 1930; *The Pioneer* (Allahabad), 29 November 1930; *The Leader*, 1 December 1930.

22 *Congress Bulletein* (Allahabad), No. 4, 1931, p. 35.

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24 *Hindu Weekly Illustrated*, 30 October 1932.

25 See for example, Sudhindra Bose in *Hindu Weekly*, 26 April 1928.

26 *Modern Review*, 47, no. 3, March 1930, p. 399. For the branch's activities see also *The New York Times*, 16 February 1930.

27 *The New York Times*, 26 January, 11 May 1930.

28 *Indian Annual Register*, 1, 1930, p. 340.

29 *Congress Bulletin*, No. 3, 1931.

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31 *Modern Review*, 55, no. 3, March 1934, p. 610.

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62 While this article focuses on Indians associated with the Indian National Congress, it is important to note that unofficial diplomacy was not an exclusive preserve of supporters of that organization. For example, representatives of the National Liberal Federation were particularly active in Britain in urging political reform taking advantage of the fact that they had a greater number of friends in influential circles than did leaders of the Congress.

63 See Cmd. 3569, 1930, *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, Vol. 5, *Memo-randa Submitted by the Government of India and the Office to the Indian Statutory Commission*, pp. 1334-1645.

64 See for example, *League of Nations Official Journal* (Geneva), Special Supplement, no. 174, September 1937, p. 34.

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66 The Indian delegate, Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, participated in the Committee on the Allocation of Legitimate Expenses, convened by the 1938 Assembly to examine

the modifications that should be made in the scale of contributions. *Monthly Summary of the League of Nations*, 19, no. 2 1939, p. 77.

67 See *Modern Review*, 43, no. 6, June 1928, p. 755; 55, no. 6, June 1934, pp. 722-6; *The Leader*, 19 May 1929, 12 October 1933; *The Pioneer*, 7 September 1930. For examples of the attempts by League delegates to interest the organization in problems of particular concern to Asia, see P. Kodanda Rao, *The Right Honourable V.S. Srinivasa Sastri, A Political Biography* (London, 1963), p. 110; J.C. Coyajee, *India and the League of Nations* (Waltair, 1932), pp. 18-19; *Final Reports of the Delegates of India to the 3rd, 9th, 10th (Ordinary) Sessions of the Assembly of the League of Nations, 1922, 1928, 1929*, pp. 131-3; 128; 127.

68 See *Hindu Weekly*, 29 June 1930; *Modern Review*, 62, no. 1, July 1937, pp. 114-5; *The Manchester Guardian*, 11, 20, June 1938.

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74 The breadth and intensity of nationalist Indian concern with this question can be gauged by a few statistics. During the period 1928 to 1938, the *Modern Review* carried 83 articles and notes about Indians abroad and the *Indian Review* 217. From 1928 to 1933, *The Hindu* wrote 129 editorials about the problems of Indians, in various parts of the Commonwealth. In the Legislative Assembly there were during the period 1928 to 1938, 14 debates concerning overseas Indians and 552 questions posed on this subject. Further, resolutions expressing sympathy with Indians abroad were almost a regular feature of the annual sessions of the Congress, the Muslim League and the National Liberal Federation.

75 T.J.S. George, *Krishna Menon*, n. 18, pp. 110-11.

76 Nehru, *Unity of India*, n. 47, p. 282.

77 Report on the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities, Prasad, *Origins of Indian Foreign Policy*, n. 6, pp. 272-3.

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80 *Asian Relations*, n. 49, pp. 29, 244-5, 248-9, 252.

81 *Ibid.*, p. 248.

82 For a fuller analysis of this negative effect of pre-independence diplomacy, see T.A. Keenleyside, "Nationalist Indian Attitudes Towards Asia: A Troublesome Legacy for Post-Independence Indian Foreign Policy," *Pacific Affairs*, (Vancouver), Vol. 55, no. 2, Summer, 1982, pp. 210-230.

83 Dr. Rammanohar Lohia, writing in the American magazine *Asia*, (New York), May 1938, p. 285.

84 See *Prabuddha Bharata*, September 1986, inside cover page.

85 Swami Vivekananda, *The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda* (Almora, 1960), Vol. 3, p. 316.

86 *Visva-Bharati Bulletin*, No. 1, 1924, p. 9. See also *The New York Times*, 30 November 1930.

87 See his radio broadcast from London to the United States, reproduced in *Indian Annual Register*, 2, 1931, p. 15. For his speeches on the continent on the theme of non-violence in international relations, see *Figaro*, 6 December 1931; *Hindu Weekly*, 20 December 1931.

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90 Nehru, *Discovery of India*, n. 58, p. 342.

91 Nehru, *Unity of India*, n. 47, p. 290.

92 T.J.S. George, *Krishna Menon*, n. 18, pp. 110-111.

93 Nehru, *Unity of India*, n. 47, p. 278. See also *Asian Relations*, n. 49, pp. 29, 244-5, 248-9, 252.

94 *Final Report of the Delegates of India to the 9th (Ordinary) Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations*, 1928, p. 157.

95 *Final Report of the Delegates of India to the 9th (Ordinary) Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations*, 1930, p. 98.

96 Rammanohar Lohia, *Foreign Policy* (Aligarh, 1963), p. 159.

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100 The legacy of pre-independence diplomacy is explored in greater detail in T.A. Keenleyside, "Prelude to Power : The Meaning of Non-Alignment Before Indian Independence," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 53, no. 3, Fall 1980, pp. 461-483.

101 Jawaharlal Nehru, "India and the Need for International Contacts," *New Era*, Vol. 1, no. 1, October 1928, p. 25.

102 Independent India also benefitted from the experience some of its nationals derived from participation in the League and International Labour Organization Secretariats. Perhaps the most prominent of these for independent India was P.P. Pillai, who served in various administrative capacities in the League and ILO between 1924 and 1946 and after independence was Minister Plenipotentiary and Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations in 1947 and 1948. Subsequently he undertook additional diplomatic responsibilities on behalf of the Indian Government.

103 The extent to which it was possible for Indians to be prepared through government service for post-independence diplomacy was, however, restricted by their ineligibility for the British diplomatic service, which was limited to British subjects of United Kingdom origin or second generation British citizens born in self-governing dominions. See India, *Legislative Assembly Debates*, 2, 1930, pp. 1616-7 ; 2, 1933, p. 1792 ; 6, 1936, p. 265 ; Cmd 3569, 1930, Vol. 5, p. 1334. The above personnel information has been compiled from various *Who's Who* published in India, the *International Who's Who*, the *League of Nations Official Journals*, and the *Yearbooks of the United Nations*. Since the focus of this article is on India, it excludes those individuals who later served Pakistan in various diplomatic capacities.

TERRORISM AND SAARC

By PARTHA S. GHOSH*

The fundamental cause of war is not historic rivalries, nor unjust peace settlements, nor nationalist grievances, nor competition in armaments, nor imperialism, nor poverty, nor the economic struggle for markets and raw materials, nor the contradictions of capitalism nor the aggressiveness of fascism or Communism; though some of these may have occasioned particular wars. The fundamental cause is the absence of international government; in other words the anarchy of sovereign states.

Martin Wight in *Power Politics*.¹

The menace of terrorism which is uppermost on the agenda of several governments of the world these days has rightly been characterised as wars that need not require violation of national frontiers. The allusion here of course is to international terrorism. But the border line demarcating "national" and international terrorism is itself so blurred that it would indeed be unrealistic to distinguish one from another. Thanks to the growing complexities of the international system, coupled with an unprecedented technological revolution, the tremour of terroristic activities are often felt thousands of miles away from their epicentres. The concept of a global village seems to be expressing itself with a vengeance.

According to a report submitted by a United States' Government counter-terrorism expert in February 1987, terrorist incidents worldwide in 1986 were as many as about eight hundred.² This writer is not sure whether this figure included the ones in India. Even if it did, probably the list was not complete, for the incidents in India itself would have accounted for about half of them. Moreover, it is not clear either as to what kind of incidents have been viewed as terroristic in nature. This leads to the crux of the problem: How to define terrorism?

TOWARDS A DEFINITION

TERRORISM is not a recent phenomenon, though of course it has hit the headlines in recent times. Yet it is rather surprising to note that the *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* which carries chapters on almost all matters of social importance does not contain any on terror-

* Dr. Ghosh is on the staff of the Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi.

ism.³ Even the latest *Oxford English Dictionary* provides only a partial definition. It defines a 'terrorist' as "a member of a clandestine or expatriate organisation aiming to coerce an established government by acts of violence against it or its subjects."⁴ The definition is questionable in two important respects. In the first place, the emphasis on the element "clandestine" is misplaced. For example, the Sri Lankan Government considered the members of the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as terrorists while their activities were quite open. Similar is true in the case of India with regard to the All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF). Secondly, the definition does not refer at all to the problem of state terrorism which is no less a bugging problem than that of terrorism proper.

The definitional problem which has become somewhat of a cliche in the case of many other societal problems cannot be ignored that way with regard to terrorism. The definition of terrorism is central to international cooperation in developing the necessary machinery to combat it.

Walter Laqueur, a noted American scholar on terrorism and guerilla warfare, in one of his recent articles underlined the basic problem confronting efforts on the part of nations to combat the problem. It emanates, according to him, primarily from the fact that there is no universally accepted definition of the phenomenon and the definition varies depending upon one's political ideology, geographic location, international linkages, incidence of terrorist activity on one's soil, and so on. Alex Schmid, the author of a detailed research guide to terrorism, published in 1984, listed 109 different definitions of terrorism provided between 1936 and 1981. Ever since, many more have been added. The United States Government alone has provided half a dozen, which again are by no means identical. Laqueur writes: "Most experts agree that terrorism is the use of threat of violence, a method of combat or a strategy to achieve certain goals, that its aim is to induce a state of fear in the victim, that it is ruthless and does not conform to humanitarian norms, and that publicity is an essential factor in terrorist strategy. Beyond this point definitions differ.... [Actually], it would be unrealistic to expect unanimity on a topic so close to us in time."⁵

The difficulty of defining terrorism has led to the cliche that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. The disagreement on definition underscores the crux of the problem which is essentially political and the SAARC experience has confirmed it once more

SAARC ENDEAVOUR TO ADDRESS TERRORISM

The first time SAARC thought of the necessity of combating acts of terrorism in the South Asian region was at the First Summit Meeting held in Dhaka in December 1985. It was a preliminary exercise and the issue

was not discussed in detail. It was decided then to have the matter looked into by a study group. The latter met in Dhaka in June 1986.

Study Group Meets in Dhaka, 12-14 June 1986

The meeting was held to examine the problem of terrorism as it affected the security and stability of the region and to submit recommendations as to how best SAARC member-states could cooperate among themselves to solve the problem. Delegates from all the seven states recognised that co-operation among SAARC states was vital if terrorism was to be prevented and eliminated from the region as part of a world-wide campaign against the growing menace. They made the following recommendations:⁶

- I SAARC Member States would unequivocally condemn all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal, and deplore their impact on life and property, socio-economic development, political stability, international peace and cooperation.
- II SAARC Member States, that have not yet done so, may consider becoming parties to the existing international conventions relating to various aspects of international terrorism in keeping with Resolution 40/61 of the United Nations General Assembly. The existing international conventions to combat terrorism include:
 - a) Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed in Tokyo on 14 September 1963
 - b) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at the Hague on 16 December 1970.
 - c) Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971.
 - d) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents, concluded at New York on 14 December 1973 and
 - e) The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, concluded at New York on 17 December 1979.
- III As a part of their obligation under international law each SAARC Member State should refrain, as per UNGA Resolution No 2625 (XXV), from organizing, instigation, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when they involve a threat or use of force.
- IV SAARC Member States should call upon one another to take measures as may be appropriate at respective national level for the prevention and elimination of terrorism. Such measures may require independent and coordinated indepth study of the root causes of prevailing instances of terrorism and harmonisation of domestic legis-

lation relating to terrorism with each other and with existing international conventions.

V Member States of SAARC should resolutely support and uphold the recommendations of the UN Ad-hoc Committee on International Terrorism as adopted by the UNGA Resolution No. 34/145 of 17 December 1979.

VI Member States may give consideration to the setting up of an appropriate mechanism for the identification of offences which may be regarded as terroristic and which for the purposes of extradition are not to be regarded as political.

VII Cooperation among concerned security agencies of Member States could include exchange and sharing of intelligence relating to terrorism so as to prevent terrorist activities through appropriate precautionary measures. The modalities of such cooperation can be worked out.

VIII Some mechanism may be considered for closer cooperation and coordination on the terrorist problem among Member States and also between SAARC States and other international agencies such as ICPO-INTERPOL, the UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, etc. The modalities of such a mechanism could be worked out.

IX SAARC Member States should cooperate by way of exchange of expertise. They could consult on how to improve existing protective measures against possible terrorist action. Training in the field of anti-terrorist techniques could be an area of cooperative activity. Training could also be imparted to concerned and selected personnel engaged in high terrorist-risk occupations on how to handle crisis situations. Seminars and workshops could be held on negotiating tactics with terrorists in a crisis situation. Consultations could be held with a view to evolving a common policy on how to react to terrorist demands, the advantages and disadvantages of different options, such as a firm and rigid no-concessions policy or a flexible approach could be discussed.

X SAARC Member States should make persistent efforts so that the media exercises voluntary restraint in reporting on the acts of terrorism. The focus should be on highlighting the immoral and criminal aspects of terrorism and in any case terrorists or terrorism should not be romanticised.

Second SAARC Summit in Bangalore—16-17 November 1986

Following the Study Group Meeting mentioned above, on 12-13 August 1986 when the SAARC Council of Ministers met in Dhaka, the subject of terrorism again came up for discussion. Reiterating the sixth recommen-

dation of the Study Group, the ministers recommended the convening of a SAARC Expert Group Meeting on Terrorism "particularly to identify offences which are to be regarded as terroristic and which, for purposes of extradition, are not to be regarded as political."⁷ In a way it was an attempt aimed at defining terrorism.

On 20-21 September 1986, the Group of Experts on Terrorism met and submitted its report which suggested measures for the implementation of seven out of ten recommendations made by the Study Group. Recommendations III, V and VI remained undecided. Since all these recommendations touched upon the definitional aspects of terrorism and a common political will on the part of the member states, the failure of the Group of Experts to tackle them meant a virtual failure of the meeting. On the most important point for which it was convened, that is, "to identify offences which are to be regarded as terroristic," the meeting registered little progress. On Recommendation VI which had said that the "Member States may give consideration to the setting up of an appropriate mechanism" for the purpose, it was noted : "There was agreement on the importance of the identification of offences which may be regarded as terroristic and which for purposes of extradition are not to be regarded as political. However, after a preliminary consideration of a possible list of offences, it was decided that due to its complex nature further time was required for the implementation of this recommendation."⁸

At the Second SAARC Summit held in Bangalore on 16-17 November 1986, the subject formed parts of the opening speeches of several leaders. But it may be noted that only three out of a total of seven leaders spoke about it, namely, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. While the first two mentioned it in a short para each in general terms, Sri Lanka's emphasis was primarily on the problem which the country was facing in combating Tamil "terrorism." It was a long narration of developments on the Sinhala-Tamil ethnic front, the tenor of which was to underline the fact that the Tamil tactics were essentially terroristic.⁹ Indeed, nothing came out of the meeting and the matter was again customarily referred to the expert committee to be convened in due course. Actually a decision to this effect was already taken at the second session of the SAARC Council of Ministers in November 1986 in Bangalore preparatory to the Second SAARC Summit.

Group of Experts' Meeting in New Delhi—18-20 March 1987

The main concern of this Group was to look into the undecided Recommendations III, V and VI of the Study Group and submit its report to the next session of the Standing Committee and the Council of Ministers. The Group had before it working papers submitted by India and Sri Lanka.

On Recommendation III, the Group agreed that in view of the Declaration made by the Heads of State or Government at the Bangalore

Summit, no further action was necessary.¹⁰ Reference in this connection was made to Paragraph 11 of the Declaration which read :

The Heads of State or Government agreed that cooperation among SAARC States was vital if terrorism was to be prevented and eliminated from the region. They unequivocally condemned all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and deplored their impact on life and property, socio-economic development, political stability, regional and international peace and cooperation. They recognized the importance of the principles laid down in UN Resolution 2625 which, among others, required that each state should refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts.¹¹

On Recommendation V, the Group agreed that no separate action was needed as some of the recommendations of the UN Ad hoc Committee on International Terrorism, as adopted in UN General Assembly Resolution 34/145 of 17 December 1979, had already been covered under measures suggested by this Group, while the other resolutions under this resolution were either addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations and Heads of Specialised Agencies of the United Nations system or were meant for joint action by the member states in international forums.¹²

As regards the measures for the implementation of Recommendation VI, which was most important, the Group made the following suggestions :¹³

- A It is well understood that extradition is subject to the laws of the requested state which, *inter alia*, provide for :
 - a) the requirement of the establishment of a *prima facie* case in accordance with the laws of the requested state;
 - b) the conduct to be an offence under the laws of both the requesting and requested states;
 - c) grounds for refusal which states are normally entitled to invoke.
- B Thus, subject to the overall requirements of the law of extradition, conduct constituting the following offences, according to the law of the requested state, shall be regarded as terroristic and for the purpose of extradition shall not be regarded as political :
 - a) an offence within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970;
 - b) an offence within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971;

- c) an offence within the scope of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including diplomatic agents, signed at New York on 14 December 1973;
- d) an offence within the scope of any convention to which the SAARC Member States concerned are parties and which obliges the parties to prosecute or grant extradition;
- e) murder, manslaughter, assault causing bodily harm, kidnapping, hostage-taking and offences relating to firearms, weapons, explosives and dangerous substances when used as a means to perpetrate indiscriminate violence involving death or serious bodily injury to persons or damage to property;
- f) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offence described in subparagraphs (a) to (e), aiding, abetting or counselling the commission of such an offence or participation as an accomplice in the offences so described.

C For the purpose of extradition between SAARC Member States, any two or more states may by agreement decide to include any other serious offence involving violence, which shall not be regarded as a political offence or an offence connected with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives.

As a means of making progress in combating terrorism, the Group felt that the member states should consider, where appropriate, incorporating offences listed above, in :

- a) national legislation;
- b) bilateral treaties; and
- c) regional legal instruments.

It was at the same time understood that these measures are not mutually exclusive and that progress at the national level would facilitate progress at the bilateral level and these in turn would make it possible for action at the regional level. It was further understood that the adoption of the measures suggested above shall be without prejudice to international obligations already assumed by member states.

In order to review the progress in the implementation of the recommendations which require action at the national level, particularly Recommendations II, IV, VII, IX, and X, the SAARC Secretariat should submit a report annually to the Standing Committee based on information provided by member governments, for its review and appropriate recommendations.

SAARC Foreign Ministers' Meeting in New Delhi—18-19 June 1987

This meeting was significant in the sense that it gave a political push to the recommendations made by the Second Meeting of the Group of Experts in identifying offences which for the purposes of extradition were not to be viewed as political. The final document adopted by the meeting called upon member states to enact or amend national legislation relating to extradition. Sri Lanka took the initiative of having a regional convention on terrorism and also offered to host the meetings of the legal experts. The latter were supposed to finalise their report before the Third SAARC Summit to be held in Kathmandu in the first week of November 1987. It was said to be keen on such a regional convention since it was faced with the ethnic conflict involving the Tamil militants whom it regarded as "terrorists" and who, it was convinced, operated from Tamil Nadu.¹⁴

REPERCUSSIONS OF SAARC EFFORTS

The Hard Realities

From the above discussion one would tend to conclude that SAARC has made reasonably praiseworthy success in working out a multilateral mechanism to address the problem of terrorism. After having approved the recommendations of the Expert Group the foreign ministers had hailed it as a "breakthrough." Prior to this, India's Foreign Secretary K.P.S. Menon, in his opening speech at the Steering Committee Meeting, had said that this was "no mean achievement considering that there are very few forums in the world today where such an identification has been possible and that, too, after prolonged debate."¹⁵ But behind the facade of this apparent success lay nagging doubts as to whether these conference wisdoms would get reflected in national policies that would usher in a new era in South Asia marking real and effective regional cooperation.

Indeed, one should not read too much in the SAARC foreign ministers' Accord on Terrorism. The deliberations in the meeting clearly revealed the wide perceptual gap among the states on the question particularly between India and Pakistan and between India and Sri Lanka. The differences between India and Pakistan over the question of terrorism are too real and complex to be white washed by a SAARC Accord. More or less, the same is true with regard to India-Sri Lanka also. The differences between them have certainly been overtaken now by the Colombo-New Delhi Accord on the Sinhala-Tamil ethnic strife, still one must keep oneself conscious of the inherent contradictions between the two countries particularly when the future of the Accord so precariously hangs on one single factor—the continuance of J.R. Jayewardene in power. By signing the Accord, the latter has contracted an enormous political risk which he may have to pay for even with his life. If it happens the Accord would be

in utter jeopardy and the old suspicions between the two countries would be revived. In that situation a commonality of approach on the issue of terrorism which is so completely a political question would be most unlikely.

SAARC experience has underlined two basic realities. In the first place, the strategy to combat terrorism has to be through bilateral agreements with India as the common denominator, and secondly, the problem is essentially political in nature and is so much integrated with political and strategic cleavages of the region that it is difficult to address it before addressing the larger questions. To grapple with the intricacy of the situation it would be in order to first take up the issue bilaterally and then view it from a regional perspective. For obvious reasons India would be the common variable in the bilateral analyses.

Indo-Pak Suspicions Continue

The conflict between India and Pakistan over the question of terrorism is the by-product of the overall conflict that characterises their relationship. Against this backdrop only, one has to analyse their respective approaches to the question. To deal with the matter there was a meeting at the secretary level between the two countries. The meeting between India's Home Secretary C.G. Somaiyya and Pakistan's Interior Secretary S.K. Mahmud that took place on 20-21 December 1986, was arranged primarily to discuss the problem of terrorism in the Punjab, a sizeable portion of which, according to India, emanated from Pakistan's connivance with the Sikh terrorists. But the outcome of the meeting was much below one's expectation. This was evident from the joint statement. Probably the tone was set for this result right from the beginning. As the problem of terrorism in the Punjab concerned India, and not Pakistan, the latter's attitude was indifferent, if not hostile. On his arrival in Islamabad, Somaiyya had noted that there was no mention of terrorism in the Government-controlled radio and television in Pakistan while reporting about the meeting even while this issue was uppermost on the agenda.¹⁶

The Joint Declaration was a general statement which was drafted in a way as if India was equally to refrain from undesirable activities for which it was blaming Pakistan. The first substantive para of the Declaration read : "On an issue raised by Mr. Somaiyya, Mr. Mahmud affirmed that his government is opposed to all forms of terrorism in Punjab and elsewhere. In this context the Pakistan Government reiterated that it does not and will not provide any support to terrorist activities directed against India. Somaiyya also gave similar assurances in this context."¹⁷ It may be noted that subsequently the Pakistani Embassy in Washington reported that during his cricket diplomacy in India in February 1987, Zia-ul-Haq had told Rajiv Gandhi that if India insisted on a declaration from Pakistan

to the effect that the latter would not interfere in India's internal affairs, it could be possible only through a package under which India would also have to declare that it would not have any truck with the so-called "Sindhu Desh and Pakhtoonistan."¹⁸ In May, the ruling Muslim League of Pakistan reiterated the same formula in its resolution which deplored the Indian tendency of blaming its internal problems on what the party called "imaginary foreign hands."¹⁹

There was suspicion in the Indian mind over Pakistan's sincerity in trying the hijackers of the Pan Am aircraft at the Karachi airport in late 1986. The Indian officials, who followed the Pakistani investigations closely, insisted on full information to make sure that the real culprits were put to trial without any attempts to withhold vital clues to give them the benefit of doubt for political reasons. The Indian Embassy seemed to have no idea when and where the proposed trial would be held, and whether Pakistan had inquired fully into the alleged complicity of some of its own nationals who helped the hijackers to gain access to the inner area of the Karachi airport. The issue was raised by India at different levels of the Pakistan Government, but the latter gave the stock reply that the matter was under investigation. Commenting on the state of affairs, G.K. Reddy, the late Indian political commentator of exceptional repute, wrote in March 1987: "There is bound to be a serious setback to Indo-Pakistan relations if an attempt is made to shield those culprits by withholding vital information from the Court. It would destroy all trust in dealings with Pakistan even on other issues of a routine nature."²⁰

Even after the passage of the Accord on Terrorism at the SAARC Council of Ministers level, Indo-Pak suspicion of one interfering in the internal affairs of the other does not seem to have receded. In July 1987, Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo alleged that India was behind the spate of bomb blasts that rocked several parts of Pakistan in the past weeks.²¹ Similarly, India also continued to harp on the tune of Pakistan's complicity in the Punjab imbroglio. On 16 August, answering questions on the BBC's world-wide phone-in interview, Rajiv Gandhi accused Pakistan of interfering in the Punjab.²² Almost during the same time, a Government of India spokesman, while commenting on Pakistan Foreign Secretary Abdul Sattar's aspersions at the India-Sri Lanka Accord said, that it was a pity that Pakistan chose to compare the sending of Indian troops to Sri Lanka with the hypothetical scenario of foreign troops being assigned to some of the troubled states of the Indian Union. He added: "Pakistan will do well to remember that India has scrupulously avoided any reference to the conditions prevailing in Sind and Baluchistan, apart from such issues as the plight of the Pakhtoons and the Qadianis." The spokesman called it as "utterly incredible" the denial by Pakistan's Foreign Secretary of his country's involvement with extremist activities directed against India.²³ Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

India-Sri Lanka Accord on Terrorism not Likely to Make Much Headway

As regards India and Sri Lanka's approach to the issue of terrorism, it has revolved around the question of Tamil separatism. Till the signing of the India-Sri Lanka Accord in late July 1987 the latter preferred to view Tamil militancy in terms of one or several forms of terrorism and prescribed a solution heavily weighted in favour of a military deal. President Jayewardene's speech at the Second SAARC Summit clearly suggested that he regarded both concepts of "terrorism" and "guerilla warfare" as interchangeable. That there existed a vital difference between the two, which India tried to underscore at various levels by prescribing a political solution to the problem, was given little respect by Colombo. Laqueur has underlined the difference between "terrorism" and "guerilla warfare" in these words :

Terrorism is neither identical to guerilla warfare nor a subspecies of it. . . . A guerilla leader aims at building up ever-growing military units and eventually an army in order to establish liberated zones in which propaganda can be openly conducted, and eventually to set up an alternative government. . . . The guerilla has, on the whole, a positive public relations image, which the terrorist clearly does not possess. . . . It is easy to think of guerilla movements that defeated the forces opposing them, but it is very difficult to remember more than a few cases in which terrorism has had any lasting effect.²⁴

Even at the Foreign Ministers' Meet in June 1987, Sri Lanka's role was less than enthusiastic about working out an action programme for combating the menace of cross-border terrorism through extradition laws and other measures. Sri Lanka's suggestion that a legal experts' meeting should be held before further action was taken interpreted by some as deferring tactics. Commenting on this *The Hindu* editorialised :

Even if the first principles of motivation require that the cautious, halting and sporadic steps taken by the SAARC need to be publicised in glowing terms, the claim that a break-through has been achieved in defining the areas of joint action against terrorism seems exaggerated. . . . It is not difficult to see that the mission on a common plan of eliminative action regarding terrorism will be bogged down by divergent perceptions inevitably arising from contextual dissimilarities as between the member nations. Be that as it may, current realities might well ordain that SAARC cannot move far away from repeated affirmations of faith in the concept of regional cooperation if it is not realised that collective

self-reliance is very much more than cautious expression of good intentions.²⁵

It was only after the signing of the India-Sri Lanka Accord that the situation appeared to be improving.

The India-Sri Lanka Accord seems to vindicate India's position that there could be no alternative to a political solution to the ethnic strife. Simultaneously, it seems to have put at rest the controversy between the two countries over the question whether the Tamil militants, particularly those operating from India, were terrorists or militant political activists with whom negotiations could be possible. But since the very fate of the Accord hangs critically on one single factor, that is the continuance of the octogenarian Jayewardene on the Sri Lankan political scene, one wonders whether the Accord and correspondingly the mutual understanding on combating terrorism would survive his exit. The trends on the Sri Lankan political scene do not leave one sufficiently optimistic. Already, the political rival of Jayewardene and his most probable successor, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, has hinted at the eventual collapse of the Accord. Replying to a letter from A. Amirthalingam, the Secretary General of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), Bandaranaike accused India of "supporting terrorism in Sri Lanka in order to fulfil that government's foreign policy and military objectives by imposing its will on the people of a small neighbouring country." The letter which was released to the Press on 25 August 1987 said that through the Accord "a virtual state of *Eelam* is created for the terrorists with one-third of our country and nearly two-thirds of its coastal belt handed over to their tender mercies."²⁶ Clearly, an India-Sri Lanka Accord on terrorism is not likely to make much headway once the accord on ethnic strife enters into rough weathers.

India-Bangladesh—No Serious Controversy

Unlike Pakistan and Sri Lanka, Bangladesh does not have any serious controversy with India on the question of terrorism. Whatever relevance the issue has for bilateral relationship it is related to the insurgent movements in north-east India. Thus, although the Chakma or the TNV insurgencies cannot be strictly identified with terrorism, the two governments have underlined the importance of cooperation between them at the administrative level to deal with them. It must, however, be noted that the problem essentially is developmental and ethno-nationalistic and therefore has got to be dealt politically at some stage or the other. And in this regard Bangladesh is certainly at a disadvantage vis-a-vis India. Its political structure does not give enough scope for accommodation of the Chakmas into the "Bangladeshi" nation for they are neither Muslims nor Bengali-speaking (they might be able to speak Bengali but when it comes to assert their ethnic identity they refuse to identify themselves as Bengali

speaking).²⁷ Contrarily, there is ample scope in India's political structure and nation-building strategy for an ethnic group to accommodate itself.

However, it cannot be said for certain that Indo-Bangladesh relations would not see a downward swing over the question of TNV activities in Tripura and the presence of Chakma refugees there.²⁸ Notwithstanding the visit of P.V. Narasimha Rao, the Indian Minister for Human Resource Development, to Dhaka in August 1987 which seemed to have cleared the ground for the return of 50,000 Chakma refugees to Bangladesh²⁹ the suspicions in the Indian mind about Bangladeshi involvement in the activities of the TNV seemed to persist. Only a couple of months back the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, Humayun Rasheed Choudhury, had to snub an Indian journalist who had referred to Indian allegations that Bangladesh was giving shelter to Tripura tribal insurgents by saying : "If any one could tell us where they are we are prepared to catch them and hand them over to the Indian authorities." Reflecting on this, the journalist wrote : "The accent was that while Bangladesh, on its part, was prepared to end cross-border insurgency, India should be equally forthcoming lest the relations soured."³⁰

THE REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE

South Asia as a region suffers from two major weaknesses--one contributes to the growth of terrorism and the other obstructs the formation of a common strategy to combat it. In the region, process of nation-building is at various stages of its development. Social tensions which take the form of religious, ethnic, linguistic and other kinds of conflict are all directly or indirectly related to this unfinished nation-building syndrome. The phenomenon of terrorism in South Asia as such has much to do with these conflicts and unless a holistic view of the whole process of nation-building and of the functioning of the modern states-system is taken, the measures to combat the problem of terrorism could at best be cosmetic.

The generic relationship between social conflict and the incidence of terrorism has already drawn considerable scholarly attention. American scholar Marvin Wolfgang, while editing a special issue of *The Annals* on "International Terrorism", wrote in his introduction to the volume :

Linear space in our national press devoted to acts of terror and terrorism seems to be increasing and may reflect the number of such acts around the world. There is surely widespread conflict. Although not all conflict contains acts of terrorism, terrorism has its genesis in conflict. Some of that conflict exists within a given nation-state, some between nations. That which lies within may generate terrorism from groups wishing to change the state, to

destabilize society; or, in contrast, from the state itself to subdue challenges to authority.³¹

Most of the terroristic problems in South Asia have indeed their origin in the nation-building dilemma faced by the countries of the region. And what makes the problem even more complex is the fact that the respective nation-building strategies are not complementary to one another but have a tendency to thrive at the expense of one another. Thus while secularism forms the mainstay of the Indian strategy, it is ridiculed in Pakistan, Bangladesh and, to a significant extent, in Sri Lanka. Correspondingly, while religion is made to play a vital role in nation-building in almost all the countries of the region, in India active political consideration is given to separate religion from politics. Both the situations, their merits or demerits notwithstanding, create difficulties for the states for they give rise to a variety of social conflicts some of which get reflected in terroristic/militaristic activities. Given the conflictual relationships that characterise the inter-state relations in the region the problem gets exacerbated by the external dabblings in regional affairs.³²

In the prevailing reality discussed above it is indeed debatable whether the problem of terrorism as it haunts the South Asian region can at all be addressed by the SAARC. A comparative regional perspective in this regard may be in order. Empirically speaking it may be argued that where the strategic linkage of the regional powers with the superpower system are symmetrical there is greater possibility of cooperation among the regional states to deal with terrorism, or for that matter anti-state militancy in general. For example, it is known that in almost all the summit meetings of the ASEAN the danger of Communist insurgency in the region is on, or near, the top of the agenda. There are, however, nuances too. It may be noted that, although the EC's (European Community) linkage with the superpower system is by and large symmetrical, there have been evidences to suggest that there is not always a uniformity of perception among its constituents with regard to the danger of terrorism. The United States' bombing of Libya was not endorsed by most of the EC countries. Even the overflight of bombers, which took off from British bases, were not allowed over the airspace of France, West Germany or other countries. The bombers had to take a route south of the Iberian Peninsula. Again, in February 1987, a meeting of the Group of Seven consisting of the US, UK, West Germany, France, Canada, Italy and Japan scheduled to be held in Rome had to be postponed apparently on account of pressure from France, West Germany and Great Britain. The meeting was supposed to discuss the issue of Western nationals taken hostage in Lebanon. It may be noted that all the three countries which caused the postponement of the meeting had hostages in Lebanon. It was thought that these countries wanted to keep a distance from the United

States in dealing with terrorism, particularly in its European context because more than the American soil it was theirs which was vulnerable.³³ From the experience, one may argue that it is most unlikely that the SAARC countries would be able to work out a common strategy to deal with terrorism as the region is already torn by strategic and political cleavages. In the given situation it may be speculated that whatever can be achieved can be through bilateral cooperation first.

Primacy of Bilateral Cooperation

The crux of combating terrorism has to be found in the signing of extradition agreements between states. Since these agreements have to be integrated to the legal systems of the contracting states it would be more worthwhile to deal with the matter at the bilateral level. The mere fact that terrorism concerns several states of the South Asian region does not make it a regional issue. Unlike, for example, the water resources question which concerns Bangladesh, India and Nepal simultaneously, neither the question of Sikh terrorism, nor that of Tamil "terrorism", nor the question of political terrorism in Pakistan or Bangladesh concern more than two states. It may be safely argued that once the bilateral agreements are signed, as has been done in the case of the Indo-Canadian and Indo-British Extradition Treaties, the SAARC would automatically internalise them into its overall strategy for cooperation which would add an important feather in its cap. Mere expressions of good intentions in rhetorical terms at the summit and then reverting back to the old game of mud-slinging at one another is simply counter-productive. They erode whatever hope one reposes on the SAARC.

Signing of extradition treaties which would actually catch the bull of terrorism by its horn is, however, not an easy job. It is possible to have extradition treaties with regard to such criminal offences as plane hijackings, etc., which are even otherwise rare and the criminals, if caught, are liable to punishment, but it is not easy to have extradition treaties on a variety of activities which are generally deemed terroristic yet cannot be easily confined to any legal straitjacket. The job becomes even more difficult because a line has to be drawn between criminal and political offences. Most of the terroristic offences fall in the twilight zone which can be viewed either way depending upon the viewer's predilections. Herein lies the crux of the problem. Indo-Pak differences over a comprehensive accord on terrorism underscores it.

CONCLUSION

While there is no dispute that terrorism is a menace of immense magnitude which needs international cooperation to tackle, it has to be under-

lined that so long the South Asian states represent conflicting political systems and also conflicting military-strategic outlook in both global and regional contexts there is nothing much to be optimistic about. On the contrary, so long they would be driven by strategic opportunism that would tempt them to ride the 'Trojan horses' that graze within one another's compound, the consensus on terrorism would remain rhetorical, not functional. But that does not mean that one should not even make an effort. From this angle whatever progress SAARC has registered is commendable. If not anything else, the process has atleast been making the states get used to each other's sensitivities and susceptibilities which by itself is a positive development. The travail of nation-building has everywhere been long and painful and there is no reason to think that it would be different in South Asia.

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- 13 Ibid., pp. 2-4.
- 14 *Asian Recorder* (New Delhi), 16-22 July 1987, pp. 19556-57; *Times of India* (New Delhi), 20 June 1987.
- 15 *The Hindu* (New Delhi), 17 June 1987.
- 16 Ibid., 21 December 1986.
- 17 Text of Indo-Pak Declaration in *Times of India*, 22 December 1986.
- 18 *Pakistan Affairs* (Washington, D.C.), Vol. 40, 1 March 1987, p. 1.
- 19 *Times of India*, 21 May 1987. It may be mentioned that the resolution rightly called a particular ^{CO} atem public domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

statement, that, if Pakistan indulged in an aggression it would be given a fitting reply was said in Hindi in a phrase which was indeed indecent and provocative.

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WORLD TRADE PATTERNS : AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF REVEALED COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE APPROACH

By R.S. TIWARI* AND N.K. BHUSHRI**

The theory of international trade emphasises that trade of an economy is determined by the factors arising from internal supply and external demand. The factors on the internal supply front constitute the elements like, cost of production, behaviour of internal demand, tariff, taxes, subsidies and overall considerations of comparative cost advantages. Factors on the external demand side include such variables as the price, quality, marketing of the products, trade and production policies of the buyer countries and the mutual trade agreements and relations between and/or among the supplier and demanding countries. Over a period of time it was found that the non-oil developing countries were facing severe constraints to augment their exports particularly in the developed market economies. These constraints were quite often mainly due to comparative cost disadvantages, lack of competitiveness, lack of commodity correspondence and so on. This leads us to examine the state of comparative advantage across products vis-a-vis products' competitiveness and commodity correspondence over time. In the context of the above, the first section examines the structure of world trade, whereas section second reveals the state of comparative cost advantage. Sections third and fourth look into the nature of the country's competitiveness and complementarities across the various products. The commodity correspondence ratio that reflects the future prospects of trade cooperation is dealt in section five, whereas, policy prescription in order to enhance trade cooperation has been discussed in section six—the concluding remarks.

I

WORLD TRADE STRUCTURE

IN order to provide a backdrop to the discussions, it may be worthwhile to give a comparative picture of world trade structure. The world trade structure has, for analytical convenience, been disaggregated into three groups: (1) Developed Countries (DCs), (2) Oil-producing and exporting countries (OPEC) and (3) Non-oil developing countries (NOPEC). Trade performance has been examined in terms of share in

* Mr. Tiwari is at the Giri Institute of Development Studies, Lucknow.

** Mr. Bhushri is at the Sardar Patel Institute of Economics and Social Research, Ahmedabad.

TABLE I
Trade Structure of Developed Countries, OPEC and Less Developed Countries at Different Points of Time

CC-Year	Share in World Export	Developed Countries Balance of Trade in Current Prices (US \$ Billion)	Terms of Trade (1975=100)	Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC)	Terms of Trade (1975=100)			Non Oil Developing Countries (Non OPEC)		
					Share in World Exports	Balance of Trade in Current Prices (US\$ Billion)	Balance of Trade in Current Prices (US\$ Billion)			
							1	2	3	1
1950	67.9	-	3.42	98.20	7.3	1.95	NA	29.80	0.31	NA
1955	68.4	-	3.31	98.80	6.8	2.02	NA	24.80	- 2.77	121.60
1960	72.6	-	1.65	106.20	6.2	1.92	33.50	21.20	- 5.41	109.00
1965	74.8	-	5.68	109.00	6.1	4.14	32.10	19.10	- 7.36	109.80
1970	77.7	-	6.91	111.50	6.0	7.56	29.90	16.30	-14.00	116.00
1975	71.4	-	20.50	100.00	13.9	60.30	100.00	14.70	-54.05	100.00
1980	67.4	-	130.23	89.80	15.9	162.25	171.70	16.70	-87.70	95.50

Source : International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics*, Supplement Series, No. 4, Washington DC, 1982, pp. 158-159.

world exports, balance of trade, terms of trade (Table I) and direction of trade (Table III), so as to locate precisely the direction of movements over time in trade structure. We have also worked out in (Table II) the growth trends.

The movement of the relative share in the total world exports relating to different sets of countries present a mixed pattern. The relative share of the developed world increased continuously from 62.9 per cent in 1950 to 77.7 per cent in 1970 but declined thereafter. During 1980 the share remained only 67.4 per cent. In the regression analysis (1961-1979) the coefficient with negative sign is found statistically significant. The relative share of oil-exporting countries in world exports declined continuously up-

TABLE II

Growth Trends in Export Shares, Balance of Trade+ and Terms of Trade of Developed Countries, OPEC Countries and Non-Oil Developing Countries : 1961-1979

	Constant Term	Regression Co-efficient	R ² Values	F = Statistics
A Developed Countries				
1 Share in world export	4.42	-0.0086*** (1.76)	0.60*	25.29
2 Balance of trade	13.59	-3.37* (5.03)	0.60*	25.29
3 Terms of trade	113.18	-0.66* (3.68)	0.44*	13.56
B OPEC Countries				
1 Share in world export	1.67	0.05* (4.35)	0.54*	16.43
2 Balance of trade	-22.11	5.01* (5.79)	0.66*	33.50
3 Terms of trade	6.01	5.00* (5.84)	0.67*	34.14
C Non-Oil Developing Countries				
1 Share in world export	2.77	-0.02* (9.09)	0.86*	80.27
2 Balance of trade	7.07	-2.92* (8.00)	0.79*	64.05
3 Terms of trade	109.62	0.02 (0.10)	0.0006	0.01

+Where,

+ Estimated with simple linear equation in respect of balance of trade and the rest in terms of log linear form.

Figure in the parenthesis denote 't' values.

* Significant at 1 per cent level.

*** Significant at 10 per cent level.

Source : International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics*. Various issues. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

TABLE III
Direction of World Trade over Different Points of Time (Values in mill. US \$)

<i>Export From</i>	<i>Export to Developed Market Economies</i>			<i>Developing Market Economies</i>		
Developed Market Economies	1965	95274	75.36	(75.87)	25920	20.50
	1970	172496	77.42	(78.40)	41356	18.56
	1975	402040	70.07	(70.30)	137967	24.04
	1980	894026	71.60	(66.69)	293387	23.50
Developing Market Economies	1965	25615	72.04	(20.40)	7380	20.75
	1970	39758	73.51	(18.07)	10886	20.13
	1975	146739	71.32	(25.66)	48953	23.79
	1980	390227	70.64	(29.11)	141177	25.56
Public Economies	1965	4683	21.56	(3.73)	3271	15.05
	1970	7764	23.69	(3.53)	5116	15.61
	1975	23091	27.48	(4.04)	13347	15.89
	1980	56367	32.49	(4.20)	31633	18.23
Centrally Planned Economies	1965	125572	68.35	(100.00)	36571	19.91
	1970	220018	71.05	(100.00)	57358	18.52
	1975	571870	66.22	(100.00)	200267	23.91
	1980	1340620	67.90	(100.00)	466197	23.61

Table III (Contd.)

Export from		Export to Centrally Planned Economies			World	
Developed						
Market	1965	5234	4.14	(24.27)	126428	100.00
Economies	1970	8948	4.02	(27.72)	222800	100.00
	1975	33781	5.89	(36.95)	573788	100.00
CC	1980	61162	4.90	(36.49)	1248575	100.00
Developing	1965	2563	7.21	(11.88)	355558	100.00
Market	1970	3440	6.36	(10.66)	54084	100.00
Economies	1975	10070	4.89	(11.01)	205762	100.00
	1980	20988	3.80	(12.52)	552392	100.00
Centrally						
Planned	1965	13769	63.38	(63.85)	21723	100.00
Economies	1970	19896	60.70	(61.62)	322776	100.00
	1975	47573	56.63	(52.04)	84011	100.00
Public Domain	1980	85479	49.28	(50.99)	173479	100.00
World						
	1965	21566	11.74	(100.00)	183709	100.00
	1970	32284	10.43	(100.00)	309660	100.00
	1975	91424	10.59	(100.00)	863561	100.00
	1980	167629	8.49	(100.00)	1974446	100.00

Note : Figures in brackets indicate the percentage share of imports whereas those without brackets denote the percentage share of exports.

Source : United Nations, *Statistical Year Book*, New York. Various Issues.

to 1970 but shot up thereafter from 6.0 per cent to 15.9 per cent in 1980. The regression coefficient with statistically significant positive signs supplements the like trend. The relative share of the developing world in the total exports, barring in 1980, declined in almost all years. The regression coefficient with higher negative values is found statistically significant. Developing countries thus, compared to the rest of the world did much worse in sharing the world export expansion.

The declining relative shares in world exports have affected adversely the balance to trade. Balance of trade in developed as well as non-oil exporting developing countries has, by and large, deteriorated for all years. The balance of trade of OPEC countries, on the contrary, has improved over time and has been favourable for all the years considered. The regression analysis with expected signs has been found statistically significant. Balance of trade, particularly in 1961-1979, was more unfavourable in the developed world as compared to the developing ones.

With regard to the terms of trade, OPEC countries indeed enjoyed a favourable position ; the regression coefficient with positive sign is found statistically significant. Developed countries also had a favourable position upto 1970 but thereafter they seem to have lost the advantage. The values of β coefficient with negative sign suggest the unfavourable terms of trade position of the developed world. The terms of trade in the developing world have, by and large, fluctuated over time. Considering all the years, it appears that terms of trade deteriorated in 1980 as compared to all the years under study. Since β coefficient is found to be statistically unreliable, no conclusive inference can be drawn.

We may examine the direction of world trade as summarised in Table III, Intra-regional trade of the developed world between 1965 to 1980 declined, whereas it increased in the rest of the world. Intra-regional trade in the developing world increased as compared to the developed and centrally planned economies. Then again, intra-regional trade of the centrally planned economies declined, while it increased, by and large, with the rest of the economies.

II

STATE OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

Generally, comparative advantage has been examined by applying three methods : (1) Input-output technique¹ (2) the factor intensity differences² and (3) export performance index.³ The appropriateness of the first two approaches was seriously questioned. Generally it was stressed that these approaches overemphasised the cost considerations, which, by and large, ignored the elements of non-price factors. The export performance index, apart from considering the cost elements also captured the effects of non-price factors such as "good will, quality service facility, etc."⁴ This shows

the methodological superiority of export performance index over the remaining approaches. We, therefore, opted to use this method for examining the state of comparative advantage. "Since this pattern is revealed by the observed pattern of trade flows, it is called revealed comparative advantage."⁵ The export performance index, which indicates the revealed comparative advantage of different export items, is worked out by using the following well known formulae :

$$EPI = \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{e_{ij}^{(1)}}{e_j^{(1)}} + \frac{e_{ij}^{(1)}}{e_j^{(1)}} \left(\frac{e_{ij}^{(1)}}{e_j^{(1)}} / \frac{e_{ij}^{(0)}}{e_j^{(0)}} \right) \right]$$

Where $e_{ij}^{(0)}$ = Share of j th country in the total export of i th commodity in the base year.

$e_{ij}^{(1)}$ = Share of j th country in the total export of i th commodity in the current year.

$e_j^{(1)}$ = Share of all commodities of the exporting country in the base year.

$e_j^{(0)}$ = Share of all commodities of the exporting country in the current year.

Thus, export performance index enables us to understand the state of revealed comparative advantage of different countries individually as well as collectively. In the present study, export performance indices for the following countries have been considered. The United States, Japan and Federal Republic of Germany in the developed world and India, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Republic of Korea, Yugoslavia, Israel and Brazil in the developing world. Thus in the study, each country has been explicitly treated as exporting country and rest of them as competitive countries. The classification of developed and developing countries is based according to the *International Financial Statistics* (IFS). In the developed group, the countries included are : USA, Germany and Japan, whereas, in the developing group, Saudi Arabia (OPEC), South Africa (Africa), Republic of Korea and India (Asia), Yugoslavia (Europe), Israel (Middle East) and Brazil (Western Hemisphere). Thus, the 10 countries selected are fairly representative of the world ; they contributed to more than 38 per cent of world exports in 1979. Based on the availability of information, two points of time, i.e. 1970 and 1979, have been considered using the two digit levels of SITC classification. The present study is based on published sources of information which in particular includes various issues of *Commodity Trade Statistics*,⁶ *Year Book of International Trade Statistics*,

Statistical Year Book,⁸ International Financial Statistics⁹ and Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade of India.¹⁰

III

RESULTS OF REVEALED COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

Developed Countries vis-a-vis the Rest of the World

The rank of export performance indices is summarised in Table IV. We first describe the state of revealed comparative advantage of the developed world. In USA, out of 22 non-manufacturing products, 17 showed the revealed comparative advantage vis-a-vis the rest of the world. These 17 products constituted in 1979, 36.83 per cent of the country's total exports and 90.63 per cent of their respective sector. In the manufacturing group, out of a total of 18 products, 8 emerged with revealed comparative advantage and accounted for 38.11 per cent of the total exports and 64.20 per cent of their corresponding sector.¹¹

It may be noted that except the sectors like, beverages and tobacco (1.0), mineral fuels (3.0), manufactured goods classified by materials (6.0) and miscellaneous manufactured articles (8.0), some export products from all sectors have emerged with revealed comparative advantage. The significant export products from the non-manufacturing sector are : live animals (0.000) cereals and cereals preparation (0.04), oil seeds and oil nuts (22.00). Each product has shared more than 3 per cent of the country's total. The products in the manufacturing sector are : machinery other than electric (71), transport equipment (73.00), chemical elements and compounds (51) and chemical materials and products n.e.s. (59). Each product from this group constitutes more than 2 per cent of the country's exports. The ranks for these products are also significantly higher as compared to most of the competitive countries.

In Japan, 22 products are seen with revealed comparative advantage out of which 14 belong to manufacturing, whereas 8 to the non-manufacturing sector. The 14 manufacturing products account for 76.57 per cent of the country's total and 86.14 per cent of their respective sector. The 8 non-manufacturing items constitute 22.25 per cent of country's aggregate and 94.47 per cent of their sectoral exports. Evidently therefore, revealed comparative advantage is mainly confined to the manufacturing sector but products of the non-manufacturing sector have also shown the utmost potential. In Japan, excepting mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials, all sectors have shown revealed comparative advantage. The products of greater significance in the non-manufacturing sector are : iron and steel (67) and non-ferrous metal (68). The important products in the manufacturing group are : electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances

TABLE IV
Ranking of Export Performance Indices of 55 Commodity Items for Developing, Developed and OPEC Countries for the Period 1970-1979

Rank for Indian Exports CC-0. In Public Domain.	SITC Code Products	Description of Export Products	USA	Japan	Federal Republic of Germany	South Africa	South Africa	Republic of Korea	Yugoslavia	Israel	Brazil
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1	61	Leather, leather manufactures and dressed for skin	—	6	9	—	—	10	9	—	7
2	06	Sugar and its preparations and honey	—	46	17	—	6	16	26	—	6
3	29	Crude animal and vegetable materials n.e.s.	—	25	14	—	—	14	6	1	18
4	66	Non-metallic minerals, manufactures n.e.s.	34	19	37	—	7	17	30	15	35
5	84	Clothing	38	38	30	—	2	5	16	9	20
6	57	Explosive and Pyrotechnic products	—	39	35	—	—	—	1	—	1
7	03	Fish and fish preparations	13	16	50	—	16	6	27	—	23
8	83	Travel goods, handbags and similar articles	—	31	39	—	—	1	—	—	—
9	07	Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices and manufacture thereof	37	50	47	—	—	35	—	—	2
10	12	Tobacco and its manufactures	9	51	40	—	27	25	17	—	10

TABLE IV (Contd.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
11	28	Metalloferous-ores and metal-scrap	14	37	43	—	15	33	19	—	9
12	68	Non-ferrous metals	29	15	16	—	5	40	12	19	29
13	65	Textile yarn, fabrics and related products	30	12	24	—	25	9	23	18	13
14	04	Cereals and its preparations and dried legumes excluding coal, petroleum	2	45	52	—	19	37	41	—	45
15	27	Crude fertilizers (minerals) and precious stones	7	22	32	2	21	28	36	12	27
16	08	Feeding stuff for animals (not included un-milled cereals)	16	44	42	—	18	36	40	27	4
17	05	Fruits and vegetables	17	40	45	—	9	26	15	2	12
18	69	Manufacture of metal n.e.s.	33	10	22	—	22	11	18	4	31
19	54	Medicinal and pharmaceutical products	22	29	20	—	—	32	13	23	37
20	01	Meat and its preparations	21	49	18	—	11	27	8	10	17
21	89	Misc. manufactured articles n.e.s.	23	14	23	—	3	20	31	13	33
22	53	Dyeing, tanning and colouring material	—	13	8	—	23	—	21	—	39
23	82	Furniture	—	21	2	—	—	22	3	14	19
24	09	Misc. food preparations	—	8	4	—	—	7	—	7	—
25	63	Wood and cork manufacture (excluding furniture)	26	35	28	—	1	8	11	—	22

TABLE IV (Contd.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
26	81	Sanitary, plumbing, heating and lighting fixtures	—	23	7	—	—	—	14	—	16
27	85	Footwear	—	41	41	—	—	4	4	—	—
28	24	Wood, lumber and cork	28	34	19	—	—	2	2	—	14
29	55	Essential oils and perfumes, toilet polishing and cleaning preparations	24	42	12	—	—	31	—	23	28
30	67	Iron and steel	39	2	29	—	10	39	35	29	25
31	52	Mineral tar, petro-gas-coal and chemical products	—	1	3	—	—	—	—	—	—
32	42	Fixed vegetable oils and fats	20	43	36	—	—	—	—	26	8
33	62	Rubber manufactures n.e.s.	36	7	25	—	—	3	10	17	26
34	26	Textile fibres (not manufactured into yarn, thread of fabrics)	6	24	40	—	13	30	34	8	32
35	73	Transport equipment	25	30	13	—	29	15	28	16	15
36	71	Machinery other than electric	12	11	38	—	24	29	20	22	24
37	72	Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances	35	5	21	—	31	19	34	24	38
38	22	Oil seeds, oil nuts and oil kernels	—	—	55	—	28	—	38	28	21
39	86	Professionals for science, photograpers, optical goods, watches and clocks	3	31	—	—	18	—	—	20	11
40	64	Paper, paper board and manufactures thereof	27	18	15	—	20	12	25	—	3
41	51	Chemical elements and compounds	19	17	26	—	17	23	33	11	33

WORLD TRADE PATTERNS

TABLE IV (Contd.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
42	59	Chemical materials and products n.e.s.	11	28	33	—	30	—	37	6	30
43	32	Coal, coke and briquettes	18	13	27	—	4	—	29	—	—
44	02	Dairy products and eggs	—	52	5	—	—	—	—	25	42
45	21	Hides, skins and fur skin undressed	5	36	48	—	8	—	—	—	43
46	33	Petroleum and its products	40	48	53	1	—	38	—	—	41
47	58	Plastic material, regenerated cellulose and artificial resins	31	20	1	—	26	34	32	21	34
48	00	Live animals	1	53	54	—	—	24	9	3	44
49	25	Pulp and waste paper	8	27	49	—	12	—	22	—	5
50	11	Beverages	—	4	10	—	14	21	7	—	36
51	23	Crude rubber (including synthetic and reclaimed)	15	27	34	—	—	—	—	—	40
52	35	Electrical energy	—	47	11	—	—	—	—	—	—
53	41	Animal fats and oils	4	32	51	—	—	—	—	—	—
54	43	Animal and vegetable fats and oils (processed) and waxes	—	33	6	—	—	—	—	—	22
55	56	Fertilizers manufactured	10	26	44	—	—	13	5	5	—

Source : United Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics, Year Book of International Trade Statistics DGCI and S, Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade of India, various issues.

(72) machinery other than electric (71), textile yarn, fabrics, made up articles and related products (65), etc.

In West Germany, 13 products—7 from the manufacturing sector and 6 from the non-manufacturing sector emerged with revealed comparative advantage. These 7 manufacturing items share 43.07 per cent of the country's export and 52.33 per cent of their respective sectors. The 6 non-manufacturing products account for 10 per cent of the country's export, whereas 59.07 per cent of their sectoral exports. It appears that, by and large, revealed comparative advantage is confined to the manufacturing sector but products from the non-manufacturing sector have also shown potential. Products from almost all sectors have emerged with revealed comparative advantage except those from beverages and tobacco (1.0) and mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials (3.0).

On the whole, manufacturing products with revealed comparative advantage, are primarily in line with the country's endowment structure, such as capital, technological know how, R&D, etc. However, non-manufacturing products with revealed comparative advantage are primarily the outcome of the country's protectionism and new protectionist policies.

Developing Countries vis-a-vis Rest of the World

The developing countries¹² may be classified in two categories : (i) countries having revealed comparative advantages in manufacturing items and (ii) non-manufacturing products. India, the Republic of Korea, Yugoslavia and Israel can be put in the first category, whereas, South Africa and Brazil would be placed in the rest of the category.

In India, out of 55 products 17 have shown revealed comparative advantage. 7 manufacturing products account for 43.71 per cent of country's total and 77.42 per cent of their respective sector, whereas, 10 non-manufacturing products constitute 34.19 per cent of the country's aggregate and 78.53 per cent of their respective sector. This suggests that revealed comparative advantage is mainly confined to manufacturing products, though sometimes non-manufacturing products are also found with revealed comparative advantage. The important products in the broad group of the manufacturing sector are : leather (61), textiles (69), medicines and pharmaceuticals (54), travel goods, hand bags, etc. (83), and clothing (84). Several potential products in the non-manufacturing group include : live animals (0.0), beverages and tobacco (1.0), crude materials (2.0) and non-ferrous metals (68). In the manufacturing sector, the products which emerged with revealed comparative advantage were mainly because of the country's resource endowment structure. Besides, several items from chemicals and miscellaneous manufactured articles were mainly the consequence of policy stimuli given by the Indian trade regime. However, it is distressing to note that machinery and transport equipment, the most dy-

namic sector in India's export basket, has not emerged as yet with revealed comparative advantage.

In Korea, 19 products were found to be with revealed comparative advantage; the 13 manufacturing products and 6 non-manufacturing products accounted for 74.99 per cent and 13.47 per cent of country's total exports, 91.78 and 73.65 per cent of their respective sector. Revealed comparative advantage is thus confined to the manufacturing sector, although products from non-manufacturing items have also shown potential. It is notable that in the manufacturing sector, several products from all the product groups, except chemicals, are seen with revealed comparative advantage. Unlike India, Korea has the comparative advantage in the star performing sector like machinery and transport equipments. Electrical machinery apparatus and appliances (73) that account for about 13 per cent of Korea's exports, and transport equipment, which constitutes more than 7 per cent of country's total have appeared with revealed comparative advantage. In the non-manufacturing sector, the products mainly from food and live animals (0.0) and marginally from crude materials (2.0) and minerals (3.0) emerged with revealed comparative advantage.

In Yugoslavia, 17 products are seen with revealed comparative advantage. Out of these 17 products, 9 belong to the manufacturing sector accounting for 24.93 per cent of the country's total and 36.90 per cent of their respective sectors. The 8 products of the non-manufacturing sector constituted 18.96 per cent of the country's aggregate and 58.5 per cent of its corresponding sector. Thus, revealed comparative advantage is seen mainly in products of the manufacturing sector, but items from the non-manufacturing sector have also shown potential. In the manufacturing sector products from all broad product groups have shown the revealed comparative advantage. Products from the mineral group (3.0) and animal vegetable oils and fats (4.0) which relate to the non-manufacturing sector have not emerged as yet with revealed comparative advantage.

In Israel, 21 products were found with revealed comparative advantage ; 14 products from the manufacturing group contributed 67.65 per cent of the country's aggregate exports and 95.36 per cent of its respective sector and 7 products from the non-manufacturing sector constituted 27.29 per cent of the country's total and 93.91 per cent of its sector. This suggests that revealed comparative advantage was mainly confined to the manufacturing group, though products from the non-manufacturing sector have also indicated the potential. Many products from almost all the manufacturing sectors emerged with revealed comparative advantage. However, in the non-manufacturing sector, the products only from food and live animals (0.0) and crude materials (2.0) are seen with revealed comparative advantage. Rest of the product group has not yet emerged with revealed comparative advantage.

Coming to the state of revealed comparative advantage in South Africa and Brazil, one notes that in South Africa 18 products, 12 from the non-manufacturing and 6 from the manufacturing sectors, are found with revealed comparative advantage. The products in the non-manufacturing sector constitute 45.70 per cent of the country's aggregate and 66.44 per cent of their respective sector. The 6 products from manufacturing accounted for 22.37 per cent of the country's total and 71.65 per cent of its corresponding sector. This suggests that revealed comparative advantage in this country has relied on products of the non-manufacturing group, although, some products from the manufacturing group have also shown the potential. In the non-manufacturing sector, products in the broad group of beverages and tobacco (1.0) and animal vegetable oils and fats (4.0) have yet to emerge with revealed comparative advantage. The same seems to be applicable for products of machinery and transport equipment (7.0) of the manufacturing sector also.

In Brazil 21 products are found with revealed comparative advantage. Of these, 14 products of the non-manufacturing sector account for 62.15 per cent of country's exports and 93.54 per cent of their corresponding sector while the 7 products of the manufacturing sector constitute 14.82 per cent of country's total exports and 44.15 per cent of their respective sector. Thus, here also revealed comparative advantage is seen confined to the products in the non-manufacturing sector, but items from manufacturing have also indicated potential. Several products both from the non-manufacturing and manufacturing sector, excepting minerals, have emerged with revealed comparative advantage.

Thus, in the developing world, India, Korea, Yugoslavia and Israel show the revealed comparative advantage in the manufacturing sector. It confirms Balassa's "Stages of Comparative Advantage." It implies that the level of a country's economic development process determines the level of comparative advantage. Besides, revealed comparative advantage seen in some items of chemicals, machinery and transport and miscellaneous manufactured sectors are the consequence of a country's trade policies. In the manufacturing and land based sectors, the existence of revealed comparative advantage is the outcome of a country's factor endowment structure.

IV

NATURE OF COUNTRY'S COMPETITIVENESS AND COMPLEMENTARITIES

The ranking of export performance indices also ascribes the state of competitiveness and complementarities. It is noted that if an absolute difference of ranking between two export countries is less than 20, they are considered as keen competitors. If the absolute difference is more than 20 but less than 40, they are marginal or potential competitors. However,

TABLE V

Competitiveness of Export Commodities Across Selected Countries Based on the Ranking Difference of Export Performance Index: 1970-1979

TABLE V (Contd.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
14	04	Perfect	*																	
15	27	Perfect	*																	
16	08	Perfect	*																	
17	05	Perfect	*																	
18	69	Perfect	*																	
19	54	Perfect	*																	
20	01	Perfect	*																	
21	89	Perfect	*																	
22	53	Perfect	*																	
23	82	Perfect	*																	
24	09	Perfect	*																	
25	63	Perfect	*																	
26	81	Perfect	*																	
27	85	Perfect	*																	
28	24	Perfect	*																	
29	55	Perfect	*																	
30	67	Perfect	*																	
31	57	Duopolistic	*																	
32	42	Perfect	*																	
33	62	Perfect	*																	
34	26	Perfect	*																	
35	73	Perfect	*																	
36	71	Perfect	*																	
37	72	Perfect	*																	
38	22	Perfect	*																	
39	86	Perfect	*																	
40	64	Perfect	*																	
41	51	Perfect	*																	
42	59	Perfect	*																	

WORLD TRADE PATTERNS

TABLE V (Contd.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
43	32	Perfect	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
44	02	Oligopolistic	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
45	21	"	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
46	33	Perfect	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
47	58	Perfect	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
48	00	Perfect	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
49	25	Perfect	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
50	11	Perfect	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
51	23	Perfect	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
52	35	Duopolistic	0	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
53	41	Oligopolistic	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
54	43	Perfect	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
55	56	Perfect	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*

* Denotes the existence of comparative advantage across the products vis-a-vis India.

Note : Co-competitors are grouped depending on their ranking differences as

- Duopolistic if there are 2 countries in the rank difference of—40
- Oligopolistic if there are more than 2 but less than 4 countries in the rank difference of—40.
- Perfect competition if there are 4 or more countries in the rank difference of—40.

Source : United Nations, *Commodity Trade Statistics*, *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics*, DGCI and S. *Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade of India*. Various issues.

if absolute difference is more than 40, they are denoted as complementary countries. Also, if there exists only one keen or marginal competitor, the market is characterised to be duopolistic as in the case of the 10 countries considered in the study. Secondly, if the number of keen or marginal competitors exceeds one but less than four, the market is said to be oligopolistic in nature. Finally, if the number of keen and marginal competitors are four or more the market is described as perfectly competitive in character.¹³

The analysis in Table V identifies the nature of markets across the products. In the United States, the nature of market for animal oils and fats (41) is oligopolistic vis-a-vis the rest of the 9 countries considered. In other items, competitiveness is perfectly competitive. In Japan the nature of competition is oligopolistic for three products, such as dairy products and eggs (02), animal oils and fats (41) and mineral tar and crude chemicals (52). In the remaining export products, perfect competition has prevailed. Germany has faced the duopolistic competition in electrical energy (35), whereas, oligopolistic competition for mineral tar, crude chemicals (52), dairy products and eggs (02). However, in the rest of the commodities, the market has been characterised as perfectly competitive.

In the developing world, India faces duopolistic competition in electrical energy (35). In products such as, dairy products and eggs (02), animal oils and fats (41), and mineral tar products (52), the nature of the market is oligopolistic. For rest of the commodities, perfect competition has existed. In Israel, the nature of market is oligopolistic with respect of dairy products and eggs (02). In the rest of developing countries and their export products, perfect competition has prevailed.

It is an interesting observation that India and Germany in electrical energy (35) face duopolistic competition. In 3 products such as dairy products and eggs, animal oils and fats and mineral tar India faces oligopolistic competition in the face of Japan and Germany. For animal oils and fats, the United States emerges as an oligopolistic competitor. The same is true for Israel in dairy products and eggs. For the majority of the products, all 10 countries are facing perfect competition, implying thereby that an individual country has to operate at a given ruling price determined by the world average.

V

PROSPECTS FOR TRADE COOPERATION

If a country wants to intensify its trade cooperation it is essential that its export supplies should correspond reasonably well with the import demand structure of others. To understand this, the ratio of commodity correspondence has been worked out and is presented in Table VI. In

TABLE VI
Coefficients of Commodity Correspondence Between Export Supplies and Import Demand Structure—1979.*

Exporting Countries	Importing Countries									
	India	USA	Japan	Federal Germany	Saudi Arabia	South Africa	Republic of Korea	Yugoslavia	Israel	Brazil
CC	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1 India	—	0.0202	0.0174	0.0218	0.0225	0.0194	0.0180	0.0200	0.0260	0.0157
2 USA	0.0235	—	0.0193	0.0252	0.0332	0.0352	0.0292	0.0339	0.0290	0.0285
3 Japan	0.0288	0.0301	—	0.0289	0.0399	0.0348	0.0340	0.0356	0.0323	0.0289
4 Federal Germany	0.0265	0.0318	0.0193	—	0.0374	0.0363	0.0316	0.0338	0.0311	0.0276
5 Saudi Arabia	0.0763	0.0703	0.0787	0.0556	—	0.0093	0.0534	0.0495	0.0565	0.0789
6 South Africa	0.0235	0.0179	0.0159	0.0190	0.0239	—	0.0197	0.0214	0.0281	0.0181
7 Republic of Korea	0.0170	0.0250	0.0170	0.0253	0.0289	0.0260	—	0.0221	0.0224	0.0181
8 Yugoslavia	0.0238	0.0274	0.0211	0.0258	0.0311	0.0302	0.0274	—	0.0271	0.0255
9 Israel	0.0159	0.0147	0.0097	0.0147	0.0192	0.0163	0.0127	0.0145	—	0.0122
10 Brazil	0.0205	0.0239	0.0198	0.0228	0.0237	0.0243	0.0221	0.0259	0.0225	—

* Coefficients of correspondence between Export Supplies and Import demand of commodities have been worked out by using the following formulae :

$$C_{pq} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n C_i^P m_i^Q}$$

Where C_{pq} = Coefficient of correspondence between export of P and imports of Q country.

C_i^P = Proportion of its commodity in the exports of country P.

m_i^Q = Proportion of ith commodity in the import of country Q.

For more details see, A. Linemann, *An Econometric Study of International Trade Flows*, North Holland Publishing Company.

1979, the export surpluses of USA correspond well with the import demand structure of South Africa, Yugoslavia, Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Korea. The export structure of Japan matches well with the import demand structure of Saudi Arabia, Yugoslavia, South Africa, Republic of Korea and Israel. The export supplies of Germany correspond reasonably well with the import demand structures of countries like Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Yugoslavia and USA.

In the developing country group, the export structure of India, corresponds well with the import demand structures of Israel, Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. The export demand of Saudi Arabia corresponds well with the import demand structures of Brazil, Japan, India and USA; the export supplies of South Africa with the import demand structure of Israel, Saudi Arabia, India and Yugoslavia and the export supply of Korea with the import demand structures of Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Germany and USA.

The export supplies of Yugoslavia match well with the import demand structures of Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Republic of Korea, USA and Israel; the export supplies of Israel with the import demand structures of Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Republic of Korea and India, and export supplies of Brazil with import demand structures of Yugoslavia, South Africa, USA, Saudi Arabia and Israel. On the whole, the above analysis suggests that the export supplies of developed countries mainly correspond with the import demand structures of the developing countries. In the developing world, there appear two groups of countries : (i) those whose export demand structures match relatively well with the developed countries and (2) those whose export supplies with import demand structures of the developing countries. India, Republic of Korea and Saudi Arabia can be put in the first category, whereas the rest in the second category. As it is, trade cooperation may be fostered between developed and developing countries. It appears that trade cooperation for India, Republic of Korea and Saudi Arabia may be expanded between and among the developed countries like USA, Japan and Germany. In the rest, trade cooperation may be strengthened among and between the developing countries.

Based on comparative specialisation of commodities and other measures, the developed countries should confine their exports to technology-intensive products and imports to labour-intensive commodities. Tentatively, the following types of trade cooperation may be considered. The United States may export some products of machinery and transport equipment to India and South Africa and in turn may import some products of manufactured goods classified by materials and miscellaneous manufactured articles. Similarly, Japan and Germany may export to similar countries some items of food and live animals, beverages and tobacco, chemicals and machinery and transport equipment and in turn may import some products from the mineral sector. In the developing group, India may export to the

Korean Republic some products of beverages and tobacco, animal vegetable oils and fats and chemicals, and may import from Korea products from machinery and transport equipment and minerals. Similarly, Korea may export to Brazil mineral products and in turn import from it some products of animal vegetables and chemicals. Brazil may export to South Africa products of food and live animals, beverages, tobacco, animal vegetables and machinery and transport equipment, and in turn may import from South Africa mineral products. However, in the rest of the countries, both from developed and developing world, the scope for trade cooperation is limited on account of country's identical production structure.

VI

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The theory of comparative cost advantage both in its conventional and non-conventional wisdom implies as to how the pattern of a country's trade is determined by the micro and macro economic efficiency. Thus, it is simply a transaction between efficiency and inefficiency of factors and commodities. The analysis of world trade structure suggests the poor performance record by developing countries vis-a-vis the rest of the world in sharing world exports expansion. The trade of developing countries has increased among themselves, whereas opposite is true for the developed and centrally planned economies. However, the developed countries still occupy a significant place in world trade as they seemingly constitute the largest share. Trade and production policies adopted by the developed world, therefore, influences largely the trade prospects for the developing world.

In the developed world, it is found that revealed comparative advantage has mainly confined to manufacturing commodities, although, products from the non-manufacturing sector have also indicated the potential. The existence of revealed comparative advantage in dynamic sectors, like, machinery and transport equipment, chemicals and allied and miscellaneous manufactured articles is primarily on the line of factor proportion theorem. Cheap and abundant factors, like, capital, technology, R & D are major determinants of the comparative cost specialisation. In the rest of the manufacturing and non-manufacturing commodities, the state of revealed comparative advantage is determined mainly by the role of protectionism and new protectionist policies of a country's trade regime.

In developing countries like India, Korea, Yugoslavia and Isreal, the revealed comparative advantage has mainly confined to manufacturing commodities, but products of the non-manufacturing sector have also shown potential. The opposite is found valid in the rest of the countries

where the level of revealed comparative advantage is concentrated to natural resource and unskilled labour-intensive non-manufacturing items. The state of comparative advantage in non-traditional, engineering and allied products is mainly attributable to the export assistance programmes of country's trade regime. The emergence of comparative advantage in some products of non-manufacturing-natural-resource and unskilled labour intensive sector (iron, steel and some in the manufacturing sector) is mainly the outcome of country's resources endowment structure and partly by the country's trade policies. It is satisfying to note that the state of revealed comparative advantage in the manufacturing sector in India, Korea Yugoslavia and Isreal has confirmed Balassa's theory of 'stages of comparative advantage.' Thus, these countries have made a "breakthrough" in achieving the comparative advantage even in technology and R & D intensive commodities. It is however dissatisfying to find that India, despite the vast subsidy structure, has not yet emerged with comparative advantage in respect of its star-performing sectors like machinery and transport equipments.

In almost all the 10 countries, barring few commodities, perfect competition has prevailed for their export products. Export supplies of the developed countries are in correspondence with the import demand structures of developing countries. The export supplies of some developing countries such as India, Republic of Korea, and Saudi Arabia are seen matching with the import demand structures of developed countries. The export supplies of the rest of the developing countries are seen consistent with their own import demand structure.

Based on the comparative advantage and coefficients of commodity correspondence this study glaringly revealed the scope for trade cooperation for developed vis-a-vis developing countries, and also among the developing countries themselves. It would be a successful attempt to enlarge and enhance trade cooperation among the developing countries, but that much depends upon the nature of country's production structure and other economic and non-economic considerations conducive to a country's growth objective. The present study, however, suffers from two limitations. First, the present study, based on two digit levels of SITC classification, needs to be extended at a greater level of commodity disaggregation. Second, the study only relates to the two points of time which needs to be extended for more years to make the result more realistic.

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NOTES AND VIEWS

NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT :
NEW TRENDS IN THE EIGHTIES

INCREASING emphasis on the economic factors in the Non-aligned Movement, the more widespread efforts of the United States to disrupt the non-aligned, and of the Soviet Union to apply a subtle and indirect pressure to veer the Movement to the leftist direction, are some of the principal tendencies emerging in the Movement after the Harare Summit.

The Algiers Summit in 1973, first started to give greater attention to the economic aspects. The Colombo Summit in 1976 and the Havana Summit in 1979 re-emphasized the economic problems facing the non-aligned community. The Final Declaration of the Seventh Non-aligned Summit lamented that for the first time since the Second World War there had been a decline in the per capita GDP of many developing countries. It reiterated that the international economic crisis was merely a cyclical phenomenon, rather a symptom of structural maladjustment marked, *inter alia*, by increasing imbalances and inequalities to the detriment of the development prospects of the developing countries. There seemed to be no hope, according to the Declaration, of a viable economic system "without a basic and fundamental change in the approaches and policies of the developed countries with respect to the establishment of the New International Economic Order." The Seventh Summit stressed the interdependent character of the international situation, and it suggested the necessity of pursuing a dialogue between the developed and the developing countries. It was an integral part of the general struggle of their peoples for political, economic, cultural and social liberation including the "attainment of full and permanent sovereignty and control over all types of natural resources and economic activities."

Both the New Delhi and the Harare Declarations reiterated : "Progress in the developing countries would help rejuvenate the stagnating economies of developed countries." Both these declarations were a bold attempt at openly accusing the countries responsible for fleecing the Third World. At the Seventh Non-aligned Summit, the Heads of State or Government stressed their determination to continue to work for strengthening and promoting international cooperation. Special importance was attached to vastly enhanced cooperation among non-aligned and other developing countries as an essential part of the NIEO and as an instrument for building it. Cooperation among developing countries is also an important instrument for the restructuring of international economic relations. Economic cooperation among developing countries could be a valuable instrument for promoting rational and efficient use of human, material, financial and technological resources available in developing countries for their individual and collective welfare. But this cooperation among developing

countries is not a substitute for cooperation between developed and developing countries and cooperation among them is not directed against any country or group of countries. They called upon the developed countries and international organisations to help promote such cooperation in the interests of all round stability and progress.

The Harare Summit documents are more incisive than those issued at New Delhi earlier, in conveying the urgency of the problems which the members of the movement faced. Moreover the Harare Summit elevated the analysis of the economic problems to the global plane by not confining to the problems of the NAM alone ; its prescriptions "encompassed" the entire international system. The NAM has discredited the arrangements of the Bretton Woods Accord. Presumably, it was because of this reason that the outcome of this Summit was widely welcomed. Even the *New York Times*, applauded its draft as a polemic-free appeal.

The following factors may be noted. They have become more relevant to economic issues of under-development :

First, as a result of *detente* there was resurgence of political perspective of international relationship. East-West *detente* had replaced the Cold War which had caused the separation of economics from the study of international politics and security-related issues seemed to be the subjects of high politics. The recent USA – USSR Accord on limiting missiles in 1987 has increased *detente*.

Secondly, The Third World sought the help of the United Nations and its agencies to solve the problems of economic development. The United Nations had responded to their development needs ; yet no qualitative results in the existing lop-sided economic system were possible. The Club of Ten, headed by the United States, held the strings on matters of international trade, aid and transfer of technology. The hostile attitude of US became evident at the time of the meetings of UNCTAD in 1964, in 1968 and at its subsequent conferences.

Thirdly, after the declaration of the Third Development Decade, started an era of developing countries' assertiveness. These nations perceived that their economic and political power vis-a-vis the developed countries sufficiently warranted a strategy of effective "trade unionism", to change the rules of the game and thereby wrest a greater share of world wealth and power. They wanted to participate in the decision-making process of international economic matters, to protect their interest and to assert their claims as the members of international community.

Fourthly, developing countries reinforced their efforts at the restructuring of the international economic system, i.e., the Bretton Woods system which reflected an unequal power structure and was not responsive to the development needs of the developing countries. These institutions lacked legitimacy as they were devised in 1943-45 when most of the developing

countries were not free. Emphasis on this aspect has been laid again and again in the non-aligned declarations. Both the IMF and the World Bank have been less fair to the needs of the Third World in 1986 and in 1987. All these tendencies made the non-aligned countries realise that their *de jure* political decolonisation was replaced by *de facto* economic colonisation, known as modern neo-colonialism. This new system of economic hegemony subjected them to coercion, subverted their identity, ended their national control over the natural resources and made them more vulnerable to political intrusions and denied them even autonomy in economic pursuits. The instability of their commodity prices added to their woes.

Fifthly, despite the announcement of *detente* by the Super Powers, the small states were being sucked into the global power politics and these states felt that the present international system had given them neither security nor development. According to the noted Pakistani economist Mahbub-ul-Haq, international relations were dominated by feudalism instead of democracy and equality of opportunity. This assessment is shared by nearly all non-aligned states.

Sixthly, psychological compulsions, i.e., the underdevelopment syndrome also played an important role. Grievances of the developing countries about the loss of dignity and recognition conspired to influence this syndrome. Development has been one of the major planks of the economic aspects of the non-aligned movement. It had always thought that independence had no meaning without development. At the Belgrade Summit, India's Jawaharlal Nehru pointed out that major problems of contemporary international relations arose from two processes, the process of independence and the process of development. He said that they were inseparable like Siamese twins. It seems that initially the ruling elites of the non-aligned countries had not articulated their views on economic development. But as they achieved maturity by rubbing shoulders with the elites of the more advanced among the developing countries and those of the developed ones, their national independence was stabilised to some extent and the problem of nation-building was also met considerably.

Seventhly, the Non-aligned Movement provided new dimensions to the strength and stature of developing countries. It served as a morale booster to the developing countries and emerged as an international economic pressure group. Today 80 per cent of the strategic materials required for defence by the two Super Powers are located in the non-aligned states.

During the post-Havana phase, closer collaboration between the non-aligned countries and the Socialist World was natural. The Socialist World has been extremely sympathetic to the non-aligned cause the initial response of Stalin and Mao notwithstanding. It made it difficult for the United States to redominate the former colonies either directly or with remote control devices. They tried to redominate by adopting the strategy of dividing some of the Third world countries. This strategy of the neo-

colonialists unfolded in South Asia and West Asia. However, the increasing political and economic weight of the non-aligned community has frustrated the attempts of the neo-imperialists to subjugate the economies of the independent countries.

The theory of equidistance is not what non-alignment really stands for. Nehru had categorically rejected this characterisation of the Non-aligned Movement. It stipulates support to all those forces who oppose colonialism, neo-colonialism with all its concomitants, including using multi-national corporations as "trojan horses," creating global markets in its new exploitative forms and creating dependencies. In order to influence the international economic system politics has to be "commanded". The Colombo Conference had given an unequivocal warning in 1976 :

It is incontestable that there is an integral connection between politics and economics, and it is erroneous to approach economic affairs in isolation from politics. A complete change of political attitude and the demonstration of a new political will is an indispensable prerequisite for the realisation of the new international economic order.

At Belgrade, 25 members of the international community had assembled under the clouds of a severe cold war thickened by the testing of the thermo-nuclear weapons by the two Super Powers which was threatening world peace. A clear political and economic philosophy emerged, though dominated by political issues, presumably because the cities of the non-aligned countries did not understand the complexities of the international economic system and financial management at that time and had not yet realised the implications of the new moves by the United States and its allies. With the increase in membership, the Movement has become more heterogeneous; many states with dubious alignments, open and clandestine, have entered the Movement. Again, in 1961 conflictual relationship between the members was totally absent, while at the Eighth Summit at Harare, out of 101 members 24 had armed conflicts on one occasion or the other and 29 had conflictual relationships. This conflictual relationship has enabled the Super Powers to adopt an intrusive strategy. Thus the influence of Super Powers on the NAM has increased and today the greatest need is to forge coherence among the Non-aligned.

The most important trend in the transformation of the Movement has been the realisation of the need of the new international economic order. The idea of traditional non-alignment underwent a dramatic change at the New Delhi Summit in 1983. While the main plank of the classical non-alignment was anti-colonialism, anti-neocolonialism became the hallmark of the new non-alignment.

Both the Seventh and the Eighth Summits at New Delhi and Harare gave a fillip to the basic ideology of non-alignment. It highlighted the need of a three-pronged strategy mapped at Lusaka, Algiers, Colombo and Havana—North-South Cooperation, individual and collective self-reliance, South-South Cooperation—to bring about structural changes in the international economic order and building countervailing power to break the North-South deadlock for global negotiations. The Harare Summit transformed the Movement into a global one. It took a global view of the current economic crisis. The strategy of the new non-alignment is to establish a new international economic order with a view to eradicate the unjust and undemocratic Bretton Woods institutions. The days of a subtle economic domination in the form of creating monopolies of technological know-how are rapidly drawing to an end. The Non-aligned must exert new assertiveness to secure justice.

N.M. KHILNANI*

* Dr. Khilnani was Director, Historical Division, Ministry of External Affairs. Currently he is Senior Fellow, Indian Council of Historical Research, New Delhi,

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BOOK REVIEWS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

DANIEL FREI (Ed.) : *Managing International Crises*. Sage Publications, California, 1982, 240 p., \$25.00.

LIKE the national ones, the nature of an international crisis may be economic, political, military or ideological. But the nature of the international crises dealt with in the book, under review, has not been clearly indicated in the introduction provided by the editor although he has referred to the paramount importance of the subject matter and the unprecedented interest it has induced among the international relations specialists. (p. 11) It is for such reason that at the fag end of the book Kari Mottola has admitted that the "concept of a crisis suffers from a careless and inflationary use." (p. 185) Even he has not indicated the nature of such a crisis clearly. It is only by way of emphasizing the need "to build a bridge between the achievements of crisis research and the present-day problems of international politics" (p. 185), that he has indirectly indicated the nature of the crisis constituting the subject-matter of the book. Since an international crisis is an outcome of incompatible or conflicting behaviour of states interacting with one another (p. 199), its nature cannot be anything but political. But the political cannot be isolated from the economic, the military and the cultural. (p. 42) The essential task will be to identify the underlying overdetermining factor.

All the thirteen papers, submitted to a Round Table on "International Crises and Crisis Management," held at the University of Zurich in 1981 under the auspices of the International Political Science Association and included in the book, except one by Mushakoji, are found to have dealt with such apparent, ephemeral and transient international events and situations as conflicts and crisis and the behaviour of the state-systems and of actors (i.e. personalities running the state-apparatus) involved in such situations (pp. 185-6), without making any endeavour to explain the same with the help of the structure of national and international relations of production and exchange. As Deutsch has frankly admitted, he is not "dealing with the question of a chronic crisis or an endemic crisis," (p. 16) because that will require the linking of the behaviour of state-systems and actors with the underlying structure of the relations of production and exchange. Such a manner of analysing the apparent outer-level process and movements characterizes the method of analysis of those bourgeois economists whom Marx called the vulgar economists. (See Marx's letter to Kugelmann dated 11 July 1868 in K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 195).

Like the vulgar bourgeois economists, these political analysts, who have contributed papers in the book under review, like to concentrate their

attention only at the apparent outer-level elements of the processes and movements between states such as communication and decision-making (see Chapters 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6), at the system-level or the psychological/typology of actors as found in a specific socio-cultural environment (see Chapter 2), or the modifying influence of the risk of nuclear war on the behaviour of the Super Powers (see Chapter 7), the ideology of non-alignment—the slogan of bargaining developing states (see Chapter 10), and the *detente* as inter-systems behaviour minimizing and controlling crisis (see Chapter 11). Probably these analysts do not want to delve deeper to identify the basic structure of national states involved in international politics because that may expose their ugly exploitation facilitating nature. In fact, the main concern of these analysts, as the title of the book indicates, is the management of international crises and not their permanent resolution because that would involve a radical transformation of the basic structures of most of the states, and "structural changes in the system", as has been superficially admitted by Mottola. (See p. 197) It is only Mushakoji who has indicated the causal relationship between such inter-state or near-global structural variables as centre-periphery structure, West-European state structure and bi-polar structure on the one hand, and the recurring conflictual international events and consequent crises (see Chapter 9) on the other. Although Mushakoji urges that "preventive diplomacy must also be sensitive to the demands and expectations of the people in the periphery and to movements for structural transformation" to gain "legitimacy" (p. 165), his basic objective is to "indicate that crisis management in a time of structural transformation must be insightful enough to develop a project about how the ongoing process of structural transformation can be guided in a non-violent and peaceful direction." (p. 166) Thus even Mushakoji's concern is not crisis solution through radical structural transformation along a non-violent and peaceful course.

Thus management of international crisis as a sub-discipline of Political Science seems to have developed to subserve the interests of those classes which overdetermine the behaviour of national state-systems and their actors in the international arena, not overtly, but decidedly from behind the smoke-screen of the system-autonomy by maintaining the *status quo* of the nature and structure of the state-system, that facilitate exploitation through the de-escalation of crisis. Even the so-called Socialist States want such de-escalation or limited escalation in the interest of a section of actors who control and run the state-apparatus.

But the fact is that certain international crises and their escalation are desirable, not from the point of view of imperialist domination over other countries or suppression of anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist and anti-autocratic upsurges in other countries (as in the case of Nicaragua), but from the point of view of making an anti-imperialist national liberation move-

ment successful. This has been admitted by Ali E. Hillal Dessouki in the following observation :

...there are certain crises, I believe, that should not be prevented or avoided, such as those related to national liberation and the right to self-determination. These are often the prerequisites for stable and just world peace. (p. 88)

This author, therefore, wants the escalation of such crises but not their resolution because, in his opinion, "Crisis management is not crisis resolution." Thus he prefers escalation of such crises within limits, not such escalation as may be required for the resolution of such crises. As such, depending on the experience of the Middle East Crises of 1967 and 1973, this author has indicated the objective of his paper and the main content of his prescription in the following manner :

This chapter deals with one aspect of crisis management. It analyses certain types of foreign policy behaviour that should be avoided in a crisis situation. (p. 88)

These exercises in crises and crises-management research, as recorded in the book under review, have however, been claimed to have made advances in Political Science and, as such, included in the second volume :

Advances in Political Science [which] reflects the aims and intellectual traditions of the International Political Science Association : the generation and dissemination of rigorous political inquiry free of any sub-disciplinary or other orthodoxy... This series seeks to present the best work being done today where political scientists ...are shaping innovative concepts and methodologies of political analysis. (p. 9)

Certainly every reader is expected to examine the veracity of this claim of the editor when going through the different chapters of this book. If the points raised in this review are kept in mind at the time of such evaluation the reviewer will feel amply rewarded.

University of Calcutta,
Calcutta.

BUDDHADEVA BHATTACHARYYA

L. N. RANGARAJAN : The Limitation of Conflict : A Theory of Bargaining and Negotiation. Croom Helm, London, 1985, 327 p., £ 25.

THE book under review contends that while no conflict or violence can be fully eliminated, the process of negotiation does help in defusing violent situations or preempting conflicts.

In developing this basic theme in his book *The Limitation of Conflict : A Theory of Bargaining and Negotiation*, Rangarajan has set up the broad parameters of the process of negotiation. The act of negotiation has been conceived with reference to an analytical reference-frame based on violence/disorder cum the 'absence of violence' spectrum. He submits that negotiations take place at various levels of inter-personal/state relations—conflictual, strained, cooperative or harmonious. Here the author also expounds the relationship between the concepts of negotiation and bargaining. Though usage tends to differentiate between the two concepts—while the former is "generally used for inter-state dealings," the latter is associated with "trade and commerce"—they have been used synonymously in the present publication. Rangarajan submits that the process of negotiations or bargaining "must have an element of give and take" and "there must be communication between the participants over a period of time." (pp 22-23)

The publication has been thematically structured around five parts which in all comprise eighteen sections/chapters. The study is concluded with an Appendix containing additional material on the theory of negotiation.

In part one, Rangarajan poses some conceptual questions regarding conflict and the different ramifications of the process of negotiation. In this context, while underlining the basic purpose of this study, the author refers to the types of violence that can be prevented/preempted through negotiation between the various disputants. In the next part, he spells out the theoretical basis of bargaining with reference to its nature/process, and the types of negotiation and the limits of this process. Also, the author highlights the different facets of bargaining process in relation to bargaining skill. Additionally, the author takes note of the duration and stages of negotiation.

Admittedly, any agreement reached through negotiation is a function of initiative taken by the negotiators concerned. It would certainly call for bridging the differences between the two disputants. But negotiation is likely to start whenever the negotiators have some favourable expectations from its outcome. All these aspects have been well spelt out by Rangarajan in illustrating the theory of bargaining in terms of its linkages, trade-offs and package deals involved in the process of negotiation between different participants.

The author is concerned about the four aspects of negotiation in part three. This part is organised into three chapters dealing with the complexity of negotiation with regard to the changing context of the bargaining space/population, the issue under negotiation, the level of bargaining power of the concerned negotiants and the absence/presence of political will.

While dealing with the various aspects of "peaceful changes," in part four, Rangarajan studies the "international rule system", the subject of making, obeying and disobeying rules and the four methods of third party interventions—conciliation, mediation, arbitration and adjudication—in resolving disputes. The author makes a very valid point when he states that, even when/where third party intervention is involved negotiation is required to choose mediators/conciliators or adjudicators.

The concluding part is largely an overview of the problem of conflict limitation. There is a perceptive projection regarding the emerging world order and conflict in the coming fifteen years.

The author uses a broader canvas in studying the linkages between negotiation and the limitation of conflict. Drawing from his years of experience in various facets of negotiation/bargaining in action, coupled with his expertise on its theoretical aspects, Rangarajan has done a very competent study in a rather complex area of inter-state/inter-personal relations. The author is a member of the Indian Foreign Service and thus a practitioner of diplomacy. He is eminently qualified to deal with the various ramifications of negotiations in resolving inter-state conflicts. The study is intellectually stimulating to the extent it poses some thought-provoking questions regarding the subject of negotiations/bargaining.

True, at times the author's presentation appears somewhat esoteric as to whether it does adequately explain "the real world of disputes and negotiations." The real world is far more complicated ! This is not to underestimate the importance of the study in comprehending the various facets of negotiation/bargaining. Admittedly, any systematic study of a complex problem such as this calls for a degree of theoretical exercise. The options available to the social scientists call for more rigorous methodological skill in handling the complex problem.

New Delhi.

SHIVAJI GANGULY

DAMODAR WADEGAONKAR : The Orbit of Space Law. N. M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd., Bombay, 1984, xii, 172 p., Rs. 85.

SPACE exploration is an historic event of the 20th Century. Man has entered a new age of cosmic exploration. The void of space is already providing benefits for mankind which include facilities for communication, navigation, meteorological observation, television broadcasts, remote sensing of earth resources, etc. Military doctrines have changed. Star wars, once talked in epics, are matter of fact details before the world community.

Space law is an important part of world law or cosmic law enacted and evolved to serve the interests of nations. The United Nations, the global institutes and the jurists have helped in shaping this body of law. India has always taken deep interest in space exploration and in the making of space law. Late V. K. Krishna Menon, K. Krishna Rao and the present Law Secretary, P. K. Kartha were among those who took pioneering interest in the making of space law in the United Nations. The present reviewer has written extensively on the subject ever since space exploration commenced and published the first treatise in India in 1973 on *Legal Controls of Outer Space : Law, Freedom and Responsibility*.

The book under review by Dr. Wadegaonkar is therefore a welcome addition to this literature on space law. The author unfortunately died last year before he could see the impact of his endeavours in space frontiers. The book has chapters on sources of space law, the Moon Treaty of 1979, boundary problem of air and outer space, remote sensing, direct television broadcasts, nuclear powered sources in outer space and recent developments in space law.

The author has presented in a somewhat slim volume most of the leading problems of space law and examined some leading issues involved. From reflecting on fundamental principles of space law to discussing current legal problems, the book presents a vast scenario of a myriad ideas which have permeated the international system of "earth-space arena", as described by Professor Myres McDougal of Yale University. The book should be of interest to specialists who may like to glance through the space frontier quickly as also to the generalists. As Justice Y. V. Chandrachud, former Chief Justice of India, has said in his foreword, the book is a monumental task accomplished by Dr. Wadegaonkar. To this we may add that the author was handicapped and sightless. That makes this book even more a tribute to the memory of this first-rate scholar who dreamt of cosmic frontiers with the zeal of a genius, grasping its fascinations and problems. He wanted to see a peaceful world order in the cosmic frontier too. We therefore pay our reverence to his memory and to his scholar-

ship. He was heading the Department of Law in Bombay University at the time of his sudden demise in 1986.

Department of Civil Aviation,
New Delhi

S. BHATT

FOREIGN POLICY

SUSHILA AGARWAL : Super Powers and The Third World. Aalekh Publishers, Jaipur, 1985, ii, 151 p., Rs. 75.

IN the modern interdependent world, aid, trade, and transfer of technology are essential components of mutual relationships among nations, but these relationships are not always smooth. The structure of global power relations determines the logic of interaction among nations and political and strategic factors play a critical role in determining the flow and receipt of foreign aid. Foreign aid is a necessary evil but it can become a habit among the recipients. The basic strategy of aid to eliminate aid gets replaced by a continuing flow of aid and its consequences can be less freedom for the recipient countries.

Sushila Agarwal examines these issues on the basis of a conceptual scheme and data based on the Indian experience. The strength of this book is linkage between concepts and empirical facts. Many of the conceptualisations of Dr. Agarwal will be contested because of two important reasons. First, her category of super powerism is not acceptable to many scholars, and this is basic to her analysis. If this category is rejected, her whole thesis collapses like a house of cards. Second, her assessment that India played "East against West" projects Machiavelli in India and the great capacity of India to manipulate the international power structure.

Many people will not accept that India has capabilities to manipulate the capitalist countries and the socialist countries.

Two serious weaknesses of the book are that it is dated and the presentation is weak. Many new trends of the 80s are not mentioned in the book. The book ends with the 70s and there is a sea change in the international political economy of India.

School of Social Sciences,
Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi.

C. P. BHAMBHRI

VINOD BHATIA (Ed.): *Indo-Soviet Relations: Problems and Prospects*. Panchsheel Publishers, New Delhi, 1984, ix, 193 p., Rs. 100.

INDO-SOVIET relations is probably one subject on which there exists so much literature that both the writers on the theme as well as their reviewers suffer from an inbuilt fear of becoming repetitive. It is indeed not easy to extricate oneself from the syndrome. Mercifully, however, the Indo-Soviet relationship itself is so dynamic and vibrant that it gives enough opportunity to authors to say something new. Vinod Bhatia's edited volume, under review here, is one such exercise in search of new interpretations, if not facts.

The main idea behind this publication was spelt out by the editor himself in his introductory note. "In preparing this compilation", writes the editor, "my main objective was to provide a variety of perceptions on Indo-Soviet relations. Of course, there are nuances in all these and we must abide by them. The question is : Do we understand the significance of Indo-Soviet relations as Nehru understood it? It is only from there that we can take off. Any other view is erroneous and dangerous." One may certainly object to this strait-jacket prescription but cannot depart from it very much either. The basic structure of Indo-Soviet relations has remained by and large the same as was conceived and operationalised by Nehru.

There are altogether fifteen contributions that comprise this volume. The contributors are academics, ex-diplomats and people from the field of journalism. Thematically speaking, the papers may be broadly classified under four heads, viz.; congruence of Indo-Soviet perspectives on international matters and broad foreign policy outlooks, Indo-Soviet economic cooperation, cooperation in the field of defence, and lastly, that in the field of science and technology. These two last mentioned areas are represented by only one article each.

For obvious reasons, the maximum number of articles, altogether eight, deal with the political relationship between India and the Soviet Union. The central thrust of all of them is that there is convergence of interests between the two countries which has made them assume mutually advantageous positions on global and regional issues. For example, non-alignment as a policy pursued by India is conducive to the interests of both India and the Soviet Union. Similarly, India's role in the Third World forums such as the Group of 77 or the South-South Cooperation or the NIEO, for structural reasons, receive support from the Soviet Union. On strategic and security matters, Soviet Union's South Asian strategy helps India to maintain the regional balance in its favour without making it compromise on the basic tenets of its foreign policy such as that of non-alignment.

In the field of defence cooperation, Soviet Union has all along been an important promoter of Indian interests, says the author of this article. It

has not only come to India's help in times of crisis but has actively helped in boosting India's indigenous efforts in the production of armaments. Ever since the Soviets gave the licence to India for the manufacture of MIG aircrafts in India, in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian border skirmish, the pace of cooperation has been maintained and the Soviets are now India's largest arms supplier notwithstanding the policy of diversification pursued by India for the last few years.

The paper on science and technology lists a number of areas where the two countries cooperate with each other, most notable among which are space technology, weather forecasting, geological research particularly in the Himalayan region, agricultural sciences, energy development, meteorology, tropicalisation, industrialisation, and so on.

Indo-Soviet economic cooperation forms a fairly sizeable section of the book. Altogether four papers have addressed the theme. They have discussed the prospects and problems in this vital areas of cooperation. One paper analyses the rationale behind the rupee trade and argues that it goes in India's interest to continue with the system.

While the book is a valuable addition to the existing body of literature on the Indo-Soviet relations one significant dimension of this relationship has virtually been ignored by the contributors. There is not a single contribution which deals with the issue of Soviet political support to the regimes in power in New Delhi. It may be recalled that Soviet endorsement of the Emergency had become an important political issue in the Elections of 1977 and the Janata Party's championing of the so-called "genuine" non-alignment owed much to this factor. Congress-CPI alliance of yester-years was certainly not merely an internal domestic development but an extension of Soviet-Indian (read Congress) cooperation.

Indian Council of Social Science Research,
New Delhi.

PARTHA S. GHOSH

PRAMOD KUMAR MISHRA : Dhaka Summit and SAARC. Netaji Institute for Asian Studies—K.P. Bagchi & Co., Calcutta, 1986, 67 p., Rs. 50.

FOR fruitful cooperation among the nations of the South Asian region emergence of SAARC is a welcome augury. South Asia as a region stands distinct due to its geography, history economy and culture. It maintains a distinct regional entity because of common religions and languages. Therefore, it is hoped that the confederation of the seven nations into SAARC at Dhaka may pave the way for fruitful cooperation.

In the first 50 pages of the monograph, Pramod Mishra gives a chronology of events leading to the formation of SAARC and makes an indepth analysis of its emergence within the broad framework of South-South cooperation and the Economic Declaration adopted at the Seventh Non-Aligned Summit.

Latter part of the monograph contains vital documents adopted at the SAARC Summit at Dhaka.

Since the Association is in its infancy, study of this nature is a welcome addition for those who want to have a serious and deeper understanding regarding problems and prospects of SAARC.

Indian Council of World Affairs,
New Delhi.

V. K. ARORA

SUBRATA BANERJEE : *Bangladesh*. National Book Trust of India, New Delhi, 1981, xii 109 p., Rs. 8.75.

SUBRATA BANERJEE'S *Bangladesh* was published in 1981 under the "World of Today Series" of the National Book Trust of India. It is quite useful as a backgrounder on Bangladesh written in English.

The book describes Bangladesh's physical features, its flora and fauna, makes mentions of its major fairs and festivals and also provides a glimpse into the performing, graphic and visual arts of Bangladesh.

The eventful early history of the area that is now Bangladesh has been commendably telescoped into a coherent account of the politico-economic changes entwined with the evolution of Bangladesh's socio-cultural matrix.

The account of the more contemporary politico-economic developments under the external and internal colonial regimes of the British and the Pakistanis respectively reflects a keen insight into the societal realities that went into the making of an independent, sovereign Bangladesh in 1971. The gap between the aspirations aroused in the pre-liberation East Pakistan and the achievements in the post-liberation Bangladesh has been explained briefly but pointedly.

The book would be useful for those who are as yet uninitiated but want to develop some expertise on Bangladesh, and indispensable for those who want to have a profile of a South Asian country in one sitting.

School of International Studies,
Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi.

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SHYAMALI GHOSH

INDIA

Political Philosophy

S. M. GANGULY : *Leftism In India—M. N. Roy and Indian Politics 1920-1948*. Minerva Associates Publications Pvt. Ltd., Calcutta, 1984, ix, 312 p., Rs. 150.

LEFTISM in India is a combination of many forces, factors and practices. A number of Indian personalities who were deeply influenced by the communist revolution in the Soviet Union accepted the basic principles and thrust of Marxist ideology. It was therefore not surprising that many young intellectuals during the course of the Indian freedom struggle sought to apply the Marxian framework and analysis to the Indian context. The basic purpose of the present study is to make a thorough and insightful academic analysis of the dominant trends and themes of the left wing in the national movement in India, with M. N. Roy as the principal focus of study.

Historically Roy's political career began with his nationalistic activities and participation in Mexican politics from 1899 to 1916 and ended with the dissolution of his Radical Democratic Party and launching of the Radical Humanist Movement from 1948 to 1954. In this study a serious attempt is made to understand and evaluate the middle phase of his career when he was closely associated with the Comintern leadership, his important role inside the Indian National Congress and the formation of his Radical Democratic Party.

Schematically Ganguly divides his study into eleven well-conceived chapters. The first chapter looks into the strategy and tactics of revolution: M. N. Roy was indeed a prominent figure in revolutionary politics in his early years. The great debate between Lenin and Roy on the national and colonial questions is of enduring relevance. Roy brilliantly put forth what Lenin called the "Asiocentric" viewpoint on the colonial question. He rather forcefully developed the viewpoint that the fight for freedom in colonial countries was essentially a 'bourgeois democratic nationalist movement' with a programme of 'political independence under the *bourgeois order*.' Hence he argued that it was necessary to establish Communist Parties in these dependent countries to organise peasants and workers for revolution. Accepting this line of argument advanced by Roy, Lenin conceded that the backward peoples of the colonies need not necessarily go through the capitalist stage of development to achieve liberation through Communism. However, Lenin was realistic enough to realise that the leadership of the colonial countries would critically remain with the national *bourgeoisie* since they were the ones who took to Western education before any other class. But from the point of view of tactics

and strategy Lenin would rather depend upon the exploited masses by giving strong support to peasant movements in the colonies.

Chapters two, three, four and five deal successively with radical trends in Indian politics like the growth of left-wing nationalism and the formation of the Worker's and Peasant's Party which was the product of the Communist Movement in India in the middle of the twenties. On the other hand, chapters six, seven and eight discuss in a cogent fashion Roy's role in giving a radical shift to the policies and programmes of the Congress in the thirties. In line with such a policy, Roy sought to use the platform of the Congress Socialist Party to convert the Congress to Socialism. He wanted the CSP to develop 'alternative leadership', but unfortunately his expectation was not fulfilled in this regard. Roy was of the opinion that there must be complete unity among the left wing forces like the CSP, the Communist Party and the League of Radical Congressmen. In spite of his best efforts he was not very successful in forging meaningful unity of the leftist forces within the Congress.

Chapters nine and ten come to grips with the policy of the left wing to the Second World War. Roy advocated the viewpoint that it would be prudent to cooperate with the British during the War in order to fight Fascism. He further argued that the War would 'accelerate the process of liquidation of imperialism.' But the Congress leaders did not show any interest in an anti-fascist programme and Roy naturally drifted away from the mainstream of the national movement. The result was that Roy established the Radical Democratic People's Party after his break with the Congress. The concluding chapter summarises the findings of the Left Movement in India during the two and half decades preceding national independence.

On the whole, it may be stated that the author of the study has clearly brought out M.N. Roy's role in giving a radical shape and thrust to the Indian National Movement. Roy, to a certain extent, did infuse the fervour of Socialism in the Congress through his slogan of alternative leadership. Arriving on the Indian scene in the early thirties, Roy was responsible for a number of intensive movements of peasants and workers. Dr. Ganguly has succeeded in bringing out in a comprehensive and critical manner the significant role of M.N. Roy in the Left Movement in the country before independence. The author has demonstrated his grasp of the leftist literature of the period which enables him to come to objective and academically relevant conclusions. The book will be very useful to all serious students of M.N. Roy and the Left Movement in India.

Karnatak University,
Dharwad.

V. T. PATIL

PRAKASH CHANDRA : Political Philosophy of M. N. Roy. Sarup and Sons, Meerut, 1985, viii, 192 p., Rs. 100.

M. N. ROY (1887-1954) is one of the most widely dissected political thinkers of the twentieth century. His different phases of revolutionary nationalism, marxism, radical humanism and his large number of writings in many different languages, some of which still remain unpublished, provide lot of interesting and intellectually stimulating material for new interpretations of his political philosophy. The present book under review is one of the recent attempts to assess the political philosophy of M. N. Roy afresh with major emphasis on the radical humanist phase.

The author admits the fact that Roy is not exactly an original thinker as, what he offers is not a new philosophy. However, he does find the elaboration and elucidation of seven inter-related themes by Roy to be important in the context of our times. But the work is a mere narrative and not an analytical piece of work and does not provide any new insight into Roy's ideas. Furthermore, there is no attempt to make a comparative assessment of Roy with thinkers like Gandhi and Tagore which further reduces the value of the work. Apart from these major weaknesses there are also other shortcomings of the book. Regarding the reasons for the relative obscurity of Roy's ideas, he does not even mention the most important one, his inherent elitism. In the context of the famous Roy-Lenin debate on the colonial question (1920) the author argues that the subsequent developments proved that Roy was more realistic without giving a single evidence. This is a serious lapse as it is generally accepted that subsequent history proved that it was Lenin, and not Roy, who was right. Some very well known secondary sources have been overlooked by Chandra like Haithcox's *Communism and Nationalism in India*, North's *Moscow and the Chinese Communists* and Eudin's very well known work, *M. N. Roy's Mission to China : The Communist-Kuomintang Split of 1927*, Karnik's famous biography of M. N. Roy and Dutta Gupta's *Comintern, India and the Colonial Question : 1920-1937*. The net result of these inadequacies is that the book does not add anything to our knowledge of the subject.

University of Delhi,
Delhi.

SUBRATA MUKHARJEE

Socio-Industrial Relations

N.R SHETH : *The Social Framework of An Indian Factory*. Hindustan Publishing Corporation Delhi, 1981 (2nd Edition), xxxi, 181 p., Rs. 60.

THE book under review is in the second edition; the first was published in 1968 and the second was brought out in 1981 with an addition of the author's new introduction.

The book was originally the author's doctoral thesis. It is tailored on a study of an organizational set up of a factory, "Oriental", situated in a small town in Gujarat, Rajanagar (both are pseudonyms). The study was undertaken almost 30 years ago apparently with a view to examine the interactions between the factory and its social setting and to see how and how far the latter impinged on the organizational and interactional dimensions of the factory. However, the author states the objective of his study in different terms, at different places. For example in the original text he mentions "to describe the various forms of relationships among the people (in the factory) and the values and norms governing these relationship" as an objective of this study. (p. 7) But in his introduction to the second edition the author states, that he "undertook this study with twin objectives, one, to study an Indian industrial organization in terms of the totality of social relationship among its workers," in a manner a social anthropologist explores such a totality in any small community, and two "to examine the current assumptions and observations on the issue of compatibility between modern technology and traditional values and institutions of predominantly non-industrial societies like the Indian society." (p.xi) As one goes through the text of the book, particularly the last two chapters in which the author has presented his final observations and conclusions, it becomes amply evident that the author had predominantly the last objective in mind.

As stated earlier, one of the objectives of this study was to examine the patterns of interaction between a traditional system and modern technology. The author suggests that such a study can possibly be done in two ways; one, by studying the changes the group has undergone on account of its members' involvement with the modern industrial system and two, by studying the behaviour of, and interactions among the people working in industrial units with a view to see how far they reflect their behaviour and interaction patterns in the outside society. The author says that he had adopted the second approach in this study.

Besides two introductions, there are seven chapters in the book. The second chapter discusses briefly the historical development of the factory town. It also gives a brief account of the development of the factory, firstly as an off-shoot of its parental company and later on as an indepen-

dent company. Incidentally, the factory manufactured such items as switch gear panels, electric substation equipment and the like.

The general theme of the third chapter is the formal organization of the factory. It discusses authority structure, interrelations between the different functional subunits and also the relations between the management, staff organization and the workers.

In the fourth chapter, the author presents the data he has collected about social background of the workers in terms of the linguistic/regional and caste divisions among them. The data on the social links among the workers, their fathers' occupations, their migrant-status, and their household compositions, are also analysed in this chapter.

In the next chapter titled "Institutional Bond," the author discusses the parallel systems of recruitment and promotion based on the nepotistic considerations of various varieties, viz., linguistic, casteist, kinship-based and the like.

The sixth chapter analyses the nexus of the informal clusters that got evolved among the workers within the formal organizational framework. The author here tries to highlight the informal underpinnings of the formal relationships among the employees of different categories and of those between the employer and employees. The discussion brings out how the personal considerations, sentiments and values influence the patterning of these relationships.

The seventh chapter is devoted to the discussion of the emergence, development and the nature of the trade union activities in the factory.

The eighth chapter titled as "Resume" recapitulates whatever was discussed in the earlier chapters and includes the author's observations on it.

The last chapter "Industrialism and Indian Society" is the author's statement on the course and the development of industrialization in a tradition-bound country like India. In my opinion the last two chapters could have been profitably combined together to form a concluding chapter.

Marx identified changes in the means of production and the consequent changes in the mode of production as factors largely responsible for the emergence of capitalism and growth of industrialization in Western societies. Weber, on the other hand, put forth the view that the genesis of Western capitalism and industrialization could be attributed to the system of values and beliefs prevalent then. (I really do not know whether Weber included among these factors the Western social institutions also, as the author says, (p. xiii), Taking a clue from the Weberian argument a few scholars argue that the social structure and culture of non-western societies was incompatible with demands of the modern industries. With a stronger push of industrialization, the traditional values, beliefs, ways of behaviour and relationship would vanish to provide room to the new appropriate beliefs, values, ways of behaviour, etc. Contradicting this and similar other views, the author argues that "...the behaviour and attitudes

characterizing the traditional Indian society were found to exist with those generally associated with modern industry." (p. xi) He subscribes to the view put forth by scholars who have done research on such non-western countries like Japan, Guatemala and various African countries that there is "some degree of compatibility between traditional culture and the dictates of industrial efficiency in non-western societies..." (p. xiv) This argument which has become a burden of song all through the conclusions of this study, finds expression in its various forms in various contexts. For example, at one place he says that the traditional structure of a newly industrializing society does not necessarily come in conflict with the industrial technology. A pre-industrial social system and radically changed technological system may go together. (p. 146)

At another point, he examines the argument relating the migrant nature of the industrial work force to the conflicts which they experience between their commitment to the urban industrial complex and their loyalties to their traditional social structure and culture. (p. 154) He then identifies four categories of workers according to their migrant-status: permanent migrants, semi-permanent migrants, temporary migrants and the village-based workers. He observes that this conflict was comparatively less among the workers of the first and the last categories than among others. This is because the permanent migrants and the village-based workers "had their social paraphernalia around them and they could divide their attention between their social obligations and their factory work without hindrance to either." (p. 155)

In some other context he says, that every one in the factory had accepted ascription and particularism in parts of their work-relationships as they accepted the achievement-universalism criteria in other parts. (p. 160) While analysing the employer-employee relationship, he says, although the factory is a formal organization, the employer-employee relationship here is characterized by the presence of a strong non-contractual element in it. Along with the legal norms, the traditional master-servant idiom is also used for cementing this relationship. He explicitly asserts that "the continuance of traditional bond may not be dysfunctional to industrial society." (p. 161) (It must be noted that the author often does not show the necessary exactness while using different terms. For example, he does not find it necessary here to make distinction between the terms 'industrial unit' and 'industrial society').

Two observations can be made on what the author has said about the compatibility of the traditional social system with the emerging industrial social order. Agreeably, the social world of the workers outside the factory finds its way inside the factory. But will this co-existence of the traditional and the emergent be a permanent feature? Is not it a temporary phase which will be followed by the supersession of the requirements of modern

technology over the traditional? It must be emphasized that it is a phenomenon, more of adjustment than of compatibility.

Moreover, when he talks about the co-existence of the traditional social system with the emergent industrial one, or of such primordial values as ascription and particularism, he is not saying something new. He is mostly echoing what earlier scholars have said. He himself tacitly concedes it (see for example p. xii). He draws support for his arguments more from the works of others than from his own data. This study is a "compliment" to the studies of many others.

The author sometimes indiscriminately dismisses well-founded arguments of others, making use of either flimsy evidence or lame logic. For example at one place he says, "For a large number of employees, work in the factory meant wealth and status," and further adds, "the fact that factory workers in villages around Rajnagar could get credit more easily than their peasant kith and kin... is very significant in this context." Thereafter, he immediately concludes, "It goes against the Marxist contention that industrial workers suffer not only alienation from their social world, but also poverty." (p. 156) I do not think that any special elaboration is required to pinpoint the shallowness of this observation. The same can be said about his comment, "One wonders how far the family capitalism in the West has really been eliminated by the so-called managerial revolution." (p. 158)

Admittedly, it is a systematic piece of research work done in an authentic anthropological tradition. However, there has been often pronounced emphasis on the details, some of which have had no bearing on the research theme. (pp. 21-22) The author has advocated direct observation of people's behaviour through some amount of participation in "their social and organization field," (sic) rather than a structured questionnaire or schedule as the most appropriate method for a research of this type. There is a possibility that a study made by adopting the method advocated by the author would turn out to be more impressionistic than factual. But apparently the author seems to be discounting this possibility.

University of Poona,
Poona.

UTTAM B. BHOI

KURIAKOSE MAMKOOTAM : Trade Unionism : Myth and Reality. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1982, viii, 140 p., Rs. 65.

IT is a fine book ; it impresses by erudition and considerable citation of ideas and data presented by other sociologists in this field. In a way it is a unique book that has tried to study trade unionism in the perspective of political developments of the country.

But what about an economic perspective ? Even if we leave the question of a planned role of industrial development in the country, though by the time of data collection for this study not only the first three Plans (1951-66), three planless years (1966-69) and even the Fourth Plan (1969-74) had all taken place, some of the decisions (three public sector steel plants at Durgapur, Rourkela and Bhilai) had directly effected the quality and the angle of decision-making at the Tata Iron and Steel Co. (TISCO), with which trade unions at the plant had to deal.

Another point to be noted is that till about a decade before, higher management at TISCO hardly bothered about improving productivity, cost reduction through better bargaining with their trade unions without updating technology, probably due to protected markets at home for their products, mainly mild steel.

Thus, according to this reviewer (one might even accuse him of holding biased views) this deficiency boggles the mind. May be even socio-metric measurements could have led the erudite author to view trade unionism, which has been pointed out.

Be that as it may, let us look at the positive and more attractive aspects of this extremely well-written research study. He has used the sociological methods and tools established in the United Kingdom and also followed in India. He has refrained from using cliches and gimmicks. His arguments automatically constitute a three dimensional effect, a sort of stereophonic effect even without the citations of an economic environment without imparting any glamour or fashionable ideas prevalent at the time of preparing the draft.

It is bound to become a pioneering study even with the omissions pointed out. Maybe we can hope for even better studies from the author. It is a sad fact of our academic life that while on the top echelons there are an adequate number of sociologists, at the field levels that is not so compared to research activists in economics and political science. Nationally we do need at least an equal number of research activists in sociology too.

Let this dissertation be their guide, which, of course, should interest higher managements of industrial units, big and small in addition to academicians.

Bombay.

O. P. ARYA

Education

SUDHA V. RAO : *Education and Rural Development*. Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1985, 334p., Rs. 150.

66 **I**F I ever get Rs. 20,000, I will buy myself half an acre of wet land and build a nice house. On my land I will plant sugarcane : cultivation with care and the use of chemical fertiliser should be able to produce twenty-five tonnes of cane. This would give me an income Rs. 4,000, of which I should be able to save Rs. 2,000 after deducting all the cultivation costs. If I continue to work hard, then in about five to six years I should be able to save Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 12,000. Then I can buy many more acres of wet land and become one of the rich peasants of Dalena.

“However, since I neither have Rs. 20,000, nor own a great deal of land, nor have the benefit of an education, it is my ambition that my children should go to school and college. I want one of my sons to become a lawyer and the other a doctor. While in school, my sons will be able to enjoy life just as much as the other school-going boys of their age group in Dalena do. I will give them pocket money, buy new clothes for them, give them good food and buy all their books and stationery. Unlike me, my sons will not graze cattle, perform agricultural labour or carry cow-dung. Their life will be easier than mine.” (page 57)

“Ragi is a staple food of the villagers and is considered as a grain of high nutritive value, especially for those doing manual work.” (page 59)

“The extensive use of jaggery by the villagers helps in correcting certain dietary deficiencies, because ‘...it contains inorganic substances of the plant juice in the fresh state, and is certainly more nutritious than sugar.’ (Hasan, 1979 : 104) (page 132)

“Not until twenty days after childbirth is a woman given a normal diet which consists of meat, fish and milk. Women from richer households consume meat at least once a week for the next four months, while the poor are able to provide it only once a month. The former have now included brandy in the diet of a post-natal woman. She is given about 500 mls. of brandy together with meat. In their perception brandy helps a woman regain her strength much faster.” (page 133)

“There is a great deal of difference between the Kulimatha and the Government Primary School. A Government school teacher does not work sincerely because he receives his salary from the government, regardless of his performance. A Kulimatha teacher is conscientious about his work because he is afraid of the villagers since they have a definite say in the continuation of his job. If the standards of the government schools have to be raised then they should be handed over to the people, who should be directly involved in the working of the school. The villagers must have a voice in the appointment of the teacher, and he should receive

his salary directly from the people. It is only then that the village school children will receive a good education." (page 151)

"For one mistake the punishment was one dozen stand-ups. For two to three mistakes caning on the palm was inflicted twelve times. If a large number of mistakes were committed, then we were beaten with a slate on folded hands. At other times, a rope was tied to the roof and we were made to hang from it with our feet above the ground and a slate was placed under our feet. If we lost our balance then naturally we would fall on the slate, which would inevitably break. As a result, we had to go through more punishments, this time from our parents, for having broken the slate. All these punishments put the fear of God in us and we felt compelled to do our work diligently and regularly."

"In our days the teacher was held in great awe and treated with much respect. No one had the courage to disobey him even though we might have disobeyed our parents. If our parents asked us to absent ourselves from school, we always refused unless we had received prior permission from the teacher. Strict discipline was maintained even in the absence of the teacher."

"If you are an illiterate then the only avenue open to you is to either work as an agricultural labourer or as a jeeta. But, if you study hard and pass all your examinations then you will be able to enter college and get a job in the city, which will give you respect: your knowledge about the world will increase and you will be able to talk to any government officer on an equal basis."

"There is no uniformity in the English language as it has no established rules which can be applied logically. How do I teach a child to spell a word when there are different ways of spelling and pronouncing the word? Besides, even words with similar pronunciation may mean something different. As a result, when one makes a mistake it is impossible to know what it is that one is trying to communicate. In the Kannada language, even if one pronounces a word incorrectly, its meaning can always be understood. In English, for example, how can I teach the children the difference between 'no' and 'know'? Any explanation in English is useless, so I have to resort to Kannada to explain their meanings."

"I wanted my children to attend school and college: if they had been educated then they would have found it easier to secure employment in the modern sector. This would not only have helped them to earn their livelihood, but would have also made their lives a little more easy and comfortable than it has been for me. If I had to tell others why they should send their children to school, then I would tell them that education would help them to acquire wisdom and give them the ability to handle their life. Most importantly, education would help them in securing employment, which would enable them to look after their parents and support them in their struggle for existence."

"The expectations from the formal school go beyond its immediate function of awarding certificates. Irrespective of the socio-economic group to which a household head belongs, he believes that if a child is not exposed to minimum confinement in a disciplined environment such as a school, he will go astray for want of anything better to do. The concept of going 'astray' in the villager's vocabulary involves indulging in activities such as gambling, stealing, destroying others' crops, smoking, consuming alcohol, using abusive language, eating in a restaurant, going to films and wandering around the city aimlessly. But if a child is in a school environment, in their perception, he will be disciplined by the school teacher. Furthermore, the classroom situation would expose the child to certain facts and knowledge which, in all probability, would mould his outlook on life. Altogether, a Dalena villager perceives the objectives of schooling and education not only in terms of being able to read and write, but also to acquire 'budhi' (wisdom), 'vidhya' (knowledge), enlightenment, the ability to discriminate and the capacity to understand both one's immediate environment as well as the environment at large. An educated person, therefore, is not one who merely emulates the youth in the city, but one who has good manners exemplified in polite forms of speech and acceptable behaviour. This includes hard work, continued respect for elders and responsibility to other members in the family. The emphasis on good behaviour led a big peasant to comment that 'an educated man with a bad character is inferior to an uneducated man with a good character'. In his view, literacy is the first step towards rising to the status of an educated man."

"It must be emphasised that the formal government school teachers of Dalena do not live in the village. Villagers are unable to either influence their conduct or the content of teaching. Many parents, because of their feelings of inadequacy due to these (their own illiterate status), do not approach the teachers. They argue that this situation could be rectified partially if the teachers become residents of the village. Their continuous presence would enable teachers to guide children's academic as well as moral behaviour."

These excerpts represent some of the facts emerging out of Sudha Rao's obviously painstaking research study of human life in Dalena, a village in the Mandya district of Karnataka. It is a meticulously systemic and commendable piece of work covering a very comprehensive format touching upon almost every aspect of the life of the village community including percentages of various castes, family structures, household types and sizes, literacy and educational levels, sources of income, occupational structure by castes, types and sizes of land holding, categories of land ownership, tenant cultivation, landless households, agricultural labour, attached labour, non-agricultural labour, unpaid labour, household labour, child household labour, entrepreneurs, salaried occupations;

levels of living, including housing, environmental sanitation and health, diet patterns, incomes and expenditure, monthly budget per consumption unit, the indigenous system of education, its method, content and forms of punishment; formal education with details of teacher qualification, administration, syllabus, methods of teaching, system of grading; and the correlation of poverty and inequality with formal education, levels of demand for education, paternal educational levels, individual educational achievements, high opportunity, cost of education, ascribed and achieved status, factions and rivalries, educated but unemployed youth, village level politics, attempts to enter the national political scene, Taluk Board elections, voting patterns and so on. Coinciding with the New Education Policy, the book brings home to the serious reader that even if the NEP is a concrete step forward, it remains a far cry in view of the crucial national tasks ahead.

If education has to become truly real-life-related and a reliable means of meeting out the needs, resolving the problems and fulfilling the aspirations of the people or an effective apparatus of civilization, then, the micro and macro aspects and elements of the realities of contemporary human life and the obtaining human situation, will have to be fully taken into account, duly coordinated and integrated.

And if integrated national development be our resolved objective, then, the rural and urban counterparts of notional development will have to become truly complementary and mutually supportive in a consciously planned sense. If the planning process has to become realistic and predictably result-oriented, then, it will have to be factual-data-based. Such a database alone could provide the basis for our adopting a 'need and source co-ordinated' approach to our overall national planning for developmental management.

Dr Rao, by implication, points out that formal education, in its present state in rural India in general and the area of her study in particular, is pregnant with dangerously counterproductive effects—as the system, more often than not, fails to fulfil the only aspiration of a salaried job which motivates most rural folks to bear the burden of educating their children. The increasing disappointment and frustration of our unemployed educated youth, is turning them into 'angry young men and women' who could constitute a new political pressure group, providing the basis of a nationwide revolt of the kind, which under similar circumstances, led to the insurrection in Sri Lanka.

She further points out that the traditional non-formal education (known as 'Kulimatha' in the area of her study under reference) which stresses conformity and aims to inculcate norms and customary behaviour, may well be replaced by formal education, which by contrast emphasises on performance in examinations and competitiveness, and thereby threatens to undermine social continuity—but not without ensuring practical linkages

with the objective application of formal education. This can be achieved only if our Educational and economic systems become 'need and source-coordinated' and mutually supportive.

Dr Rao's work reminds one of the emphasis that the Vice President R Venkataraman recently laid on the need to make the functioning of the Panchayat System as mandatory throughout the country, in which case, every village Panchayat could compile the essential data on Rao's format or an improvised version thereof. This data could then be consolidated at subsequently higher levels of the system, viz., block, tehsil/taluka, subdivision, district, division and state, towards its final integration at the national level and could eventually become the basis of scientific planning for overall national development and management.

While the book provides enough food for thought for every concerned educationist, it could be of special significance for NCERT, the Planning Commission and the State Planning Boards.

Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan,
New Delhi.

M. P. CHHAYA

INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER

By Ashok Jambhekar

The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and students as well as libraries, a compact bibliography of such current Indian publications in the field of social sciences as are received from publishers, but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness, it is hoped that this section, together with the review section of this journal, does list publications of importance, useful for libraries and research workers in the social sciences.

BALAN, K. *Education for Excellence*. Intellectual Publishing House, New Delhi, 1986, xi. 87 p., Rs. 50.

Education moulds character, inculcates self-discipline and develops individual potentialities and qualities. It plays an important role in social change, social mobility and integration and in giving status, security and success alongwith a spirit of service and satisfaction. Education should be society based; the ultimate goal should be transformation of educational benefit into social development. This study, keeping in view the social requirements of education, discusses the objectives of educational reform : role of education in character-building, intellectual development, rural development; qualities of teacher and the new outlook required for children's education.

BANERJEE, Brojendranath *Peace, Friendship and Cooperation*. B.R. Publishing Corporation, Delhi, 1987, 208 p., Rs. 125.

This is a book about the time-tested friendship between India and the USSR, which has been described by the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, during his visit to India in 1987, as an example of peaceful-coexistence. The author deals with similarities of views and perceptions of the two countries on issues related to global peace and development. He further underlines the significance of bilateral cooperation in the economic, scientific and cultural fields for strengthening India and promoting the cause of peace in Asia. It also discusses the fresh economic, trade, scientific and technological agreements emerging out of the Indo-Soviet Summit Meeting in 1985. A chapter is devoted to the development of science and hi-tech in the Soviet Union.

BHATTACHARJEE, Arun *Ground Work of Political Science*. Metropolitan Books Co., New Delhi, 1982. 124 p., Rs. 50.

BIDANI, S. N. and P. K. MITRA *Industrial Sickness : Identification and Rehabilitation*. Vision Books, New Delhi, 1982, 189 p., Rs. 95.

This study analyses the factors and causes responsible for units becoming sick and also the symptoms that usually accompany the process of sickness. It examines the method of conducting viability studies of a rehabilitation programme for a sick unit, the formulation and implementation of an effective rehabilitation plan and its subsequent efficient monitoring. Separate chapters are devoted to the Reserve Bank of India's guidelines on industrial sickness and findings of various committees on this issue. It also discusses the role of technical personnel employed by the financial institutions and outside consultants for the revival of sick units.

BOSE, Ashish and P.B. DESAI *Studies in Social Dynamics of Primary Health Care* (Studies in Economic Development and Planning, 29). Hindustan Publishing Cor-

poration on behalf of the Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi, Delhi, 1983, xvi, 228p., Rs. 95,

The Alma Ata Declaration of 1978 which placed the goal of "health for all by 2000", was accepted by almost all nations of the world. It advanced primary health care as a key to attaining this target, which in turn calls for appreciation of community behaviour as well as perceptions of social, economic and demographic conditions of the people. This study taken up by the Population Research Centre of the Institute at the instance of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, provides results of team research in the field of primary health care in a framework as warranted by the approach advocated by the declaration. The first part deals with the philosophy behind the declaration and major recommendations of the ICSSR-ICMR study group on *Health for All : An Alternative Strategy* and of health policy in India. Second part gives an assessment of the working of the Community Health Workers Scheme currently known as Health Guides Scheme in five selected PHCs in Haryana and Punjab and its perception by the community. It also discusses Punjab's Pilot Project and provides data on the reach of the health services to the rural masses in a district in Haryana. Part III deals with policy and planning option for attaining the goal of health for all by 2000 AD and considers prerequisites of obtaining the goal. Maximum community involvement in two health sectors, namely the control of malaria and adoption of the small family norm, is studied in the fourth part. The Appendix Section includes the "Statement on National Health Policy" formulated by the Government of India in 1982.

GUPTA, Madan Gopal *International Relations Since 1945*. (4th Edition) Chaitanya Publishing House, Allahabad, 1986, xii, 364 p., Rs. 50. (Paper).

Revised and brought up-to-date textbook.

HAR GOVIND *The Monopolies Act : Doctrinaire Qualification and Industrial Growth in India*. Radiant on behalf of the Birla Institute of Scientific Research, Economic Research Division, New Delhi, 1986, x, 198p., Rs. 85.

It examines critically the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1969 alongwith the amendments. The study points out that the doctrinaire quantification of concentration of economic power under the act has caused an adverse impact on industrial growth which further aggravated after the 1984 amendments. Further, it has pointed that some of the enterprises, which could reasonably fall outside the purview of the act, have been roped in and brought within the coverage of the Act. It makes a comparative study of regulation of economic concentration in the contemporary anti-trust legislation in five advanced countries, namely United States of America, United Kingdom, France, West Germany and Japan and adds a small note on the European Economic Community. The author, a former member of the Indian Revenue Service and tax-consultant, suggests that there is need for early removal of the MRTP irritants and streamlining of the procedure for the purpose of achieving GDP growth rate of 5.2 per cent envisaged in the Seventh Five Year Plan.

INDIA, LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT *Commencement and Termination of Sessions of the Central Legislature, Provisional Parliament and Lok Sabha and Names and Tenure of Presiding Officers (1921 to 1986)*. Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1986, 31 p., Rs. 7 (Paper).

JAITLEY, ANAM *International Politics : Major Contemporary Trends and Issues*. Sterling, New Delhi, 1984, viii, 326p., Rs. 18.50 (Paper).

The author in this five-part book discusses the Western liberal, Marxist and Third World perspectives, the determinants of international politics, the post-War

World scenario and the controlling and regulating mechanisms. Serves as a useful textbook.

JANGAM, R.T. *Organisation and Management*. Sterling, New Delhi, 1982, vi, 152 p., Rs. 60.

Textbook designed to serve the students of management in Indian universities.

JHA, Makhan *Indian Civilization : Approaches and Methods*. Indian Publications, Ambala Cantt, 1982. 112p., Rs. 45.

In brief, it discusses the approaches and methods for the study of Indian Civilisation. It presents a comparative analysis of the study of two sacred cities, viz, Gaya and Janakpur and discusses the findings of various other orthogenetic cities.

JOHANNSEN, Hano and G. Terry PAGE *International Dictionary of Management*. Vision Books, New Delhi, 1983, 390p., Rs. 125.

Contains 5000 entries covering all branches of management and its application in various other fields. It also includes brief descriptions of numerous institutions, statutory bodies, etc., dealing with a wide range of business, employment and management matters. First Indian edition with Indian section compiled by Dr. S.P. Parashar.

MAVALANKAR, Anand P. *International Political Economy : A Critical Introduction* (Harold Laski Institute of Political Science Publication, 138). Harold Laski Institute of Political Science, Ahmedabad, 1986, 86p., Rs. 30. (Paper).

MUTHUSWAMI, B. (Ed.) *Selected Writings of C. R. Reddy VI : Some Great Lives*. C. R. Reddy Centenary Celebrations Committee, Andhra University, Waltair, 1981, xvi, 193p., Rs. 15.

The C. R. Reddy Centenary Celebrations Committee in this first volume of writings of the great thinker on matters of state, society, politics, economics, language and literature, presents critical appraisal of Vemana, a poet of Western Andhra, Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Ramakrishna Paramahansa, Vivekananda, Viresalingam, Gokhale, Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, etc. Collected from the available papers in the Andhra University Library, The Nehru Memorial Museum Library and the Bangalore Government Archives. Address of V. P. Madhava Rao, Dewan of Mysore on the epistles of Swami Vivekananda and Dr. Reddy's letters to Gokhale are provided in the appendix section of the volume.

NAYAR, C. P. Somanathan *Finance Corporations : A Study of Unregulated Banks*. Institute for Financial Management and Research, Madras, 1982, x, 121 p., Rs. 41.

This is a study of financial intermediaries which do the business of banking in the informal sector in India particularly the southern states. It identified about 3000 such corporations in India in 1979-80 concentrated mainly in the southern states with total outstanding deposits of about Rs. 650 crores. Besides studying their structure and function, it examines issues related to their business of banking and protection to depositors by regulating their functions.

RAJ KUMAR, Annie Besant's *Rise to Power in Indian Politics 1914-1917*. Concept Publishing Co., New Delhi, 1981, 182p., Rs. 60.

The period under study is significant from two angles, namely that at this time the politics of protests and petitions was given up and the scheme of self-government was launched, and Mrs. Besant, a theosophist and reformer, was drawn into Indian politics due to Government of India's attitude towards her. She became President of the Indian National Congress. It is in this background that the author examines her role in Indian politics, evolution of her political ideology, dynamics of her leadership and discusses her style, method, organization and nature and character of her contribution to Indian politics of the period.

RAMJILAL (Ed.) *National Integration : A Symposium*. Dyal Singh College, Karnal, 1987, xx, 191p.

Collection of papers contributed to a seminar organised by the Department of Political Science of Dyal Singh College, Karnal under the College Humanities Social Sciences Improvement Programme of the UGC in October, 1986. These papers discuss all the important issues like communalism, fundamentalism, secularism, regionalism, language problem, education, reservation policy, centre-state relations and minority institutions which affect national integration.

REDDI, M.P.R. *Peasant and State in Modern Andhra History*. Clio Book Club, Kavali, 1986, vi, 256p, Rs. 48. (Paper)

Evolution of agrarian system under feudalism, colonialism and the conditions of peasantry are discussed in this study. It outlines the historical significance of the agrarian revolution effected by the British rulers and its consequences. Reactions of peasants to the oppressive fiscal administration and exploitative agrarian structure perpetuated by the colonial state are traced to understand aspects of the peasant consciousness and awakening in the 20th century. Appendix includes: Presidential Address of the author to the 9th session of the Andhra Pradesh History Congress and a note on *Athavanavyavaharatantram* a Mackenzie manuscript.

Salt March Golden Jubilee Souvenir 1930-1980. Gandhi Museum, Madurai, 1980. n.p. (Paper)

The souvenir has been brought out to raise funds for the construction of a Memorial Hall to the Museum which has been doing significant work in propagating Gandhiji's philosophy and ideals and imparting education to the students to learn about his life, work and freedom movement, etc.

SHARMA, Shanker Dayal *Readings in Indo-Soviet Friendship and Cooperation*, Bombay, 1987, 130p.

On the auspicious occasion, when in India 40th anniversary of India's independence and in the USSR the seventieth anniversary of the Great October Revolution is being celebrated, the author an accomplished scholar, veteran freedom fighter, and former Governor of Andhra Pradesh, Punjab and Maharashtra, President of Indian National Congress, Minister in the Government of Madhya Pradesh and at the centre and presently Vice-President of India, through his articles, editorials and speeches, presents a perspective of all aspects of Indo-Soviet friendship and cooperation.

SUBRAMANIAM, K. S. *Rural Violence and the Administrative Dimension* (Occasional Papers on History and Society 45, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, 1987, 31p, (Paper)

The "Garibi Hatao" slogan and 20-Point Programme were launched to awaken the rural poor to their social, human and legal rights. With this consideration the Untouchability (Offences) Act of 1955 was tightened up and re-enacted as the Protection of Civil Rights Act 1955, the Bonded Labour (Abolition) Act was passed and the Minimum Wages Act was strictly enforced. Direct assault on poverty was launched and schemes of welfare programmes were formulated. But these programmes have been leading to increased violence against the rural poor and the administrative machinery has largely been siding with the rural vested interests. This study in this background highlights the major trends of violence and assesses the situation in Bihar and the role of the administration in that state. It concludes by raising some issues relating to the role of the administration generally.

WEST BENGAL, *Gorkhaland Agitation : The Issues—An Information Document*. Director of Information Calcutta, 1986, v. 50p, n. p, (Paper)

It discusses issues relating to the agitation including objectives, programmes and actions of the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) and its social and political consequences. It contains important documents and data concerning the issue.

THE INDIAN OCEAN IN WORLD POLITICS:

REFLECTIONS ON ITS FUTURE

BY PRASANTA SEN GUPTA

Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This ocean is the key to the seven seas. In the 21st century the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters.

Alfred Mahan

WITHOUT giving an unqualified endorsement to Mahan's observation, one can easily say that the growing naval activities by the Super Powers in the Indian Ocean have served to push it into political and strategic limelight.¹ The reasons for the importance of the Indian Ocean in world politics are not inscrutable.

Its (Indian Ocean) geographical location, the important sea routes which traverse it, and the wealth of natural resources of the densely populated countries on the shores of the ocean are the main factors of this strategic importance. There is in the Ocean a network of essential trading routes which connect, by way of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, the countries of the Far East and Australasia with the Middle East, and by way of the Suez Canal, the Far East and Australasia with Europe and America. Besides, the countries on its shores possess a wealth of natural resources such as wool, jute, tea, rubber, tin copper, gold, diamond, uranium and magnesium, chromium and antimony, in addition to oil which is today one of the most important resources.²

The strategic importance of the Indian Ocean was revealed during the 1973-74 oil crisis when it was demonstrated how vital the oil supplies from the Indian Ocean region were for the industrial West, and how vulnerable to oil pressure the West was. In view of the strategic and other importance of the Indian Ocean, the Super Powers' increasing naval activities, including the installation of military bases there, seem unsurprising. Any worthwhile study of the Indian

*Dr Sen Gupta is Lecturer, Political Science, Kalyani University, West Bengal.

Ocean should proceed from an examination of the Soviet and American interests there as well as of their strategic policies. What we present below is a vast variety of interpretations about the Super Powers' naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and they are by no means beyond debate. Let us begin with the Soviet Union.

SOVIET INTERESTS AND STRATEGIC POLICY

Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean has been interpreted as Kremlin's grand design to dominate this ocean and its approaches. According to Cottrell and Burrell, Soviet entry in the Indian Ocean is simply a fulfilment of the Russian desire, entertained by rulers from the time of Peter the Great to the present, not only to find warm water outlets in the South, but to use such facilities to extend Russian control and dominance worldwide. In their words, "The Kremlin's ultimate objective is immutable - the creation of a world under Soviet paramountcy."³ From an entirely different view point others have contended that Soviet naval entry in the Indian Ocean came following the establishment of communication facilities by the United States at the North West Cape in Australia and at Asmara in Ethiopia. As this was followed by announcements in December 1966 and June 1968 indicating that the United States was ready to construct a logistic support base at Diego Garcia, the Soviet Union felt that Washington had planned to deploy Polaris and Poseidon type submarines in the area that could threaten the Russians. As Gill has observed, "The Soviet deployment of vessels in the Indian Ocean was... concerned to provide a counter to the possible presence of the American craft in the region, and hopefully to neutralize it as a source of nuclear attack on the Soviet Union by making it less secure for the operation of offensive vessels than it otherwise would have been."⁴ Still others have argued that the Sino-Soviet rift has served to encourage Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Smolansky has maintained that while the Soviet naval entry in the Indian Ocean has been strongly influenced by Washington's decision to deploy nuclear submarines in its waters, the extensive political involvement of Kremlin has been dictated primarily by the exigencies of the Sino-Soviet dispute. However, he has qualified his observation by saying that, "There may have been no direct initial relationship between the two in the sense that the Sino-Soviet rift would probably have dictated a political involvement by the USSR in the affairs of the

sub-continent even without the naval strategic considerations. In this particular instance however, the two have been closely interwoven.⁵

Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean has also been interpreted in terms of Moscow's geographic necessity to maintain the communication line between the European and the East Asian parts of the Soviet Union. It is appropriate to mention that the Soviet Navy comprises four fleet areas: the Baltic, the Arctic the Black Sea, and the Pacific. It is through the Indian Ocean that connection between the three European fleets can be maintained assuredly. As Kudryavtsey has noted, "... the Soviet Navy uses the waters of the Ocean's international zone, which is open to the ships of any country in accordance with international law. These sea communications are very important to the Soviet Union since they represent the only non-freezing sea routes linking Soviet ports in the Black and Azov Seas with Soviet ports in the Far East."⁶ For some observers, Moscow's sailing in the Indian Ocean signifies a "naval demonstration" only, a part of gun-boat diplomacy that belongs rather to the area of political use of the navy than to the strictly military activity of the fleet. They have taken the view that the Soviet Navy might move into action in support of either a "national liberation movement" or one of the friendly littoral powers in order to protect it against foreign aggression.⁷ An important military objective of the Soviet Union has been to detect and oppose in the waters of the Indian Ocean US strike forces, including submarines equipped with Polaris and Poseidon missiles and attacking carriers western points of the Ocean could reach targets in the Soviet Central Asia and the Urals.⁸

Of Moscow's non-military interests in the Indian Ocean, mention may be made of flag-showing: a time-honoured strategem to augment naval influence and prestige. For a state such as the Soviet Union, which aspires to acquire more recognition as a global power, it is only natural that it would wish to have its presence felt outside the coastal waters and adjoining seas. As Vali has remarked, "To demonstrate its naval strength in manner consistent with international law and established practices, the Soviet Union undertook to advertise its super power status by a naval presence in waters which prior to the midsixties did not see Soviet naval vessels. This flagshowing is one objective, and certainly not the least important, of the entry of Soviet warships into the Indian Ocean."⁹ Soviet presence in the Indian

Ocean basin has also been encouraged by considerations of trade. Smolansky has pointed out that several countries in this general area have developed extensive economic and commercial relations with the Soviet Union, supplying a number of important raw materials and serving as consumers of certain Soviet industrial products.¹⁰

Soviet strategic policy has been directed towards protecting Moscow's interests against the pressure of Western dominance. To this end, the Soviet Union has increased arms sales and military agreements in the Indian Ocean littoral states and skilfully used the various regional conflicts for obtaining military and trade agreements. The 1962 India-China War and the 1965 war between India and Pakistan have served to lay the groundwork for the Soviet-Indian Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in August 1971. The Soviet Union has been brought closer to Iraq, and for a time to the United Arab Republic, thanks to the Arab-Israeli armed conflicts. It assisted (with Nasser's help) the emergence of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). In each of these cases, significant military understandings were reached thereby giving the Soviets bases and facilities (at Umm Qasr and Aden, for example).¹¹ Critics have explained Soviet support for the 'liberation movements' especially in Southern Africa and the Gulf, more in terms of Moscow's desire to create independent states that would trade and have other relations with it. Shephered has argued that from the 1960s onwards Kremlin has been the primary supporter through funds and training for Southern African liberation movements from South West African People's Organization in Namibia to Zimbabwe African People's Union in Zimbabwe, and the same pattern has begun in other major conflict areas. In his words, "the USSR has moved into powerful strategic position in Ethiopia where the Soviet Union provides training support for Cubans and liberation movements operating in the Southern Africa, and is able to monitor its interests in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf. The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen has been a primary recipient of substantial Soviet and Cuban military assistance, including military personnel."¹²

AMERICAN INTERESTS AND STRATEGIC POLICY

For the United States the Indian Ocean has a 'low priority interest' if compared with the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans or the Mediterranean Sea.¹³ None the less, the United States has been maintaining its

naval squadron in the Indian Ocean. Commentators have differed in their interpretations of the American naval presence in the Indian Ocean. There are those who have taken the view that the Indian Ocean is looked upon by the imperialist powers, including the United States, as an important military outpost. Following the collapse of colonial rule in Asia and Africa the imperialist powers have turned their attention to devising new ways and means with a view to retaining their ascendancy over their former colonies. Though they were forced to quit their colonies, they have not renounced their global policy of war and aggression.¹⁴ Others have maintained that the United States has a stake in the political order and stability of the Indian Ocean region countries. As conflicts between regional powers and a major change in the local balance of power would serve the interests of the Soviet Union and China, and, therefore, the world military balance would be tilted in its disfavour, Washington has felt the need to maintain the status quo, though a change of status quo favourable to its allies or friends would not be unwelcome.¹⁵ More important, the United States has provided billions of dollars in economic and military assistance to countries of the region. Besides, Washington's economy has over \$ 10 billion of commercial investments in the area, including about 3.5 billion in oil. While the United States has imported only about ten per cent of its oil requirements from the Persian Gulf, Western Europe has bought over sixty per cent of its oil from the Gulf. Thus, there is nothing unusual in Washington's desire to protect such vital interests of its allies.¹⁶

US policy has been directed towards protecting the increasingly important trade and supply routes from the Gulf to the Cape and the Suez Canal. Until 1975 the US bases and facilities in Ethiopia were closely related to the Arabian Sea route to the Suez Canal.¹⁷ The US strategic decision to strengthen the military power of South Africa from 1960 to 1977 was closely tied to the US trade and investment policy.¹⁸ It has been argued that in South Asia periodic visits by task forces from the Seventh Fleet has increased, and that the visits in 1971 and 1973, and again in 1979 were directly related to threats to US interests either in Pakistan, in the Arabian Gulf or on the Arabian Peninsula. A search for bases closer to the Indian Ocean is necessary as about three weeks are required to pass through the Straits of Malacca and into the Indian Ocean. The base at Diego Garcia has served to meet this need.¹⁹

To prevent the Communist or 'unfriendly' groups from holding the reins of power has constituted another goal of the US strategic policy. This has been borne out by the increasing activity of contingents of the Pacific-based Seventh Fleet. As Shepherd has noted, "From time to time aircraft carriers from Subic Bay in the Philippines, aided by support ships stationed in the Gulf and eastern Africa, have been despatched to the Indian Ocean during a crisis. The most notable occasion was the Bangladesh Crisis of 1971, but other visits were made during the Somalian and Ethiopian (1977-78) and the Iranian and Yemeni (1979) conflicts."²⁰ Still another US strategic consideration has been "to suppress liberation movements" throughout the zone. US activities in this regard have taken the form of counter-revolution, CIA subsidies to rival movements, assassination, bribes, and clandestine arms shipments through third parties to Angola in 1974-75, Oman and the Yemen from 1965-75, and to Iran from the anti Mossadeq coup in 1953 to the 1979 revolution.²¹

LITTORAL REACTION

Many littoral states feel that the entry in the Indian Ocean by the Super Powers, equipped with nuclear warheads, has exposed their territorial security to danger. This feeling has impelled them to demand that the Indian Ocean be declared a "zone of peace." Being 'developing nations' and desirous of self-reliant progress without foreign interference, they want to put an end to Super Power conflict in the Indian Ocean area.²² Thus, the idea of a 'zone of peace' in the Indian Ocean is the outcome of apprehensions created by the establishment of naval bases by the Super Powers in the Indian Ocean. The idea was formalized at the Lusaka Conference of Non-Aligned States in September 1970.²³ One problem, however, remained regarding the geographical limits contemplated in the concept. Sri Lanka has made the demand that the entire Indian Ocean region including the land territories and territorial waters be included within the peace zone.²⁴ In 1971 the littoral states drew the attention of the United Nations to it. And in December 1971, the General Assembly carried a resolution designating the Indian Ocean "for all time as a zone of peace." The 1971 resolution called upon "the Great Powers... to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral states of the Indian Ocean with a view to: Halting the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean; eliminating from the Indian Ocean all

bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of Great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of Great Power rivalry."²⁵ It appears from this declaration and subsequent declarations and the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean that the promoters of the 'zone of peace' envisage neutralization (demilitarization) and denuclearization of the region, though it remains vague whether these measures are to apply to the ocean area only or also to the land territory surrounding the ocean which would include the littoral and hinterland states themselves. However, the Indian Ocean continues to remain an area unfree from the tensions of war. This brings us to the question of obstacles to implementing the 'peace zone' proposal.

OBSTACLES

Attention has been drawn to various obstacles which stand in the way of implementing the peace zone proposal. Broadly speaking they are of two types: legal and non-legal. Among the legal obstacles mention may be made of the doctrine of the freedom of the high seas, and the doctrine of state sovereignty.

According to international law the open sea, lying beyond the limits of the territorial waters of states, "cannot be subject to a right of sovereignty for it is the necessary means of communication between nations and its free use constitutes an indispensable element for international trade and navigation."²⁶ The peace zone would at least amount to prohibiting warships traversing the ocean otherwise than by way of the exercise of the right of innocent passage, and it would thus amount to an interference with the doctrine of the high seas.²⁷ However, we should not suppose that neither amendment to the laws of the high seas nor accommodation of the littoral states' interests to the rules of the Law of Sea is possible. Going by the past experience one can rather say that the whole area of the Law of the Sea has always represented an accommodation of the differing and conflicting interests of states.²⁸ There are chances that without binding rules on the proper use of the seas to the greatest possible advantage of all states and also for the purpose of establishing a legal order in and over it, a state of anarchy and lawlessness will prevail on the open sea. This will not only render its use incapable of proper exploitation;

the lives and property of persons sailing on it will be jeopardized.²⁹

There are those who feel that the 'peace zone' concept collides with the doctrine of state sovereignty. The concept obligates the littoral states to refrain from maintaining large armies and bases so that no single power can dictate to the other littoral states, whereas the doctrine of state sovereignty is based on the principle that no limitation can be imposed except when a state agrees to bind itself by agreement upon the size of the armed forces and armaments which a state determines by exercising its sovereign power. Thus, to advocate limitations of the armies and armaments of the littoral states is to wink at the doctrine of state sovereignty.³⁰

Among the non-legal obstacles, mention may be made of the tribute system, to use Shepherd's phrase. Under the tribute system the Super Powers "act as major patrons, providing protection and other services for the Third World client-states in return for trade, resources and profits The Third World states, which benefit, are prepared to pay a very high price, and sometimes much higher than they calculate, for protection by the system."³¹ It is appropriate to mention that today states are bound together by a vast variety of ties: economic, military, political, etc. It is hardly deniable that most of the littoral countries require as much economic assistance as possible in order to accelerate their domestic economic growth as well as to avoid overpopulation, mass deprivation, mass discontent and possibly mass violence. The Super Powers have insisted alternately (depending on the situation) that foreign economic aid and trade ventures have been conducted either for altruistic, economic and political reasons, or to counter the other Power's politically-motivated ventures. In any case, one finds a mutually reinforcing quality in the ties between donor and recipient. As Singer has put it, "The more aid is extended by one country to another, the more foreign trade there is likely to be. The more foreign aid and trade exists, the more economically dependent the weaker state may become on the powerful. The more economically dependent a weaker state, the more likely it is to support the political interests of the more powerful (other things assumed equal). The more it tends to support the political interests of the more powerful state, the more likely it is to receive more foreign aid. And so it goes."³² The ruling elites of some oil producing countries (Saudi Arabia, Iran, etc.) looked

upon the Egyptian revolution of early 1950s, and the revolution in Iraq in early 1960s, and their later cooperation with the socialist bloc of countries as a threat to their regimes. For understandable reasons, they turned to the West, particularly to the United States, for military aid. Note in passing that South Africa's arms imports registered a sharp increase following the insurgency movement against the South African white regime, from \$ 30mm in 1971 to \$ 130mm in 1972, and this level of imports was maintained in the subsequent years. Similarly, Ethiopian defence expenditure, which was more than double that of Somalia till 1974, increased to almost five times that of Somalia in 1975. And no change was observed in that level in the later years. Arms transfers to these countries till 1976 remained at a relatively low level, but in 1977 Ethiopia received substantial arms aid from the Soviet Union after its war with Somalia.³³ The West Asian group of countries in the Indian Ocean have been the principal buyers of foreign arms. Note in passing that the United States was the major arms supplier to the region during 1973-77 with over \$ 11.8bn arms transfers of which 90 per cent was acquired by the West Asian group of countries. The Congressional study of the United States' Foreign Policy Objectives and Military Installations has explained the reasons for the United States selecting this particular group of countries as target area thus: "the US has both a conventional and perhaps strategic nuclear military interest in the Indian Ocean region. Military objectives for conventional forces include the capability to: (1) protect US interests in the region; (2) employ or threaten force in the Middle East; (3) secure the Indian Ocean air and sea routes against harassment or interdiction; (4) intervene in support of other objectives in the littoral and related to all of these; (5) balance Soviet forces in the region and attain a superiority in a crisis. The US also possesses a potential strategic nuclear military objective of developing, when necessary or convenient, ballistic missile submarines targeted on USSR."³⁴

Military ties have also taken the form of multi-lateral "Collective Security" agreements, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Warsaw Pact, the Central Treaty Organization and the South-East Asia Treaty Organization. Bilateral treaties have ranged from the sale, loan or grant of small amounts of military equipment, through arrangements for advising, training, supplying and or commanding the military in question, to sending troops in support of the

regime in office against both internal and external threats. Bilateral treaties, as Singer has pointed out, "provide for the establishment of mentor bases and the stationing of mentor troops on the soil of the weaker; for the equipping of indigenous officer corps in the mentor country...."³⁵ Thus, one can argue that for most of the littoral countries, tied to the Super Powers economically, militarily and in other ways, it is difficult to seriously endorse any proposals intending to curb the Super Powers' naval activities in the Indian Ocean. And they can hardly be expected to move beyond paying lip sympathy to the proposal of 'zone of peace.'

Another non-legal obstacle is that no consensus of opinion is in evidence among the littoral countries on the question of the neutralization (demilitarization) and denuclearization of the region. Smaller Indian Ocean Powers - for instance, Sri Lanka, Singapore, the Himalayan States and some African States - would welcome such moves which would solve some of their most urgent security problems; but it is doubtful whether the major littoral powers, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Indonesia, and probably Somalia and Ethiopia, would agree to reduce their military expansion and to eliminate their military, naval and air bases and installations. Chances are remote that the littoral states which have concluded defence or friendship treaties with outside Powers (as India and Iraq with the Soviet Union, Pakistan and Australia with the United States, Malaysia and Singapore with Britain) will be agreeable to an abrogation of their treaties.³⁶ Unity among the littoral countries has also been obstructed by their clashing power ambitions.

As a matter of fact, the political situation of the Indian Ocean region has been complicated by a host of issues. In the African realm there are certain boundary disputes which have generated tensions between neighbours like Uganda, Sudan and Egypt. There are racial tensions between Zimbabwe and the Union of South Africa due to racial policies. In Asia, issues like Arab-Israel military confrontation, the boundary quarrel between Iraq and Iran and Afghanistan, and the question of territorial waters in the Gulf area are critical. In a situation such as this, those who feel that what is needed to keep the Indian Ocean as an area of peace is to persuade the Super Powers to stay out of it, unduly simplify a complex state of affairs. And those who stress the need to face the Super Powers by the littoral countries "on

the basis of a unity of approach" seem to overlook the issues which seriously divide the littoral countries.³⁷ As Misra has commented, "Though there is broad support for the 'peace zone' idea in the Afro-Asian world, it is doubtful if their commitment or determination is equally firm. Some countries are paying lip-service to the idea, and their commitment or determination is only skin-deep. A variety of complex factors - domestic as well as external - are responsible for this situation. Hence to expect a really united action is to take an overoptimistic view of the situation and to minimize the difference of outlook obtaining among the countries of Asia and Africa."³⁸

FUTURE

What, then, is the future of the Indian Ocean? It is difficult to deny that the Indian Ocean has strong potentials of developing into an arena of dangerous conflict. And this has led Gannon to comment that, "The (Indian Ocean) area will probably remain volatile. The enmities are ancient. The interests of the Great Powers intrude and will continue to do so in all likelihood. Considering these factors, among others, the chance of an outbreak of armed conflict in the Indian Ocean area remains unpleasantly high."³⁹ In the current international situation it is a difficult exercise, if not an impossible one, to insulate any geographical area from the dangers of conflict without the Super Powers' cooperation. Attaining this cooperation is less than easy primarily because the Super Powers' perspectives of the international system are poles apart. A few words about their perspectives. The dominant theme in the view of the international system is the theory of imperialism. The social systems in most of the advanced and powerful countries are characterized by capitalism which is supported by class exploitation. And imperialism is simply the international expression of this exploitation. It is the obligation of the USSR to shield the communist states from capitalist-inspired counter-revolution and invasion, and insofar as possible, to help other countries on the path to revolution. The American world view turns on questions of political freedom and tyranny, and evaluates social systems in terms of freedom of speech, the right to vote and tolerance of dissent. The parallel to individual freedom in international society is the principle of national, independence and self-determination, and the parallel to infringement of individual rights is the violation of territorial

sovereignty and foreign interference in the internal affairs of a free nation. The United States is obligated by its vast resources and its historic ideals to play a role of leadership in protecting weak members of the international community and in guaranteeing minimum standards on international behaviour.⁴⁰

Besides, the member states of the contemporary international system are prone to increase their influence, prestige and status. Such sensitivity to their power status is particularly characteristic of the Super Powers since the global balance of power depends in large measure on the credibility of the assistance these countries may provide to their allies and friends.⁴¹ In a situation such as this, only a phenomenon of parallel interests can bring the Super Powers closer together. There are those who feel that the competition between the Super Powers is limited in nature because there has been a basic entente between the United States and the Soviet Union since Yalta, and, therefore, public statements by the leaders of the two countries should not be taken literally.⁴² To return to our argument. The Super Powers have parallel interests in the Indian Ocean region. "Both seek to control regional conflicts through Super Power intervention. Both seek nonproliferation when there are at least four potential nuclear powers - India, South Africa, Pakistan, and Israel - in the region. Both have similar concerns with respect to the Law of the Sea, such as their desire to secure the freedom of navigation in the straits. Both seek to control revolutionary movements that could affect their interests.... Both worry about the emergence of third parties in world politics."⁴³ In view of these parallel interests of the Super Powers, Gannon's remark that, "the chance of an outbreak of armed conflict in the Indian Ocean area remains unpleasantly high", sounds extreme. The Super Powers feel that political stability and economic development in the Indian Ocean region and the avoidance of dangerous conflicts there will serve to secure their interests. Only a gross miscalculation by them may cause a head-on military collision.

However, the absence of war in the Indian Ocean does not ensure the establishment of peace there. The absence of organized violent conflict means what Kenneth Boulding calls "unstable peace." What is desired is an enduring peaceful relationship based on mutual respect, and not sulah which means only the end of hostilities or truce. And this can be attained

not in an area where every individual or group who could conceivably resort to violent conflict is simply destroyed, but in an area characterized by the absence of preparation for war or the serious expectation of war.⁴⁴ Thus, one can argue that it is war that resists peace. If war be the cause of the absence of peace it is well to consider the causes of war, as well as why war has endured throughout all ages of civilization.

War is a complex phenomenon, and experts have differed on its causes. Communist dialecticians have distinguished between certain kinds of war, such as imperialist wars, revolutionary wars, and wars of national liberation; the seeds of war, they have alleged, are inherent in capitalism in its highest stage. Quincy Wright, an eminent authority on war, has related the causes of war to certain aspects of the world situation, namely⁴⁵ (1) a state of opinion violently hostile to the existing state of affairs; (2) inadequacy of international organization to deal with conflicts; (3) inadequate system of law; (4) unstable equilibrium of material forces.⁴⁶ He has also observed that economic and political forces have entered powerfully into everyone of these considerations. War has also been explained in terms of fear. Wickham Steed has observed that, "The feeling of insecurity and the fears which it endangers are undoubtedly the strongest potential causes of war in the world today."⁴⁶ We find, then, that wars have occurred under all types of political organization from the earliest recorded history of man. This should not lead us into supposing that man is by nature warlike, nor will it be proper to explaining war in terms of man's disposition to wilful perversity. The recurrence of war throughout history suggests that man has failed to evolve political, economic and social institutions of which the war institution has not been a part, and that war has performed functions for which there have been no other workable procedures.

Opinions differ as regards the contributions of war. There are those who insist that war has never "paid." Willard Waller asserts that, "The most unfortunate thing about war is that it accomplishes nothing. All the effort that goes into it is wasted; all its sacrifices are vain. the issues between nations, over which they go to war, still remain when the war is done; war does not settle anything."⁴⁷ Others hold that war has made contributions

quite beyond the capabilities of any other means. Professor Clyde Eagleton notes that, "for centuries, war has been regarded as a means of remedying unjust situations, of settling disputes, of enforcing rights."⁴⁸ Similarly, Professor James T. Shotwell comments that, war has been used as an instrument against criminal aggression as much as it has been the instrument of aggression itself. It has played a beneficent role in history as well as a criminal one."⁴⁹ It seems incorrect to contend that war produces evil only. Instances are not unknown in which war was the means by which peoples escaped from oppression which to them had become unbearable. As Palmer and Perkins point out, "The American Revolution ended a regime which the colonists had come to regard as denying the natural rights of man; the French Revolution overturned a corrupt and autocratic monarchy; the Latin American Wars of Independence removed the heavy hand of Spain and gave to Latin Americans the opportunity to build their own lives and fortunes; the American Civil War ended once and for all the question of national unity and it brought the abolition of Negro slavery...."⁵⁰

Whatever the beneficent contributions of war, the view is inescapable that war is an 'inhuman,' 'barbarous' and 'costly' means of achieving even good ends. War demonstrates man's inability to find more civilized means. War is condemnable not because it has no social utility, but because it is an uncivilized and savage way of gaining things. It is plain that we are living in the "age of overkill," and that war has potentials for unimaginable destruction. Thus, the search for alternatives to the war system is a matter of great urgency. We want not just an end of hostilities, but the absence of preparation for war or the serious expectation of war. However, to ensure peace alternatives to war it will be required to perform the defensible functions of war. On the whole the task is less than easy; it calls for serious efforts by statesmen everywhere.

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45 See Quincy Wright, Causes of War and Consequences of Peace, (New York, 1935).

46 Cited in N.D. Palmer and H.C. Perkins, International Relations (New Delhi, 1985), p.189.

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STRUGGLE FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

By Joseph Benjamin*

NUCLEAR disarmament has been a constant preoccupation of the international community ever since the emergence of nuclear weapons. Over the years, it has come to be recognised that nuclear war constitutes the greatest single peril to the survival of mankind and now nuclear disarmament has become the most pressing item on the disarmament agenda. Problems of security and disarmament have become matters of vital concern to the international community after the II World War. Within a few weeks of the signing of the UN Charter, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki catastrophe dealt a blow to the new world organization. At its first General Assembly in 1946, the very first resolution recognised by unanimous decision underlined the close connection between problems of security and disarmament and asked the newly established UN Atomic Energy Commission urgently to make specific proposals for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

But if we see the recent budget for military expenditure, the arms race swallows up more than \$ 600 billion. Recently US President Reagan has fixed \$ 2 trillion for next year's military expenditure. The industrial world spends around 84 per cent and the developing world only 16 per cent. Till now 120 wars have been fought all over the world between 1945 and 1976; only 6 occurred in the industrialized world and all the rest were fought in the developing world. New generation of strategic theatre and tactical weaponry are replacing the earlier generation. In the US arsenal, the Mx missile is to replace the Titan missiles; the Trident C-4 and D-5 missiles are to replace the Posidon and Polaris submarine borne missiles; air launched cruise missiles are to improve the utility of the B-52 bombers, which themselves are in due course to be replaced by new bombers. The Soviet Union has developed and deployed SS-20 missiles; SS-21 and SS-23 missiles are reported to be under development to replace the vintage SS-4s and SS-5s. The US is to produce in the next few years

* Dr. Benjamin is Lecturer, Department of Political Science, St. Francis de Sales College, Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu.

some 10-14,000 additional nuclear warheads of various explosive yield. The USSR also must be implementing similar measures.¹

The future role of nuclear weapons will be subject to detailed debate in the coming period for a variety of reasons. On the one hand the USA has recently announced that it will emphasize counterforce capabilities in its strategic doctrine. Such emphasis will be made possible by continuing development in military technology, improving the quality of strategic weapons and the accuracy of their delivery systems. There is also the possibility that new nuclear power will continue to emerge. On the other hand negotiations are in progress to limit strategic weapon development. Further, the results of the mutual force reduction (MFR) negotiation may have significant consequences for nuclear policies in Europe.

Until 1944, US and Soviet policies concerning strategic nuclear weapons relied primarily on the doctrine of mutual assured destruction. The main feature of this deterrent doctrine is a certain ability to inflict massive destruction on the enemy population and industry in a retaliatory attack following a massive nuclear strike by the enemy.

HISTORY OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

In 1945 nobody had any doubt about the right policy for atomic bombs. Hiroshima was destroyed on 6 August 1945. So the United States' President and British and Canadian Prime Ministers met in Washington and they urged, that atomic energy should be used not for destruction, but to promote the common prosperity and happiness of all people and they proposed that UN should establish a commission to make specific proposals:²

- for extending between all nations, the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends;
- for control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purpose;
- for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons of adaptable to mass destruction;

d) for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to project complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.

On 7 January 1976, three days before the UN Assembly met, the United States' State Department set up its own committee to consider how the Washington Declaration could be carried out. Dean Acheson was its Chairman, and among its members were Dr Vannevar Bush, the leader of the 35,000 scientists who had worked for the United States Government on weapon research during the war, Major-General L.R. Groves, Military Commander of the United States Army concerned with the bomb, Dr. J.B. Conant, a well known scientist, President of Harvard, and J.J. McCloy. This eminent body at once appointed a Board of Consultants which included David Lillenthal, the Chairman of Tennessee Valley Authority; Dr Oppenheimer, the leader of the team at Los Alamos who made the bomb; and three leading men from private chemical, electrical and engineering firms.

The Report which Oppenheimer drafted for the Board of Consultants became the foundation of the UN Plan for the Control of Atomic Energy.

Soviet Government decided on moves to secure the banning of nuclear weapons in conjunction with steps to reduce conventional armed forces under appropriate international control. As far back as 1949 at the 1st session of the U.N. General Assembly, the USSR had proposed a general arms reduction. In such a reduction priority would be given to banning the production and utilisation of atomic energy for military purposes.

On 14 June 1946, Bernard Baruch, the United States' delegate laid the plan before the UNAEC. He put a great stress on the urgent dangers which the world confronted, emphasised the fact that the IADA (which was proposed in Lillenthal Report) would have wide positive functions for the development of atomic energy for peaceful use, as well as the duty to ensure, that no nuclear weapons should be made; proposed that at that proper moment the use, manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons should be forbidden; and urged that the violation of this ban should be treated as a matter of extreme gravity. In the opening paragraphs of his speech he said, "We must provide the mechanism to assure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes and preclude its use for war. To that end we must provide immediate, swift,

and, sure punishment to those who violate the agreements ...³

In 1948, during the 3rd Session of the General Assembly in the autumn the Soviet Union urged the Assembly to recommend that the permanent members of the Security Council should, as a first step in reducing arms and armed forces, cut all their existing group, naval and air forces within one year by one third. A proposal was given to set up an international control agency. In December 1950, Assembly set up a committee of twelve members to consider how the deadlock in the two Disarmament Commissions could be broken and how future discussions should be carried on. This committee recommended to the next session of the Assembly that the two commissions should be dissolved and should be replaced by a single body to be called the U.N. Disarmament Commission. This new body would deal with all armaments - nuclear, mass destruction and conventional and all armed forces of every kind. A draft for making friendship between nations was submitted by the USSR to 6th Session of U.N. General Assembly on 12 January 1952. This draft also contained proposals for convening a world conference on disarmament.

For practical discussions on concrete aspects of the disarament problem, a Sub-Committee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission was established consisting of the USSR, the U S A, Britain, France and Canada. In June 1954, the U'S'S R submitted a proposal concerning prohibiting atomic, hydrogen and other types of weapons of mass destruction. On 11 June 1954, Britain and France submitted to the Sub-Committee a memorandum, which, among other measures, provided for the prohibition of the use and manufacture of armaments acceptance once and for all the Franeo-British proposal of June 1954 during 9th session of General Assambly. It paved the way to breaking the deadlock over disarmament. On 4 November 1954 the General Assembly adopted a resolution that, on the basis of the Disarmament Commission's Report and the Soviet draft resolution, called for a further effort to reach agreement on the basic provisions of the international convention.⁴

On 12 March 1955, the four Western delegates proposed a draft resolution expanding and clarifying what the Anglo-French memorandum meant by the word "major reduction." The essential words were these: "There should be an agreed level of armed forces to which all states in excess of it shall reduce, so

that no state shall have armed forces strong enough to be a serious threat to international peace."

On 10 May 1955, the U.S.S.R. Government put forward a new disarmament programme, which provided for cuts in armed forces and armaments as early as 1956. As a second stage, in 1957, it was proposed to halt the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

At the Geneva Summit Conference of the four powers, President Eisenhower proposed what came to be known as the "open skies" plan, which envisaged aerial photography of the territories of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. including all areas with military installations. This proposal was also put forward by the U.S.A. at Geneva meeting of Heads of Governments and later in the Sub-Committee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission.

THE PROGRAMME OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

The negotiations on disarmament problems throughout nearly 15 years in the post-war period made it quite clear that both U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. instead of reducing armaments, have started the arms race. In these conditions the Soviet Government came forward with an initiative that represented an entirely new approach to the problem of removing the menace of nuclear war. The U.S.S.R. put forward a programme for the general and complete disarmament of all states. The proposals to this effect were made by the Government of the U.S.S.R. at the 14th session of the U.N. General Assembly on 18 September 1959. The draft provided for the abolition of atom and hydrogen bombs, for a halt to their further production and for verification and inspection.

The programme of general and complete disarmament was intended for a four year period. During the first stage it was intended to reduce under appropriate control, the numerical strength of the armed forces of the U.S.S.R. the U.S.A. and the Peoples' Republic of China to 1.7 million men each, and those of Britain and France to 650 thousand men each. The armed forces of other states, arms and military equipment would be scaled down at the same time. During the second stage, it was proposed to complete the abolition of the remaining armed forces of states and to dismantle all military bases on foreign territory. Finally, during the third stage all types of nuclear weapons and missiles would be destroyed, air-force material dismantled, war ministries and general

staffs abolished and and military training discontinued. The International Control Agency would supervise to achieve this.

On 20 November 1959, the 14th Session of the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution on general and complete disarmament. U.N. declared that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time.⁵

The Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament were submitted to the U.N. Disarmament Committee consisting of ten nations (the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, USA, Britain, France, Italy and Canada), which started work in Geneva on 15 March 1960. On 22 September 1960, President Eisenhower said that "the US would be willing to match the USSR in shutting down major plants producing fissionable materials one by one, under international inspection and verification."⁶

A joint disarmament negotiation started between US - USSR from June to September 1961 and a draft was submitted to 16th session of the U.N. General Assembly. At the 21st session of the U.N. General Assembly, the Soviet Government suggested an urgent discussion "on the elimination of foreign military bases" In the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The U.N. debate on American military bases, many of which were intended for use under nuclear strategy plans, stimulated the struggle of the people in the countries where those bases were situated for their abolition. As a result the USA was compelled to liquidate its bases in Morocco, Libya, Pakistan and other countries. Realising the danger inherent in the existence of American military bases on French territory in 1966 the French Government decided to withdraw from the NATO military structure and to dismantle such bases on its territory.

TREATIES ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Since 1946, the United Nations have created a series of commissions and committees to consider the question of world disarmament. These were major post-war initiatives and agreements on a multilateral

level designed to promote basic conventional and nuclear disarmament.

On 5 August 1963, a treaty banning all nuclear tests, except those held underground, was signed in Moscow by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. Its article I(1) says : "Each of the parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapons, test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control."⁷

From 8 August 1963, the Treaty was open for signature in all three capitals (Washington, Moscow, and London). By 10 October 1963 (date of the Treaty's entry into force) 105 nations including three capitals had signed it. Of the states which refused to sign, the most important were the People's Republic of China and France; other governments which did not sign the Treaty included Albania, Cambodia, Cuba, Guinea, North Korea, and North Vietnam.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco

On 14 February 1967, a treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America was signed at Tlatelolco, Mexico; 21 representatives took part in it.

Entry into force of the treaty was subject to the following requirements being met: "(i) deposit of the instruments of ratification by all the sovereign states in the Treaty's zone of application; (ii) signature and ratification of Additional Protocols I and II annexed to the Treaty by the powers concerned; and (iii) conclusion of bilateral agreement with the IAEA on the application of safeguards on each country's nuclear activities."⁸

Under Additional Protocol-I, Britain, France, the Netherlands and the United States undertook to apply the status of denuclearization to the territories for which they were internationally responsible and which were situated within the Treaty zone.

Additional Protocol-I was quickly signed by Britain and the Netherlands, by the United States on 26 May 1977 and by France early in March 1979. Additional Protocol-II was first signed by Britain and thereafter by the United States on 12 May 1971, by France on 18 July 1973, by China on 21 August 1978, and by the USSR on 18 May 1978. However, in the

absence of signatures and ratification by Cuba and Guyana the entry into force of the treaty remained in abeyance.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

A treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 12 June 1968. It came into force on 5 March 1970, by which date, a total of 47 countries had deposited instruments of ratification. The treaty was signed on 1 July 1968 by the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom; 56 other countries signed on the same day.

As of 1 September 1980, a total of 115 states were parties to the Treaty. Of these states, 78 non-nuclear weapons states had negotiated safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 69 of these agreements were in force, while another nine such agreements approved by the IAEA Board of Governors were awaiting entry into force.

Countries which had not signed the Treaty by the end of 1980, including France (which had, however indicated that it would abide by the Treaty's principles), were Argentina, Brazil, China, Cuba, Israel and South Africa.

Following the signature of the Treaty by five member states of the European Community - Belgium, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands - the European Commission began negotiations with the IAEA on an inspection agreement as stipulated in Article 3, with the objective of reaching agreement on how the Euratom control system, as previously applied, could be adopted and verified by the Agency in accordance with the treaty requirements. The Council of Ministers on 25 September 1972, approved the context of the agreement, which was signed on 5 April 1973.

NPT FIRST REVIEW CONFERENCE

A First Review Conference (as provided for in Article 8 of the Treaty) was held in Geneva from 5 to 30 May 1975. Of the non-signatory countries, 10 including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Spain - were then considered to have the capability of becoming nuclear weapon states within the next two years. Of the above seven, only

Argentina, Brazil and Israel were represented at the conference as observers along with Algeria, Cuba, South Africa, the Arab League and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL). Of the existing nuclear weapon states, China, France and India (which had conducted its first nuclear test explosion on 18 May 1974) were not represented at the Conference. Among potential nuclear weapon states, Canada, Iran and Sweden have specifically decided to forego the production or acquisition of nuclear arms.

The Conference adopted by consensus a declaration calling inter-alia for: (a) International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards against the diversion of fissionable materials imported for peaceful purposes; (b) efficient protection against accidents and theft of nuclear materials during their use, storage and transportation; (c) accelerated negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States for the conclusion of a further strategic arms limitation agreement; (d) the seeking of a complete ban on nuclear weapon tests, and pending such a ban, the restriction of underground tests to a minimum; and (e) the creation of internationally recognised zones free from nuclear weapons and set up on the initiative and with the approval of the states directly interested in the zone concerned and with the cooperation of the nuclear weapon powers.⁹

NPT SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE

A Second Review Conference was held in Geneva from 11 August to 7 September 1980. At this conference the Director General of IAEA stated that there were 50,000 nuclear weapons on earth with a total explosive capacity a million times that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. He also said that 95 per cent of the nuclear plants in all the non-nuclear weapon countries, parties to the NPT or not, were under IAEA safeguards, and that 69 of the NPT parties had IAEA safeguard in force. The Conference, however, did not issue a final document, mainly because of disagreements between the nuclear weapon powers and the non-nuclear weapon states.

BILATERAL TALKS (US-USSR)

Two agreements, signed in Washington on 30 September 1971 were: (i) An agreement designed to reduce the risk of the out-break of nuclear war, in which both parties undertook to notify each other immedi-

tely in the event of an accidental, unauthorized or any other unexplained incident involving a possible deterioration of a nuclear weapon which would create a risk of outbreak of nuclear war; to take necessary measures to render harmless or destroy any such weapon; and to justify the other in advance of any planned missile launches extending beyond its national territory in the direction of the other party.

(ii) An agreement amending an earlier agreement signed in Geneva on 20 June 1963, by the heads of the U.S. and the Soviet delegations at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, known as the "Hot Line" Agreement providing for the establishment of a direct communications link between the two governments for use in an emergency, e.g. an abrupt shift in the East-West military balance. Under the 1971 agreement the communication link was improved by the proposed replacement of Cuba and teleprinter links by a satellite communication system comprising two circuits and a number of group stations.

During the U.S. President Nixon's visit to Moscow on 22-29 May 1972, the United States and the USSR signed a treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems; an interim agreement of certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms and six different cooperation agreements.

The treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems signed on 26 May 1972, was the culmination of over two years' talks on strategic arms limitation (SALT) held between the two governments. This treaty known as SALT I and SALT I (1972) set a ceiling on the numbers of inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) launchers and anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) sites. The agreement allowed the U.S. its 1,054 existing operational ICBM launchers, and the Soviet Union, 1,618 of which twenty-two were under construction. It also permitted the U.S. to reach from its existing 656 SLBM launchers on forty one ballistic missile submarines a ceiling of 710 SLBM launchers on forty four submarines, and the Soviet Union, from its base level of 740 SLBMs to reach a ceiling of 950 SLBM launchers on sixty two submarines. These quantitative ceilings were so high and so exceeded their strategic needs that there was no sacrifice of either operational or constructional capabilities. The Soviet Union was allowed more missile launchers than it had because no limits were set on intercontinental bombers in which the U.S. had a

very large lead. The Soviet Union had one ABM system located near Moscow, deploying sixty four launchers; the U.S. had none. They agreed to one site for each side deploying no more than 100 ABM launchers at each site. This was no hardship because neither side intended to build a second site.

During a visit to the U.S.A between 17 - 25 June 1973, Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), concluded a series of agreements between the U.S.A and the Soviet Union, the most important being an agreement on the basic principles of negotiation on the further limitation of strategic offensive arms and an agreement on the prevention of nuclear war.

The agreements on the basic principles of negotiation on the further limitation of strategic offensive arms, were earlier signed on 21 June 1971. The text of the agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War was signed on 22 June 1973.

During a further visit to the Soviet Union by President Nixon from 27 June to 3 July 1974, the U.S. President and L.I. Brezhnev signed (i) a U.S. - Soviet Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Test and (ii) a protocol to the treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles Systems of May 1972.

At the end of a meeting in Vladivostok 23-24 November 1974, President Ford and L.I. Brezhnev agreed that a new agreement should be concluded between the U.S.A and the U.S.S.R. on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms to last until 31 December 1985. The two leaders agreed on the provisions on which further negotiations should be based, in particular that the new agreement should include the following limitations : (a) both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles; (b) both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of SLBMS equipped with multiple independently targeted warheads.

President Ford gave the numbers agreed under (a) as upto 2,400 and under (b) as upto 1,320 missiles on either side.

A new treaty was signed on 28 May 1974, by President Ford for the United States and L.I. Brezhnev.

nev for the Soviet Union. Though completed and complemented, the 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests had remained unratified. However, Article IX of the new treaty laid down that both treaties should be ratified simultaneously.

The 1972 Interim Agreement between the U.S.A and the U.S.S.R concluded in connexion with the SALT I Treaty formally lapsed on 3 October 1977, but both sides undertook to continue to observe its main provisions pending the conclusion of a further strategic arms limitation (SALT II) treaty.

After several years of negotiations such a treaty was eventually signed in Vienna on 18 June 1979 by President Carter for the U.S.A and President Brezhnev for the U.S.S.R. The SALT II set initial equal ceilings of 2,400 strategic nuclear weapons declining to 2,250 by the end of 1981, with various sub-limits on MIRVs; until 1981 there would be no deployment of ground and sea-launched cruise missiles; the production of Soviet (backfire) medium range bombers would not be increased beyond the present estimated thirty a year and both powers were to refrain from giving it inter-continental capability; both sides undertook not to deploy the mobile ICBM launchers and neither side was to introduce more than one new type of ICBM till 1985. In SALT II the bargaining weapon systems, such as MIRVs, were never bargained away and finally became part of the strategic inventory of both parties. The same has happened with cruise missiles or mobile ballistic and missiles in SALT II. The ratification by the U.S seems dependent on the presidential deal with Congress resulting in larger defence expenditure.

Just after Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, President Carter on 3 January 1980, formally requested the U.S Senate to delay its consideration of ratification of the SALT II Treaty.

The U.S.A and the U.S.S.R., which have been arguing for 13 years how to restrict their nuclear arsenals, have started talking about reducing them. Henry Jackson and Paul Nitze (who was a negotiator at the Geneva talks) argued that SALT I had conferred on the Soviets an undue advantage in "throw-weight" that heavier warhead loads. Most of the observers are not optimistic about a Big Power accord on a freeze or a cut. A new round of strategic arms reduction talks (START) were proposed in place of the non-ratified

strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), not merely to set limits on both nations' strategic arsenals but to actually reduce their number of ICBMs. START talks commenced on 29 January 1981. President Reagan proposed that both sides should limit their strategic arsenals to 5,000 warheads and of these no more than half should be landbased ICBMs. The initial Soviet reaction to this specific proposal has been negative though President Brezhnev had welcomed the offer to resume arms control talks as a step in the right direction. The Soviets, on the other hand, have proposed phased reduction across the board by one-third to be followed by another one-third. This has been rejected by the Americans.

President Reagan of the U'S'A' appears to be in a conciliatory mood in respect of the Soviet Union. He has agreed to meet Yuri Andropov, "where and whenever" he wants to sign a pact banning land based intermediate nuclear missiles. Report of 4 February 1983 said, the U S seemed to be veering away from its "zero option" stand over deployment of medium range nuclear missiles in Europe indicating that it might accept even partial cuts in such weapons. The proposal requires the dismantling of all the 600 SS20 Soviet land-based intermediate range missiles deployed in the Urals and directed at Western Europe as a price for the NATO powers foregoing their plan to instal 572 Cruise and Pershing 2 missiles in Europe. The "zero option" proposal was made by President Reagan as a counter to the Soviet offer to halve the number of landbased intermediate range missiles directed at West European targets. The "zero option" was initially propounded by President Reagan in November 1981.

In rejecting President Reagan's "zero option" proposal the Soviet Union alleged that the motive behind his so-called peace proposal was to defuse protests in Western Europe and thus clear the path for development of a new generation of U S missiles that would give Washington a first strike capability against Moscow's strategic missile force. Speaking in Bonn, President Brezhnev told the West Germans and the world, how unfair and one sided these missile reduction proposals were. He said :

The Soviet Union would have to dismantle its already deployed missiles to cancel the proposed, but uncertain, deployment of U'S' missiles in Western Europe. Uncertainty surrounds

the deployment of Pershing 2s and Cruise missiles by the U S in Europe because of strong public and certain governments' opposition. Moreover, President Reagan did not spell out whether to balance the Soviet dismantling of intermediate range missiles; the British and the French theatre nuclear missiles would be dismantled.¹⁰

President Reagan, in a major policy change on 30 March 1983, offered the Soviet Union an interim agreement to limit medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe pending an accord on eliminating all of them. He said, his new offer, which gave no numbers but called for cuts to equal level was an interim solution since Moscow had rejected his own "zero option" plan. The President offered his compromise proposal after months of pressure from Western European leaders concerned about the growing anti-nuclear movement in their countries and who call for a change in U S policy at the Geneva talks.

Again President Reagan said that, "if the Soviets will not now agree to the total elimination of these weapons, I hope they will at least join us in an interim agreement that would substantially reduce these forces to equal levels on both sides."¹¹

He added that under his new interim plan the United States would substantially reduce its planned deployment of 572 Pershing-2 and Cruise missiles in Western Europe if Moscow reduces the number of warheads on longer-range intermediate nuclear missiles "to an equal level on a global basis."

In response to the U S President's proposal, the Soviet Foreign Minister Andre Gromyko announced on 2 April 1983, that the U S President Reagan's interim variant for medium range missiles for negotiations was not acceptable to his country.

The Reagan Administration, Gromyko went on to say, was mistaken in thinking that by putting more pressure on U S S R , it had better chances of reaching an agreement with Moscow.¹²

REYKJAVIK SUMMIT

The recent attempt for disarmament of nuclear armaments was held on 11 and 12 October 1986 when the two Super Powerleaders - President Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev met in Reykjavik, the capital city of Iceland for the second summit. The eagerly awaited first summit of the world's two mightiest Powers, the U S A and the Soviet Union, was held in Geneva on 19 and 20 November 1985. The time-schedule was drawn up for the next summit to be in Washington in June 1986 and again in Moscow in 1987. But the sudden decision to hold the second summit on 11 and 12 October 1986 came as a surprise because a chain of events had apparently queered the pitch for an early session.

The Reykjavik Summit (11 hours of talks spread over two days) collapsed despite the initial progress over the question of cuts in nuclear arms.

The Soviet package envisaged the elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the current century. The package provides for (a) a 50 per cent cut in each component of the Super Power nuclear arsenals-land-based ICBMs, submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles and missiles in strategic aircraft - regardless of the differing Soviet and American Formulas; (b) leaving out of count in the strategic arsenals the US forward-based systems and medium-range missiles; (c) acceptance of the original Reagan "zero option", namely, the dismantling of both Soviet and U S - Euro-missiles; (d) freezing of Warsaw missiles of 1000-Km range and discussion of their future and (e) restricting Soviet medium-range missiles in Asia to 100 in return for a U S agreement to deploy the same number on its territory targeted on the Soviet Union.

The stumbling block in these agreements was President Reagan's grand vision "Star War" space defence initiative and research programme (SDI).

President Reagan was adamant that the U S retain the right not only to conduct scientific research on new "Star War" weapons but to develop and test them as well. Reagan made "an entirely new proposal" to the Soviet leader Gorbachev: "a ten-year delay in deployment of SDI in exchange for the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles from the

respective arsenals of both nations." It was the Soviet leader, Reagan said, who balked. "The General Secretary said he would consider our offer only if we restricted all work on SDI to laboratory research, which would have killed our defensive shield."¹³

He was ready to delay for 10 years the deployment of space arms so long as both the Soviet Union and the United States provided their good faith by destroying nuclear missiles year by year.

Reagan did not like the restricting of his "Star War" programme to laboratory research and testing. On the other hand Gorbachev said he would have to be "a mad man to agree to the development of space weapons by the U.S.A. while divesting the Soviet Union of its strategic nuclear weapons."

In sum, Gorbachev expected progress on three issues: removal of Euro-missiles, banning of chemical weapons and limiting "Star Wars" to the laboratory by extending for a decade the Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) Treaty and thus forestalling the actual deployment of weapons in outer space. According to the Soviet plan, Soviet and American medium-range missiles were to be eliminated from Europe.

The return concession demanded from the U.S. by the Soviet Union - extension of the ABM treaty for another 10 years did not involve much sacrifice on America's part. The SDI system would be ready for deployment in less than a decade. The Russian insistence on the ABM Treaty's extension and the American refusal led to futility of the summit.

U.N. SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

1978, First Special Session

With a dismal record on the field, third world countries asked for the holding in 1978 of a special General Assembly session when they expressed profound regret that there was neither agreement on CTB nor SALT II.

The General Assembly held a special session on disarmament from 23 May to 1 July 1978, in New York. In the opening meeting Secretary General Kurt Waldheim emphasized the need for a strategy of disarmament. Lazar Majsov (Yugoslavia), who was elected the

president stated that a realistic prospect for present international efforts included both the limitation of the use of nuclear weapons and their total prohibition, as well as the discontinuance of "sabre rattling" with nuclear rockets for the purpose of existing political pressures. A total of 129 speakers, including the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, participated in the general debate at the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

In this Special Session, a text including a Declaration and a programme of atomic, as well as a machinery for disarmament negotiations and deliberation, were drafted.

In the Declaration, the General Assembly stated that the "mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self extinction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced."¹⁴

It was said that the existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone were then sufficient to destroy all lives on earth. The Assembly pointed out that the hundreds of billions of dollars spent annually on the manufacture or improvement of weapons were in sombre and dramatic contrast to the want and poverty of two-thirds of the world's population.

In setting forth basic principles to guide disarmament negotiations and measures, the Declaration emphasized the importance of refraining from threats against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of any state or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination.

Some other principles which were adopted in the U.N. Special Session are as follows: all nations have the right to participate in negotiations; while disarmament is the responsibility of all states, the nuclear powers have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and for halting and reversing the arms race; disarmament measures should ensure the right of each state to security and that no one state or group of states obtain advantages over others, and agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification.¹⁵

At this Special Session, most of the speakers talked about the curbing of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons, including chemical weapons.

Emphasizing the need to work towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the Programme favours such measures as agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, further Soviet-United States negotiations on strategic arms limitations and reduction, nuclear-weapon free zones and expanded non-proliferation agreement.

The Programme of Action also stresses gradual reduction of military budgets on mutually agreed basis and at the same time it also called for an expert study of the relationship between disarmament and development.

In the section of the Final Document, dealing with disarmament machinery, the Assembly stated that two kinds of bodies were required - deliberative and negotiating. Accordingly it established, as the deliberative body, a Disarmament Commission composed of all members of the United Nations. With regard to the negotiating body, the Assembly welcomed new arrangements to broaden participation in the existing body, the Committee on Disarmament and to give it a rotating Chairmanship as well as a closer relationship with the United Nations.¹⁶

This new Disarmament Commission replaced the one with the same name which was established by the Assembly in 1952. It held its first session in May/June 1979. It followed the instructions from the Assembly. It began work on drawing up a comprehensive programme for disarmament. The Commission succeeded in reaching agreement on recommendations concerning the elements of such a programme.

The new negotiation body, the Committee on Disarmament resulted from an agreement reached at the U.N. Special Session by the Soviet Union, France, the United States and the United Kingdom. The committee formerly had a membership of 31 states and worked under the co-Chairmanship of the Soviet Union and the United States. Now, under the new arrangements, it is open to the five nuclear weapon states and 35 other states. Its membership is to be reviewed at regular intervals and its Chairmanship is to rotate monthly among all its members. The reconstituted Committee on Disarmament will continue to submit reports to the General Assembly.

In spite of great effort by the U.N. Special Session, nuclear arms are increasing day by day.

1982 Second Special Session on Disarmament

In the Second Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly, many statesmen, diplomats and experts from 157 countries and representatives from non-governmental organisations stated their respective positions and views. The session concluded on 10 July 1982.

Unlike the First Session in 1978, the recent special session could not agree even on a consensus document on which nations could commit themselves to the objective of disarmament. The report of the Second Session referred to reaffirmation of the nations to the Final Document of the First Session, but within a few days after the session ended, the U.S. administration let it be known that it would not continue the ongoing negotiations on comprehensive test ban with the Soviet Union.¹⁷

In fact while this report was adopted by officials in the earlier plenary session, Heads of State and Government of some militarily powerful states had asserted their firm belief in perpetuating nuclear arsenals and nuclear war doctrines.

Basing on the consideration that, "A primary truth which is a little hard to accept is that the process of disarmament is not independent of the conditions of international security," the French Foreign Minister declared during the session that, "France cannot, in full independence, escape the threat of a vastly superior force other than by nuclear deterrence." Security, as perceived by them, must be maintained by them, must be maintained by nuclear deterrence.¹⁸ The U.S.A. made no mention of any worthwhile concession on the basic issue. The U.S.S.R. has made the much publicised pledge not to use nuclear weapons first.

Along with other non-aligned and non-nuclear weapons countries, India considers that use and threat of use of such weapons would be in violation of the U.N. Charter and that its possession divided the nations on unequal terms. Indian Prime Minister had suggested a five-point programme in her message to the session. The programme proposed that there should be : (i) binding convention on non-use of nuclear weapons and (ii) there must be a freeze on

nuclear weapons combined with cut off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. Further, it had suggested, (iii) immediate suspension of all nuclear weapons tests and (iv) reversion to the task of achieving a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Finally, this programme suggested that the (v) United Nations should take the lead in educating the public on the dangers of nuclear war and highlight the positive aspects of disarmament and its link with development.

The significant factor in the Special Session was the failure of the non-aligned states to unite and adopt a common stand. Though just before the session the non-aligned foreign ministers met at Havana and in their declaration had dealt extensively with the issue of disarmament and the 21 non-aligned nations in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament had come up with an agreed document, when it came to the non-aligned states taking a stand in the U.N. Special Session they failed to do so. This was the first time the non-aligned failed to agree on a common draft on a basic issue like disarmament.

FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

The results of the three decades of struggle for nuclear disarmament convincingly demonstrate that this is an extremely complicated and difficult problem to resolve. There is a great disparity between the approach and the objectives of the Super Powers and their allies and the Third World countries. During the last eighteen years (1962-1979) the measures concluded through the Geneva Disarmament Committee are the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Seabed Treaty (1972), the Biological Weapons Convention (1972), and the Environmental Modification Techniques Convention 1977 (not yet in force) - all of which are designed mainly to suit the needs and requirements of the Super Powers. These treaties have not led to arms reduction or to saving in military budgets of a kind to have any measurable economic implication. On the contrary, the Super Powers have achieved a staggering overkill capacity.

Total megatonnages and number of items stockpiled by the nuclear Powers are growing instead of decreasing. According to the Pentagons' data published in June 1975, the total power of the nuclear warheads accumulated by United States was 615, 385 times that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Accor-

ding to The New York Times, the U S atomic stockpile consisted of "26 basic types of nuclear weapons incorporated into 33 weaponssystems."¹⁹

The analysis of the history of the struggle for nuclear disarmament enables one to appreciate the historic importance of the struggle. The progress of disarmament talks did not and could not produce positive results for a long time because the Western Powers were steering a course towards armament rather than disarmament.

The development of atomic weapons by the Soviet Union was a response to the refusal of the United States to agree to a ban on these weapons. Once the arms race is ended and nuclear weapons are destroyed, many of mankind's vital problems could be settled successfully..

In the name of modernization USA has started to get new types of nuclear weapons. In fact, just to keep their prestige in the world, both USA and USSR seek to get/develop new types of weapons - nuclear or conventional. Instead of disarming both Super Powers are engaged in an arms race that has its bearing on global peace and stability. Thus the international community has to go a long way before it can hope to live in a world without nuclear weapons.

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THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY AND THE CONGRESS - A CASE FOR RETHINKING

By Dilip Mohite*

The main concern of this paper is to examine the relationship between the American President and the Congress in the foreign policy areas. As it is, it is a well known fact that the American Constitution lays down certain tacit principles like the 'separation of powers' and 'checks and balances'. It is on these principles that all powers between the executive branch and the legislative branch of the government are rationally distributed. However, in the foreign policy areas the experience shows that the executive branch, led by the President, enjoys virtual edge over the Congress in making and implementing foreign policy objectives. This does not mean that the role of Congress is insignificant. It plays its own role but the conventional view is that the Congress is a minor actor and generally follows President's lead in the foreign policy making.

The Act of 1947, tilted the entire balance in favour of the President. Secrecy and worldwide responsibility reduced Congress' role to minimal which further resulted into docility and passivity on its part. It was believed that the link between the Congress and the President is the weakest in foreign policy matters. The foreign policy decisions, its implementation and execution is considered as the privilege of a small group of people, the so called experts who help and advise the President. This has become expedient especially when America has emerged as a Super Power and its struggle to maintain its preeminence before the formidable rival, the Soviet Union. Secrecy was considered as the effective answer to maintain American hegemony. Involving Congress with its enormous size, lack of expertise, with procedural delays and above all its inability to maintain 'secrecy' resulted into "Presidential preeminence" in foreign poli-

* Dr. Mohite is Reader in Political Science, M.S. University of Baroda, Baroda.

cy matters, "supported by nation's intellectuals. This was considered necessary to meet the challenges of the times."¹

USA'S GLOBALISM)

THE post-World War II and the emergence of cold war had overriding effects on the American nation and its foreign policy. The resurgence of Soviet Union with its socialist manifesto programme to the war-torn Europe, and other old and new nations of the world gravely threatened the Western capitalist nations of Europe. The fragile economy and military weakness of most European nations made them susceptible to communist influence and ideology. The Americans who themselves were strongly committed to liberal capitalist ideology saw communist resurgence as a threat to their own ideology as well as to its allies in Europe. Security for both, the American nation and its allies, became password of American foreign policy. In this process, apart from Marshal Plan for Greece and Turkey, "the United States effectively attempted to become the World policeman, and was willing to go anywhere to put down communist insurrection in the spirit of 'messianic globalism'."²

ASCENDANCY OF PRESIDENCY

The series of security alliances all over the World and attempts to increase the area of influence to contain communism needed top level decision-making apparatus. Further it was expected that such an apparatus would serve the purpose with utmost secrecy. This was possible only if the said apparatus was small and composed of those people loyal to the Chief Executive. From the period starting with Truman's Presidency, the foreign policy apparatus grew enormously in its importance and power but shrunk in size. The creation of National Security Council (NSC) as the role policy-maker and National Security Adviser (NSA) as its coordinator occupied closest position to the President, the basement in the White House.

The growth of NSC-NSA and presidential preeminence in the foreign policy area was due to larger American involvement during the past forty years. It has become so intense and frequent that very often it had hardly a choice to keep itself aloof even it so desired. Moreover, such involvements also set aside all high democratic-humanistic ideals proudly incorporated by the 'Founding Fathers' and cherished by the American people for 200 years.

It is true that the threat perception of America is much different than what it used to be some forty-years back. In the age of highly developed science and technology, the cold war gimmicks or the war games can be lost if secrecy is not maintained. It can also mean irreparable strategic, military and economic losses for America. Hence, the decisive role that is expected of American nation is that of strong, unified and rigorous action supported by secrecy and effectiveness. This would mean enormous powers for President and for NSC - NSA. The asking principle is that the success of such action requires non-interference from the American Congress; a direct challenge to the cardinal principles of "checks and balance" and "separation of powers" embodied in the American Constitution. Soon after the New Deal, "the historians, political scientists, and journalists had held that a strong Presidency was a necessity."³

The arguments favouring presidential preeminence in the foreign policy were the ground that it "needed the power to respond to sudden attacks and to protect the rights and property of American citizens." The 1966 Legal Memoranda also pleaded for enlarged mandate in the following words :

In the twentieth century the World has grown much smaller. An attack on a country from its shores can impinge directly on the nation's security.... The Constitution leaves to the President the judgement to determine whether the circumstances of a particular armed attack are so urgent and the potential consequences so threatening to the security of the US that he should act without formally consulting the Congress."⁴

The direct consequence of this approach resulted into tremendous concentration of power in the Presidency pushing congressional power of war-making into the sideline. During late 60s and early 70s Johnson and Nixon were "apparently encouraged to become exceedingly inventive in circumventing the congressional war-making power."⁵

Democracy Threatened

With the events starting from Eisenhower's presidency to Reagan administration, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. argues that, "presidential powers were so much expanded and abused by 1972 that it threatened our constitutional system."⁶ On one hand there were

presidents like Lincoln, Roosevelt and Truman who used extraordinary powers with a full knowledge and understanding that they would be accountable to the Congress after the war-time emergency ended. On the otherhand President like "Lyndon Johnson and Nixon abused power even in peacetime, claiming a near absolute power to be the permanent prerogative of the President."

Meanwhile, the need to have a full-fledged organization like NSC, headed by NSA had emerged as the sole adviser to the President. Due to several limitations of State Department, the NSA assumed the role which surpassed the Secretary of State and became the sole adviser to President on military matters. For example, "Rostow was Air Marshal to Kennedy (as) he was always advocating bombing of Vietnam."⁸ Apart from Vietnam, intervention in Cuba, Nicaragua, Chile, bombing of Cambodia, Lebanon, Indo-China have cost US enormously in terms of money, men and prestige. Just one instance that "at a time when United States Government was spending \$ 25 billion a year on the Vietnam War, it failed to launch an anti-poverty programme in the country that cost \$ 10 billion a year."⁹

Office of National Security Adviser

During all these crises, the United States foreign policy was guided by the NSA. Here, an attempt is made to briefly examine the role of NSA vis-a-vis presidential powers. P.M. Kamath has pointed out that the rise of NSA was phenomenal in the American Government. It was during Kennedy-Johnson era that the NSA's role as a keyman in the government reached its climax. It is essential to note that both the administrations NSA's, McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow were known for their strong anti-communist views which got reflected quite conspicuously in the American foreign policy gestures in Cambodia, Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic,etc. Apart from these two men, Henry Kissinger's personal role and ego were tacit examples of the influence and execution of American foreign policy. "Kissinger laid down particular and under "National Security Act of 1947 went ahead with the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to national security." Nixon and Kissinger both wanted "authority shifted to White House and thus to themselves."¹⁰

As one can see, the role of NSA had become increasingly significant when he spoke on behalf of

the President, represented him in all high power committee meetings, appeared before TV and the press and spoke with the added advantage of his proximity and influence over the American President. From this the inference can be drawn that presidents also seem to rely heavily on their NSA's thereby enhancing latter's reputation as "Super Secretary" of the State.

The crux of the discussion is that the teaming up of the Chief Executive and NSA in the recent past have given rise to two pertinent issues.

The Issues at Stake

The first issue relates to the crucial constitutional debate over the principle of 'separation of powers' and 'checks and balance'. The post-war and cold war situation raised the Presidency to mystical heights to the extent that it deified the basic norms of democratic government. Under the pretext of national security, "the withholding of information from Congress, the attempted intimidation of the Press, the use of the White House itself as a base for espionage and sabotage directed against the political opposition—all signified the extension of imperial presidency from foreign to domestic affairs. Underneath such developments there could be discerned a revolutionary challenge to the separation of powers itself."¹¹

The second issue refers to democratic accountability of National Security Adviser to the Congress. It is strange that the NSA is not accountable to the Congress when he enjoys all the powers and privileges of the executive branch. The NSA, popularly known as Super Secretary, takes all crucial decisions, some advantageous but most of them damaging to USA, uses all possible resources of the nation and still remains insulated from any testimony. This calls for a debate to reconsider his role and position within the framework of the Constitution. The Super Secretary is not a super human incapable of making mistakes. On Henry Kissinger's performance, Hans Morgenthau says "Kissinger, despite his extraordinary brilliance, often failed."¹²

The American Presidency in three decades of its history has made American Democracy impotent. Between the two groups, the anguished left have looked upon the State as enemy, an alien. Their anguish is well documented and the "roll call of policies which libe-

rals advocated and which turned out to be corrupt is almost too long to list."¹³

This means, more often than not the executive branch overplayed the security hoax, and more often to serve their own interest supported by big business. It was way back in 1957, that General Douglas MacArthur exposed the governmental stand on security aspect. He stated, "Our government has kept us in a perpetual state of fear, kept us in continual stamp of patriotic fervour with the cry of grave national emergency. Always there has been some terrible evil at home or some monstrous foreign power that was going to gobble us up if we did not blindly rally behind it by furnishing the exorbitant funds demanded...."¹⁴ The executive branch used national security so effectively that an average American lives under tremendous psychological fear of surprised nuclear attack. Everything was mystified as "national security is a modern incantation. As in any incantation, the words have both power and mystery. In the name of national security, all things can be threatened. All risks can be taken. All sacrifices can be demanded. Break ins, wire-taps deception of Congress, assassination attempts on foreign leaders - indeed the Watergate cover-up and the intervention in Vietnam - were all ordered in the name of national security."¹⁵

Interventions and covert military operations engineered by the agencies under NSC are deemed by Morgenthau as "moral and political disaster." The history of last thirty years amply shows the decline of American moral and ethical spirit. All through, the US Government supported fascist leaders or military dictators or those who clearly lacked popular credentials as the case in Laos, Vietnam, Cuba, Guatemala, Cambodia, Chile, Bangladesh, etc.

Principles of Constitution Overlooked

The entire account or an overview of events lead us to one conclusion that the executive branch, and Presidency in particular, have clearly defined the basic principles of the American Constitution - checks and balance and separation of powers. Such gross violation of constitution is primarily due to two reasons. Firstly the Presidency was allowed to grow omnipotent over other branches of the government by the American Congress. Complacency on the part of Congress has distorted American constitutional system. Many executive actions were secret and "when a

congressman is told that CIA operations are super secret', self interest makes him prefer not to know anything about it."¹⁶

Secondly, the foreign policy decisions are a matter of elite decision and further restricted to a small group within the executive branch; this has been brilliantly propounded by C. Wright Mills. The evidence indicates that the persons who staff the "major political decision-making posts in the government are overwhelmingly from the upper business and professional classes."¹⁷ Historian Gabriel Kolko observes that nearly 60 per cent of foreign policy decision-making posts "were held by people on loan to the government from either corporate law firms, investment and banking houses, or industrial corporations." The recent study also indicates that upto 1981, similar men occupied key positions in the vital governmental structure."¹⁸ Such a group is often susceptible to narrow interests of a small group. Thus, they will be able to take the executive branch to the level of 'omnipotence' where the current system appears as one of overall "minimal accountability and minimum consent." Since elite groups are "minimally accountable to public they have a substantial, though by no means, maximum freedom to shape popular attitudes."¹⁹

ROLE OF CONGRESS

Emergence of the Presidency as the sole spokesman for American foreign policy was a matter of trust and confidence in the man and his office. It is a queer paradox that glorious achievements of the last two hundred years can be undone in just thirty years beginning with the Act of 1947, arming the executive branch with extraordinary powers in war-making and foreign policy area. The immediate consequence of this act was the ascendancy of executive branch led by President and descendancy of the Congress. The general belief is that in foreign policy matters, Congress is a minor actor and usually follows President's lead. The Presidents elected so far, were deemed as angels and men with holistic integrity, till the recent revelations shook the nation. All norms of law and humanity were violated and institutions and their integrity at an all time low. On one hand in Congress, the collapse of the old baronies was necessary but nothing substantial has come to replace it especially when a spokesman of Henry Kissinger's stature adheres to such views: "America is in retreat."

It is true that during the last three decades the Congress apathy, matched by its limitations in the foreign policy areas, has created far-reaching consequences which not only affect the American people but the peoples of the World at large. It directly challenged the two cardinal principles of the constitution, the separation of powers and checks and balance. The 'Founding Fathers' had envisaged that "in the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people."²⁰ In the present context, we find that the balance heavily favours the executive branch. The wisdom of one man, supported by the kitchen cabinet in the executive "went down in flames in Vietnam." Issues like Watergate, the possibility of a nuclear war and many such issues demand a serious reconsideration of executive-legislative relationship. It is true that in domestic matters, the President operates with perfect harmony, consistent with the principles of balance of power and separation of powers. When it comes to foreign policy, Congress' docility and passivity is clearly seen. Yet following Vietnam and Watergate, the Congress resurgence is clearly visible. Between the two views that Congress is docile in foreign policy matters while others hold the view that, "The congressional role was not less important than that of the President, it was simply lessvisible,"²¹ it is true that though in certain events or crisis the executive branch has overacted and surpassed its role, close scrutiny reveals series of acts by Congress which limits and controls the latter's action - in 1964, Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 1966, Senate Committee hearing on Vietnam War 1973, Mandate on Vietnam War 1974, embargo on U.S. arms to Turkey 1975, vetoed intervention in Angola 1975-76, investigation of U.S. intelligence agency activities abroad, nuclear proliferation, etc. In the light of above discussion the issues which emerge are as follows :

- Executive hegemony in foreign affairs;
- Congress' role in foreign affairs reaffirmed;
- Principles of separation of powers and checks and balances; and
- Creditability and responsibility of American Democracy.

In the light of above observations the points which come up for consideration are as follows :

- a) Whether presidential hegemony is desirable in foreign affairs ?
- b) Whether the Congress should have equal share in foreign policy, much in conformity with the principle of separation of powers and checks and balance ?
- c) Credibility of American Democracy.

CONCLUSIONS

To begin with the first issue, the presidential hegemony in foreign affairs has proved far more dangerous and damaging to the image of American nation as a whole. The executive branch where unity of action was expected turned out to be a force of competing loyalties amongst the bureaucrats. Each one wanted to be close to the President and to serve this end they used all unscrupulous means to denigrate the other. It is a well known fact that McGeorge Bundy, Rostow and Kissinger tried all their resources to underrate Secretary of State and others. They wanted to be supreme in decision-making and the result was a disaster for America.

Another aspect which needs serious consideration is the accountability of National Security Adviser to the Congress. The NSA is not answerable to the Congress, while the Secretary of State has to testify before Congress even for those sins committed by the NSA. The NSA, popularly known as Super Secretary of State, makes all crucial decisions - good or bad, uses all possible resources of the American nation and still remains insulated from any accountability. This calls for a debate to include a provision in the constitution and define his role and function. This will enable putting necessary restraint on the presidential powers only to ensure that his wings are trimmed and not cut.

The next issue pertains to the role of Congress in foreign affairs. Here it is necessary to note the difference between the 'policy-making' and 'policy implementation'. There is a vast difference between the two as one would readily agree, that the Congress does have sufficient and significant role to play in the making of American foreign policy. However, these are broad policy areas which are identified and further streamlined to suit a particular situation. This part is done by the President and his executive staff. The issue, therefore, is that whenever its implementation takes place, there is a wide gap between the foreign policy principles and its achieve-

ments. Very often the method deployed by the executive action group tends to violate some basic humanistic norms of democratic America. It is here where the Congress swings into action and the outcome is to assert its role and to uphold the principle of checks and balance and the separation of powers. In other records, the Congress has negligible role to play in the event of crisis where a forceful and emergency action is needed.

The history of USA shows the period of presidential ascendancy from 1947 to 1973, while the period thereafter shows resurgence of Congress. The balance however swings from time to time and event to event and thereby raises some hopes that there can be some device as Herbert Wechsler's advocacy of 'neutral principles.'

In the final analysis, I submit that lately the Congress has asserted its authority in foreign affairs and it should continue to do so. If Congress was docile and passive, the blame squarely rests on Congress as an institution, and people of USA in general. If Congress threw itself in oblivion, "the fault is in the people, who egged on my Congress and the press... each one is losing faith in their institutions. Perhaps the fault is in the quality of leadership."²² Pygmy leadership and pygmy generation replaced by staff aides, special assistants and cautious bureaucrats, all led to general degeneration of those hopes and dreams cherished by the Founding Fathers. The rights of the people and justice is the ultimate objective of the constitution. As John Jay rightly says, "the people who own the country ought to govern it." In the present context, the international situation is so complex and explosive that one cannot rely on the judgement of the man or few bureaucrats or even for that matter Congress if it is docile and passive. After all, foreign affairs of USA are not merely concerns of that country alone. The survival and welfare of the entire humanity on the planet is a moral responsibility of all peoples and they should bravely accept this challenge. In all fairness, the issues like congressional and presidential relations are no doubt important but what is more pertinent is the faith in humanity and democracy which leads people to moral judgement. The words of Lord Bryce are apt to conclude this discussion: "History shows that they (people) do this atleast as wisely as monarchs and oligarchs, or small groups to whom, in democratic countries the conduct of foreign relations has been left, and they have evinced more respect for moral principles."²²

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OIL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIA

By R.L. Chawla*

The oil bonanza that induced an economic boom in Nigeria during the 1970s led to its economic doom by the mid-1980s. For more than a decade and a half, oil earnings had provided a large proportion of government revenue, served as a stimulant to domestic investment and accounted for more than 90 per cent of the export receipts.¹ Nigeria also enjoyed a natural comparative advantage in its oil sector relative to the Middle Eastern countries. The quality of Nigerian oil, with low sulphur content, has found ready acceptance in West European and North American markets. Burgeoning oil revenues provided the Nigerian Government with the necessary financial resources to undertake new plans to unify and integrate the country torn by the civil strife of late 1960s. The massive oil resources enabled the federal government to exercise centralisation of authority and decision-making in Nigeria. Oil wealth also provided an enormous scope to the Nigerian authorities to pursue a bold foreign policy to project Nigeria as a regional power.

Needless to add, the oil receipts accruing at a meteoric level, especially during the 1970s, played an important role in the economic development of Nigeria. The fiscal impact of oil for Nigeria has been quite significant. It provided financial sustenance to the federal government in meeting its current and capital expenditures. The swelling oil revenues led to considerable investment in physical infrastructure, education, social services as well as industrial development. More importantly, oil revenues had enabled the Nigerian Government to launch ambitious development projects.²

* Dr. Chawla, Reader in Economics, PGDAV College, Delhi University, is also Consultant, Centre for the Studies on Technology and Trade, New Delhi.

Despite the far-reaching impact that the oil sector had on the economy as a whole, the process of oil-induced economic development has had certain ramifications. As oil came to be the locomotive of development, the traditional agricultural and trading economy of Nigeria received a serious setback. With oil, Nigeria's dependence on traditional markets became more pronounced. Domestically, the resultant pattern of income distribution turned highly skewed and inter-regional income differentials have been more marked along with disparities in endowments of schools, roads and health services at the regional level. Riddled by military **coups** and the Civil War of 1966-70, admittedly petroleum acted as a powerful centralising force in Nigeria because the government possessed huge invisible resources at its command. This produced a serious distortion in the economy of Nigeria. As a centralising force, the Nigerian Government's distribution mechanism of federal revenue led to benefits and losses for particular ethnic groups. The restrictive effects of the traditional income distribution and intra-regional inequalities were aggravated by a process of industrialisation based on import substitution industrialisation strategy (ISI). Heavily import dependent as this strategy is, skewed pattern of income distribution and stagnant export earnings limited the process of industrialisation upto a point. Constrained by these in-built anomalies and faced with the depressed world oil markets, especially since 1982, the oil-induced development strategy in Nigeria has been under critical scrutiny during the recent times. As an alternative, the focus of the development strategy seems to have shifted from oil-induced economic development to agriculture-led economic recovery in Nigeria.

THE broad objective of this paper is to examine in depth as to why an oil-rich country such as Nigeria has contributed little to vitalise the economy as a whole. What are the long term possibilities of indigenous economic development for an oil-dependent economy such as Nigeria? To what extent, the shift of development strategy from oil to non-oil sectors such as agriculture and industry would resolve the conflicts and contradictions inherent in the Nigerian economy? These are some of the crucial issues that merit serious consideration.

The plan of the paper is as follows: the first section attempts a brief survey of Nigeria's external trade and tries to show how even the dramatic expansion of external sector during 1970s denied a course of diversified economic development for the country. The following section will analyse the ramifications of intra-regional differences and existing income distribution pattern on the process of economic development. The final section tries to evaluate the recent development policy shifts in Nigeria and offers some prognostications.

EXTERNAL TRADE PROFILE

During the 70s, Nigeria witnessed a dramatic increase in its foreign trade sector. In an absolute way, the value of exports which hovered around \$ 751 million in 1965 reached a figure of \$ 1,239 million in 1970; \$ 7,994 million in 1975 and \$ 25,968 million in 1980. In a similar way, the import bill went up from \$ 770 million in 1965 to \$ 1,059 million in 1970; \$ 6,041 in 1975 and \$ 16,469 million in 1980. The average annual growth rate of exports for the years 1965-70 was around 10.3 per cent, going upto 41.4 per cent during 1970-73 and 45 per cent during 1973-75 as well as during 1975-80. Correspondingly, imports grew by 6 per cent, 21.8 per cent and 63.8 per cent for the respective periods.

In sharp contrast to the 1970s, Nigeria's exports, however, showed erratic trends in the first half of 1980s. The value of exports which peaked in 1980 fell sharply to \$ 18,984 million in 1981; \$ 12,952 million in 1982 and \$ 10,508 million in 1983. It rose thereafter to \$ 14,525 million in 1984 and again fell to \$ 12,567 million in 1985. On the other hand, imports slided down continuously during this period. From a level of \$ 20,554 million in 1981, these fell to \$ 18,658 million in 1982; \$ 13,422 million in 1983 and reached the lowest point of \$ 8,877 million in 1985. In short, Nigeria's foreign trade registered negative growth rates in the first half of the 1980s.

Available data also presents a contrasting picture of the average annual growth rate of exports and imports during two different time periods, i.e., 1965-80, and 1980-85. Both exports and imports registered positive growth rates; 11.5 per cent and 15.1 per cent per annum respectively during 1965-80. As against this, the same marked negative annual growth rates, 9.9 percent and 11.5 percent respectively during 1980-85. © 2010, P. D. Domn, The Kumaran Collection, Haridwar

plain the phenomenal growth in exports during 1970s relates to the two oil price hikes, viz., 1973-74 and 1979-80. With the depressed world oil markets in 1982 and onwards, Nigeria's exports also fell sharply. Since Nigeria's export composition is highly petroleum sector oriented, changes in oil prices and world oil demand affected its export earnings. Petroleum accounted for 89.07 per cent of total exports in 1978 and during 1980-85, it has gone upto 96 per cent.

As far as Nigeria's non-oil exports are concerned, cocoa beans and butter, natural rubber and palm kernels constitute another group of items. While these items accounted for 7.1 per cent of the total exports in 1978, their share fell to 2.5 per cent by 1980. Therefore, declining trends in these items made Nigeria to depend more and more on the export of crude oil. Even by 1985, these primary commodities did not constitute more than 3 per cent of the total exports. On the other hand, manufactured goods formed a larger proportion of the total import bill during the period under consideration. These accounted for 83.1 per cent in 1980 but fell to 72 per cent in 1985. Import of food, however, went upto 21 per cent in 1985 from 11.3 per cent in 1980. At a disaggregated level, machinery and transport equipment alone accounted for 50 per cent of the total imports during 1979-80. The share of chemicals was around 7.4 per cent during the same period. In the aftermath of the oil price hike of 1973-74, as the process of industrialisation accelerated, the import demand for capital goods and critical raw materials also registered a sharp upturn and made the Nigerian economy more dependent on the Western suppliers.

Nigeria's trade is also highly oriented towards a select number of developed countries. Not only do these countries supply its need for manufactured products but also are the important consumers of Nigerian oil. During 1978-80, around 70 per cent of Nigeria's imports came from a handful of Western countries like the United States, UK, West Germany, Netherlands, France and Italy. Similarly, around 89 per cent of Nigeria's exports were directed to the United States, West Germany, Netherlands, France, Italy, Belgium and Sweden during the same period. These trends continued as late as in 1985. While Nigeria's trade with developing countries forms one-tenth of its total trade, the centrally planned economies figure negligibly in its trade profile. Among the developing countries, Brazil and India constitute important trade partners of Nigeria.

That oil has been one of the major economic indicators of Nigeria's external sector can hardly be contested. The oil sector provides continuity to its process of economic development. Taking into consideration the share of primary commodities exported and the share of manufactured goods imported, available data with us indicates a trend that as oil exports increased, manufactured imports also increased by the same proportion during the 1970s. With a fall in oil exports in the first half of the 1980s, although the total import bill fell the manufactured imports' share fell more sharply.

Except for the years 1974, 1975 and 1979, Nigeria suffered a deficit in its current account throughout the decade of the seventies. Nonetheless, the level and proportion of this deficit was easily manageable. During 1981-83 however, Nigeria witnessed a disproportionately large deficit in its current account mainly because of its declining oil export receipts, rising import bill and mounting debt service obligations. Current account deficit as a percentage of GDP averaged 8.1 per cent during 1981-83 as compared to an average of 2.9 per cent in 1970-72 and 3.3 per cent in 1976-78. Exports as a percentage of GDP reached 42 per cent in 1980 from a level of 30 per cent around mid-1970s. Importantly, the end result of the excess of exports over imports during the seventies was reflected in the accumulation of international reserves. These enabled the Nigerian authorities to meet their import bill for a period of 7.6 months during 1973-75 as against hardly 2.6 months around 1965. This picture altogether changed in the first half of 1980s. Since 1981, Nigeria witnessed a sharp downturn in its international reserves, barely sufficient to meet its import bill for a month or so. Debt service ratio which remained around 4.6 per cent in 1981 also touched a dizzy height of 30.4 per cent in 1985.

In short, the external trade boom during 1970s paved the way for industrialisation in Nigeria. Given, however, the orientation of Nigeria's trade to the developed countries such as USA, UK, West Germany and Japan, the industrialisation process was intertwined with these industrially advanced countries. Technological dependence of Nigeria on such countries rendered its production process capital-intensive. Beginning with early 1980s, boom conditions evaporated and the world economy plunged into a severe deflationary phase. The strategy of capital-intensive industrialisation in Nigeria lost much of its ground.

Industrial growth rate slided; much of the production capacity remained unutilised owing to unavailability of imported spare parts and critical raw materials, and the rate of unemployment surged creating political and social tension in the country. In other words, Nigeria has had little insulancy power to keep away from the vicissitudes of the world economy, once it adopted the oil-induced process of economic development and strengthened its external trade linkages with the economically advanced countries.

Efficiency of Industrial Growth Strategy

In its post-colonial era, the Nigerian Government like many Third World countries, launched ambitious development plans to speed up the process of economic growth.³ Swayed by nationalist fervour but dismayed by the "export pessimism" drift in the early 1960s, policy-makers and planners in Nigeria adopted an inward looking industrialisation strategy of import-substitution. As a growth strategy, import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) was conceived to usher in rapid industrialisation of the economy, provide a diversified economic base, absorb Nigeria's growing labour force and reduce its dependence on oil in the long run. The oil boom of the 1970s provided considerable opportunities to industrialise Nigeria rapidly. At the same time, the Third National Development Plan (1975-80) stressed that the productive capacity of the non-oil economy had to be developed as the country's oil resources were exhaustible. As a consequence, state's participation in economic activities burgeoned. Massive public investment in infrastructure projects, and heavy industries such as steel, cement and petrochemicals, coupled with generous financial support to small-scale industries, formed the nuclei of industrial development in Nigeria.⁴

For Nigeria, industrial growth rates for the second half of the 1960s and the decade of the seventies show an impressive record. For instance, during 1965-80, industrial growth rate averaged 13.4 per cent per annum as compared to overall GDP growth rate of 7.9 per cent. The manufacturing sector alone grew by 14.6 per cent per annum during this period. Textiles were the leading sector, claiming virtual self-sufficiency in late 1970s, with a quarter of the total manufacturing labour force, and using mostly domestically produced cotton. As the Nigerian economy went through an early phase of industrialisation, beer, soft drinks, cigarettes, detergents and cosme-

tics were conspicuous growth industries. Further, a wide variety of processed foods, electronic equipment, pharmaceuticals and household wares enjoyed the label of "Made in Nigeria." Alongwith this, production of components and intermediate goods also witnessed a spurt. Heavy investment in vehicle assembling raised its production to a high level by 1981. The overall index of manufacturing production (1972=100) which had reached 394.9 in 1981 rose further to 432.7 in 1982. However, the overall index conceals more than what it reveals. For example, synthetic fabrics and soft-drinks showed more than a ten-fold increase between 1972 and 1982, whereas the vehicle assembly production broke an all time record by increasing fifty times during the same period.

Importantly, Nigeria also invested massively in capital-intensive heavy industry since 1979. For instance, the share of capital expenditure for manufacturing, mining and quarrying in economic services increased to 27.1 per cent in 1979-80 from a low figure of 7.2 per cent in 1974-75. Understandably, the second oil price hike of 1979 opened a floodgate of new imports into Nigeria. When the oil boom was over by the beginning of 1981, Nigeria entered the international financial markets on a significant scale. Foreign borrowings sharply rose to meet the growing deficits in current account during 1981-82.

In sharp contrast to the decade of the seventies, Nigeria's ISI strategy came under heavy pressure in the first half of 1980s. The declining trend in oil prices resulted in savage cutbacks in essential imports of parts and machinery which in turn slowed down the industrial growth rates. Between 1980 and 1985, the index of industrial production (1972=100) declined from 190.8 to 168.4. This represents an average annual decline of 1.9 per cent during the period. Looking more closely at the industrial sector during 1980-85, we however see a silver lining in the shape of a positive annual average growth rate of manufacturing production. This showed an average growth rate of 1.9 per cent per annum during the same period. Contrary to expectations, the index of manufacturing production fell by 5.3 per cent in the first half of 1986 and preliminary data for 1986 show a 6.4 per cent decline in this sector over the year as a whole.

A basic question which needs to be answered is whether ISI strategy offers unlimited expansion and

accelerates the development process in a monoculture economy such as Nigeria. Assuming the world economy had not entered the deflationary phase in the early 1980s and oil prices were maintained more or less at the same level as in 1979-80, could an oil economy like Nigeria achieve a sharp upward trend in its industrial production? *A priori*, a look at the development projects as had been envisaged in the late 1970s and early 1980s show that the ISI strategy may not offer the desired results. A number of factors may be catalogued in this respect. Even as it is, any accelerated pace of development will have to take into consideration such basic constraints as lack of socio-economic infrastructure, non-availability of skilled labour, heavy dependence on critical raw materials and capital goods from outside, and above all a skewed pattern of income distribution. Consequently, the existing pattern of industrialisation as reflected in the Fourth Development Plan may be described as ill-conceived, lopsided and devoid of any long run comparative advantage.

Essentially, Nigeria's problems in respect of an appropriate development strategy is not the ISI strategy as much as the adoption and implementation of such a strategy in the context of a development plan envisaging perpetual dependence on foreign technology, skilled manpower and capital goods, especially from its traditional trade partners such as industrially advanced Western countries. Despite the fact that the Nigerian Government's policy has been to force manufacturers to invest in developing local substitutes for many raw materials, its dependence on heavy import of processing equipment and even raw material has been quite pronounced.⁵ The launching of steel, petro-chemicals and fertiliser industries during the Fourth Development Plan illustrates this point. Shortages of imported iron ore and continued power cuts resulted into excessive unutilised capacity of various steel plants in Nigeria more recently.⁶ This has led to rising costs, reduced output and higher prices for various types of steel products. Similarly the development of petrochemicals industry has suffered on account of financial crisis faced by the Nigerian Government. The long gestation periods for various petrochemical units due to financial uncertainties have further raised their investment costs and deferred the availability of output for domestic absorption.

It is in the light of these limitations that one has to examine the effectiveness of the ISI strategy

for the Nigerian economy during the 1970s and early 1980s. Rising unemployment, worsening income inequalities combined with regional disparities in infrastructure endowments, sectoral imbalances, increasing foreign participation and marginalisation of small-scale industrial units and strong linkages with the Western economies have been some of the crucial issues which merit serious attention.

PROBLEMS OF REGIONAL IMBALANCE

problem of Employment and Income Distribution

The employment creation aspect of import substitution industrialisation strategy in Nigeria has been unsatisfactory. It may be noted that even in the 1970s when the industrial base of the Nigerian economy expanded, the capital-intensive choice of technique had a poor impact on the unemployment problem. A recent study on unemployment in Nigeria shows that while the overall rate of unemployment fluctuated upwards from 1.7 per cent in 1966-67 to 4.3 per cent in 1976, unemployment has remained largely an urban phenomenon. Analysis by states shows that in certain instances, e.g., in 1974 some states (Mid-West, Rivers, South-East) recorded double digit unemployment rates upto 15 per cent while others (North-West, Kano, Kwara) recorded single digit rates as low as 1 per cent and 3 per cent. As for the state capitals, the situation was much worse with unemployment reaching 22 per cent in some of them (Calabar in 1976). As a result of the free educational programme of the civilian regime in the Second Republic (1979-83), unemployment had become more critical for secondary school-leavers and graduates. From 1983, such unemployment had reverted to its pre-civil war pattern of more people remaining unemployed for a much longer time period owing mainly to the prolonged economic depression. Between 1983 and 1984 the extent of under-employment among the urban labour force increased largely for involuntary rather than voluntary reasons. The situation was attributable to reduced capacity utilisation in many industries. The extent of underemployment in rural areas by 1984 was roughly four times the level in urban areas. This was naturally to be expected in view of the scope of disguised unemployment in the agrarian sector.⁷

Moreso by the beginning of 1987, capacity utilisation in the manufacturing sector was estimated to have fallen to an average of less than 30 per cent.

According to the Manufacturers' Association of Nigeria (MAN), 200,000 workers (about 40 per cent of the labour force) were estimated to have been laid off in 1984-85 and this number has continued to rise more recently.⁸

Apart from the grave magnitude of unemployment in Nigeria, the basic question is related to the labour absorptive capacity of the industrial sector in general and manufacturing sector in particular during the 1970s and early 1980s. Available data with us shows that the percentage of labour force in industry hardly rose from 10 per cent in 1965 to 12 per cent in 1980. Further, the manufacturing industry employed around 1 million people before the economic crisis engulfed Nigeria in the early 1980s. As stated earlier, 40 per cent of this labour force was retrenched during 1984-85. In other words, the manufacturing sector hardly absorbed 2 per cent of the total labour force in its rapid growth period of 1970s. By mid-1980s, even this share fell considerably on account of the deflationary phase in the Nigerian economy.

That the Nigerian economy witnessed a highly skewed pattern of income distribution and regional inequalities in infrastructure endowments cannot be gainsaid. While data relating to income distribution is highly fragmentary and disjointed, some prognostications have been made to point out that income inequality has been growing rather phenomenally. According to one estimate, income differentials between urban and rural sectors grew rapidly during 1966-67 and 1975-76. For instance, urban per capita product as a percentage of rural per capita product rose from 309.6 in 1966-67 to 547.7 in 1973-74 and 936.3 in 1975-76. This implies a three-fold increase during a decade.⁹ The wide differences in urban and rural sectors per capita product have been attributed to considerable differences in labour productivities in different economic sectors of the Nigerian economy.¹⁰ Regarding inter-personal income inequalities, available evidence suggests that there was a sharp trend towards inequality within the modern sector from 1970 to the mid-1970s after a moderate degree of inequality in the 1960s. As a measuring rod of inequality, the Gini co-efficient in the modern sector reached .7 in 1976-77 from .55 in 1970. The magnitude of inter personal income inequality in the rural sector has been low with Gini indices probably around .3.¹¹ It is also probable that a decline in inequa-

lity might have occurred after 1976 through a sluggish performance in the modern sector, especially in the oil sector in 1978 and with a rise in agricultural production of about 3 per cent in 1976-77. With the renewed boom in oil prices in 1979-80, income inequality had been accentuated because the government funnelled its oil revenues into the urban sector. With the crash of oil prices around the mid-1980s, and consequent sluggishness in industrial activities in Nigeria, economic recovery through agriculture development might somewhat narrow down the income differentials between rural and urban sectors.

While each National Development Plan document included statements about the need to bring about a just and egalitarian society, no Nigerian government (civilian or military) ever seriously attempted an important redistribution of income or a direct assault on equity problems. Regional disparities in infrastructure endowments are a reflection of this malfunctioning. Lamenting this aspect, Henry Bienen states:

Indeed, almost all observers of Nigeria agree that inter-regional income differentials have been more important than inter personal ones and that income differentials per se have been less contentious in Nigerian political life than disparities in endowments of schools, roads, health services, and the like.¹²

Sectoral Imbalances

Largely as a result of expansion of import substitution industrial activities in the decade of the 1970s, with its emphasis on consumer durables, the Nigerian economy increasingly reflected certain sectoral imbalances. Agriculture sector suffered massively. Not only was agriculture budgeted for relatively small amounts in successive development plans, but during 1975-78 agriculture had consistent shortfalls in actual investments compared to the Third Plan's (1975-80) allocation for it. For example, the federal and state governments allocated 11.6 per cent of their resources to agriculture in the First Plan period, but this declined to 9.9 per cent and 7.1 per cent during the Second and Third Plan periods respectively. This, however, increased to 12.7 per cent in the Fourth Plan. Despite this increase, the average allocation of 10.3 per cent in the four plan periods

falls short of the allocation in the First Plan period. What is more disquieting is that during 1962-68, the combined proportion of agricultural expenditures out of the total for all sectors was 6.4 per cent and declined to 3.5 per cent in 1975-80.¹³ Paradoxically enough, this is despite the fact that the agriculture sector absorbed a substantial proportion of labour force i.e., 68 per cent in 1980 and contributed 36 per cent to GDP in 1985. Notwithstanding the fact that the producers' prices for agricultural commodities were raised substantially in 1975, the average annual growth rate declined by 2.5 per cent per annum during 1974-78 and the negative trend continued till 1983. With agricultural production not expanding rapidly enough to meet the rising demand (population rising by 3 per cent per annum), food prices rose rapidly. Consequently, wheat and flour imports grew from 400,000 tons in 1975 to 1.3 million tons in 1978 and rice imports grew even faster from 1974 to 1978. Infrastructural and marketing bottlenecks limited the ability to use imported food to hold down prices. As a result, food prices increased more than those of non-food items between 1973 and 1978.

Much of the industrialisation pursued in Nigeria during the 1970s bears the imprint of large foreign companies dominating the advanced sectors of its economy. Theoretically, all the larger houses have had the maximum level of foreign equity -- 40 per cent or 60 per cent; however, production in these sectors depended primarily on the imports of goods and services. Major foreign-controlled commercial houses like the United Africa Company, Paterson Zochonis, SCOA Nigeria, John Holt (Lonrho) have continued to maintain a strategic lead in the import trade despite their public relations attempts to portray themselves as essentially manufacturing firms. They have successfully survived attempts to indigenise trading. Therefore, the resultant gains from the expansion of the dynamic industrial sectors were reaped by foreign firms/subsidiaries, rather than by the indigenous sector. Not only did the foreign firms utilise the capital-intensive technology, sophisticated machinery and highly skilled native or alien labour, but also they were potential sources of imported inputs; lucrative profits on their operations along with heavy remittances causing a major stress on the balance of payments of the Nigerian economy.¹⁴ Even the financial policies which are geared more to the external source of capital resources to meet

grandiose project costs are bound to aggravate the payments imbalances in the medium to long terms. Nigeria accumulated its foreign obligations at a much faster rate when the world oil market slided and its oil earnings fell considerably in the early 1980s. As payments problems worsened from 1982 onwards, the willingness of foreign shareholders to provide new investment resources also diminished.

Thus, the pattern of industrial growth initiated in Nigeria during the seventies not only presented a seriously distorted way of development, high social cost, unemployment and under employment of resources, inequitable distribution of income and wealth and regional disparities, marginalisation of small-scale industries, but also aggravated these problems in the face of the oil price crash in the mid-1980s. The recent debt problems in Nigeria have further confounded the economic crisis situation and authorities currently provide the most liberal incentive package to attract foreign investment in the country.

RECENT ECONOMIC CRISIS

With an accumulated debt of \$ 18.3 billion in 1985, Nigeria's total external debt showed a staggering growth of 105.6 per cent between 1980 and 1985. According to World Bank estimates, Nigeria's annual repayments to its creditors will average \$ 3.5 billion during 1986-87. Although higher oil production raised the 1985 export earnings over 1984, the sharp increase in debt service payments forced the government to reduce imports considerably. Substantial trade arrears (\$ 3.5 billion to \$ 6 billion) have further aggravated the debt problem.

Factors contributing to the worsening economic situation in Nigeria included the sharp downswing of oil prices in early 1986, reduction in farm and industrial output, excessive public expenditure on social and physical infrastructure and import dependent industrialisation exacerbating inflationary pressure on the domestic economy. As stated earlier, the Nigerian Government had launched an ambitious development plan for its steel, petrochemicals and infrastructure industries during 1981-85. To finance such a plan, the government not only did borrow heavily but also accumulated substantial trade arrears during 1981-83.

Faced with massive debt service obligations, President Babanqida had to announce on 31 December

1985 that debt service ratio would not be allowed to exceed 30 per cent. Still, Nigeria was unable to repay its short term obligations. Consequently, from April 1986 onwards, Nigeria obtained successive 90 day moratorium on principal repayments due to the London Club. Formal debt reschedulings through the London and Paris Clubs had also, run into difficulties because of the government's announcement that it would not seek an IMF loan.

To overcome the domestic political constraint, the Nigerian authorities struck an ingenious arrangement with the IMF under their Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP); the authorities agreed to submit to IMF's "enhanced surveillance," while declining to draw down on the IMF loan. Not only did this agreement provide substantial World Bank loan, bridging loan from Western Central Banks but also paved the way to debt reschedulings with the Paris and London Clubs. Considerable sums were rescheduled, and hope for new resource flows, were revived.

Although these agreements reduced medium and long-term debt service payments in 1986 within a limit of 30 per cent ceiling, the Nigerian Government adopted the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) to restore internal and external equilibria. The major components of such a programme included expansion of non-oil exports, reduction in the import content of locally manufactured goods, self-sufficiency in food and enlarging the role of private sector in the economy. Introduction of the Second Tier Foreign Market (STFM) in September 1986, abolition of import licenses, rationalisation of import duties and abolition of export duties formed the corner-stone of Nigeria's foreign trade policy. The programme was instrumental in securing IMF, World Bank and creditors support for debt rescheduling at the end of 1986. Though the debt rescheduling operation only covered the period upto 1987, it is evident that Nigeria will require similar arrangements for the rest of the decade of 1980. Additionally, it will need substantial amount of new capital resources to accelerate the tempo of growth.

SHIFT IN DEVELOPMENT POLICIES

Reviving Agriculture

Faced by an unprecedented economic crisis around early 1980s, the Nigerian Government shifted its

development strategy from oil-induced growth to agricultural-based recovery. Much wider in scope than the "Operation Feed the Nation" campaign of 1970s, the new "Green Revolution" strategy became the credo of the Babangida Government by mid-1980s. Innovative organisational changes and a series of sweeping measures contemplated by the government were the two main planks of a new agricultural strategy.

Constrained by the operative efficiency of government-run large farms of the yesteryears, the new strategy encouraged joint private-public enterprises in the agriculture sector. One of the major organisational changes reflected in this strategy is that the agricultural production and processing have been transferred from Schedule II to Schedule III of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act, allowing foreigners to own upto 60 per cent of the equity in an agricultural enterprise. The strategy also suggests that the small holding is the centrepiece of food production. Crude estimates show that about 40 per cent of the capital expenditure programmes in the Fourth Plan were earmarked for the small farmers.¹⁵

Apart from these organisational changes, the Nigerian Government took a series of far-reaching measures to stimulate recovery in its agriculture sector. Banning imports of several important agricultural commodities, substitution of locally produced agricultural inputs for imports, disbanding country's moribund crop marketing monopolies and devaluation of its currency Naira, formed some of the significant measures to revive agriculture in Nigeria. Further, in order to develop and promote agricultural exports from Nigeria, the government lifted the ban on exports of agricultural commodities and introduced instead export incentives. The exporters were allowed to retain 25 per cent of foreign exchange earned from all non-oil exports and this amount was raised to 100 per cent under SAP Programme in 1986. That the Nigerian agriculture should not suffer from infrastructure bottlenecks, a network of rural feeder roads was developed in areas of high agricultural potential. The government's pressure on industrial units to invest directly in agriculture and commercial banks to effect increased lending to this sector was mainly oriented to feed, rather than starve, agricultural operations with sufficient credit resources. Withdrawal of the government from direct participation in agricultural production and distribution of agricultural products, and move for privatisation of agro-

industrial parastatals, marked the beginning of the laissez-faire philosophy in Nigerian agriculture. Creation of sufficient storage capacity, development programme of fertiliser production to meet domestic needs and other supportive infrastructure clearly point to the Nigerian Government's concern to increase incentives and boost investment in agricultural infrastructure and extension services.

Notwithstanding the emphasis placed on the development of the agriculture sector, government's budgetary allocation for this sector has been a serious constraint in recent years. For instance, the total allocation for agricultural and rural development in the Federal Government's investment budget fell from 894.3 million Naira (15 per cent of total Federal investment) in 1986 to 765 million Naira (12.6 per cent) in 1987. These allocated funds further include 400 million Naira for a newly created Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural infrastructure.

Nigeria's excessive reliance on external solutions to resolve its problem of agriculture production seems to be misplaced. The liberal opening of the economy to foreign enterprises to produce food on a large scale may be detrimental to the economic interest of Nigeria. Previous experience with large-scale food production suggests that this can divert necessary resources away from the subsistence sector, where the majority of Nigerian farmers is to be found.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Prolonged sluggishness in world oil market notwithstanding, oil in Nigeria still remains the single major source of foreign exchange earnings, large government revenue and financial assistance for various development programmes. However, the productive capacity of the Nigerian economy to turn its growth inwards has been limited essentially because of the pattern of economic growth pursued during the 1970s and early 1980s. Despite the fact that Nigeria had a long tradition of planning, and by 1985 four development plans had been completed reflecting a reasonably high GDP growth rate, somewhat diversified industrial structure and rapid growth of the services sector, yet the problems of income distribution, regional disparities in infrastructure endowment, social costs of industrial production and sectoral imbalances seem not to have received adequate attention of planners and policymakers in Nigeria.

Faced with an acute economic crisis around mid-1980s, largely due to exogenous shocks, the Babangida Government announced a SAP Plan in 1986 which perceptibly marked a shift in the development strategy of Nigeria. A cursory glance at the components of the SAP reveals that Nigeria intends to reduce its dependence on oil exports, achieve self-sufficiency in food and as well effect considerable reduction in imported raw materials. Nigeria's foreign trade policy is revamped with a package of export-import incentives to earn additional foreign exchange. However, SAP may at best be considered a temporary reprieve, it falls short of long-term concrete solutions to the Nigerian economic malaise. Further, this has been necessitated because Nigeria cannot totally sever existing economic links with its traditional trade partners of the Western world and therefore is obliged to pursue a style of development which maximises indicators of external solvency, unmindful of its own perceived socio-economic development projects. In short, the economic policy formulation has come to be dictated by the behaviour of the external sector in the immediate future.

As an alternative policy measure, schemes of regional economic cooperation with African countries in particular, and major developing countries such as India and Brazil in general, would be ideally suited for a country like Nigeria. Although Nigeria is a founding member of the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS), its average annual exports to this regional grouping did not constitute more than 3 per cent of its total exports during 1981-85. With a deepening of the economic crisis in Sub-Saharan African countries, innovative mechanisms of trade promotion can certainly help Nigeria to have increasing economic intercourse with this region. Barter deals is one such mechanism to expand South-South trade.

Given, however, the limited size of the regional markets and unsettled political issues, it would be appropriate to forge closer economic relations with major developing countries outside the region. In this regard, India's economic relations with Nigeria deserve a fresh look. A large number of India's joint ventures in Nigeria have been showing satisfactory performance and these also cover a wide array of economic activities. Nevertheless, there still exists scope for India to collaborate jointly with Nigeria in areas of agro-based products, leather processing,

engineering industries and electrical goods. Since Nigeria has shifted its development strategy from oil-induced growth to agriculture-based recovery, it opens possibility of a number of potential ventures for India to help Nigeria in its agriculture sector. Moreso, in the agriculture development strategy of Nigeria the small farmer is the centrepiece of food production and necessary inputs of credit, research, extension services and supportive infrastructure have to be provided to him on priority basis. India's proven expertise in this and related areas can be of tremendous benefit to Nigeria.

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- 1 Between 1970 and 1980 the share contributed by oil to government revenue rose from one-fourth to over three-fourths and accounted for well over 95 per cent of total export earnings around mid-1980s. An idea of increase in domestic investment is provided by Nigeria's The Guidelines to the Third Plan which stipulated in 1973 that there would be a 10.7 billion Naira total investment during the 1975-80 plan period. In March 1975, the total investment was projected at 30 billion Naira i.e., a three-fold increase during the same period. A revision in 1976 increased the public sector spending for investment alone to 26.5 billion Naira.
- 2 The Fourth Development Plan (1981-85) assumed that oil revenues would increase from \$ 20 billion in 1980 to \$ 40 billion in 1985. Steel, petrochemicals, fertilizers and cement were the favoured sectors for development during this period.
- 3 The time periods of the various National Development Plans were as follows:
First Plan (1962-68); Second Plan (1970-74); Third Plan (1975-80) and Fourth Plan (1981-85). The formulation and launching of Fifth Plan was deferred in 1985 due to the economic crisis engulfing Nigeria. However, in mid-1986, the Nigerian Government unveiled a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) which has to run from July 1986 to June 1988.

4 For instance, infrastructural (power, transport, communication and education) sector accounted for 42 per cent of the actual investment during 1975-78 as against total allocated share of 40 per cent in the Third Plan Period, (1975-80). Similarly, the manufacturing sector absorbed 14 per cent of actual investment as against an allocated share of 19 per cent during the same period. For details see Henry Bienen, "Oil Revenues and Policy Choices in Nigeria," World Bank Staff Working Papers No. 592 (Washington, DC), Table 9, p.54.

5 In 1985, the Federal Government set out the following five year targets for minimum levels of local raw material sourcing; soft drinks and breweries 100 per cent; agro-food industries 80 per cent; agricultural processing industries 70 per cent; petrochemicals 50 per cent; machine tools 50 per cent and chemicals 60 per cent. Despite these targets, there are practical difficulties to surmount as and when imported inputs are replaced by domestic substitutes. For instance, technical demands are difficult and there is inadequate research into Nigerian substitutes. Heavy production costs tend to make locally sourced materials more expensive than imported counterparts and hence industrial units' dependence on imports continues unabated. Presently, an estimated 60 per cent of all raw materials used by local industry are imported. The car assembly plants depend on imports for about 95 per cent of their inputs.

6 Starting its operations in 1981, a West German-built direct reduction steel plant has been operating at about 20 per cent of its installed capacity. The Delta Steel Company runs three rolling mills which are heavily import-dependent and have operated at less than a third of their capacity.

7 E.O. Akinnifesi, "Unemployment and Economic Development in Nigeria - Analysis and Policy Implications," Economic and Financial Review, (Lagos, Nigeria), Vol.24, No.2, June 1986, p.61.

8 Economist Intelligence Unit, Nigeria, Country Profile 1987-88 (London), pp.32-33.

- 9 Henry Bienen, n. 4, Table 16, p. 61. If we take rural per capita product as a percentage of urban per capita product, we find the same fell from 32.3 in 1966-67 to 18.3 in 1973-74 and 10.7 in 1975-76.
- 10 The Kuznets ratio (labour productivity in the industrial and service sectors divided by labour productivity in agriculture) rose from 2 in 1966 to 2.4 in 1970 and a high 6.2 in 1975 in Nigeria. See for details, V.P. Diejomaoh and E.C. Anusionwu, "The Structure of Income Inequality in Nigeria: A Macro Analysis," in Henry Bienen and V.P. Diejomaoh (Eds.), The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Nigeria (New York, 1981), pp. 100-115.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Henry Bienen, n. 4, p. 17.
- 13 James O. Osakwe and M.O. Ojo, "An Appraisal of Public Sector Financing of Agricultural Development in Africa with Particular Reference to Nigeria," Economic and Financial Review Vol. 24, no. 2, June 1986, p. 37. An estimate suggests that between 1970 and 1982, annual production of Nigeria's principal cash crops fell sharply; cocoa by 43 per cent; rubber by 29 per cent; cotton by 65 per cent and groundnuts by 64 per cent. See for details, World Development Report 1986 (Washington D.C.), p. 72.
- 14 Outflows on account of investment income from Nigeria continuously maintained an upward trend, e.g., from 693 million Naira in 1983 to 932 million Naira in 1984 and 1354 million Naira in 1985.
- 15 James O. Osakwe and M.O. Ojo, n. 13, pp. 38-9.

ROLE OF THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT IN WORLD PEACE *

By (U. Arun Kumar **

Since the beginnings of history the goal of an enduring state of peace has been the foremost objective of human societies. The Upanisads positively reverberate with the most earnest prayers for peace. The Bible speaks of the vision of Isaiah in which swords were turned into ploughshares and spears into pruning hooks, and men gave up the art of making war.

These ancient and deep-seated longings for peace have been poignantly reaffirmed after every war, as the evolution of man progressed through wars of ever growing ferocity. It would seem that man has indeed made a fine art of destroying his own species with increasing efficacy and diminishing cost. And now in the age of thermonuclear weapons, computers and micro-electronics, the cult of war has reached its ultimate climax. We are closer today than ever before to an entirely unprecedented type of universal disaster that could lead to the disappearance of the human species.

This danger is very real and it has been explicitly recognised in several resolutions and declarations of the nonaligned summits. Successive declarations of the nonaligned summits have proclaimed that the policy of Nonalignment is of universal applicability. The quintessential objectives of the Nonaligned Movement are peace, disarmament and development. To achieve these, the Nonaligned nations seek to maintain and promote independence, sovereignty and equality of nations and to establish a new world political, economic, informational and communication order. All these objectives and the means are necessarily of a global character, applicable

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** Mr. Arun Kumar is an engineering student at the M.V.S.R. Engineering College, Kalyanpur, Hyderabad, and Haridwar.

not only to the Nonaligned but also to all other states~~the~~ the aligned, the neutral and the non-bloc states (Sweden, Finland, Ireland) too.

I

TWENTY ONE years ago the First Summit Conference of the Nonaligned, held in Belgrade in 1961, had declared: "War has never threatened mankind with greater consequences than today. On the other hand, never before had mankind at its disposal stronger forces for eliminating war."

In any examination of the linkage between the Movement of the Nonaligned and the struggle for disarmament, both the elements of the Belgrade Declaration of 1961, quoted above, have to be kept in mind: the menace of war before mankind and the growing awareness of the people for the elimination of war. In fact at Belgrade, it is worth recalling today, the leaders of the Nonaligned emphasised the threat of nuclear war as the top-priority concern of the entire Nonaligned Movement to the visible annoyance of a number of representatives who, preoccupied as they were with the struggle against colonialism, naturally emphasised the urgency of supporting the struggle for liberation. The leaders of the Nonaligned, particularly Nehru, Nasser and Tito, while understanding the sentiments of those who were getting impatient for a world front against imperialism, reiterated the urgency of the struggle against the arms race, particularly nuclear arms. It is this priority in emphasis on disarmament which led the Belgrade Conference to decide on sending official representation on behalf of the nonaligned community to both Moscow and Washington, urging the cessation of nuclear tests. This was the first concerted action of the nonaligned community and it is significant that it was the first step on a world-scale towards nuclear disarmament.

Long before this move at Belgrade, the Nonaligned nations, despite their not having at that time any organised platform, had emerged as the pioneers in the struggle for disarmament. In a sense, the very concept of Nonalignment can be regarded as the first most powerful indictment of the policy of arms pile-up as had been laid down by the cold war. The refusal of the Nonaligned nations to join the military blocs was the expression of their assertion of not only independence but their resistance to the concept of military might as an instrument of policy in international relations.

While this new assertion of independence, mainly on the part of the countries which had newly freed themselves from colonial bondage or tutelage, was not easily comprehended by the Great Powers, it is significant that the first official denunciation of Nonalignment came from the regime which at that time claimed its stakes on world domination mainly on the strength of its military might. John Foster Dulles, who unashamedly believed in the power of the United States military might to shape the world, spoke against Nonalignment as something "immoral." In a sense Dulles brought out, no doubt unwittingly, the organic link between Nonalignment and disarmament.

The very nuclear weapons, supposedly created to deter war, would pose a threat to the survival of mankind, if deterrence should fail and the weapons were to be used. All nations have therefore acknowledged that the only way out of this dilemma is through collective prevention of nuclear war and through nuclear disarmament.

However, it is paradoxical that while there is a growing consensus for nuclear disarmament, there is at the same time an uncontrolled nuclear arms race and an increasingly unstable deterrence. It is as if man has blundered into a tunnel that has no exit. The only light that enters the tunnel comes from its entrance but so far man has found it impossible to stop and retrace his steps towards the light. Why has it been difficult for him to do so?

This is not a philosophical question. It is a dilemma rooted in the psychology of man, in that tight bundle of fears, instincts and emotions that is subject to periodic releases in creative joy or wanton destruction. This schizophrenic aspect of man is illustrated by the contrast between the noble resolutions adopted by the Nonaligned Movement in response to the spiritual urges for a world without war, and the desperate actions of nations to modernise and multiply their means of mutual destruction.

We live today under a constantly growing fear of nuclear disaster. The hapless people of the Third World are mute witnesses to the unfolding of the potential for their destruction. It is appalling that they should have no say concerning their fate and that they should be regarded as expendable in a war of mutual annihilation between the nuclear giants. This is a monstrous new dimension to the daily strug-

gle of the people for survival. The fate of mankind should not obviously be left in the hands of a few adversary nuclear-weapons states. It is essential for the others in the common interest of all to force themselves seriously to address the most urgent objective of our time - the prevention of nuclear war.

It is one of the great paradoxes of history that nations should want to acquire the very same horror weapon which had shown its potential to annihilate the human race (at Hiroshima and Nagasaki). And it is one of the great ironies that after having acquired the evil, they want to control it. The arms race is neither new nor unique. It was there for as long as we can remember. But the present predicament of man is both new and unique. While the arms race has often led to wars, we cannot permit that to happen now. Looking at the very nature of deadly weapons a war today will mean the end of human civilisation. And yet the arms race is going on, not often because of human volition, but because of the inexorable military technological processes over which it seems we have lost our control.

Nuclear arms have completely changed traditional strategic thinking. In fact there can be no strategy in a nuclear age. The nuclear bomb is no doubt the supreme deterrent, but it cannot be used. This is the crux of the present dilemma of military strategists.

Today, there is glib talk of a limited nuclear war, and some assure that even after a nuclear war there will still be a part of humanity to carry on this tragic course of man. At any other time such people would have been put in a lunatic asylum as dangerous men.

The balance of terror may be a satisfactory theory to strategists. But it is a dangerous concept, for in a dynamic situation a perfect balance is never reached and while each tries to outdo the other, there can be an accident or the temptation for a pre-emptive strike.

It is wrong that a nation should pursue its own security at the cost of the rest of humanity. It is wrong to presume that some nations should possess nuclear weapons and others not. A world security system cannot be constructed on these premises. There is nothing to stop proliferation in these conditions, and that is the greatest danger.

Any assessment of the Second Cold War is bound to give top priority to military strategic matters. It is in that visible palpable field that the great silent majority of the world has come to realise that we have suddenly entered a very dangerous transitional period in global relations. While that is true, there are other imponderable features which have to be taken into account; an assessment of their importance might enable us to take a less pessimistic view of the future.

The last 38 years have been years of change and development; but they have retained throughout some elements of continuity, the most conspicuous being the surprising durability of the United Nations system in spite of many crises. This, in its security and political aspects, and more closely concerning ordinary people all over the world - in its 'equality of life' role as manifested in the work of the various subsidiary agencies, has been a major, and positive, feature of a world tired after two wars and living under the umbrella of the balance of terror. The other major, positive development during the period between the two cold wars has been the phenomenon of decolonisation which led to the emergence of new states on the international scene. These nations refused to accept the theory and practice of derived loyalties, linked policy attitudes and subsidiary relationships, and opted for autonomy in policy formulation.

II

The Nonaligned Movement was the inevitable product of decolonisation. Its link with the earlier cold war was important, but not integral. The raison d'être of the Movement was the desire of the weaker nations for economic and political viability as nation states, as also their wary attitude towards interventionism in all forms, military or political, overt or covert. The activities of the Nonaligned Movement, and the existence of a dialogue at a serious level even during the most tense moments between the strategic adversaries, are interrelated. This has led to a certain definable, but slow progress in the innumerable, unexciting, peripheral dialogues at several levels in the world system, while the core negotiations on economic and political issues made little progress.

The prime concern of the founding fathers of the Nonaligned Movement was the preservation of indepen-

dence, newly won in most cases, of its members from the political pulls and pressures emanating from the confrontation between the two Super Powers. But soon they realised that economic dependence could also erode their sovereignty and expose them to continuing exploitation by the affluent countries, including their erstwhile rulers. To prevent old-fashioned political colonialism being replaced by economic neo-colonialism, each nonaligned summit, starting from the Belgrade Meeting of 1961, has been devoting increasing attention to the economic problems of developing countries. After reviewing their plight and progress, each meeting comes out with a declaration calling on the world community to follow certain lines of action or to adopt a certain set of policies.

The United Nations has been the principal forum where action in pursuit of nonaligned declarations has been initiated. Other developing countries in the UN have given their full support to the lead and initiative provided by the Nonaligned Movement. Together they formed what came to be known as the 'Group of 77,' which in effect has been functioning as the operational limb of the Nonaligned Movement in the economic sphere.

To start with, their efforts met with a positive response from the developed countries. The Belgrade Nonaligned Declaration led to the convening of UNCTAD I in 1964. The Generalised Scheme of Preferences, the pledge to provide official development assistance, the setting up of the World Bank's soft loan affiliate IDA, the Extended Fund Facility in the IMF, the formulation and acceptance of a development strategy for what were successively designated as 'Development Decades' by the United Nations created a climate of cooperation and hope during a period when the developed countries themselves were passing through a phase of unprecedented prosperity, with full employment, high rates of growth and conditions of general price stability. And then there was a sudden setback.

One after another, the developed affluent countries found themselves battling with major domestic problems: pressures on their balance of payments, inflation, mounting unemployment and slackening of growth. In dealing with them, they began to ignore and bypass all the commitments they had made after World War II, to have a regime of stable exchange rates, to curb and abolish protectionism and to promote capital flows to developing countries through the

World Bank, IDA and by way of official development assistance. The dialogue on problems of developing countries in every international forum began to end in a deadlock.

With clear signs of the crumbling of the old order, which anyhow was a creation of the developed countries and unsatisfactory to the developing countries, the Algiers Nonaligned Summit in 1973 gave a call for a New International Economic Order, in which instead of grudging 'concessions' and discretionary aid from developed to developing countries, there would be a restructuring of their mutual relationship to make it more equitable and more responsive to the needs and aspirations of the majority of mankind.

The UN General Assembly gave full support to the plea by adopting a detailed, carefully thought out resolution on the subject, to which the developed countries also subscribed. But when it came to discussion of specific issues, usually in the specialised agencies dealing with them, there was no progress. There were sterile speeches ending in a stalemate. In the UN too, the debates on North-South issues were getting increasingly acrimonious.

III

But now a new milestone is reached by the South's own level of consciousness. A decade ago the concept of collective self-reliance was hardly known, but today South-South cooperation is a live issue. No doubt there were obstacles and pitfalls in achieving it, but the very popularisation of the concept marks a significant progress in the perception of the developing countries to put their own house in order side by side with their collective demand for a fair deal from the North. In all spheres of human activity, consciousness is the first step on the road to consummation. If South-South collective self-reliance is a slogan today, there is little doubt that the Third World countries will strive towards its realisation tomorrow or the day after. The formal independence of a country invests it with an inexorable momentum towards development, even if the political and the economic infrastructure are fragile. This is seen in the experience of India in the last four decades and it can also be discerned by the interest and appreciation that India's economic development with its lopsidedness, evokes in the rest of the Third World.

In the sphere of economic activity the Nonaligned Movement has set the pace in articulating the demands and aspirations of the entire South. It was at the Lusaka Summit in 1970 that economic proposals of the Nonaligned were for the first time formulated. The Algiers Summit, three years later, initiated the concept of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) which was fully developed by the time the Colombo Summit met in 1976. If any international forum has assiduously propagated NIEO, the credit goes to the Nonaligned Movement.

From decolonisation to disarmament and development is a long trip that the movement of the nonaligned countries has made during the last 25 years of its life.

IV

A question being asked is: What has the epochal NAM achieved? The fact that the Movement, which had multiplied its strength four times since its birth in 1961, could display a spirit of unity and solidarity, despite the divergences in the economic, political, social and cultural systems of the member-countries is a shot in its arm. As our late Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Chairperson of the New Delhi NAM Summit put it: "The Summit has disappointed the prophets of doom and gloom who had predicted break-up of the Nonaligned Movement. The Nonaligned Movement has now emerged as a power to be reckoned with and the developing countries cannot be pushed to the brink of disaster. The Summit has established that the Third World, with nearly half the global population, wants peaceful and just co-existence of the rich and the poor nations; a New International Economic Order which aims at equality and socio-economic development through mutual cooperation of all countries and an end to the mad arms race, especially of nuclear weaponry, pursued by the affluent society. These are the very fundamentals for the survival of mankind."

A world without wars is the ideal which the Nonaligned Movement seeks. And complete disarmament is the way to achieve this goal. But, for the present, nuclear disarmament is the most urgent imperative. If it is to become a reality, then reliance on nuclear deterrence must be regarded as a collective fallacy.

The Nonaligned Movement's stand on the dangers of war is not a pacifist one, for, the newly inde-

pendent countries are jealous of defending their hard won freedom and for that they take the realistic view of having to provide for their own defence. At the same time they make a very pertinent distinction between the right to defend and the design for world domination. The danger of nuclear war falls into the second category with a totally different dimension: as it threatens the very existence of mankind as such. This is being more and more realised also by the common masses even in the countries with vast nuclear arsenals. It is therefore logical and rational that the call against the nuclear war danger has come from the Nonaligned Movement with vast potentials of its response the world over. It is in this context that Mrs. Indira Gandhi characterised the NAM as the "biggest peace movement in history."

From this understanding of the Nonaligned Movement's approach to the question of national security and world peace--marking the difference between the two--one can detect the fallacy in the fashionable argument that while the Nonaligned Movement is sermonising to the Great Powers on the urgency of nuclear disarmament, its member-states themselves are not reducing their own arms budget. Neither inconsistency nor hypocrisy, as claimed by some critics, is therefore involved in the stand of the Nonaligned on national defence and threat of nuclear war.

The other set of arguments takes a deceptively wise stand that the Nonaligned Movement not having an economic clout, any hectoring against the developed North does not behove them. These pundits seem to advise the Nonaligned to take a 'realistic' view of their own weakness and make peace with the affluent countries if they expect to get aid, credit and food from them. This is precisely the line of thinking that led Jeanne Kirkpatrick to write to Third World governments last year threatening that their persistent voting against the United States stand in the UN might lose them all the aid they might be getting from the US Administration.

What is missed in this argument is that the far-sighted elements in the North have come to recognise that the developed countries cannot do without the developing by way of either raw materials or markets. The temper in the 'Group of 77' makes it abundantly clear that the developing countries are in no mood to take a docile position. Certainly the prospects are bleak for an immediate breakthrough, but there is a realisation that the North needs the South no less than the South needs the North.

Thus, to wait for all our internecine conflicts to be solved, all our arguments to be reconciled would be a prescription for inaction. It is a continuing process, this nonaligned campaign for a better world order, for more democratic relations, and even more important, a more assured climate of peace and orderly development for the poorest individuals and societies in the world. Whether it is the next step in the North-South dialogue, or the next orderly attempt to improve the world economic system through a summit conference, the next General Assembly, and by involving the socialist countries in the discussions, or whether it is an attempt to finally liquidate the colonial problem in South Africa and end the ongoing conflict in West Asia, the Nonaligned countries have to work together. Individual countries have always the difficult choice between narrow national interest and the interest of the group as a whole, as against the rich and the powerful.

If India and other like-minded countries, which means the large majority of the membership, utilise to the full the present information techniques and communication facilities, this would not be an impossible task. It is, however, important that we know our own mind and that we know the facts in different parts of the world as accurately and in as much detail as possible. Quite unconsciously, the dominant forces in the world today distort information and the dissemination of facts and ideas. We need not accept these. We need not be in a terrible hurry to reject them either. The essence of the nonaligned approach here, as everywhere else, is to stress the autonomous approach.

One simple example would prove this. In the last 40 years we have seen the transformation of military allies into strategic enemies and the reverse process of older enemies becoming political, ideological and military partners. The arguments between Democracy and Communism, between Marxism and free enterprise, between Authoritarianism and Anarchism, are now sought to be given a universal validity which makes it obligatory for all countries to stand up and be counted on either side of the ideological barricade.

This, of course, is something which older civilisations cannot honestly accept. Over the centuries we have learnt to live with enemies turning into friends, occupiers enriching our cultures, alien religions contributing to a new synthesis in our way of life. It is not that these ideological differences

are not genuine, not inspired by the highest motives, not related to the objective environment in the world today. These are definitely links, but these are not universal. They are not valid for all times or for all countries. These are the result of experiences outside the history of several great, self-sufficient civilisations like the Chinese, the Japanese, the Arabic, the Persian and the Indian, to mention a few among the many. The dominant power of modern communications should not make us forget the need to preserve our own basic traditions, thought, styles and priorities in our assessment of possible dangers and opportunities. It is this attitude of self-respect and self-sufficiency in national policies and collective action which would make the Nonaligned Movement a much more active and responsible participant in global decision-making than before.

Also, the Nonaligned Movement has taken the initiative to place the problem of the arms race before the world public. As NAM experts have stated, it is only public opinion which can force governments to take up disarmament seriously. There is no doubt if the peace movements in Europe and America are any indication of public opinion, that the world is becoming more and more aware of the dangers of a catastrophe to which military strategists are taking mankind.

Thus the role of the Nonaligned Movement in peace-keeping, is a pertinent question at a time when the Super Powers appear to be occupying the centre of the world stage, and the medium and small powers have withdrawn to the sidelines.

World peace is too fragile a plant to be left to the mercy of power politics or super power muscle. In the present day, any conflict, even a seemingly peripheral one, involves the participation, vicarious or covert, of one or more of the big powers. And when the region is regarded as a particularly sensitive one where the strategic or economic interests of the big powers are involved, any conflict is fraught with the greatest danger. It is easy for the conflagration to spread and to engulf a much wider area and even to threaten world peace. In this nuclear age when the Super Powers possess the means to destroy the world many times over, no country, however small or distant it may be, can afford to remain unconcerned. The sooner the medium and small powers recognise that in the Nonaligned Movement lies their best hope of protection, the sooner will it resume the active role to

which it has been dedicated. But to enable the Movement to justify such hopes, it must receive a renewal of strength and support from the united will of these powers. The destiny of the nations of the world would be consigned into the hands of the big powers to determine at their will, unless the small and medium states, whose future is principally at stake, unite in activating the Nonaligned Movement to preserve and protect it.

NAM'S CRUSADE FOR WORLD PEACE *

BY CHINTAMANI MAHAPATRA **

He was indubitably the Chief, if not the sole progenitor of a movement that is known today as the Nonaligned Movement the world over. And the Chief was Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru of India. A youngman of thirty-eight then, Nehru attended the International Congress of Oppressed Nationalities in 1927 and it was then that the idea of world peace was born in his perceptive mind. Later, as one of the chief architects of the NAM in the post-Second World War period, Panditji made his invaluable contribution by associating the noble concept of world peace with the Movement.

The Bandung Conference of 1955, which in a way saw the germination of the seeds of nonalignment as a movement, incorporated the five principles of international relations embodied in Nehru's concept of Panchsheel which indicated the requisite conditions for maintenance of peace in our otherwise warring planet. The only other leader among the important leaders of NAM, in the early years of its development, who had a serious concern for world peace was Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. Nkrumah, although not associated with peace movements directly or institutionally, had clearly demonstrated his love for world peace by banding together with Nehru and other leaders who used to express concern about the growing cold war.

UNIQUE CRUSADE FOR WORLD PEACE

INDIVIDUAL voices against war have been raised since antiquity. And the organised peace efforts had begun to take shape as early as in the aftermath of the

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**Mr. Mahapatra is a student at the Centre for American Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Napoleonic Wars. For the first time in the history of the world, organised peace societies sprang up in New York, Massachussets and Ohio in 1815, and the following year witnessed the foundation of the Society for the Promotion of Permanent and Universal Peace in Great Britain. An International Peace Congress was organised first in 1843 with the active participation, among others, of famous Belgian and French leaders, such as Emile de Lavaleye, Gustave de Molinari, Frederic Bastiat and Frederic Passy. Comprehensive international organisations like the League of Nations and the United Nations Organisation came up after the global wars with ideals of prevention of war and promotion of peace.

But NAM's struggle for world peace has a striking difference and a remarkable uniqueness. It is different from the earlier peace movements, largely dominated by the Americans and the Europeans, in the sense that the latter could hardly focus attention on the root of the problem - the cause of the disease. None of those peace movements was actually concerned about the exploitative nature of the imperial system or about the suffering millions of the myriad colonies. A brief spell of anti-imperialist movements in the United States and Britain arose out of racial feelings and unadulterated selfish interests and certainly not out of sympathy for the dominated, the downtrodden and the oppressed. The Nonaligned Movement, on the other hand, has not only been fighting for the elimination of colonialism but has also been struggling hard to minimise the negative repercussions of today's neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism.

On the other side of the picture, the League of Nations was doomed to failure from the very beginning when one of its chief founding fathers, Woodrow Wilson, could not carry his country with him to make it a member of the League. Subsequently, Japanese aggression against Manchuria, Italian attacks against Ethiopia and Germany's militarism in Europe dealt a death blow to the very purpose for which the League was established. The League's successor, the United Nations system, by granting veto powers to the five permanent members of the Security Council, made it crystal clear that it could do nothing in the case of a dispute that involved the Great Powers.

But NAM took up the challenge. The challenge to world peace came basically from the growing cold war between the two Super Powers who had formed their respective military blocs. NAM came along boldly to

face the cold warriors by bluntly refusing to enlist themselves in any of the power blocs, but at the same time making positive efforts to function as a "regulator" of the cold war.

How it all began ?

The hot Second World War came to an end. But the war still continued. This time it was the cold war. The hot war was antithetical to peace. The cold war was unconducive to peace, as the two newly born military giants soon began recruiting their allies threatening another war of almost global proportions. Anybody-not-with-us-is-against-us was the reigning belief in the ruling circles of the two Super Powers. Amidst heightened suspicions in Washington and Moscow regarding the motives of the countries outside the military blocs, Pandit Nehru was preaching friendship with all. He told the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in 1947; "Asia stretches her hand out in friendship to America, Europe, as well as to our suffering brethren in Africa" This statement spelled out the most important philosophy of the concept of nonalignment - a novel and non-traditional approach to world peace.

Traditional foreign policy choices down to the end of Second World War, such as alliances, neutrality and balance of power, were based on division or segregation of the international community, whereas non-alignment emphasized the cohesiveness of the community of nations. A non-aligned state "has by definition no enemies: other states are either present or potential friends." Now that a new cold war has replaced the short interlude of detente, the Chairperson of NAM, Rajiv Gandhi, again reminded in his speech at a state banquet in Washington on 12 June 1985 that:

Nonalignment has been a positive force for peace. It stands for friendship and cooperation with all One friendship need not be at the cost of another.

THE SUCCESS STORY OF THE STRUGGLE

Back to the early years of the post-war world developments, as bilateral and multilateral defence pacts proliferated, Nehru asserted the principles and relevance of nonalignment to world peace by arguing at Bandung:

If all the world were to be divided up between those two big blocs... the inevitable result would be war. Therefore, every step that takes place in reducing that area in the world which may be called the unaligned area is a dangerous step and leads to war....

Nehru's appeal was indeed heard. He did not believe in the dictum that says, one has to prepare for war in order to achieve peace. His was an approach to peace that downplayed the need to resort to the use of force to establish peace. The very spectacular rise in the membership of NAM from a mere twenty-five members at the first summit in 1961 to a hundred and one full members at the recently concluded summit at New Delhi in 1983 speaks of the success of Nehru's appeal in no uncertain terms. It simply indicates that NAM has been able to prevent seventy-six potential members from joining the one or the other military bloc. It does not, in fact, need any extra wisdom to imagine the unforeseeable consequences that might have come up on this planet, only if there had not been an alternative choice in NAM during a period of intensive cold war that had ensued right upon the heels of the hitherto hottest war.

NAM's efforts at establishing peace did not simply end with keeping away from the "entangling alliances." The nonaligned countries, long before the institutionalisation of the movement, had already started playing the catalytic role of "regulator" between the conflicting parties with a view to reducing tension and enhancing peace. A bright example at hand is the role of the few nonaligned countries during the Korean War. The Afro-Asian group of nonaligned countries, under the informal leadership of India, took a position in 1950-51 that provided a "sobering effect" on the Western countries and "persuaded them not to allow misuse of the UN in escalating the Korean War." During the Suez and Hungarian Crises of 1956, the Nonaligned countries painstakingly avoided taking sides to castigate one party or the other by using "verbal thunderbolts", but supported the UN efforts to bring about a solution to the concerned problem. As a matter of fact, throughout the 1950s, the Nonaligned countries considerably came to the help of the United Nations in seeking solutions to crises of various kinds and intensities in countries like Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Lebanon and Cyprus.

In the process NAM has also made its contribut-

ion to the very survival and effectiveness of the United Nations by preventing control of the world body's organs and agencies by any single or group of powers. The United Nations, over the years, has assumed an important position by making and codifying international law, by seeking solutions to international disputes through mediation and peace-keeping methods and providing a forum for discussion of a wide range of international issues. As a result, control of the world body by one or a few powers would only make it another tool of exploitation and an instrument of strengthening sectional interests.

However, the most spectacular success of NAM is perhaps found in its struggle against colonialism. When the United Nations was founded in 1945 it had only thirty-one members that today would be called newly independent countries of the Third World, and after about forty years, since then, the number has swollen to more than a hundred, most of whom achieved their independence in the intervening period. The magnificent role that NAM played in the decolonisation process is admitted on all hands. The issue of decolonization always found a priority over other issues on the agenda of the Nonaligned Movement from time to time. While the grand success of the decolonization process gets reflected in the statistics - out of 750 million people who were under colonial rule in 1945, all but only 3 million are free today. The fact remains that the final chapters of the story are yet to be written. NAM however, has been trying all these years through all available means to put an end to this abominable system.

Colonialism that had come to grip our planet in the course of the last four-hundred years collapsed in about forty years. The most remarkable aspect of this massive socio-political change in the world map is the fact that in all, but a few instances, the transfer of power was more or less peaceful. History has, of course, recorded cases of use of force in ending the colonial rule of the alien powers. It was, however, almost inevitable in those few cases because the so-called colonial masters failed to realize the changes and the new forces at work and rather behaved like an ostrich burying its head in the sand. India, for instance, had to resort to military action to free Goa from the Portuguese who were the slowest in relinquishing their colonial holds, although they were the first in modern history to set the trend of colonial expansionism. India received wholehearted support for this action from the nonaligned countries in and out of the United Nations.

Now, in fact, the United Nations has already legitimized the use of force against colonialism since 1970 by making a declaration that continuation of colonialism is a crime and that people under such rule have an inherent right to struggle by all necessary means at their disposal against the colonial powers. This step was urgently needed because of South Africa's racist white regime's persistent colonial oppression over the black majority of South Africa as well as Namibia. NAM's persistent fight against all forms of colonial exploitation emanates from the understanding that "peace which is imposed by an alien conqueror has hardly restful and soothing qualities...." And that no peace worth its name is ever possible, unless colonial chains and shackles are completely broken.

THE ON-GOING STRUGGLES

Peace is an illusion in a world of politically free but economically unequal nations. The peaceful co-existence between the fabulously rich and abjectly poor is nothing but a camouflage that hides the simmering fire of discontent and uneasiness which may disrupt the deceptively peaceful surface whenever an opportunity arises. Present day's ubiquitous inequality and uneven distribution of the global wealth is reflected in the fact that above 60 per cent of the inhabitants of the Third World, which comprises 49 per cent of the earth's land surface but embraces about two-thirds of its population, subsist in chronic poverty. This massive majority of mankind accounts for only 21 per cent of the gross global product, 25 per cent of the world's export earnings and only 9 per cent of the world's health expenditure.

The phenomenon of the uneasy co-existence of super-rich, rich, middle-income, poor and extremely poor countries in the world is largely the unfortunate outcome of hundreds of years of colonialism. And now despite political decolonization, relational economic inequality is perpetuated in a subtle manner through the wide network of neo-colonial relationships.

The importance of the struggle to alleviate poverty from within and minimise economic pressures from abroad was recognised at the very founding meeting of the Nonaligned nations. The Cairo Conference of NAM put emphasis on the "obligations of all developing countries to accord favourable considerations to the expansion of their reciprocal trade, to unite

against all forms of economic exploitation and to strengthen mutual consultation." At the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development at Geneva in 1964 the Nonaligned countries, alongwith other Third World countries, formed a Group of 77 by emphasizing cooperation among themselves in order to fight the unjust international economic system. Ten years later, the Group of 77 successfully pushed through a resolution in the UN General Assembly that called for the establishment of a New International Economic Order.

While the constant endeavour is to end the cold war centres and build a bridge between the Capitalist West and the Socialist East, the call for a new and just international economic order aims at bridging the undue gap between the Advanced North and the Developing South. In the face of serious and powerful resistance from the North to the concept of NIEO, the Nonaligned countries have now begun putting priority on South-South cooperation rather than the direct North-South dialogue. More recently, at the New Delhi meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of NAM in 1986 the following few significant initiatives were taken in this regard

(A) A research and information system to monitor constantly world economic trends and the role of the TNCs is to be set up at New Delhi.

(B) A consensus was reached on the need to evolve a common strategy for global negotiations in the context of the so-called North-South dialogue.

(C) The statutes of the Centre for Science and Technology, to be set up at New Delhi, were finalized and requisite number of signatures were secured.

(D) Plans were drawn up for economic and technological cooperation in 22 sectors.

In addition, a Generalized Scheme for Trade Preference (GSTP) was launched at Brasilia in May 1986, which is likely to bestow fresh strength to South-South cooperation.

Success in this field is still afar. The problem involves no easy solutions. Most of the economic policies and programmes adopted by NAM are yet to take off the ground. Lack of scientific manpower, skilled labour and technology in adequate amounts create added problems for South-South cooperation.

Yet the potentiality for success in this domain is enormous. Member countries of NAM are a sizeable source of strategic raw materials, such as bauxite, copper, iron ore, oil, tin, tungsten and uranium, to mention a few. They constitute a market, according to an estimation, that is about seven times as big as that of the United States and about five times that of the EEC member countries taken together. Trade among the developing countries has also been recording a faster rate of growth since 1970 than that of the total world trade. Although trade among the developing countries constitutes a very small portion of the world trade, there is little doubt that the trend is quite encouraging. Whereas the well-off will continue to strive to keep the status quo going, the deprived have got to keep up their endeavour to change the system for the betterment of the greatest number of people residing on this earth.

**"WHEN THE RICH MAKE WAR, IT'S
THE POOR WHO DIE".**

Arms race on land, water as well as in outer space is another menace that today poses a threat to the survival of the very human civilization on this planet. Alongwith the geometrical advancement of scientific discovery and technological innovation, military technology has also been able to open those thus far invincible frontiers that until recently only the fantasists could cross. The result is a great upsurge in the military's appetite for resources of all kinds, starting from base metals to the highest flight of scientific imagination. This in turn has encroached upon the domain of civil technology. The military is draining an amazing amount of energy and resources that could otherwise have been more purposefully utilized for the amelioration of civilian life. Indira Gandhi once bemoaned: "It is a tragic paradox that nations spend seventy-five times more on armaments than on developmental assistance to weaker nations." The tragedy lies not only in the current costs of this huge preparation for war but also in the potential costs that are perhaps now beyond an ordinary human's reckoning. Arms race has brought all of us close to a catastrophe that raises the question--if we at all have a future, let alone a peaceful future!

Concern for disarmament has been aired at almost every NAM conference since its inception. Starting at Belgrade in 1961, NAM kept on its call for a world disarmament conference until the Colombo Summit of

1976 referred the demand to a UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD). Two such sessions were held in 1978 and in 1982 at the insistence of the Nonaligned countries. But nothing substantial came out of those conferences. The paramount stumbling bloc is the existence of a self-perpetuating international military order with a hierarchical power structure, the top position holders of which thrive on the big business of arms production and sale. The mammoth military-industrial-complexes in the United States, Soviet Union and a few European countries have developed a vested interest in the armament business. Holding of exhibitions of military equipment and hardwares to draw potential customers is gradually becoming a routine affair. "Floater 83" - a floating exhibition of military equipment - arranged by the British Ministry of Defence to attract buyers for the labels "proved in the Falklands" is a recent illustration.

However, NAM has to keep the struggle going. After all, the developing countries are the usual hosts of hot wars that are fought with the weapons supplied by the very military industrial houses. For the arms suppliers, myriads of mini-and major-wars on the soils of the developing countries have been the real-life testing grounds for their weapons. More wars-more sale-and-more profit has been the simple equation for them, so they remain in the background of almost every war as armourers, advisers, sponsors or combatants. Whereas the doves in supplier countries have safely nested in their soldier's helmets, it is the poor who die when the rich make war.

IGNORANCE IS WEAKNESS - NOT BLISS

There is a world information system today that serves the interest of the major international powers and helps in eternalizing the existing pattern of flow of information. If knowledge is power, control of information enhances it. And control of about 80 per cent of the flow of information in the world is in the hands of only four Western news agencies - Associated Press, Agence France Press, Reuters and United Press International. The control, development and ultimately the content of information by these news agencies is detrimental to the cause of peace in a broader sense of the term. NAM therefore, has given a call for the establishment of a New World Information Order (NWIO). The demand for restructuring the present information order had begun in the 1970s when the concept was shaped by Muhammed Musmondi of Tuni-

sia. It was then endorsed and enlarged by subsequent meetings of Nonaligned countries. NAM's position is regularly cited in the preambular sections of every UNESCO resolution on the NWIO. Like the demand for NIEO, call for a NWIO has also incurred the hostility of the Western countries.

NAM nonetheless, in a fashion somewhat similar to emphasizing South-South cooperation, established a separate Nonaligned News Agencies Pool in 1976 to further the cause of the main objective of founding a New World Information Order. The Non-Aligned News Agencies Pool is designed to serve as a single, intergovernmental news service throughout the Third World. And one of the primary goals is to counter the distorted and inadequate news coverage by the Western media on the problems and developments taking place in the developing countries. According to a report of the Seventh Meeting of the Pool at Pyongyang, North Korea, in 1982, about 86 agencies had joined the News Pool and about 50 had already started active participation in newssharing arrangements coordinated by Tanjug, the official Yugoslav service. Significantly the annual resolution of the UN General Assembly, initiated by 41 NAM states of the 67-member Committee on Information, called for UN and international support for the pool.

Over and above, NAM also now demands the institution of a New Scientific and Technological Order and a New World Cultural Order. This integrated approach to use the news, views and knowledge for the overall betterment of mankind has invited the wrath of the privileged few. The support of the few socialist countries to certain moves of the NAM is misinterpreted and misrepresented by the privileged, occidental leaders as a schemed attack on them and on their so-called freedom of the press. They stage walk-outs from meetings and in extreme cases, even withdraw from the membership of important international organisations. But as in the economic field, so here NAM's struggle is on.

OBSTACLES TO BE OVERCOME

Diagnosis is as important as prescription for any kind of illness - individual or social; so is the faculty to distinguish between causes and symptoms. It is often stated that lack of unity or causes of conflict among the developing nations is due to several differences, such as in their territorial size, stages of economic development, types of administrat-

ive structures and wide variations in their overall cultural orientations. What is significant is that all these factors under prevailing circumstances do not constitute the principal hindrances for the unity of the NAM member states, or for that matter, cause of world peace. The root causes of socio-economic as well as military tensions in various pockets of our planet are the last vestiges of colonialism, the prevailing patterns of neo-colonialism and the perennial effort by the powers that be to resist any change in the system.

There exists a criss-cross conflict of interests between the small but dominant subsystem that enjoys the monopoly of military capability, finance capital and advanced technology and the large but dominated subsystem, spanning Asia, Africa and Latin America that is striving for justice and just international orders. The result of this conflict of interests between unequals is that the dominant few have been able to penetrate into the decision-making centre of the dominated subsystem through selective military and economic assistance which is anything but altruistic. This has caused the NAM to drift "imperceptibly into the eye of the storm between two rival ideologies." Close economic, military and political ties between a superpower and a small nation normally drags the latter to the orbit of the former. The countries which are so far able to remain outside the rival superpowers' camps are constantly courted by Washington, Moscow and their strong allies by dangling the carrot or display of the stick. Numerous nations have in fact changed their alignments or nonalignment as a result of such external pressures.

External influences on the internal structures of the nonaligned was felt in the early years of the development of the Movement. As has already been mentioned earlier, nonalignment as a foreign policy choice pursued by a handful of Afro-Asian nations in the 1950s played a catalytic role during the critical period in resolving various conflicts as well as in assisting the United Nations to function effectively. But NAM as an institution and as a group in the United Nations has not succeeded much in making any meaningful contribution towards conflict resolution. Voting patterns in the United Nations distinctly indicate that the Nonaligned countries are guided more by other interests and commitments in their voting behaviour than by the principles and programmes they agree upon in NAM conferences and meetings. Till date not an example exists to show that the

Nonaligned countries have demonstrated any semblance of solidarity as an institutionalized group in the matter of conflict resolution. In the early 1960s, serious cleavages among the member states of NAM erupted on issues and developments relating to the Congo Crisis and the membership of Mauritania in the United Nations.

The cleavages subsequently came down to such a level that in contrast to the questions relating to New Delhi's military action in the liberation of Goa and Djakarta's of West Irian, majority of the NAM member nations in 1975 voted for a UN resolution that strongly deplored Indonesia's military action to incorporate the eastern half of the Timor Island (the other half was already part of Indonesia) and called for withdrawal of troops.

It sounds amazing that "what was considered right by NAM in the 1960s became an international wrong in 1975." It is quite understandable that NAM could do little to defuse the situation in Afghanistan or prevent the Falklands War. In these cases a Super Power and a Great Power were directly involved. But the years' long war between the two Nonaligned countries such as Iran and Iraq only mar and not make the Movement.

Furthermore, differences quite unrelated to the principles and practice of nonalignment have begun to crop up in NAM meetings creating an adverse state of affairs. As for instance, at the meeting of the Coordinating Committee of NAM in Colombo in 1978, several Arab states sought to expel Egypt from NAM because it signed a separate peace treaty with Israel.

True it is that taking different stands on issues by NAM nations is a healthy political development towards an international democratization process, but it is hardly democratic when NAM acts and behaves, as a divided house purely because of foreign influence and serves only somebody else's interests.

More damaging to world peace and NAM unity is, however, the bilateral, sub-regional and regional arms race between and among Nonaligned countries. While preaching general and comprehensive disarmament, the developing nations themselves are busy building their arsenals. Military expenditure is increasing at a faster rate in developing countries than in the developed ones. Between 1969 and 1978 the defence

expenditure of developed countries rose by 7.5 per cent, but of developing nations by 61.9 per cent. It is not only the rate of increase but also the proportion of defence outlay to national income that tends to be more in the developing world. Most of the money spent on arms build-up goes to the supplier nations. The gravity of the matter is indicated by the fact that between 1969 and 1978, arms imports by the Third World rose by 231.1 per cent, although the share of the oil producing Middle Eastern countries was quite substantial.

It is no consolation that in absolute terms the Third World spends much less on defence than the First and Second Worlds. Looked at in terms of total socio-economic developmental programmes that suffer due to more defence spending, the trend in the Third World is certainly deplorable. Moreover, buying of weapons from abroad leads to an imitation of the technological fashions set by the Super Powers and their allies. It also leads to a total dependence of the buyer on the seller for sophisticated spare parts as well as for ways and means of manning and maintaining the sophisticated weapons bought. The sellers, on the other hand, see an ever increasing market in the Third World for their weapons and create conditions for more sale by encouraging or supporting regional wars. The paradox is that the Third World countries help in perpetuating the very military order they swear to fight. Finally, the different stages of economic development among the Third World countries have created a situation which has led to various, and often conflicting, perceptions of international financial and monetary systems. Diverse perceptions and conflicting interests have created obstacles for the Nonaligned countries in defining a New International Economic Order. Today one can broadly divide the Third World countries into four categories, such as the Oil Producing Countries (OPC), Advanced Developing Countries (ADC), Middle Developing Countries (MDC) and Less Developing Countries (LDC). The oil-producing countries can now hold hostage the world's entire monetary system. The Less Developing Countries on the other extreme, cannot survive without external assistance. While the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries have not contributed much for the Third World cause, their pricing policies have hit the developing countries the hardest.

MEASURES TO MOVE THE MOVEMENT FORWARD

First of all, it is worth mentioning that one has to live with certain natural and inherent limitations imposed upon an individual or a nation by geography and historical processes. No one can ever change the geographical location of a country or put Poland in the Pacific, nor can one undo history. But within these limitations and giving consideration to the unknown that might happen in the future, nations can always move forward by adjusting to the geographical realities and by learning the lessons from history.

Let There be a Peace Offensive

The peaceful struggle for a generally disarmed world should continue. But the Nonaligned countries should at the same time take serious steps to find out ways and means to reduce their military expenditures and arms race. It is tragic history that not a day has gone by since the end of the Second World War when there was no armed conflict in the developing world. And it is worth remembering that the merchants of death selling sophisticated weapons to warring developing countries have not fought a single war among themselves since 1945.

The first step towards eliminating, or at least reducing preparations for war and putting an end to the existing conflict, has to be a comprehensive **detente** among all the conflicting parties. Conflict among the Third World countries assumes numerous forms, stemming from ethnic, tribal, religious, and national differences to social and economic issues. Conflict is like illness and like any other illness it requires "correct treatment" to cure it. It, therefore, necessitates careful study and research. NAM should try to evolve a conflict-resolving mechanism that can take care of various kinds of conflicts. Since no two types of conflicts are likely to be alike and the methods of resolution can hardly be standardized, attention must be paid to understand the nature and dimensions of any particular conflict. A conflict-resolving mechanism that makes it an article of faith not to take sides or strike bargains but to help the disputants to reach a solution will naturally be more productive, because it is basically dealing with people who are fighting for what they believe to be their rights--personal, ethnic, community or national.

The next step to peace-making through negotiation and mediation should be peace-building through

social, economic political and cultural cooperation among the Nonaligned countries. Economic and political cooperation among the developing nations has had enough attention, but cooperation in the cultural field is yet to draw adequate consideration. The people of nonaligned countries have for long known one another only through Western eyes; the time has come when they should see one another from their own perspectives. Certainly there will not be many people in our own country who can figure out "Yaounde" on the world map, but there are many who can rattle away even the latest fashions in New York or Paris. This is the result of cultural imperialism. That is why Indira Gandhi once suggested: "... rather than unguardedly accepting versions put out by news agencies and publishing houses of the Western countries, we should get to know one another directly and keep in touch to have first hand acquaintance with our respective views."

The spark of wisdom in the suggestion above lies in the fact that it is high time the students, scholars, professionals and experts of the Third World started critically examining the text books and other literature coming from the West for a better understanding and perception of one another's history as well as current developments. The Americans have their own reasons in not highlighting adequately their colonial rule over the Philippines in their text books. The Japanese have of late begun rewriting their history books to omit certain facts, as for example, the "severe oppression" perpetrated by the Imperial Japanese military forces in Southeast Asia during the Second World War. History books of the Soviet Union will not adequately highlight the Czarist colonialism over Central Asian territories that were later annexed by Communist Russia. The point that is made here is that advanced countries have their own utilitarian approaches to writing history or presenting the current developments in their own country as well as elsewhere. As the Nonaligned News Pool has come into existence to tackle part of this problem, the other part should also receive sufficient attention and efforts.

Moreover, with a view to providing additional strength to NAM's move to know one another, it would perhaps not be out of place to suggest holding of NAM festivals in the capitals of nonaligned countries which should also popularize the concept of "peace in the world." In addition, since sports has become an important instrument of furthering international

understanding, "NAM Goodwill Sports Meets" may be organised from time to time.

The emphasis that is being put in this paper on cooperation among NAM member countries is not to suggest another bloc formation by these countries. Rather, cooperation and improved understanding among the developing countries is extremely essential, because most of the armed conflicts that are taking place in the world today are on Third World soil. Success in this field will encourage the "observers" as well as those countries which are trying their best to come out of the "entangling alliances" or uneasy bilateral relationships with big powers to join NAM.

Thus, the peace offensive to be launched should adopt a comprehensive approach embracing peace-making, peace-building and then peace-keeping.

Vox Populi Vox Dei - Let There be a Popular Movement !

It is almost axiomatic that without cooperation or at least non-interference from the big and powerful countries the realization of world peace would be next to impossible. It also seems obvious that the Great Powers, in pursuance of their respective interests, will continue to indulge in activities that might intensify the cold war and make hot wars more imminent. Under such circumstances, the only course open is perhaps initiation of a popular movement. Although the wealthy and the strong leave no stone unturned to bend popular perceptions along their own lines, they do not always succeed. Now and again their activities are turned down by the people, like the recent anti-nuclear movements in Europe and America. And in that perhaps lies the ultimate hope of world peace.

But how many people in the developed countries actually know about NAM and its crusade for world peace, so that their cooperation can be solicited ? When an American would hit upon the word "nonalignment" or "NAM" in the New York Times or Washington Post once in a blue moon and turn on the pages of Encyclopaedia Americana Lexicon Universal Encyclopaedia to know more about it out of curiosity, he would be utterly disappointed to find absolutely nothing about the concept there. A Japanese would meet a similar fate when he opens the English or Japanese version of Kodansha Encyclopaedia of Japan. If an

Uncle Sam or a John Bull happens to pick up The World Book Encyclopaedia, he will carry a totally wrong and agonizingly inadequate impression about NAM and its objectives. The only place where the word "nonaligned" figures in this encyclopaedia is in the very first sentence of the entry "Third World." It reads: "Third World is a name sometimes given to the economically developing and politically neutral countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. These countries are also called neutral nations or nonaligned nations." What a distortion of facts and inadequacy of information.

NAM should make every possible effort to carry the message of world peace to the politically aware and conscious public of the developed world who only can be a powerful check on the policies and programmes of their government (and the few vested interests) which encourage war, hot or cold. Wherever feasible, NAM should also join hands with the peace societies of the developed countries having similar goals.

A CONCLUDING NOTE

Although we have witnessed a myriad minor and major armed conflicts since the last global war came to an end we have also luckily escaped a third world war. Has the NAM not contributed a lot to the avoidance or prevention of a terminal, tragic disaster? Certainly, it has. Even then NAM is all too often criticised for its inability to succeed in certain fields. But the critics - who make noises about NAM's failure - often overlook its success stories. It is not very difficult to fish out the weakness of a movement like NAM. But should one not try to appreciate the imposed as well as inherent limitations under which NAM makes its multi-dimensional operations?

Perhaps what the UN Secretary General remarked about the United Nations on the eve of its fortieth anniversary is squarely fitting to NAM as well. He said:

The United Nations cannot-and was not, intended to solve all the problems of the international community, but it is the best place to avoid the worst and to strive for improvement. And it has made a good start for better, in fact, than is often recognized.

NAM AND WORLD PEACE*

By LOPAMUDRA PATNAIK **

Unto the heaven be peace,
 Unto the sky and the earth be peace;
 Peace be unto the waters,
 Unto the herbs and the trees be peace;
 Unto all the Gods be peace,
 Unto Brahman and unto all be peace,
 Peace, yea, verily peace !
 May that peace be unto me.

Shukta Yajurveda.

The desire for universal peace is ingrained in Indian thought and philosophy. Since Vedic times, such lofty ideals have been sustained and nurtured by the spiritual heritage of India. Time and again, seers have emerged on the Indian scene to perpetuate and propagate such philosophy at home and abroad. Such a messiah of peace was Jawaharlal Nehru, the architect of free India, and one of the founding fathers of the Nonaligned Movement. It was his political sagacity, foresight and humanitarian outlook, which inspired him to put forth his novel concept of nonalignment at a time when the world environment was surcharged with fear, suspicion and tension. By doing this, he renewed the ancient traditions of the motherland and raised the concept to an international Movement with a stirring appeal for mankind.

This Nonaligned Movement or 'NAM' as it is popularly known, will be soon stepping into its silver-jubilee and will be the cynosure of all political pundits. With 25 years of history behind it, a debate will surely ensue on whether NAM has come of age with brighter prospects ahead or has it been tottering on its deathbed all these years and is doomed to a premature death. As it is today, it will be either praised or criticised - it just cannot be ignored for the simple reason that it has managed to survive the test of time on the international arena.

* Third Prize winning essay at the All India Essay Competition organized by the Indian Council for World Affairs in November 1986.

** Ms. Patnaik is a student at Bhubaneshwar.
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After all, it has been trying to light candles instead of resorting to cursing the darkness again and again.

Whether NAM deserves an eulogy or an elegy in context to its role in peace-making is the thousand-dollar question. To answer it we need to clear our mind of all prejudices before starting to trace the evolution of NAM, the course which it has been following in context of the various issues troubling the world, the stumbling blocks in its mission of peace, and the successes and failures it has had to experience.

I

THE post-Second World War period witnessed a turbulent phase in international politics. In the face of a common danger from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, Russia and America with diametrically opposed political and social ideologies had come together, but they could not foster real friendship. As the war came to a close, the differences came to the surface and the erstwhile allies became rivals and the world witnessed the rise of two gigantic power blocs, one headed by America and the other by the Soviet Union. Disputes and tension were fuelled by their mutual distrust and suspicions. The democracies of Western Europe formed NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) under the protective umbrella of the United States. The Soviet Union, in its turn, retaliated by forming the Warsaw Alliance in 1955. Soon NATO was strengthened by SEATO the South East Asian Treaty Organization. Thus, both Super Powers became party to a number of bilateral and multilateral military pacts. Arms race ensued and the international situation became highly disquieting with two hostile camps, each convinced that the existence of the other was a standing menace to itself.

Around the same time, with imperialism on the wane, nations were gaining their independence in Asia and Africa. In Asia, India achieved independence in 1947. The long struggle and the incalculable sacrifices which went into the fight for freedom shaped India's objective to remain free at all costs and to fight colonialism anywhere in the world. In the process of trying to rope in the newly liberated countries into the military alliances sponsored by them, the Super Powers cast their covetous eyes on India. But, India refused to buckle in under their rivalry.

Nehru with his balanced and dispassionate judgement, viewed the world events with concern. He foresaw the danger of independent nations becoming colonies once again; and saw the military pacts as prejudicial to world peace. In his words, "I think that the policy of military alliances of the Cold War has not brought any such results to the world.... In the last few years, the spread of this policy to Asia has not added to the world's security or to any country's security.... It has really come in the way of a country's progress...." The astute statesman that he was, Nehru realized the danger of being drawn into the bloc rivalry and also the dangers of annoying the Great Powers. But still he held his ground and put forth the concept of Nonalignment. India declared, in unequivocal terms, that it would remain neutral in the cold war and refrain from aligning itself with any of the rival power blocs. In Nehru's words - "For too long, we of Asia have been petitioners in Western courts and chancellories. That story must now belong to the past. We propose to stand on our own feet. We do not intend to be playthings of others...."

At first India's foreign policy of Nonalignment was misunderstood and much maligned. However, the clarion call for peace, mutual cooperation and friendship touched the hearts of some countries. As a consequence, the great Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung (Indonesia) was held in 1955. It became the forum for the birth of the Nonaligned Movement, with the basic aim to further the cause of the newly independent countries to develop economically and survive politically in an atmosphere of international peace and mutual cooperation. Five principles called the "panchsheel" were accepted as the basic guidelines for the functioning of the Movement. These were: (i) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity; (ii) Mutual non-aggression; (iii) Mutual non-interference in each other's affairs; (iv) Equality and mutual benefit; and (v) Peaceful co-existence among nations in spite of ideological differences. These principles were an assertion of the will to live in peace for the general good of humanity. Then, a meeting between Nehru, President Tito of Yugoslavia and President Nasser of Egypt in Brioni, Yugoslavia, finally launched the Nonaligned Movement. They decided to have the first Summit meeting of NAM at Belgrade in September 1961, and brought the NAM formally into existence.

Thus, the Nonaligned Movement, born as a third force to play a useful mediatory role against the

background of Super Power rivalry, focused its attention on shaping the nature of international relations. Amidst the cold war and escalating tensions, it kept itself alive to the need of peace and harmony in the world - after all NAM was created with the primary purpose of preventing the new nations from being sucked into the all-consuming cold war of the power blocs. Nonalignment is itself based on the contention that the national interests will be taken care of by itself in a peaceful international order. On this basis, NAM has recognised that peace is a condition of progress and has asserted that the progress resulting from it can be meaningful only if and so long as an all out nuclear war does not occur. Thus, concern for international peace is one of the main objectives of NAM. At the very first NAM Summit at Belgrade, Nehru had laid emphasis on the importance of peace. The Cairo Summit in 1964 had reaffirmed the deep conviction of the Nonaligned community in peaceful co-existence. The Fourth NAM Summit at Algiers in 1973, declared that there could be no lasting peace as long as humanity remains "confronted with colonialism, foreign domination and occupation, neo-colonialism, imperialism and Zionism.... Peace is indivisible. It should not be reduced to a mere shifting of confrontation from one area to another."

However, from the practical point of view, maintenance of world peace is easier said than done. Divergent ideologies, conflicting interests, lust for power and position and other factors make lasting peace a rare phenomenon in the world. Border disputes, political dissensions, religious discord, personal animosities, struggle for supremacy, narrow parochial interests, reckless pursuit of power and position, political bigotry, etc., are usually at the root of all conflicts and confrontations. However, it is true that every one and every nation aspires for peace. If a world-wide plebiscite were taken to elicit the views of people about the desirability of war, there would perhaps not be a single vote cast in favour of it. But the main point is, a mere desire for peace cannot bestow it on humanity ! It is essential to give the desire a concrete shape by following a course of action which can lay the foundation of the edifice of peace. People, as well as nations, have to adopt policies and conduct which can promote the cause of peace. And this is the real snag in the way of peace. People profess to be lovers and advocates of peace, but often their actions and policies run counter to their outward professions.

It is rightly said that "We all desire peace but not the things that make for peace." This is the tragedy which humanity is facing today. For instance, the big powers advocate peace, at the same time they continue their sale of weapons to countries most of whom cannot afford to pay for them, they fight wars by proxy and they back one or the other rival in tension-ridden and highly vulnerable regions. The destructive passions of war do, indeed, dominate over constructive sentiments of peace. And it is a bitter lesson of history that with science and civilization making phenomenal progress day by day, peace and amity are becoming more and more rare.

Against this highly disquieting backdrop, it would not be wrong to say that the Nonaligned Movement has plodded on with its efforts in strengthening peace, diffusing tensions and creating favourable conditions for success in its mission. Concerns and anxieties in the context of peace, disarmament and development, have been the focus of NAM's attentions, whether they be in the Middle-East, Central America, Africa or Asia. As Rajiv Gandhi, while addressing the Ministerial Meeting of the Nonaligned Coordinating Bureau said, "Everything that affects peace, everything that abridges the freedom of nations, everything that aggravates international economic disparities is of concern to the Nonaligned Movement." NAM's stand on the major world crises needs to be examined to enable one to have an evaluation of NAM's role in world peace.

II

We may start with the Middle East which is undergoing a crucial phase in history. With the Iran-Iraq War, the Palestine problem and Arab-Israeli conflicts, the region is volatile enough to light the fuse for World War III. Iran and Iraq went to war in September 1980, and till today they show no signs of restoring peace to their strife-torn region. The war had its genesis in political rivalry and a dispute over the Shatt-al-Arab waterway, which forms the region's economic and strategic life-line. Estimates show that already a million lives have been lost in this senseless war apart from massive destruction of oil-industry infrastructures. With the indirect involvement of the Super Powers, and the obstinacy of both sides in not deciding to settle issues peacefully, the war has thrown the Arab world into disarray.

Several attempts have been made periodically by mediators sponsored not only by the Nonaligned (NAM) bloc but also by the United Nations and the Islamic countries to bring about a settlement. In February 1981, at the Nonaligned Foreign Ministers Conference, the Ministers, laying emphasis on the principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states, called upon both the combatants to cease war and to settle claims peacefully. The Conference also nominated a "fact-finding" team to seek a solution to the Iran-Iraq War. However, no consensus could be reached. The Coordinating Bureau of the Nonaligned Countries had a wrangle over the wording of the appeal to Iran and Iraq to end their fratricidal war and seek a negotiated settlement of their territorial dispute. With Iran insisting that the Movement name and punish the aggressor, and Iraq demanding an unconditional surrender of Iran, no solution could be found. However, the Ministerial Meeting renewed the 1983 Delhi Summit's appeal to both Iran and Iraq to seek fresh negotiations on ending the war. The Iranian Minister objected to the appeal on grounds that it treated the aggressor and aggressed equally. This brings to mind, a similar situation in 1961 when the Belgrade Summit of NAM was being held under the shadow of international tension created by the resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union and then the United States. Nehru had then deprecated both with equal vehemence and had made a fervent appeal to the Soviet Union and the United States to stop their tests, without naming who resumed the tests first and who afterwards. Nehru had maintained that in matters concerning threats to international peace, naming culprits did not lead anywhere, but rather jeopardised the efforts to meet the real threat.

The Palestine problem is another knotty issue. Since the adoption of the Palestine partition plan by the UN General Assembly in November 1947, and the subsequent establishment of the Jewish State of Israel in May 1948, fighting has been going on with intermittent spells of peace between Israel and the Arab States. It is usually commented that, "It was Britain which plunged a dagger into the heart of the Arab world by creating Israel," displacing in the process nearly two million Palestinians who have been condemned to being refugees for centuries together. Political bigotry, born of aggressive nationalism, could not bring about reconciliation between the Arabs and the Jews; now their conflicts have worsened. Now, Israel is America's major ally in West

Asia and the Middle Eastern radical republics have gone in for Soviet arms. To counteract this threat, Israel has built its military strength with US aid and committed blatant aggressions against its Arab neighbours ignoring UN resolutions. However, after the 1967 War several Palestinian nationalist groups emerged. The Palestine Liberation Organisation known as PLO came up as an organised military force, challenging the expansionist ambitions of Israel.

The Palestinians have adopted terrorist tactics and guerilla warfare, focusing world attention on their demands for abolition of Israel and resettlement of Palestinians in their homeland.

The Fourth Algiers NAM Summit in 1973, responded to the call of the Palestinians. In its Political Declaration, it demanded that the national rights of the Palestinians must be restored and asked its member states to put pressure on big powers and take action in the UNO to achieve this objective. It appealed to the US to stop supplying arms to Israel and asked its members to boycott Israel. NAM's stand was strengthened, when in 1974 the UN affirmed the right of Palestinians to self-determination. But the clashes continue. Israel continues attacking other Arab countries. The PLO leader, Yasser Arafat is recognised as the international symbol of Palestinian resistance.

Bombing of the PLO headquarters in Tunisia by Israel in September 1985 was condemned by many, except the US which defended the Israeli action calling it a "legitimate response to terrorism." NAM, championing the cause of freedom and liberty, condemned Israel for its "serious act of aggression" at its Foreign Ministers Meeting on 2 October 1985. It called for an emergency session of the UN Security Council to impose sanctions against Israel. A communique adopted by the Ministers voiced "indignation and grave concern" over the attacks. Following a fresh wave of violence, India as NAM Chairman, has urged an early international peace conference to find a just solution to the situation in West Asia, and it has asserted that there can be no peace in West Asia without the PLO being involved in the peace negotiations.

Lebanon, lying along the Mediterranean coast, is also a victim of Israeli aggression; Israeli raids into Lebanese territory every now and then to counter the tactics of its enemies and internal wranglings

between the Maronite Christians and Muslims has reduced the republic almost to ruins. In accordance with the Cairo Agreement of November 1969, the presence of Palestinian fighters in Lebanon and their operations against Israel was legitimised, but the Israelis continue to drive them out with their superior military strength. Lebanon is haplessly torn with strife in all quarters.

NAM deplored the use of force against the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. It appealed to Israel to abide by the UN Charter. In its Fourth Summit at Algiers in 1973, it warned Israel that its persistent defiance of the international community would lead the Nonaligned to take individual and collective measures against it. The Colombo Conference of NAM in 1976 reiterated that Israel should be persuaded to honour the UN resolutions, but the appeal fell on deaf ears. Again in 1978 and in 1982, Israel struck across Lebanon, ostensibly in self-defence occupying large areas in the South. The UN Security Council passed a resolution branding Israel as an aggressor and provided sanctions against it, but the move was vetoed by America on the plea that it would further aggravate the situation. Obviously, the US veto was another instance of the UN being misused to advance cold war interests. Emboldened by this, Israel continues its brutal and naked aggression against its neighbours.

Closely allied with the problem of colonialism is the more dangerous doctrine of racial discrimination. South Africa is still suffering from the nefarious racial policy of apartheid. Ruthless suppression, discrimination, institutionalised exploitation and oppression of the blacks by the minority whites are common features. Consequently, there has been large-scale riotings and conflicts in South Africa. As one writer has remarked, "How can there be peace and amity when a whole section of people of a sub-continent is reduced to the position of hewers of wood and drawers of water ?"

Nothing can be a more brazen denial of justice and equality than such a policy. From its very first summit at Belgrade in 1961, NAM has vigorously condemned the "inhuman policy of racialism pursued by South Africa." It has expressed support to the armed struggle going on for its eradication. Even the UN has recognised the legitimacy of the anti-apartheid struggle and has drawn up programmes of action designed to eliminate this obnoxious policy. In face of

world condemnation, the US and its allies continue to use their vote power to rule out the application of mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa. However, recently the United States has taken a firmer stand. This hardening of world opinion will be an encouragement to the natives of South Africa to continue their struggle and to fight for their human rights. As Rajiv Gandhi, the current Chairman of NAM, said, "India and the rest of the nonaligned world would spare no effort to bring the racist regime in South Africa to an end." NAM has also urged for the unconditional release of prisoners who have been imprisoned for their opposition to apartheid, including Nelson Mandela, the African National Congress leader.

Related to the policy of apartheid, South Africa's domination over the black natives of Namibia, formerly known as South West Africa, is also endangering international peace. Namibia is supposed to be an independent country but it is no better than a colony or a dependency governed by Whites from Pretoria - the South African capital. For years, the Namibian people have been struggling against heavy odds to shake off the fetters but they have not yet been successful.

NAM champions the cause of freedom and liberty of the Namibian people. While addressing the Ministerial Meeting of the Nonaligned Coordinating Bureau at New Delhi on 19 April 1985, Rajiv Gandhi said that, the Nonaligned community had to express its solidarity with Namibia, "that brave nation yearning for freedom." "For all of us in the NAM," he added, "the historical battle against colonialism continues." The announcement of an "interim government" in Namibia in June 1985, further aggravated the situation. At a special meeting of the UN Council for Namibia, India as NAM Chairman voiced the "grave concern and profound indignation" over the formal installation by South Africa of a "puppet" administration in Namibia. NAM recognised the South West African Peoples' Organisation (SWAPO) as the sole, authentic representative of the Namibian people and proposed that SWAPO must secure greater assistance in its struggle. In fact, India has accorded SWAPO full diplomatic status in New Delhi. Again in November 1985, in the UN Security Council the Nonaligned nations moved a resolution to impose "mandatory selective sanctions" against the Pretoria regime. However, it was vetoed by Britain and the US, and India "profoundly regretted" the twin veto which came after a three day

debate in which most speakers had condemned Pretoria for having blocked Namibia's independence for almost two decades.

On 19 May 1986, South Africa launched aggressive attacks against three Frontline States - Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana the targets being the guerilla facilities and the offices of the African National Congress. This has been widely condemned; NAM has called on the UN Security Council to deal "promptly and effectively" with the serious threat to peace and security posed by these dastardly acts of unprovoked aggression. The Movement's Coordinating Bureau, reiterating its stand on sanctions against South Africa, condemned the policies of "constructive engagement" and active collaboration with the apartheid regime, followed by certain Western and other states with vested interests. The Bureau also expressed concern and indignation at the covert and overt attempts to destabilise and subvert legitimate governments and the increasing acts of intervention and interference in the internal affairs of the Nonaligned and developing countries.

Central Asia has also been in ferment for some time. The Afghanistan Crisis began with the entry of Soviet troops in December 1979 under the pretext of the Treaty of Friendship signed in December 1978. The Russians are in control of the country, but still there are flare-ups with the rebels who are active in certain pockets of the area. Soviet Union contends that the United States, by aiding the rebels, desires to prolong the crisis as a part of its overall Third World strategy. In its turn, America has demanded an unconditional and complete Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan as a prelude to any negotiations. But, whatever the motivations of the two Super Powers may be, they seem to be playing the game of power politics to the disadvantage of the small countries.

Since 1979, efforts have been made by both Western and Afro-Asian countries to persuade Moscow to withdraw from Afghan territory. In November 1982, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan and reaffirmed the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of Government, "free from outside interference, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever." The Nonaligned Foreign Ministers' Conference in 1981, reiterated UN's stand. It urged a political settlement that would ensure the Afghan peoples' right to determine their own destiny.

Recently addressing the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of Nonaligned Nations in New Delhi, the Pakistan Foreign Minister said that in the Geneva talks, three of the four instruments which were to comprise a political settlement had been virtually finalised. They were an end to interference from abroad, an international guarantee of Afghan neutrality and an arrangement that would allow refugees to return. He also said, "We hope that the fourth and last instrument relating to the withdrawal of foreign troops would be substantively addressed and finalised" at the forthcoming talks. He described the continuing military intervention by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan as a direct challenge to the Nonaligned Movement. Thus, NAM in its attempts has urged the main parties of the dispute to discuss the issue directly and to settle the problem amicably.

It is no secret however, that the Afghanistan problem is being exploited by Pakistan. In order to counter the supposed threat to its safety, Islamabad is securing massive quantities of armaments from the United States and is virtually turning into an American military base threatening peace and stability in Asia. NAM has conveyed its protest against this literal "arming" of Pakistan.

Tension has also been brewing in Vietnam and Kampuchea in Southeast Asia. After the split-up of Vietnam, cold war politics stepped in and the Vietnam War took a large toll of lives. Both Russia and China helped the Communists, while the non-communist forces were supported by France and the United States. In 1975, the surrender of South Vietnam ended three decades of war; and in 1976 the country was officially united as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, with Hanoi as capital. The United States' setback in Vietnam was taken very poorly by it and skirmishes still occur. NAM has supported the people of Vietnam. It has asked both Vietnam and the United States to abide by the Paris Peace Accord signed by them in 1973.

The Kampuchean issue is much more tangled. Kampuchea, originally called Cambodia and for some time as Khmer Republic, has had to suffer a lot on account of its geographical location. Its sovereignty has been attacked a number of times. After its independence in 1955, Prince Norodom Sihanouk established his supremacy and adopted the policy of nonalignment. During the Vietnam War, anti-US revolutionary forces struck throughout Indo-China. NAM has an anti-imperialist content. At the Algiers Summit in 1973, it

recognised the exiled government of Prince Sihanouk as the only legal and rightful government of Cambodia and asked all its member states to establish relations with it. Since then various powers have become active, making Kampuchea the centre of rival attentions. Recently, Vietnam has announced a unilateral decision to completely withdraw its troops from Kampuchea by 1990. NAM feels that regional issues, like the Kampuchean one should be resolved by the countries involved through negotiations and not by exchange of invectives or by force. There have been clashes on the China-Vietnam border and Thai-Kampuchean frontiers. NAM has expressed its concern at these developments and has called for expediting the process of a peaceful settlement.

Chaotic developments in Central America have lately been of much concern. The confrontation between Nicaragua and the United States is threatening stability and peace in the region. In El Salvador, the US administration is providing protection to the rightist regime and has accused the Nicaraguan Government led by the Sandinists, of providing assistance and training to guerilla forces against El Salvador.

Early in 1983, the Nonaligned Nations Coordinating Bureau met in Managua (Nicaragua), to discuss the complications arising from the confrontation. Nicaragua charged America for its "interventionism" and called for a severe censure of Reagan's policies in the region, designed to overthrow the leftist regime in Nicaragua. Though the Reagan Administration denied the allegations, it made clear that there could be no improvement in US-Nicaragua relations as long as Nicaragua continued to "support the guerilla movement" in El Salvador. Recent reports of the US openly arming the rebels in Nicaragua have been widely condemned. NAM has expressed concern at these developments, and conveyed its distress at the continuing American policies in Central America. It has also advised Nicaragua and the United States to negotiate for a peaceful settlement.

Tension has also been mounting on the Mediterranean coast. Since the assumption of power by Colonel Gaddafi as the country's military ruler, there has been an undercurrent of tension and verbal battle between the United States and Libya. The cause of dispute now is the territorial water limit claimed by Libya, but contested by the US. Libya maintains that the entire Gulf of Sidra falls within its sovereign territorial domain, and Gaddafi has drawn "a line of

"death" above the Gulf's entrance below which the US planes and ships are subject to attack. On the other hand, the US is equally determined to enforce the 12-mile limit and has carried out major manoeuvres in the area. On 15 April 1986, US launched a major offensive against Libya and defended it as an attempt to put down international terrorism, as it believes that Libya is the principal centre of terrorism and Col. Gaddafi is the evil genius behind the menace. This has been widely condemned. The whole of the Nonaligned world is up in arms against the US as it feels that the latter is championing the wrong cause in sponsoring terrorism. At an emergency session of the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau, NAM expressed its outrage against what it perceived as an unnecessary show of muscle power over a relatively defenceless Third World country. Obviously, it was like swatting a fly with a sledgehammer. The Nonaligned countries tabled a resolution in the UN Security Council, condemning America's air attack on Libya as a violation of the UN Charter and called on the United States to refrain forthwith from any attack as counter-terrorism cannot bring peace. It also requested the UN Secretary General to take all appropriate steps to restore and ensure peace in the region. As a demonstration of NAM's solidarity with Libya, the Coordinating Bureau sent a six member delegation headed by the then Indian External Affairs Minister, B.R. Bhagat, to meet Col. Gaddafi and then the UN Secretary General to hand over the resolution on Libya. The delegation assured Libya of full support as well as "meaningful" diplomatic initiatives to meet the situation.

Another area of the world where the security environment has steadily deteriorated is the Indian Ocean region. It has become the battleground of big power rivalry, where military build-up is escalating at a feverish pace endangering the security of the littoral and hinterland states of the Ocean. After World War II, USA took the responsibility of protecting Western interests in the area by making Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean its principal naval base. Over the years, its presence in the Ocean has grown steadily. The Soviet Union, not to be left behind, has also built its military presence in the Indian Ocean. This race for military bases or ports continues.

'Militarisation' of the Indian Ocean is resented most by the Asian and Pacific nations. Even though

the UN has declared the Indian Ocean a 'zone of peace' since 1971, there has been no significant demilitarisation in the region. At its Colombo Summit in 1976, NAM took a serious note of "the cold war emerging out of the US base in Diego Garcia." NAM has proposed an international conference on the Indian Ocean which could force the big powers to implement the UN declaration. However, led by the United States, the Western Powers contend that with the Afghanistan situation still unresolved the climate is not conducive for convening the proposed conference. In February 1981, NAM again expressed concern at its Foreign Ministers' Conference. It called on the Super Powers to keep their hands off the Indian Ocean, and has laid great hope in the proposed international conference on the Ocean. And this needs to be successful, as in the words of an expert - "the developments taking place in the Ocean will determine the future of Asia and the world, if not within this century early in the next. The question of India's security is linked to the question of what happens in the Ocean."

Perhaps, the greatest stumbling block in the way of international harmony and peace is the armaments race. Triggered off by the Cold War it has been escalating with stock-piling of more and more weapons day by day. Estimates show that such is the arms build up level in the world, that it is becoming a danger to humanity. It is not certain what the stock-piles with the United States and Soviet Union amount to, but it is generally conceded that the two have enough potential not only to destroy each other but most of the world several times over, spelling the ruin of mankind and all that is dear to it. Since the harnessing of nuclear energy for destructive purposes the danger has increased manifold, and the Super Powers have even started talking glibly about 'limited nuclear wars' and so on. But it is a mistaken concept that 'preparedness is the best preventive of war,' for if men spend money and labour to invent and manufacture more and more highly sophisticated weapons, they certainly do so with the consciousness that these may have to be used. Apart from threatening the security environment of the world, the armaments race has also had an unhealthy impact on the Third World. Militarisation policies stagnate the socio-economic development, which is so essential to Third World countries. And nothing is more suicidal and fallacious than to believe that the arms will terrorise the world into peace.

Thus the need for disarmament and an end to the highly dangerous armaments race has been the priority of all peace-loving nations and organisations. Disarmament conferences and Super Power summits are being held under the auspices of the United Nations and other organisations, but they have failed to produce any concrete result. NAM has repeatedly expressed its concern and anxiety over this issue. A war in any form would be the very negation of what it is fighting for. In an actual war, as Nehru had pointed out, Nonaligned nations will have no option but to join it on the side which they jointly or individually consider as just. In other words, Nonalignment can exist only so long as the Third World War does not break out. The prevention of a war is thus, not only the objective of NAM, but also the very condition of its survival. In September 1985, after the Luanda Conference, the Nonaligned ministers stressed the urgent need to arrest the drift to war, and a comprehensive treaty on the prohibition of all types of nuclear tests in any medium for all times. They blamed bloc rivalries aimed at extension of spheres of influence for the worsening international situation. Also on 19 April 1986, nonaligned nations appealed to the Big Powers to stop nuclear explosions, to put a freeze on strategic offensive arms and a moratorium on the development of space weapons. Rajiv Gandhi, addressing the Ministerial Meeting of the Nonaligned Coordinating Bureau at New Delhi said, "Death is pursued in the name of life. The very existence of humanity is entrapped in the nose-cones of these frightful paraphernalia of destruction. This is what makes disarmament the great imperative of our day. That is why the Nonaligned Movement lends its full backing to any initiative that promotes disarmament."

International terrorism, now on the increase, is yet another major challenge to the world and all countries, big or small including the Big Powers, are directly or indirectly affected by this growing menace. Shooting, bombing, blackmail, aircraft hijackings, assassinations, sabotage and other ruthless tactics are employed by the terrorists to compel the world to listen to their demands, and their victims are usually innocent people. Even more alarming is the emergence of state-sponsored terrorism. A tragic instance of this is the dastardly attack by Israeli bombers, with American support, on Tunisian territory at the end of September 1985 which took a toll of about 70 lives, including innocent women and children. Another state which indulges in terrorism and atrocious acts of brutality is South Africa.

NAM has vehemently condemned terrorism in unequivocal terms. The Ministerial Meeting of the Nonaligned Coordinating Bureau has given a call for coordinated effort to combat terrorism in all forms, whether organised by individuals, groups or states.

III

After studying NAM's stand on the various issues confronting the world, it would not be presumptuous to say that NAM has been contributing to the cause of peace in its own small way and according to its own judgement arrived at by consensus. Certainly, it has not deviated from its mission by fuelling conflicts in any part of the world, though it is true that it has not met with much success. But this can be said to be true also for the United Nations, which was hailed at its inception as a great instrument of peace. It is evident therefore, that every organisation has to take in its stride both failures and success. After all, it is better to have fought and lost, than not to have fought at all. Thus, while highlighting NAM's failures and the grave defects which it suffers from and which cause misgivings for the future, we need to properly appreciate its role in peace-making.

Since 1961, the face and character of NAM has undergone subtle but significant changes. If the original architects of NAM - Nehru, Nasser and Tito - were around today, they would find that their concept of nonalignment has watered down rather than being tightened up; and they would be certainly astonished at the spatial expansion of their creation. From about 25 members at its first summit, seven summits later, NAM has drawn almost 100 member nations plus some 40 observers and guests representing four continents. Size and numbers may have military significance, but in the case of NAM, its over-size as in the case of a human being is proving to be its major and worst handicap. There is no ideological inspiration or loyalty which binds these hundred-odd nations firmly and moves them towards united and determined action. It is unable to cope with critical problems and issues that cry out for urgent solutions. "What once used to be a platform of like-minded nations, bloodbrothers in the mighty anti-imperialist struggles and national liberation movements of the '50s and '60s, has now become a fat and flabby and fractious extended family of cousins," - is how one writer puts it. Its heterogeneity has made it vulnerable to outside pressures. In fact, during Cuba's Chairmanship,

NAM was criticised for veering away from "authentic nonalignment." Radical members led by Cuba had tried to shift the organisation to a pro-Moscow stance, arguing that the Soviet Union was the "natural ally" of the Nonaligned countries. However the move was defeated by the personal intervention of Tito.

Former Foreign Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, feels strongly that "the criteria for membership has become diluted." NAM has been therefore, likened to an "open house" to which any and everyone is always welcome. Thus, Egypt and Pakistan with their pro-US tilt, Vietnam and Cuba with their pro-Soviet tilt are as much non-aligned as India or Yugoslavia. Rumania, Spain and Portugal are guests and the Philippines is an observer with practically the same privileges as the members regardless of their connections with the NATO or the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, it has become impossible for the Nonaligned countries to stick to any ideology or even principles. They do not have any clear-cut objectives or goals except the preservation of world peace. Clearly, to keep a herd of 100 nations equidistant from the Soviet Union and the United States is not the role of nonalignment. That role as visualised by NAM's founding fathers was something very different : to strengthen the independence of the developing nations, enable them to develop fast according to their own choice and to resist pressures from the power blocs to get involved in their confrontation.

Within the organisation itself, NAM is riddled with bilateral quarrels, open wars and covert as well as overt interference in the internal affairs of others. For instance, India and Pakistan are still confronted over the Kashmir issue, and Iran and Iraq are engaged in a bloody war. Moreover, there are sub-groups within the Movement with their local or regional interests which run counter to the professed goal of world peace. Thus, Syria and Libya are more concerned with overthrowing Israel than anything else, Cuba and Chile are interested in using the NAM umbrella for their anti-US protests, the goals of OPEC, ASEAN, and OAU are different although they all belong to the Nonaligned community. In short, NAM is said to be a "house divided against itself." As K.P. Mishra says: "There is a danger of nonalignment becoming technical or formal. Some countries want to keep one foot in nonalignment and one foot in alignment, and this might be a more dangerous form of alignment." Controversies and bitter wranglings over major issues continue. For instance, they could not agree to who

should represent Kampuchea, whether Egypt should be expelled or not. Similarly, NAM could not formulate an acceptable policy on Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and neither on the Iran-Iraq War. It is this basic disagreement and antagonism of the Nonaligned nations which is taken advantage of by the Big Powers. If the two Koreas, two Vietnams and the small nations of West Asia had resolved to live in peace as good neighbours, they would not have become the pawns of cold war politics. To put it bluntly, NAM is now "riddled with international power politics." It has been reduced to a mere "talking shop" in the words of a critic, who says, "after exhausting their lungs and straining their throats, the delegates adjourn to continue the same exercise again at a future date...."

However, NAM has helped in hastening the process of decolonisation in various parts of the world, especially on the African continent, but, in its place neo-colonialism has raised its head. The Moscow Test Ban Treaty of 1963 was mainly the effort of nonaligned states, and it had heralded the East-West detente which however, proved to be temporary. Through the efforts of the Nonaligned community, conditions threatening another war have been diffused, particularly on the Korea and Indo-China issue. At the same time, it is to be accepted that Nonalignment could not prevent the Chinese aggression of 1962, nor the Pakistani aggression of 1965 and 1971 against India. However, it is through NAM that the concepts of Nonalignment and peaceful co-existence have acquired world-wide significance. In fact, at the Helsinki Conference it was because of NAM's efforts that NATO and Warsaw countries had subscribed to this philosophy resulting in detente. Thus, NAM has the potential to give a new direction to international politics.

With over 100 members, diverse interests, strong sub-group loyalties and Super Power affinities, NAM has to retain its validity, notwithstanding the inherent weaknesses, as it is as much relevant today as it was in its yester years. Its very rationale and foundation - the preservation of world peace - has imparted a resilience to the Movement to survive amidst exposure to Super Power pressures, economic domination, neo-colonialism, bilateral quarrels and ideological overtones and to achieve more success than any other comparable military, economic or political alliance. It has to survive for tomorrow, because today ^C the Super Powers are again in confrontation.

ion, the armaments race is on again with infinitely more destructive potential, Cold War has resurfaced and peaceful co-existence is threatened. The circumstances which warranted the Movement have reappeared with a greater danger and they are likely to prevail in the future also. So, it has to keep up the name of its founding fathers and rise to the fore with determination and clarity of thought to achieve its aim. Nonalignment has to prove Nehru's authenticity of vision and create a new international order. As Swami Vivekananda had put it, "Arise, awake and stop not, till the goal is reached."

Thus, with some reorganisation and reorientation NAM has to strive forward. Its basic task would be to get rid of dissenting factors and concentrate on vital, pivotal issues concerning every member of the community. Priorities should be set right. Global arms race and the global economic crisis should be challenged first. Economic inequalities which bring the Nonaligned nations under the spell of Big Power rivalry should be sorted out. So long as the Nonaligned world remains hungry, backward, under-developed and dependent on others for food, energy and other needs, NAM cannot contribute much to world peace. To be heard, one should speak from a position of strength. Pious appeals will only fall on deaf ears. The Nonaligned developing nations should, therefore, move into an era of active economic cooperation for mutual benefit and growth, and they should align themselves and protect themselves from the exploitation of Big Powers. To be truly Nonaligned, self-reliance is very essential. Only then NAM can help restore world peace and equilibrium, by tackling the problems in one voice.

As an eminent writer has put it: "For all its inner contradictions and its outer flabbiness, NAM represents one of the most durable, non-military groupings in history. It is a movement that has not just survived the tests of time intact but has blossomed into one of the most potentially powerful global forces." It is to be seen how NAM fares in the future and how effective a role it plays in the management of world affairs and in establishing world peace. It is to be hoped that the next Summit at Zimbabwe (in Africa) in September 1986, under the Chairmanship of Robert Mugabe will give a new impetus to peace efforts in the world. Hope springs eternal in the human breast, and as Collins has said, "Peace rules the day where reason rules the mind."

BOOK REVIEWS

FEDERALISM IN INDIA : STEPS TO THE FUTURE

A Review Article *

GENERAL PROBLEMS

IF there is one country in the World that really needs a functionally effective federal political system - with its vast landmass, growing population and wide diversities of language, religion, race and way of life - that is India.

In some ways, the present Indian federal scheme was launched in 1950 on the basis of certain wrong assumptions. Admittedly, the partition of the country had influenced the constitution-makers to frame a constitution that was biased towards a strong centre designed to keep the newborn nation united. The fact that the Indian constitution-makers deliberately opted for a "Union of States" and not "Federation of States" is indicative of their attempt to establish an indestructible union. Even otherwise, there was evidently a belief among them that the Congress Party will always remain the dominant political party at the Centre as well as at the states' level. Thus, the Indian Federation started operating in the post-independence period with the dominating influence of the strong Congress Party.

In an important sense, the Indian Republic started with an inherent contradiction. While the Indian Constitution established a federal political system, all the political parties (in particular the Congress) that were operating in the system were unitary and highly centralised. This is an important element to comprehend the various ramifications of the Indian Federation in operation.

The results of the 1967 General Elections started a process of rethinking regarding India's federal structure. Today almost half the constituent states in India are under non-Congress rule. It is only understandable that different kinds of issues should

* Durga Das Basu : Comparative Federalism, Prentice Hall, New Delhi, 1987, p.642, Rs. 200. Tarun Chandra Bose (Ed.): Indian Federalism: Problems and Issues, K.P. Bagchi & Co, Calcutta, 1981, Rs. 120.

be raised or questions asked about the more desirable pattern of political and economic relationship between the states and the Centre.

A federation is functionally effective so long as it facilitates the building of a nation with two levels of governments (central and state) having independent spheres of jurisdiction, playing a co-ordinating and collaborative role in achieving common national objectives. Some of the conceivable objectives in this context are:

- i) To carry on unitedly the task of national political and economic development;
- ii) To blend national aspirations with local initiatives;
- iii) To operate a federal system based on decentralised political power coupled with evenly balanced economic capability;
- iv) To accommodate the political/economic demands at the various levels - states/sub-states, or, say, Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes; and
- v) To expedite the ongoing process of national integration.

An important element of the Indian Federation has been the Planning Commission, which was set up through a Central Cabinet decision. In operation it has functioned more as an appendage of the Centre. This agency envisaged the working of a unified economic system and underlined the supreme goal of national development. Aside from anything else, it was conceived as an instrument to ensure central control in national economic activities. It must be admitted however, unlike the Soviet Gosplan, the Indian Planning Commission is a recommendatory body.

The problem of the Indian Federation was complicated by the growing sub-national level movements, inter-state river/water/border issues and also the ever present common national language issue.

Admittedly, federation is perceived as an on-going accommodative political process. However, the Indian Federation has not fully conformed to that desirable norm. In view of its slow adaptive and accommodative capability in the face of varied challenges: language/ethnicity/economic disparity and

population explosion, etc., the Indian Federation has failed to attain its expected level of efficiency. It would appear, the level of economic development is the key to the understanding of how and why the Centre and the States are often involved in a collision course. Since the level of national economic development is not adequate, bulk of the States' economic demands on the Centre remain unfulfilled. If the Centre faces the demand for more funds from states, the latter is also faced with the same situation vis-a-vis the local governments.

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS: A SURVEY

It would be useful to understand the problems of federation from a comparative perspective. In many ways, Comparative Federalism by Dr Durga Das Basu provides a broad reference frame for comprehending the legal ramifications of the problems of federalism in general and that of India in particular. The book under review is an analytical study of the general legal principles that evolved in the operations of the various federal constitutions of the World. These principles are enforceable through the process of judicial review in the various federal political systems.

The author is a leading exponent of constitutional law. In writing this book, Basu has used his long years of understanding about the operations of constitutions. He studies constitutions from the standpoint of structural legal terms. Obviously, this approach is different from that of a political scientist who is interested in the actual functional traits of the constitutions along with their stipulated structural facets.

In view of his legal-constitutional background, Basu in his present study focuses on the proper legal interpretations of the federal constitutional texts from a comparative standpoint. The basic purpose of the author in this endeavour is to produce a reference guide to different federal constitutions.

Comparative Federalism is divided into three parts, structured around sixteen chapters. Part one of the book deals with general principles; part two handles Centre-state relations; and part three studies relations between various constituent states within a federation.

Some of the specific issues discussed among

others include: origin and nature of federalism, Indian Federation in particular; territory of a federation; citizenship; distribution of legislative powers; impact of different kinds of emergency upon federal powers; agencies of coordination and cooperation; settlement of union-state disputes; inter-state comity.

The present volume is part of a comparative constitutional law series. Students as well as practitioners of constitutional law who are interested in the working of a federal political system would be benefited.

There are no absolute standards of federalism. Indeed, there are always local variations. Nonetheless, a constitution may be called federal, if it stipulates legal separation of powers between the central government and the constituent state governments that may be periodically called for interpretation through the judicial process.

Looking at the subject of federalism, it would be quite reasonable to call the constitutions of India, USA, Switzerland, Australia, Canada and West Germany as being federal. However, while going through the volume, it becomes quite obvious that in comparative terms each of the above federal countries exhibit certain local - both operational as well as structural - variations. Basu however, does not go into the functional facets of federalism.

In an important sense, Basu's study has been not only comprehensive but also distinctive. The book studies the general legal principles. Anyone interested in constitutional law will find it very rewarding. In particular, any specialist (on Indian politics) who is interested in the issues and challenges before the Indian federal polity will find Basu's study a meaningful reference frame.

ISSUES BEFORE THE INDIAN FEDERATION

In contrast to Basu's general study on federal constitutions, Indian Federalism - Problems and Issues edited by Professor Tarun Bose, is an elaborate study on the various social, political and economic ramifications of the Indian Federation in operation. This edited volume is comprised of papers presented by various political analysts in a national seminar on the subject of Indian Federation held under the auspices of the Political Science Department, Univer-

sity of Kalyani (West Bengal). This seminar was organised to examine and analyse the political and economic dynamics of the Indian Federation in operation, with a view to highlight some of the prerequisites for its effectiveness towards the pursuit of national goals.

Given this broad reference frame sixteen contributors handled the problem and issues of Indian Federation from the standpoint of their respective fields of specialisation in politics. While some of the contributions competently went deep into the functional and structural facets of Indian federalism, others made propositions regarding the urgent need for working out a functionally meaningful political system in tune with basic national objectives.

A number of papers dealt with Centre-state relations. Dr. S.R. Maheswari, in his provocative presentation, asserts that the Indian Constitution has been strongly influenced by the unitary bias of the Government of India Act of 1935. In fact, the Centre-state relations have always contained the seeds of conflict. Thus, if the states have been entrusted with the task of development, the resource-yielding power has been essentially bestowed to the Centre. He contends, to the extent that centre-state relationship is basically a functional interaction between the Centre and states, the matter calls for the evolution of a sound political process.

Professor Nirmal Bose's paper studies the states' (in particular West Bengal's) demand for more political and financial power from the Centre. In this context, he suggests certain remedies for financial problems.

Sanjay Prakash Nanda focuses on the centre-state relations from a historical and economic perspective. He contends that the concept of federal structure in India is relatively of recent origin. As such it has never been a true federation. Nanda calls for rethinking in this regard in view of the emergence of problems of economic power of the states.

Amartya Mukhopadhyay takes a different perspective in his analysis of the interaction between the leaderships of the Centre and the states within the Indian Federation. He submits that the central government's policy since India's independence has never been conducive to the development of autonomous political leadership within states. The author does not consider that regionalism is contrary to the develop-

ment of a stable Indian federation. In fact, he submits that it is only nationally committed regional political parties which have succeeded in compelling central leadership to reconsider the question of centre-state relations.

Dealing with "The Centralizing and Federalising Tendencies in the Indian Polity Since the mid-1960s," Sanjeeb Mukherjee provides a systematic view of the operational linkages of the class forces within the Indian political system since the mid-1960s, and underscores their bearing on the tendency towards greater centralization. He points that despite periodic attempts it has not been possible to establish centralized rule because of the imbalance of the class forces caused by the rise of new dominant classes that posed sharp challenge against the predominant big business class. We are, however, not much enlightened by the author's logic. He seems to have made it more complicated, rather than clarify.

Dr Bharati Roy's paper deals with the growing fiscal imbalance in the Centre-state financial relations. She submits that to the extent that the states have no say in working out the basis of allocating financial resources to them by the Centre it caused increasing dependence of the former on the latter.

Far more cogent has been the contention of Professor Samirendranath Ray regarding the relevance of decentralisation. He advocates decentralisation from the standpoint of development. He calls for the restructuring of the distribution of financial power as a prerequisite for the cause of planned development.

Prasanta Sen Gupta deals with the "myriad problems" of the Indian Federation in his paper on "Inter-Governmental Relationship: Crisis in Federal Spirit." In winding up his paper, he submits that regional interests have to be articulated by the state governments so that the question of national integration and economic growth can be properly handled by the central government.

In another paper, Dr Amal Ray very competently traces the history of the federalizing process in India. Ray contends that the existence of a composite middle class elite provides the main support base of the Indian federal system. There is no need to over-tress this point. Indeed, from time to time there have been regional as well as linguistic/ethnic/religious lines which put tremendous stress and strain on

the Indian Polity. The cases of movements such as Khalistan, Gorkhaland, Jharkhand, etc., are worth mentioning. However, Ray has a point when he says that "the relatively smooth operation of India's delicately balanced federal constitution may have, in part, been due to the one-party dominant system." But more importantly it has been due to the persistence of the "consensus system" within the Indian Federation, as Ray rightly submits.

Starting from a different perspective Dr Rakhari Chatterjee puts forward the proposition that "the existence of a non-centralized party system is the most crucial of the ways in which non-centralization can be maintained in a federation." However he goes on to add that non-centralization was maintained in India under one-party dominance during the two phases, which he calls- "the period of centralizations and convergence (1951-63)," and "the period of divergence (1963-69). This latter period was followed by the phase of a kind of "personalistic centralization" of the Congress Party since 1969. This phase had in its turn generated a process of deinstitutionalization and ad-hocism which eroded the autonomy of the state, the basis of a federal structure. What are then the remedies for countering this process? Chatterjee submits that the multiplicity of parties and the emergence of regional political parties, having a national outlook, are some of the solutions that could counter the problems generated by centralization. But the point is: To what extent is it possible to engineer political development ? For one thing, the best of federal constitutions cannot ensure the effective operation of a federal polity. And for another, while it is easy to theoretically design a party system conducive to the federal process, it is difficult to operationalize that design.

In a relative reference frame, Dr Balveer Arora in his contribution—"Party System and Federal Structures in India: Linkages and Issues"—raises some interesting points. Arora points out that the one-party-dominance political system has not been successfully maintaining non-centralization. In the absence of an adequate institutional framework to secure the cooperation of states there has been heavy reliance on party channels for federal coordination. This has been a marked feature not only during Congress rule but also during the Janata interlude. Arora has made a very pertinent observation regarding the working of the Indian Federation. Even though, the Indian political system is marked by one party dominance, the

federalizing process is sustained through continuous bargaining between the central unit and the constituent (states) units of the Congress Party.

In his paper on "Federalism and All India Services," Dr Ashok Kumar Mukhopadhyay contends that the all India Services were created for efficient implementation of nation-building policies. Mukhopadhyay calls for the creation of separate services for the Centre, the states and the public undertakings.

Dr B.B. Jena pleads for the restructuring of the Seventh Schedule because of its heavy bias in favour of the Centre. While suggesting some of the spheres from which states could secure a share of the resources mobilized by the Centre, he emphasises the need for setting up a uniform civil service with a single pay structure and common service conditions. It would appear from Jena's contention that the problems faced by the Indian Federation are not that intractable; and if certain structural adjustments are made, this federation could be made operationally effective.

The volume concludes with 3 papers dealing with the problems of separatism in Northeast India and Punjab. Dr B. Pakem highlights how imbalanced economic development in Northeast India since independence produced regional social tensions. These social tensions in turn generated a sub-nationalism that posed a challenge to the process of democratisation in Northeast India. Pakem contends that primordial loyalties of the people in the region prevented them from joining the national mainstream. Pakem's contribution is insightful, it provides a perceptive analysis of some of the causative factors behind regionalism in Northeast India.

A somewhat corollary paper on the above topic - with particular reference to Naga and Mizo resentment - has been contributed by Ms Jyoti Jafa. It is Ms. Jafa's contention that Naga and Mizo disaffection has been essentially caused by the fact that the two communities resent being ruled from distant New Delhi. This is a sign of a dismal failure of communication. But then, Jafa contends that separation in Northeast India is also historically rooted. This contention cannot be accepted without qualifications. In understanding the challenge of separatist tendencies in Northeast India one should not overlook the involvement of external forces which have played a role in fomenting regional tendencies. Ms Jafa has

treated this major issue in isolation. What is more, it is preposterous to suggest that separatist movements in Northeast India have eroded the structure of the Indian Federation to a great extent. The presence of separatist movements by themselves do not pose a threat to a political system. A viable political system should have the ability to accommodate diverse political and economic demands.

The paper on the demand for Khalistan (that has posed a challenge to India's federalizing process) by O.P. Goyal submits that it is indicative of the upsurge of Sikh fundamentalism. This fundamentalism implies the Sikh urge for religious unity and identity. While Goyal's contention is well taken, it would be simplistic to analyse the problem without taking into consideration the mischievous role sometimes played by some of the interested anti-Indian external elements. In any event, without the restoration of a process of dialogue - on a democratic basis - between the forces demanding Khalistan and those who are opposing them it is inconceivable that the political impasse in Punjab can be brought to an early end. But then the stability of the Indian Federation lies in its ability to absorb periodic shocks or accommodate demands without being diverted from its objectives.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE ?

Having perused the literature on general legal constitutional structures of federation, coupled with the relevant socio-economic and political dynamics of the Indian Federation, it is quite legitimate to ask: What steps the Indian polity could envisage to achieve the goals of a smooth and integrated federal system? In brief, this is going to be a long drawn process. There is no short route to reaching the goal of a stable federal system. However, one could consider the following initial conditions for the proper operation of the Indian federal system.

First, national integration can be achieved not by sacrificing greater regional interests and demands but by accommodating them with reference to the broad national goals. Secondly, the federal system should be able to raise or ensure the supply of more financial resources. Thirdly, (and this is related to the second proposition) it calls for financial autonomy of the state. The financial relationship between the Centre and the states is the most explosive problem; unless the matter is urgently attended it could pro-

duce a situation within the federal system beyond control.

Additionally, the federal system should permit existence of linguistic, religious, ethnic and cultural diversities. And for another, there should be enough room for structural/functional flexibility within the political system.

Along with these general propositions, some specific steps could be conceived about the Indian Federation. (i) There should be one term (say, 6 years) for a directly elected presidency; (ii) Rajya Sabha should comprise equal number of directly elected members from each constituent state irrespective of their size and population; (iii) Planning Commission should be reconstituted as an autonomous body responsible for the formulation and execution of plans; (iv) The process of a more rational distribution of the sources of revenue between the Centre and the state governments has to be evolved; (v) Local governments should be made autonomous and economically self-sufficient as far as possible; and (vi) While the states should remain the autonomous constituent units within the federation, Centre should have the sole responsibility to conduct and formulate national policies in the spheres of defence, external affairs, currency and transport and communication. This is merely to reiterate the steps stipulated within the Constitution of the Indian Federation.

Last but not least, Article 263 of the Constitution should be used whenever/wherever there is need for it. The article envisages the setting up of an inter-state council by the President with a view to resolving Centre-state or inter-states disputes.

Understandably, no societal/political order is a fool proof system. And there is no ready or quick-fix solution for institutional/systematic inadequacies. However, it is not difficult to formulate plans and then execute them on the base of small but positive incremental changes within a definite time-frame. Needless to add, hindsight always scores higher than the foresight. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to make all the right moves provided the relevant facts are collected and marshalled without bias or preconceived notions.

Shivaji Ganguly

POLITICAL THEORY

FRANK THAKURDAS : Essays in Political Theory. Gitanjali Publishing House, New Delhi, 1982, xiii, 406 p., Rs. 125/-

THE author of the book under review is fairly well known to teachers and students of Political Science for a long time. He has a good many books to his credit. Even after his retirement as a revered teacher in 1979 he has refused to retire from the world of thought; the present work is ample proof of that.

What is most noteworthy is that Professor Thakur das has strongly resisted his intellectual ossification. Although Professor Thakur das has frankly requested readers "to indulge in believing that the author was brought up in the English liberal tradition and was conditioned by what he read in the writings of humanist Barker and radical Laski," (p. xi) he has the critical intellectual capacity to transcend the conditioning limits of his own traditions and assert that "Marxism has presented a challenge to the Western world which Western social and political theorists from Max Weber to David Easton have not completely succeeded in meeting." (p. 47) He admits that "many of the predictions that Marx and Engels and Lenin made, have come true," and Marx had left behind a framework of analysis and the "categories like the role of the classes, the struggle for that power, the attitudes of the various sections of society, the continuation of exploitation ... the inherent contradictions in the system as it operates, the inevitable consequences of unemployment, miseries, the maldistribution of wealth, concentration of political power, war, etc.; in short the continuing features of the capitalist world despite enormous technological development, and the struggle of the colonially dominant people in Africa and other parts that still continues." Indicating the inadequacy of both the liberalist and the empiricist theorists he asserts, "To all these questions neither the theorists of the old style nor the empiricists of the new style pay any attention and the fundamental questions of social and economic justice are either bypassed or totally ignored." And emphasizing the vitality of Marxian theory he asserts that it helps us to understand the anatomy of civil society and the real and hidden forces which continue to produce the severe consequences such as poverty, unemployment and war, to comprehend correctly the nature of the social, economic

and political reality and indulge in political activity with a view to forcing the pace of change. In his opinion it is for this reason that "Marxism as an ideology has made an impact on the world in the last 100 years and has given a new direction to human thinking and human events as no other social philosophy since Plato has ever achieved." (p. 48)

All these ventures me analyses and comments show that Professor Thakurdas has the intellectual capacity to transcend the conditioning limits imposed by the traditional structure of thinking in which he was born and intellectually brought up. But as one cannot totally squeeze out the intellectual nourishment that one has received from tradition, Professor Thakurdas has exhibited a liberal pattern of thinking by asserting that Marxism and liberalism are not so irreconcilable or incompatible and by expressing a hope of seeing them make a happy compromise. (p. xi) This confusion is harmful to Marxism in particular. As the author admits, "Political theory is not born in a social or political vacuum;" (p. 49) the rise of liberalism has a particular context and the analysis of that context would show that liberalism serves the interest of the capitalist class more than any other and supports a social system ensuring the dominance of that class. The rise of Marxism, on the other hand, had a different social context, namely the crisis of the former social system manifesting in the form of unemployment, inequality, poverty and war, and to remove all these social ills Marxism advocates the replacement of the former social system. Thus the reconciliation means the coexistence or intermingling of both the social systems or parts thereof. But Marxian logic of social development suggests the replacement of one by the other.

In spite of such Marxian logic of social development, Marxian leaders of Soviet Russia and the Peoples' Republic of China have now taken steps to expedite the pace of socialist construction with little doses of capitalism. And such doses include foreign investment from capitalist countries with provision for the repatriation of profit and introduction of stock market. These developments may be said to be the signs for the realization of the pious hope of a happy compromise between liberalism and Marxism as cherished by Professor Thakurdas. One may rightly expect the release of some forces due to the liberalizations at the superstructural level introduced by measures of socialist democracy. But the operation of

such forces may be obstructed by capitalist measures introduced at the level of production. This indicates that the compromise may not be as happy as that.

If this question is left aside, the contents of the book, which include theory and thought, modern trends and old speculation, concepts like liberty and equality and thinkers like Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, Laski, Barker and Gandhi, deserve readers' attention.

Although the author has expressed great respect for the Marxian system of analysis in various places in the book, he himself has seldom applied the same. As for example, in analysing the nature of Greek political theory, the fact, that "active participation and deep involvement in all its spheres of civic life... was strictly limited and was confined to only a section of the whole community which exclude aliens, slaves women, and children," (pp. 20-1) has not been made the basis of analysis. Again, according to the author, "political activity may be understood as relating to the management of men's collective life whose outward manifestation is the state." (p. 1) Such a view of the state may be said to be an attempt to camouflage its role as an institution of legitimization and oppression (when the former fails) reproducing the conditions of the relations and forces of production necessary for the exploitation of the labouring class by the dominant owning class. Although the author rightly asserts that "Neutrality in Political Philosophy or in its criticism in Political Science is a myth," (p. 109) he has not indicated that the grounds of acceptance or rejection of a theory through criticism lies in its capacity or in the capacity to comprehend and explain reality and its complexity.

In the course of elucidating the two interpretations of liberty, namely and mainly that of Bradley, Green and Bosanquet and of Isaiah Berlin, the author has rightly asserted that "Liberal social and political values are not independent of the economic milieu i.e. the capitalist system, but are indeed a part of the texture and in a sense has grown out of it... and given it a false facade of democratic liberal respectability. More analysis, no matter how brilliant as Professor Berlin's is, does injustice to the vital relationship and diverts them of their substantial content." (p. 141) But the underlying insight of the above assertion gets blurred in the following observation:

Liberty, Bosanquet had urged, was a matter of determinate growth and added that state action can promote this by creating conditions in which a large majority can exercise greater freedom of choice than under prevailing conditions. The movement of the British welfare state, as far as I can see, has greatly followed the line of growth hinted at by Bosanquet and so elaborately developed by his twentieth century followers. (p. 141)

Although Professor Thakurdas has critically summarized the views on equality from Rousseau to Rawls he has not indicated that a radical restructuring of society along Marxian lines might prepare the basic ground for the development of social equality.

Surveying the writings of liberals like Hobhouse, Barker and Lindsay on the one hand, and liberal socialist thinkers like Cole, Laski, Strachey, Crossman and Crossland, who occupied the major part of the university syllabus till recently, Professor Thakurdas has rightly observed that "none of them chose to challenge the capitalist system as such." (p. 201)

In dealing with political idealism, the author has observed that the Marxists have not made as complete an attempt as the Idealists have made to explain "all aspects of man-state relationship." (p. 203) Such an observation may legitimately be challenged in view of the onrush of Marxist writings on various aspects of human relations including man-state relations in recent years.

The analysis of the significance of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau could have been made against the backdrop of their times -- indicating the need for reflection of their times in their writings.

The author has also elaborately discussed the political theory of Barker -- its framework and content and contention. Although the analysis is comparative, it is not so critical probably because of his intellectual nourishment in Barker's thought. However, compared to his writings on Barker, the author's analysis of the writings of Laski is more critical.

In his treatment of Hegel, the author very briefly mentions the impact of contemporary politics on his philosophy but gives a broad analysis of the impact of Hegel's thought on his successors - more

particularly on Marx. The author has also intelligently dealt with the Hegel-Marx link referring to Louis Althusser's writings.

The "rough and rush exercise" that the author has made in giving an outline, both historically and spatially, of the Marxist studies made by different schools or groups in the west since 1920 amply indicates the author's thorough acquaintance with the writings of various Marxist thinkers - even of the recent ones. What is more, despite his upbringing in liberal political tradition, the author has not missed the essence of Marxism lying in the constant interaction between theory and actual political practice. (pp 394-5)

By way of treating Gandhi's views on religion and politics, the author has observed that Gandhi's economic ideals and schemes are "naive and full of contradictions." (p. 382) This appears to be a disjuncted analysis. If the bearing of Gandhi's moralising politics on his economic ideas and scheme is considered from Gandhi's point of view such naivety and contradictions would appear more apparent than real.

Buddhadeva Bhattacharyya

Calcutta University,
Calcutta.

R.C. DUTT: Retreat of Socialism in India: Two Decades Without Nehru 1964 - 1984. Shakti Mallik, New Delhi, 1987, xvi, 219 p. Rs. 120/-

R.C. DUTT is not unknown to the world of scholarship. He has established a reputation for lucid exposition of any theme he chooses to take up. He is a great admirer of Jawaharlal Nehru; he studied his political career, in particular his socialism, with great care and considerable sympathy. Dutt himself appears to be a good socialist in his political outlook and sympathies.

Retreat of Socialism in India is a continuation of his earlier work which he called Socialism of Jawaharlal Nehru. The two books together give a good connected account of how and when Socialism joined the stream of political thought and activity in India, what part Jawaharlal played in its popularisation and radicalising through it the ideology of the Indian National Congress both before and after Inde-

pendence, and its retreat in the post-Nehru period. It was not easy for the Congress to take to Socialism in the pre-independence period. This for two reasons, one, the pre-occupation of the Congress with the struggle for freedom and, two, its general reluctance to go for detailed exposition of any new social order after Independence. Any such exposition would have created internal conflicts hampering the growth of nationalist sentiment in the country and a joint fight to end foreign rule. With all this general disinclination there was no way to stop the growth of socialist thought in the country. In the West it was a creed which was attracting more and more adherents. It had a message for the oppressed peoples everywhere. Jawaharlal became an ardent socialist not long after he got immersed in Congress politics and India's struggle for freedom. Dutt, in his earlier work, has explained in enough detail the part Jawaharlal played in spreading the socialist ideology in the country, the mixed reaction he produced in the Congress and the degree of success he achieved or failed to achieve in moving the Congress towards socialist thinking.

The real test came when India became free. Jawaharlal was the Prime Minister. It was open to him to take the country in the socialist direction. This he did in no small measure. The Constitution itself, without using the word 'Socialism', bore marks of socialist thinking. The real test came in two fields, one the field of industrialisation and other the vast agrarian sector. There could be no Socialism in the matter of industrialisation if the whole or the bulk of the field was left to the private sector. Several steps were taken to see that the public sector had a large role to play. A good deal of the industrial sector, including key industries, was reserved and sought to be reserved for it. But with all this reservation the private sector kept on expanding and growing in strength and influence. Dutt deals with all this and explains how it happened. It was natural for Jawaharlal to aim at speedy development. This development could not be a slow and leisurely affair. The private sector, with all its ills and failings, could not help playing its part. With scarce capital resources and limited managerial ability the public sector had to go along with a growing private sector. The Socialism of Pandit Nehru had to accommodate itself to the growth of the private sector even though it was sought to be confined within the overall pattern of our five-year plans. This raised the issue whether Democracy and Socialism must inevitably

produce a mixed economy with a growing role for the private sector or any other outcome more favourable to Socialism was possible.

There was also a good deal of compromise when it came to the agrarian sector. In all the policies laid down all the intermediaries had to go so that land belonged to the tiller of the soil. Ceilings were also fixed. In the final picture that has emerged, it is true, Zamindari has been abolished and there are some other changes. But some intermediates still remain and the land that was made available for redistribution among the landless or the small or marginal farmer was far below their legitimate expectations. The idea of cooperative farming, to which Nehru attached considerable importance, never struck roots in the Indian soil; there was no popular or administrative machinery to implement it even on a modest scale. With all these failures Jawaharlal did make a serious effort to import socialist values into all his planning, but according to our author, even this Socialism with all the dilution it suffered was not pursued seriously by the Prime Ministers who followed him. There was no question of giving up this Socialism formally or otherwise. In fact some measures were taken to strengthen the socialist element in the Indian economy. According to an amendment moved by the Indira Gandhi regime India became formally a 'Socialist, Secular, Democratic Republic' but the socialist content still remained limited. There was bank nationalisation and other measures and yet the private sector continued to grow. There were other developments, including a decline in the status of the Planning Commission and weakening of the drive towards self-reliance, which could be described as the "retreat of Socialism" in India. The essence of Socialism is economic justice for all and lessening of economic inequalities. This raises a host of issues. It seems a wider field of study will help us better to understand the obstacles Socialism has encountered in the country. It is not only Socialism but other isms too have suffered and the passion that gave birth to them has lost its old intensity. This has to be studied in both national and international contexts.

The sincerity of Jawaharlal's Socialism in the pre-independence period was unquestioned. That was so even in the post-independence period, but there was a difference. The concrete question was whether Socialism could deliver the goods in the democratic context with its emphasis on the freedom of the individual.

dual and a wide variety of rights. There were other obstacles too. Was the total social scene in the country such that all the political and social goals envisaged in the Constitution not easy of realisation? Let alone Socialism, the very working of Democracy in our country needs close examination. We need both Democracy as well as Socialism but this is an arduous task. Democracy without the socialist content would be a limited thing. Equally, Socialism without democratic values would be an uninspiring goal. What we have set out to achieve is difficult and complex. A certain discipline, dedication and a sense of purpose are needed. The wider study suggested here may well be undertaken by Dutt himself.

New Delhi.

Sadiq Ali

FOREIGN POLICY

John Muttam: Arms and Insecurity in the Persian Gulf. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1984, xii, 227 p., Rs. 150/-

NATION states seek more arms because they are anxious to promote their own security. Ironically, as they amass more weapons to defend themselves better, their neighbours and other states feel more threatened or insecure than before. They in turn acquire more and better weapons, because there seems to be no other way. This naturally triggers a new chain of heightened insecurity and a new round of weapons acquisition. The spiral of insecurity becomes a vicious circle and as nations acquire more and "better" weapons they become more insecure than ever before. The balance of power became an awesome equation, a global nightmare, with the advent of nuclear bombs and the ballistic missile delivery systems. This is an all too familiar and deadly dilemma confronting mankind.

The strategic nuclear equation between the two Super Powers and their global rivalry inevitably worsen the ongoing regional arms races and even spawn new ones in different parts of the globe. In fact, as John Muttam rightly points out, the Super Powers, along with the Big Powers or developed nations, carry on a conventional arms race either directly or by proxy in different parts of the globe. It seems that it is in their interest that the regional arms race goes on at a high pitch, and at the same time they both are anxious that these local arms races are confined to conventional weapons and do not escalate

into the nuclear weapons level.

Muttam then moves on to what he calls the key purpose of his book, namely, conceptualisation of regional arms race. He rightly asserts that arms control at the regional level is also of crucial significance because much of the present state of international insecurity and instability is an inevitable consequence of the regional arms races bedeviling different areas of the globe. Will the Super Powers and Big Powers accept some restraint in their promotion of regional arms races? he asks more in anguish than in anger. Will the dominant regional powers do so?

But, as the author struggles to conceptualise regional arms races, he gets into deep waters. For example, he insists that the competition between the two Super Powers is "autonomous, self-sustaining, intense, vertical and horizontal," whereas the one between the developing nations is so very dependent on "external sources, uncertain, vicarious, sporadic and fluctuating." But, elsewhere in the book he claims that the regional arms races at the level of conventional weapons are "autonomous." Later he changes his mind and absolves the developing nations of all blame because the regional arms races were inevitable given the colonial legacies they inherited, the territorial and boundary disputes among them, extra regional factors like the Super Power rivalry and the greed of the weapons' suppliers. The promise of conceptualisation of the regional arms races remains largely unfulfilled. Similarly inadequate is his cumbersome analysis entitled "Dynamics of Armamentism," whatever that may mean.

However, the historical narratives on the rivalry in the Gulf and the Iran-Iraq War, etc.. are well documented and useful. His summation that the prospects for arms control in the Gulf Region are bleak is correct, though it is no startling news. What with the obvious lack of interest in arms control on the part of the states in the region, the Super Powers and the other arms suppliers. Even the prolonged and seemingly endless Iran-Iraq War did not change their indifference to arms control. Sad, indeed!

B. Ramesh Babu

Department of Civics and Politics,
University of Bombay.

HEMEN RAY: Chinese Vietnam War. Radiant Publishers, New Delhi, 1983, x, 134 p. Rs. 60.

FOR anyone who is interested in studying the Southeast Asian situation the book under review provides more than merely entertaining reading. It not only gives the reader a closer insight into the hostile situation in the region obtaining particularly after the end of the Vietnamese War, but also offers another opportunity to check the assumptions and paradigms that were built around the theory of fraternal relations among the Communist countries.

The core of the book, as specified by the title, deals with the Chinese War against Vietnam. The Chinese troops began a major military assault on 17 February 1979, following a series of border clashes, and occupied a number of border towns with a view to punishing Vietnam for its alleged intervention in Kampuchea. After suffering heavy casualties, however, they began to withdraw on 5 March and it was announced on 18 March that they had completely withdrawn from Vietnamese territory. (pp. 111-112) A series of Sino-Vietnamese talks held in Hanoi between 19 April and 18 May 1979 and then in Beijing in June for a negotiated settlement of the dispute failed to produce any positive results and the impasse continues as acrimonious accusations against each other still dominate their mutual relationships. The author has been very careful in documenting these developments making the book extremely readable and absorbing, and here lies the success of a meticulous researcher like Dr. Ray.

While charting the background of the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979, the author argues that the war was not the result of sudden deterioration of their relations. Its roots lie in the proceedings of the Geneva Conference in which Zhou En-lai tried to persuade Hanoi to accept a compromise settlement, i.e., a divided Vietnam. Despite the North Vietnamese unhappiness over the Chinese role in preventing the unification of Vietnam by peaceful means, (p. 10) the Sino-Vietnamese cooperation continued as the Vietminh Government had to depend heavily on Chinese economic and military aid. The over-dependence prompted Hanoi even to take a pro-Chinese stand at the early phase of the Sino-Soviet rift. Yet, the North Vietnamese resented the Chinese attempts to undermine the importance of a united Vietnam. They felt that the Chinese wanted to play a "hegemonist" role in the region and a united Vietnam was considered by Beijing as an

obstruction. As the clash of interests had been brewing, the US bombing on North Vietnam created a new situation, (p. 15) demanding Hanoi's breakthrough in securing Soviet military assistance in the face of strong opposition from China. Besides making a comprehensive analysis of these developments, the author deals with other reasons for the Chinese estrangement from North Vietnam like the Chinese rejection of the Soviet proposal for 'united action.' He refers to the Chinese arguments in rejecting it (Mao's statement on p. 32) and Hanoi's acceptance of the same. (pp. 30-31)

In Chapter III, the author gives a detailed account of the Chinese attempt to ward off the Soviet influence in North Vietnam in the context of the increasingly successful Soviet moves to guide the Vietminh in the course of their war against the United States.

The Sino-American detente pushed the North Vietnamese further into the Soviet fold. A high level Chinese delegation went to Hanoi to remove the North Vietnamese suspicions of the new Chinese diplomatic moves in cultivating friendship with the United States and to persuade them to accept the US proposals for the end of the war. The mission was a failure. The author records the Soviet success in using the Sino-Vietnam rift to gain considerable influence in the region.

The author briefly refers to the Chinese hidden unhappiness about the North Vietnamese success in unifying the entire country which constituted another basis of the Sino-Vietnamese rift. Added to this, serious dispute took place over the Spartly Islands. Both the Chinese and the Vietnamese documents state that the relations between the two countries had deteriorated after the occupation of Paracel Islands by the Chinese in 1974 and the occupation of the Spartly Islands by the Vietnamese in 1975. It would have been more rewarding if some details of the territorial claims made by both the countries could have been presented.

The internal situation in Kampuchea and the eventual Vietnamese intervention gave the Chinese a pretext to settle an old score. The author brilliantly presents the internal crisis in Kampuchea in which not only the Vietnamese but also the Chinese forces had been militarily involved. He narrates the

role of the Chinese media in assailing Vietnam's involvement in Kampuchea even though as many as 20,000 Chinese military personnel had been attached to the Kampuchean Army. Tension mounted in their relationship and the situation took a grave turn as the Chinese accused Vietnam of adopting a discriminatory policy against their brethren living in Vietnam. Beijing alleged that Hanoi forced thousands of Chinese nationals to leave Vietnam. Such allegations were rejected by Hanoi as slanderous and motivated. The verbal accusation was followed by Chinese troop movements along the border. The author makes a thorough survey of the border tension which eventually led to the Chinese invasion. He also cites the statements of high level Chinese leaders declaring their determination to "punish" the Vietnamese for their invasion of Kampuchea. Such declarations had been made by more particularly Deng Xiao-ping during his visit to the United States and to Japan on the eve of the war. The Chinese resorted to massive military incursion into Vietnam even though the Soviet Union had extended strong support to Hanoi. The author presents an absorbing account of the course of the war and records interesting developments inside China during the war-like anti-war movements in the major cities. (p. 111)

The author has made an in-depth study of the adverse effects of the war on the Chinese economy compelling China to abandon some of its important plans for development. Following the war, China's defence expenditure had increased by 20 per cent. It is true that Vietnam had also suffered economically as the war was thrust upon it, but its fighting forces inflicted heavy loss on the advancing forces, and thus, convinced the rest of the world about their fighting potentiality. The war proved to be costly for both the parties but the Soviet Union gained in the bargain.

It would have been more useful if some of the Sino-Vietnamese diplomatic wars in the United Nations on the issue of Kampuchea, and also on the war, could be included in this otherwise extremely useful study. There is no doubt about the academic value of this brilliantly written book. It is a unique addition to the studies of less-known developments in this extremely volatile region. The author deserves congratulations for this noteworthy contribution to the academic world. The references at the end of each Chapter and the Appendix containing the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation will enable

future researchers to make full use of the book.

Abu Nasar Saied Ahmed

Department of Political Science,
Dibrugarh University,
Dibrugarh.

SEEWOOSAGUR RAMGOOLAM: Our Struggle : 20th Century Mauritius. Vision Books, New Delhi, 1982, vii, 208 p.

THERE have been very few accounts on the affairs of the third world island countries of Asia and the Pacific. As such the addition of the present work to the existing meagre literature is welcome. The book Our Struggle has another special feature - neither is it solely an autobiography nor a biography but both, plus the story of 20th Century Mauritius.

In what may be called the first part, there is a vivid description of the "anti-colonial struggle" as told by the tallest man of this century Mauritius-- Sir Seewoosagar Ramgoolam and presented by Anand Mulloo. The special feature of this struggle is that it was, as claimed by Sir Seewoosagar, directed against two hegemonies, one which he describes as the "oligarchy"--the dominant Franco-Mauritian minority which had a strangle-hold on the Mauritian working classes and the economy, siding the British colonials and thwarting any progressive change to maintain its hegemony, and second, British Imperialism itself, which after losing its hold over the sprawling Asian sub-continent in 1947, was struggling and fighting the last-ditch battle to maintain its colonial hold over whatever still remained under their tottering hegemony.

Naturally, the liberators of colonial Mauritius were between the devil and the deep sea. The strategy to be adopted to wriggle out of the ruse was a highly complicated one. Added to this was the ethnic division among the Mauritian settlers and differing interests. In the first part of the book, divided into six chapters, the "epic struggle" has been portrayed. This "struggle" which was different from other anti-colonial struggles of Asia because the leadership of the Labour Party, which was in the forefront of the struggle, never thought of entering a collision course directly against British Imperialism for it identified the "oligarchy" as its enemy number one. To put it in the words of the leader, "Unlike most other

colonies of Africa, Asia or the West Indies, Mauritius did not struggle for its independence from the British Colonial Government with a united voice and as one people... thanks to the Franco-Mauritian population which long controlled power under the colonial system and so was afraid of losing its vested interests." (p. 83) This quotation which is central to Our Struggle throws a flood of light.

It was through a series of compromises not just with British Imperialism but with the "oligarchy" also (for example forming a Coalition Government with them and not nationalising the sugar industry controlled by them) that Mauritius was able to declare independence in 1968. Added to this was the conviction of the leadership that the "British Government... was committed to the decolonisation process but had to see that the transfer of power took place in an atmosphere of mutual confidence." (p. 83)

But certain questions remain unanswered in the book. The British colonialists always maintained-- including in their Indian Colony--that they were not for continuing in power and that they would hand over power in an atmosphere of mutual confidence. But they would not do so unless compelled otherwise. This is a moot point. Further Mauritius was also fighting to put it in the words of Antonio Gramsci a "hegemonic struggle", just as India did. But if we go by the words of the leader of the struggle the model of the anti-colonial struggle in India was not suited to the conditions in Mauritius. (p. 60) In fact, Sir Seewoosagur disapproves the adoption of the "Gandhian method of Satyagraha... and civil disobedience" as a "mistake" committed by his contemporary Basdeo Bissoon Dayal in Mauritius against British Imperialism.

Thus it was a strategy of a series of compromises that characterised the "struggle" in Mauritius. And the natural outgrowth of these compromises was the adoption of the economic approach of "live and let live" mixed economy. The last three chapters, i.e., the second part of the book, is devoted to the evolution and consolidation of this policy. The welfare measures intended to take the country along the path of "Socialism" are presented briefly. The importance of the sugar industry, the backbone of the Mauritian economy, is highlighted as also the quest for marketing sugar. Again the attempts to industrialise Mauritius led the state to invite investors; offering "concessions" was a natural corollary to the liberal approach of the leadership.

Infact no exception can be taken, if after going through the book one reaches the conclusion that "all is well that ends well."

K Veerathappa

Department of History,
Bangalore University,
Bangalore.

S. PIERRE PETRIDES : The Boundary Question Between Ethiopia and Somalia - A Legal and Diplomatic Survey. People's Publishing House, New Delhi, 1986, 127 p.

THIS book deals with the Somalian claims to the territories of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. The author who is a historian, geographer and jurist, argues the case from the point of view of international law. He ridicules the Somalian claim on the territories which at no stage of history were part of one Somali nation, state or kingdom.

To substantiate his argument, that the present borders were inherited by the present Government from their predecessors, the author provides texts of the treaties and agreements which gave sanctity to the present borders. He reproduces 20 maps for this purpose. He argues that legally Somalia has no right over the land of its neighbours where no doubt people of Somali origin also reside.

Petrides argues that Somalia cannot reject the various treaties and agreements entered into by its neighbour Ethiopia with the European colonial powers who were busy in the scramble of Africa. In his defence he quotes from United Nations decisions and international law on the question of acceptance of treaties by successor governments.

The author argues that Ethiopia's sovereign rights over Ogaden and Haud (areas claimed by Somalia) "rest in historical continuity and exclusivity of title, possession, usage and sufferance; they are not the result of tricky agreements or of dubious financial dealings with local chieftains. As for the inhabitants of Somali origin, they are not indigenous; they are, in fact, alien intruders and infiltrators who had displaced from their ancient home, the Ethiopian population of Oromos (Galla and Galla Boranas)". (p. 7)

On the basis of the above, the author says that Somalian accusations that Ethiopia acted as a black imperialist and became the accomplice of European Imperialism is ridiculous. (p. 13)

From pages 16 to 40 the author gives details of agreements with the French, English and Italians recognizing the boundaries of Ethiopia. He quotes passages from the texts as evidence. According to him rival colonial powers had to accept the Ethiopian claims because these areas were found to be under the actual occupation and control of Ethiopia. The Ethiopian right over these lands was not accepted on a negotiating table. Ethiopia had to defeat Italy in the Adawa War of 1896. Before going to war the Emperor of Ethiopia, Menelik, sent a letter on 10 April 1891 to all Heads of European States which were party to the 1884-85 Berlin Conference. Defining Ethiopia's national borders and inviting Europe to respect them, he wrote with gentle simplicity that "these are our borders, please respect them. If not, we will not remain passive and indifferent. We will resist, putting our hope in God." (p. 13) Even after defeat the Italians took seven years to come to terms.

Finally in 1908 an Agreement between Italy and Ethiopia recognized that all the territory belonging to the tribes towards the coast shall remain dependent on Italy and all the territory of Ogaden shall remain dependent on Ethiopia. (p. 45)

Having referred to various treaties and agreements, the author reiterates that the Ethiopian Agreements and Treaties with colonial powers should be respected by the successor governments and should not be challenged by anyone. He asserts that: (a) there exists a mutually acceptable juridical basis on which a peaceful arrangement can be worked out; (b) that the said juridical basis is constituted by the Italo-Ethiopian Boundary Convention of 1908; (c) that the said Convention is still valid according to International Public Law (and) its validity is formally recognized by such international institutions as the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity; (d) that the said Convention's interpretation is possible since the UN Resolutions of 1974 establish the rules governing the succession of states in respect of treaties.

In support of his argument, the author includes as Appendix 5 the UN Document of 1974 on Succession

of States in Respect of Treaties. According to this document, Somalia's claims in its dispute with Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti are based essentially on ethnic and self-determination considerations and on alleged grounds for impeaching the validity of certain of the relevant treaties. Somalia has challenged the validity of the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty on the ground that it was the treaty "concluded between foreign colonial powers without the consent or knowledge and against the interests of the Somali people."

Somalia invokes the provision in the UN Charter which envisages the right of self-determination. Ethiopia and Kenya argue that the treaties in question are valid and that being boundary settlements, they must be respected by the successor state.

Supporting Ethiopian and Kenyan arguments, the document quotes Article 62, Paragraph 2a of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties (1969). The Convention provides that a fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a Treaty. (p. 102)

The International Law Commission of 1974 concludes that treaties establishing a boundary should be recognized to be an exception to the rule, because otherwise the rule instead of being an instrument of change, might become a source of dangerous friction. It also took the view that "self-determination", as envisaged in the Charter was an independent principle and that it might lead to confusion, if, in the context of the Law of Treaties, it were presented as an application of the rule contained in the present article. (p. 103)

The Commission concluded that in the interest of maintenance of the system of multilateral treaties and of the stability of treaty relationships, as a general rule, the principle of de jure continuity should apply.

The entire book is devoted to prove that the present border of Somalia and its neighbours came into existence after long discussions, correspondence or as a result of war. The author argues that these borders have been accepted by the then governments and have been recognized by the Organization of African Unity and United Nations; they should therefore be accepted by Somalia.

The main shortcoming of the book, which no doubt

is recommended for all research scholars who study the Horn of Africa, is that it lays too much stress on the treaties and does not attempt to give a historical account of the small chieftaincies which existed in the Somali area or rather coastal areas of the Horn. Had there been one Somalia and a united nation of Somalies, the colonialists would not have colonized the Horn. And like Ethiopia, Somalia too would have been free. There is a lot of truth in the statement that many Somali chiefs signed treaties with European colonizers for small benefits and gifts and thus "sold" their motherland to the Europeans.(p.13)

Vijay Gupta

School of International Studies,
Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi.

SOCIAL SYSTEMS

ALEXANDER ATKINSON : Social Order and the General Theory of Strategy. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1981, xi, 305 p., £ 8.50.

MIKHAIL Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in a statement on 8 February 1988, on Afghanistan said, "Any armed conflict, including an internal one in any country, can poison the atmosphere in an entire region and create a situation of anxiety and alarm for that country's neighbours to say nothing of the suffering and losses among its own people. That is why we come against any armed conflicts." The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in December 1987, and the promise to go ahead in the same direction was premised on the widely held belief that not only a limited nuclear war is unrealistic and a winnable war is out of question, but also that the only way humanity can survive now is to move decisively in the direction of a weapons-free world and not in a distant future. In such a situation Atkinson's question--"In the nuclear age, is the theory of strategy to be left behind destitute by recent fashion that there is no strategy any more--only crisis management?" acquires topical importance. The author maintains that social dimensions, of more general and theoretical implications of shifts in the assumptions of theory of strategy,

have been poorly researched. The book attempts to remove this lacuna with the help of original documents from China on problems of war, strategy and social order. Many of these documents were not available to scholars, not knowing Chinese language, and conceptualisation has been developed by Atkinson by closely following the thought-current of Mao Tse-tung in different phases of war against Kuomintang and the Japanese for a new democratic social order. The author envisages a new life for the idea of violence promoting policy even in the nuclear age.

It is asserted that "social life is a moral state in the fullest sense under the conditions of violence," (p. 144) and the natural condition of social life is war, the guerrilla form being the means by which its instruments approach the very nearest to their primal social origins. The book is replete with such propositions, the truth of which is neither demonstrated by empirical corroboration and absence of negative instances nor by logical inference from other propositions. The general theory of strategy, discussed in the book by a frontal attack on the classical theory of war in favour of revisionism, successfully advances the theoretical advantage of taking into consideration the alternative social orders canvassed by contending adversaries in war to understand, explain and predict the outcome and related questions of tactics. However any discussion about a general theory of strategy must not leave out an explicit statement of ontological and epistemological assumptions about man, society and history. To most students of Social Sciences, Atkinson's repetitive denunciation of Clausewitzian "theoretical" treatment of questions of war strategy in terms of power of arms deployment issues sans moral and social ends and concomitant ideological divides, would look like whipping a dead horse. A sense of history in terms of evolutionary development of human emancipation from natural determination, suggests a standard to choose sides in an historical context. Atkinson's theoretical probings fall short of addressing these issues, leave apart advancing the epistemological position that a general theory of strategy must spring from a cognitive consciousness that comes from this historical participation.

The value of the book lies in its extensive documentation of the strategy of social transformation that the Communist Party of China followed in concrete conditions in mainland China. The armed

invasion of the social order to be superseded was not conceived in any abstract terms but concrete analysis of the prevailing class relations which remitted power into the hands of the enemy and the projected land revolution that would not only smash the power base of the enemy but simultaneously pave the way to a new restructuring of social order, state power and armed strategy. The book is rich with historical material. The conclusion that the whole problem of social order becomes the prime obsession of general theory on which a free contemplation of strategy should always come to rest is well drawn from the Chinese illustration. But there seems to be no justification to make the Chinese experience, and by and large a successful culmination of the strategem of coordinated understanding of armed conflict, state power and social order, to occupy the whole space to build a general theory of strategy as such. The derisive reference to Lenin's writings, is only one example of obsession with the "Chinese paradigm." The general truth that contributes to a theory of strategy and social order, derivable from the Chinese experience of 20's, 30's and 40's, must not be counterposed to revolutionary experiences of other people or the Chinese people of the later period but to be theoretically integrated into a common theory. Probably Atkinson, like so many other "committed" Western scholars, cannot come out of a guilt feeling of having neglected the Chinese experience too long.

The book demonstrates that real power behind every armed power is the social and moral power of the human formations wielding the armed power. Hence any theory of strategy must simultaneously or primarily be a theory of human social formation. Since Atkinson does not go beyond this general methodological perspective to indicate even in bare outlines a theory of social formation, his search for a general theory of strategy does not base itself on any discrimination between alternative social formations or theories of social order. Obsession with power of arms, adherence to the assumption of non-violability of social order and a neglect of the 'hand of politics' have made the classical theory of war blind to the theoretical significance of revolutionary wars of the twentieth century. Absolutisation of violence as an instrument of policy or social transformation may develop a conceptual cataract in the theoretical eyes

of many a later day scholar. The theoretical issues raised in the book deserve widespread discussions.

Nirmal Singh

Centre for Study of Social Systems,
School of Social Sciences,
Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi.

SACHCHIDANAND SINHA : Caste System: Myths, Reality, Challenge. Intellectual Book Corner, New Delhi, 1982, ix, 236 p., Rs 100.

THE book under review was published by Intellectual Publishing House, New Delhi. The author of the book, a socialist activist earlier associated with peasants and workers' movements, has since switched over to writing for well over a decade.

The book, which runs into 236 pages, has six chapters and an index; there is no bibliography. In Chapter One the theories of caste are examined starting from Senart's racial theory of the caste system. The author critically deals with Risley's and Ghurye's analysis. Similarly Nesfield's theory of caste, based on occupations, is thrown overboard. F.G.Bailey and Louis Dumont's Homo-Hierarchicus are analysed and conclusions are questioned.

The author points out how even the notions of purity and pollution are not adequate to highlight especially the superior status enjoyed by the Brahmins. Mahapatra (Maha) Brahmins officiating during Shradha ceremony are considered lower by many other castes. Similarly the Marka Brahmins in Karnataka have low status. "Then there is not really a hierarchy of castes from the Brahmins down to the lowest orders. And certainly in the intermediate ranks there is hardly a fixed gradation. Often the various castes claim for themselves a primacy which the other castes hotly dispute." (p. 32) I do not agree with the whole statement, though there is substantial truth in it. Regional variations, internal contradictions and conflicting versions have always provided a lee-way, so that the caste system in actual practice has ever been undergoing changes and never remained rigid as it is often portrayed. But the hierarchy part of the system obtains all over the country. This has been substantiated by empirical studies carried out in different regions by sociologists/anthropologists.

Again on p. 34 the author says, "In Buddhist literature it is the Kshatriya who seems to have enjoyed precedence over the Brahmana." He also quotes extensively from the Puranas, Ramayana and Mahabharata, where Brahmins tried unsuccessfully to exterminate Kshatriyas. The interesting part is the story of Ravana as a Brahman king who was finally killed by Rama the Kshatriya king. I am inclined to draw attention to the Backward Classes Movement in the South, particularly the Dravida Khazagham under the leadership of E.V. Ramaswamy Naicker who hailed Ravana as a hero and denounced Rama as a representative of the Aryan's; hence Brahmana culture and even the play was termed as "Kimayana". One would find it difficult to resolve this kind of conflicting version. Thus the difficulty to delineate the caste system as being monolithic.

There has been a good deal of similarity between the views held by the present author and late Dr. B.R. Ambedkar with reference to Buddhism, role of Kshatriyas and how the Brahmins also sometimes tried to pass off as rulers, hence calling themselves Brahma-Kshatriya or alternatively taking over Kshatriya titles.

But there has been a shift in the author's argument when he says that in the caste system, like in Feudalism, ownership of land is mainly in the hands of dominant castes. Thus "power, status, economic advantages all cluster together towards the upper layers of society." It is further said, that "it was not the poverty of the people which reduced them to a lower caste status; on the otherhand, it was their lower caste status arising from their subjection which led to their dispossession." (p. 58)

Though very cleverly argued, it sounds like an egg or shell theory. A poor Brahman and a rich Scheduled Caste person are not equals. Further, land is not concentrated only among the dominant upper layers of Indian society. It may be that a substantial percentage of land is concentrated among Jats in Rajasthan, Haryana, UP, Bihar; among Maharattas in Maharashtra; Lingayats and Okkaligas in Karnataka; Reddy's and Kammas in Andhrapradesh; Vellalas, Mudaliars and Gownders in Tamil Nadu. It is important to recall that all these castes fall under the rubric Shudra varna, neither Brahmins nor Kshatriyas.

There is neither purity of race and much less of caste. Hence there is scientifically not much in

purity of blood and pedigree. I am inclined to agree with the author when he says on p. 157 that purity of blood has no meaning. But "if there is any purity of blood, it is to be found only in those tribes, who remain relatively isolated in their mountain or forest fastnesses, or among some of the lowest castes."

There have been indigeneous built-in techniques of social mobility quite apart from the process of Sanskritization, which is said to account for some passing off. The Brahmins being a minority, officiating as priests historically, have been quite a pliable group. They "would spin out a legend or genealogy to suit any one who had the ability to pay them and the power to make others to respect his transformed status." (p. 73) Shivaji - the Maratha ruler - is a case in point. It is also true that those who acquired Kshatriya status came from innumerable but dominant Sudra caste-groups; these rulers could also order to alter the caste status - high and low as the case may be - whims and fancies - while the court Brahman priests readily carried out the King's wishes as pointed out by J.H. Hutton in his book Caste in India.

Though the author states that searching for the origins of the caste system and speculations will not yield much substance, he indulges in doing the same unfortunately. For instance on p. 180 he says, "The names of the Varnas may have arisen in peculiar circumstances of their formation. The Brahmana was the common name used for the priests from the very beginning, so the new priestly varna continued to call itself by that name. In fact even the priests of the outcastes in many places are known by the same appellation even now. The name of the Kshatriya varna might have been derived differently." This is nothing short of speculation and searching for origins.

Sachchidanand Sinha puts forth finally a pet theory of tribals getting transformed to several layers of caste through the various stages of economic development. But others in the forested high lands resisted integration in the system and they continued with their own tribal modes. Bihar, Orissa, North East India, where considerable concentration of tribals obtains, does not lend any evidence in support of this. Tribes and castes are living side by side; caste has contiguous elements.

Since the author was a socialist activist, he naturally brings out and writes on the Backward Clas-

ses and their movements. It is not a mere economic factor that industrialization, urbanization, education and many other forces of modern democracy have failed to tackle casteism in some fronts, while it has adjusted to changing conditions on other fronts. It is not always the Brahman who is the enemy of the castes below. If the so-called Backwards—Shudras—blame the Brahman, for Scheduled Castes and Tribes, it is the ruthlessness of the Sudras that haunts.

The book is very well written and extremely readable. The printing is equally good. It can provide some general knowledge though extreme caution is needed to identify contradictions and convenient arguments.

C Parvathamma

Department of Sociology and Social Work,
University of Mysore,
Mysore.

RELIGION

R.S. BHATNAGAR : Dimensions of Classical Sufi Thought,
Moti Lal Banarsidas, Delhi, 1984, xx, 241 p., Rs.
130.

PROF. R.S. Bhatnagar deserves to be congratulated on gathering together in one compass the variegated dimensions of classical Sufi thought as it developed during the Middle Ages. It is a very timely production at this juncture of Indian history, when India appears to have entered a stage of increasing communal hatred and disharmony bordering on the collapse of civilised coexistence. Surely, religion does not preach hatred. It teaches, if anything, the brotherhood of man and the Fatherhood of God. As poet Iqbal said:

Mazhab nahni sikhataa aapas mein vair rakhnaa
Hindi hain hum, vatan hai Hindstan hamaraa

(Religion does not teach mutual animosity. We are Indians. India is our Fatherland.)

Over the decades, somehow, this sense of cooperative living and mutual adjustment seems to have been eroded and it would seem that we are heading towards a state of cannibalism.

We were confronted with this new phenomenon, called the communal riots, during the days of our freedom struggle. At that time, we thought that these were engineered by the British rulers who sensed a danger to the British Empire from the movement of Hindu-Muslim unity and Gandhian support to the Khilafat Movement. There were good reasons too to so analyse the situation at that time, since mostly the communal riots took place in districts headed by British officers and they were conspicuous by their absence in states governed by Indian rulers, where the various communities lived cheek by jowl and had evolved a pattern of coexistence based on mutual respect and consideration for each others religious susceptibilities. This was in fact the result of an attitude of socio-religious tolerance which had grown all over the sub-continent over the centuries and had come to govern the psyche of the Indian people.

In the growth of this attitude, the Sufi cult had played a predominant role. In essence the Sufi philosophy pursues the ideal of soul-making or an overall spiritual transformation of the soul. As the author says, Sufism is a way of life in relation to man's inward transformation. It is a particular discipline of the soul which cannot be revealed through rational principles. The Sufis comprehend truth (Al-Haqq) as they experience it, and live with it. To quote Al Ghazali, the Sufis are men of feeling and not men of words. Thus the Sufi enjoys the practical experience of the Real, seeks nothing except God and keeps a personal relation with Him in his own way. At the same time, as the author says, he visualises a speculative form of truth which further opens the channels of his mystical quest. The Sufis have, in the process, developed a philosophy of their own, which is realised after a direct vision of reality. It is, however, difficult to evaluate such a wisdom since most of the genuine mystical teachings of the illuminated dervishes and the celebrated Sufis are to be found in their spiritual experiences gained in mystical ecstasy and remain incommunicable and indescribable. The learned author has very ably overcome this handicap and has tried to grasp the truth underlying the doctrines of those Muslim sages who formulated their mystical systems in the face of Islamic orthodoxy. With deep understanding and erudite scholarship at his command, the learned author has attempted to make an assessment of Sufi philosophy traceable in the writings and utterances of Sufi saints of the first rank, beginning with the age of the Prophet

of Islam and ending with the year of the death of Abd al-Rahman Jami (A.D.1492). This period was an epoch of classical Sufism, as it exhibits a reasonable development and elaboration of the varieties of Sufi doctrines which inspired the later Sufis of the Islamic countries and India in the formulation of their philosophical systems.

The Sufis consider love as the essence of Divine Life. Their mystic path is the path of love which ends with the realisation of the state of absolute unification with the Real. As Jami says:

Strive to cast off the veil, not to augment.

Book lore; no books will further thy intent.

The germ of love to God grows not in books;

Shut up thy books, turn to God and repent.

Abu Hamid al-Ghazali was the first Muslim mystic who brought Sufism close to Islam, as he sought to interpret Sufi doctrines from the standpoint of the Quran and traditions. In his Destruction of Philosophers, Ghazali examined and refuted the philosophical way of thinking, particularly that of the Greeks and justified the spiritual quest after Truth. He believed that a true lover of God is he who surrenders his will to the Will of God and acquires the attributes of God. The Arif or the gnostic is a lover of God whose soul is enlightened by God. He completely disassociates himself from wordly temptations, controls his lower self and acquires purification. He gains knowledge of God through contemplation. Ghazali developed the theory of degrees of fana. That state of fana is experienced when the lover of God passes away from his mortality; perfect state of fana is reached by him when he is obliterated from his thought of absorption in God. First he journeys to and then in God he experiences fana from fana.

Ghazali's writings had a great impact on the Sufis of the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries. Abd al-Qadir Jilani for instance, synthesized theological and mystical knowledge. He had firm faith in Islamic teachings and Quranic mysticism. According to him, a true Sufi is one who observes Sharia and follows traditions with sincerity on the spiritual journey to God. Ibal-Arabi was another learned mystic who was influenced by Ghazali. According to him, God

is the essence of everything. He exists Himself or in His state of Unity and He exists through Himself, which implies His state of multiplicity. Thus, God alone exists. The so-called created things of the universe are his manifestations or attributes. He is transcendent as well as immanent. A religious God, according to him, is a personal God, and as such, He should be regarded as limited and an imperfect God. The Creator and the creation are ultimately identical and thus the question of the emanations appearing from the One and the spiritual fall of the Real, does not arise.

During the early growth period of Sufism, i.e., from the 7th to the second half of the ninth century, the mystics of Islam lived a solitary and ascetic life. They were sincere to Islam and followed the path recommended by the Prophet and the traditions. They were pious Muslims, kept themselves aloof from worldly possessions and believed in complete renunciation of the world. As the learned author says, the main teachings of the Quran, which they practically followed, were concerned with a firm faith in One God, worship of God, because of the fear of Hell and the hope of the Paradise, surrender of the individual will to the Will of God, recollection of divine names, prayer of and love towards God. The early Sufis imitated the life of the Prophet since he was considered as the perfect Man and the true guide on the path of God. They lived an unworldly life like him and accepted his views on repentance, purity of soul, prayer of God and surrender of individual will to the Divine Will. The four Caliphs were also regarded as the true spiritualists in all aspects.

The first Sufi to speak about various spiritual stages, particularly that of patience, was Hasan of Basra who lived in the second half of the 7th century A.D. He was a pious Muslim who attained spiritual perfection through Sharia or the law and austerity.

From the second half of the 8th century, the Sufis became interested in theoretical mysticism. Speculative thinking on the various mystical problems is traceable in the writings of the Sufis who flourished in the first half of the 9th century. Islamic mysticism took the form of theosophical Sufism in the system of Ibrahim Dhul-Nun. He interpreted the concepts of repentance, blame, self-mortification and gnosis on the basis of his personal experiences gained on the spiritual path. He also differentiated

between theological, philosophical and mystical knowledge. He held that God-head cannot be gained through discursive thought. Mystical knowledge (Marifa) is the only true and the highest knowledge because it is reached through contemplation on the attributes and essence of God.

Abu Yazid Bayazid was the first Islamic mystic who interpreted the Quranic concept of Tawhid from a pantheistic standpoint. He preferred love to austerity as the sole criterion of spiritual perfection and held that the stage of Fana or transmutation of self can be attained when the servant of God purifies his soul and attains perfection in gnosis.

The mystical philosophy of Abul-Qasim al-Junayd enriched Sufi thought to a large extent. According to him, sensual faculties take him to the stage of the union with God. For him Sufism means that God makes you die and makes you alive in Him.

Sufi thought developed in India during the 13th and 14th Centuries more or less as an elaboration of the mystical views of the Persian Sufis. Shaykh Moinuddin Chishti (AD. 1236), popularly known as "Gharib Nawaz," who settled at Ajmer and established the Chishtiyya Sufi sect, preached the development of saintly qualities like charity and magnanimity. He laid stress on the ascetic and moral aspects of spiritual life and recognised renunciation as the only true means for the realisation of higher stations of poverty and unification with God on the spiritual path. He said :

Four things are the gems of soul.
 First, poverty which manifests richness;
 Second, satisfying a hungry man;
 Third, suffering revealing happiness, and
 Fourth, showing friendliness to one who is an enemy.

The theory of complete detachment from worldly things was expounded by Qutubuddin Bakhtiyar Kaki (A.D.1236), the first spiritual descendant of Moinuddin Chishti. As a true follower of Islam and the traditions, Qutubuddin regarded fear of God (Khawf) as an instrument of the moral progress of the soul. According to him, the spiritual state of nearness to God is a sign of true saintliness.

Bahauddin Zakariyya (A.D. 1262), the founder of the Suhrawardiyya Order of Sufis in India was another

great spiritualist of this period who propagated the mystical view of his Master, Shaykh Shihabuddin-al-Suhrawardy. He was not against living an aristocratic life as he believed that it is the spiritual and moral perfection of the soul which ultimately matters.

Shaykh Fariduddin Ganj Shakar (A.D. 1265) of Ajhodan, or Pakpatan, who is regarded as the second spiritual descendant of Moinuddin Chishti was the renowned disciple of Qutubuddin Kaki. He was a pious Muslim of orthodox views and was known for his observance of ritual ceremonies. As a mystic, he disregarded worldly pleasures and favoured a life of asceticism. He said :

The more you love this world; the more distance will appear between you and the Eternal Life. The veil between the Master and His servant is but this world, and the cause of pollution is nothing but this world.

He considered the stage of repentance (Tawba) as an important station on the spiritual path because it develops the soul's kinship with God.

Another Muslim mystic, who played a great role in the evolution and development of Sufi thought in India, was Shaykh Hamiduddin (A.D. 1273) of Nagaur. He was initiated by Moinuddin Chishti and was well versed in theology and Islamic traditions. He gave much importance to control over the lower self or nafs through watching the self.

Fariduddin's views on theology and mysticism were followed by his disciple Khwaja Nizamuddin Awliya (A.D. 1325) of Budaun. He was the fourth spiritual descendant of Khwaja Moinuddin and was popularly known as Mahbub-illahi. He was a learned scholar and was well acquainted with the works of Ghazali, Jilani and Suhrawardy. Nizamuddin recognised six principles to be followed by the devotees of God for realisation of intimacy with Him. They are : living a life of seclusion, remaining pure in prayer and ablutions; keeping fast, overlooking everything for the sake of God; showing sincerity towards the Spiritual Masters and considering God to be above everything.

In this masterly exposition, the learned author has covered all this ground and much more. As one threads through the mosaic of his thesis which has

indeed an encyclopaedic spread, one's mind is struck by the parallelism which exists between the Sufis of Islam and the Upanishadic Rishis and the Yaugic saints of ancient India. As the Vedantic mystics merged into Godhood, they exclaimed in ecstatic rapture Aham Brahmosmi (I am the Creator), and Tat-twam-asi (Thou art that). The Brahmo cult found its modern version in Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Devendra Nath Tagore and Keshub Chandra Sen in the 19th Century to be further developed and enriched by Gurudev Tagore. The Bhakti Movement of the saints of mediaeval India, namely, Chaitanya Mahaprabhu, Guru Nanak, Kabir, Mira, Tulasī, Surdasa, Sant Ram Dev, Janeshvara, Tuka Ram, Narsi Mehta and others was only a manifestation of the same spiritual urge which prompted the Sufi saints of Islam. The latest exponents of this movement were Ramakrishna Paramhans, Swami Vivekananda and Swami Rama Tirtha.

Evidently, the various mystic streams flowing from God-intoxicated saints, from generation to generation, irrigated the Indian thought fields and influenced the behavioural pattern of the vast masses of the Indian people over the centuries, with the result that a social system based on mutual respect and harmonious coexistence came to be developed in the far-flung corners of India. The common masses realised that God is One, but the paths are many (Eko sad vipraa bahudhaa vadanti). This gave full freedom to everyone to worship God in his own way, and pursue his own path to Godhead (Ishta Deva) at his own speed and according to his own perception thus eliminating the scope of spiritual conflicts. Socio-economic and political conflicts did, however, arise from time to time with disturbing consequences, but that is another story.

It is indeed ironical and a matter for great concern that somehow during the last several decades, forces have risen which threaten to damage and destroy the psycho-spiritual legacy of the saints of the Sufi and the Bhakti Movements. This is a dangerous trend and presents a serious challenge before the leadership of Bharat. The book under review offers a message of hope and ray of light in the darkening clouds which have ominously gathered over the horizon.

New Delhi

G.B.K. Hooja

ARUN KUMAR BISWAS : **Buddha and Bodhisattva - A Hindu View.** Cosmo Publications, New Delhi, 1987 xvi, 264 p., Rs. 165.

REINTERPRETATION and revaluation of religious ideas are extremely helpful for a deeper understanding of the spiritual and empirical significance of the great teachings of the prophets. From a comparative standpoint, scholars tend to differ on the controversial issues of the original doctrines. In recent years, however, a greater concern for the fundamental unity of religious teachings seems to be a salient feature of religious studies in India.

The book, under review, examines the differences and interrelationships between Hinduism and Buddhism from a socio-religious viewpoint and comes to the conclusion that the Buddha's message was originally Vedantic. In support of his thesis, the author presents his arguments in seven chapters. First two chapters summarize the accounts of the life and teachings of the Buddha available from historical and legendary sources. In Chapter Three, the author discusses the points of disagreement over the teachings of the Buddha and tries to resolve them by reinterpreting the alleged non-Hindu concepts of Buddhism in Vedantic terms, while explaining the common nature of the Buddhist and the Vedantic teachings. The Buddha's life and message have been integrated with the Bodhisattva doctrine in Chapter Four of the book. Chapter Five depicts the process of evolution of the Bodhisattva concept through which the Bodhisattva was elevated to the status of a "saviour" of mankind from its original position of a spiritual aspirant. It is also established that the concepts of Saptarishi and Avatar in Hinduism and of Bodhisattva in Buddhism appeared in this evolution of the idea of a "saviour."

Swami Vivekananda is believed to be a reincarnation of the Buddha's spirit of universal love and sympathy. In support of this view, the author submits his arguments in Chapter Six of the book. In the last chapter, the social and spiritual messages of the Buddha and Bodhisattvas have been discussed from the viewpoint of Hinduism. In the Appendix, ten Bodhisattva anecdotes are illustrated with brief notes by the author.

In this publication the author has underlined the unity of the spirit of Hinduism and Buddhism. He develops his thesis at two different levels. First,

he shows the identity of the teachings of the two religions. Secondly, he rejects the alleged differences between them with regard to their views on God, rituals, caste system, etc. In some ways, the author's contention seems to be based more on his emotional conviction rather than on a more rigorous comparative analysis of various manifestations of the areas of assimilation that have tended to persist between Buddhism and Hinduism. In the light of this observation, it would be oversimplistic to conclude that the great Hindus are Crypto-Buddhists, or that the Buddha's message is essentially Vedantic.

For a general reader and students of religion, the book is a good addition. It provides a comprehensive view of the social and spiritual dimensions of the development of Hinduism and Buddhism in India. The author's credit lies in maintaining an easy flow of discussion that presents some insights into the controversial issues of the Hindu and the Buddhist teachings and practices. The production of the book, however, seems somewhat shoddy. Pages xiv-xv of the book provides a lists of maps and illustrations. But unfortunately nowhere in the book one finds any map or illustration.

Swati Ganguly

Dept. of Buddhist Studies,
University of Delhi.

V.K. GUPTA : **Kautilyan Jurisprudence.** B.D. Gupta,
Delhi, 1987, xii 356 p. , Rs. 175. -

KAUTILYAN Jurisprudence is compiled from Kautilya's "Arthashastra" by excluding extra legal matters. Out of a total 5391 Sections (Sutras) 2592 sections have been reproduced and regrouped as the law is scattered throughout the "Arthashastra." The book has been divided into five parts and forty-five chapters.

Gupta attempts to distil the legal thoughts of Kautilya on a whole range of themes. He has also given his own commentaries at the end of each chapter which helps a reader immensely in understanding the theme.

An Appendix has been provided giving relevant texts in Sanskrit. It preserves the autonomy of the reader who can draw his/her own inferences.

V.K. Arora

Indian Council of World Affairs,
New Delhi.

INDIAN BOOKS OF THE QUARTER
By Ashok Jambhekar

The object of this feature is to offer, every quarter, scholars and students as well as libraries, a compact bibliography of such current Indian publications in the field of social sciences as are received from publishers, but not reviewed in this journal. While no claim is made to exhaustiveness, it is hoped that this section, together with the review section of this journal, does list publications of importance, useful for libraries and research workers in the social sciences.

AGARWAL, N.P. Analysis of Financial Statements : A Case Study of Aluminium Industry in India. National, New Delhi 1981. xii, 363p., Rs. 100.

This is a study of the aluminium industry based on data relating to the financial statements collected from the annual reports and accounts for the year 1963 to 1976. It presents their correct financial position, studies the changes that have taken place in the industry during the period under study and assesses profitability and financial strength with the help of comparison of industry ratios and results with standard ratios as also the individual company's ratio with standard ratios as well as industry ratios. The author has taken the help of techniques of financial statements' analyses and statistical devices for analysis of data contained in financial statements.

ARTERBURN, Yvonne J. The Loom of Interdependence : Silkweaving Cooperatives in Kanchipuram (Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology). Hindustan Publishing Corporation, Delhi, 1982. xviii, 205p. np.

Through the study of silkweaving cooperatives in Kanchipuram in Tamil Nadu, the famous anthropologist dispels the myth created by a book on India's economic development entitled India the Slumbering Giant which argued that soporifics of traditional values, bureaucratic inefficiency and political instability made development sluggish. The author here says that by introduction of new values, governmental assistance the

pace has quickened and is catching up with the developed world. It analyses how India's planned system of social and economic development has affected one small group, the handloom silk-weavers, and what are the causes for these cooperatives having succeeded. According to the author it is because of the right mixture of worker initiative and activity, product marketability, governmental assistance and organizational structure. To provide real practical meaning to the cooperative form of organization, the author shows that different castes of weavers and nonweavers cooperate on the basis of equality and friendship, not hierarchy and purity-pollution. It also shows that the political involvement in the cooperatives not only has helped them to succeed but also expand and grow. This is an important contribution to urban anthropology.

BALDEV SINGH. Research and Development in Industry
(Occasional papers on History and Society, 48)
Nehru memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi,
1987, 23 p., Paper.

Based on survey report "Research and Development in Industry" put out every alternate year by the Department of Science and Technology, it analyses data regarding R & D expenditure by the industrial sector and the numbers of R & D personnel employed in in-house R & D units, and the relevance and reliability of this data. It suggests that along with basic data on inputs of resources and personnel and their deployment, output data should also be readily available. The surveys follow the UNESCO recommendations regarding international standardisation of Statistics on science and technology but these do not suit science and technology planning in a developing country and also affect industries, economic and technology policies. Therefore the scheme for collection, analysis and presentation of data should correspond to the requirements of policies. There should be greater scrutiny for ensuring reliability of data and better exchange of information and coordination between concerned scientific departments.

BARAL, Lok Raj The Politics of Balanced Interdependence : Nepal and SAARC. Sterling, New Delhi, 1988, 140p., Rs. 100.

While discussing various variables which play role in creation of regional associations, their sustenance and success, the focus is put on the inter-relationship between the big and the small. Indo-Nepal relationship is taken for this purpose in this book. It discusses factors like civilization, historical experiences and politico-economic systems, strategic security, geography and global issue areas. Basing on these it discusses Nepal's quest for balanced interdependent relationship.

DARSHAN SINGH Zail Singh : Man of the Masses. United Children's Movement, New Delhi, 1986, v.p. Rs.100.

DEVAHUTI (Ed.) Bias in Indian Historiography. D.K. Publications (On behalf of Indian History & Culture Society Delhi), 1980, 5p., xxxi, 407p., n.p.

Indian History and Culture Society was formed to probe into the basic questions about the study and writing of history in our country. It held its first conference in 1978 which dealt with problems such as identification of Indian culture, conflict and consensus in Indian civilization, approaches, etc., and published the proceedings under the title Problems of Indian Historiography. This volume presents papers contributed to its second conference in 1979. It is divided into two parts. Papers in Part I analyse a variety of biases exhibited in the writing of Indian History, such as imperialist, nationalist, racial, regional, religions, marxist and others as well as three papers on the neglect of oral sources. Papers in Part II bring to light or reinterpret original source-materials, Indian and foreign, in the fields of archaeology, art, epigraphy and numismatics from various periods of Indian history.

GUHA, Ranajit (Ed.) Subaltern Studies I : Writings on South Asian History and Society. Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1982, viii, 24 p., Rs.90.

As a sequel to the domination of elitism in the historiography of Indian nationalism, the aim of

the present collection of essays is to promote a systematic and informed discussion of subaltern themes in the field of South Asian studies and help to rectify the elitist bias characteristics of much research and academic work in this area. The word 'subaltern' is used as a name for the general attribute of subordination in South Asian society whether this is expressed in terms of class, caste, age, gender and office or in any other way. However these essays do give consideration to dominant groups that they deserve as subaltern groups are always subject to the activity of ruling groups. The contributions encompass history, politics, economics and sociology; attitudes, ideologies and belief systems.

INDIA, JOINT COMMITTEE TO ENQUIRE INTO BOFORS CONTRACT (Chairman : B. Shankaranand). Report. Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1988, vi, 238p., Rs. 50.

Proceedings of the Committee appointed by Parliament in terms of the motion adopted by the Lok Sabha on 6 August 1987 and concurred in by Rajya Sabha on 12 August 1987 and presented to Lok Sabha on 26 April 1988.

INDIA, LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT The Namibian Question. Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1988, 46p., Rs. 20, Paper.

It describes briefly history of Namibia's occupation by foreign powers and its struggle for freedom. It also describes the efforts made by the United Nations, NAM and the Commonwealth for its liberation.

INDIA, LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT National Electronics Policy. Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1988, iii, 77p., Rs.20, Paper.

Keeping in view the important role of electronics in the fields of atomic energy, communications, defence, education and space technology, a Department of Electronics was set up in 1970 and in 1971 Electronics Commission was set up for reviewing the entire field of electronics with regard to research, development and industrial operations. In 1986 the Commission was reconstituted for formulating policies towards integrated and coordinated development of elec-

tronics. This second edition of study describes the evolution of electronics policy and various measures taken to expand production of electronic goods in the country. As in other cases, this is primarily intended to serve as background material for the Members of Parliament.

INDIA, LOK SABHA SECRETARIAT Tourism Policy of Government of India. Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1987, 34p., Rs.12.

Second edition focuses on the evolution of policy and its implementation.

INNAIAH, N. The Birth and Death of Political Parties in India. The author, Vijayawada, 1982, v, 122p., Rs. 50.

A good reference book on history of political parties at the national level and regional level born upto 1980 and appended with brief biographical data on some Indian politicians connected with various political parties and a list of references party-wise.

KAMBLE, N.D. Deprived Castes and Their Struggle for Equality. Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1983, viii, 364p., Rs.200.

Traces the origins of Mahars, original inhabitants of Maharashtra and its adjoining states and discusses their culture, beliefs, demographic profile, social status, achievements in the administration, judiciary and army. He underlines the causes of their embracing Buddhism which according to the author was because of their being treated low in caste hierarchy and denied upward social mobility and equality despite being a martial race with a glorious military record.

KASHYAP, Subhash C. Parliamentary Privileges (Monograph Series 12). Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1988, 45p., Rs.15, Paper.

Enlarged and revised version of the talk given by the Secretary-General of the Lok Sabha to the Indian Economic Service probationers in the Second Appreciation course in Parliamentary Processes and Procedures held at the Bureau of Parliamentary Studies and Training of Lok Sabha

Secretariat. It discusses certain special rights accorded to the members of Parliament under the Constitution with a view to protecting their functional freedom and to enable them to discharge their duties and responsibilities to fulfil obligations as people's representatives.

KHAN, Mohd. Sharif. Teacher Education in India and Abroad. Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1983, 156p., Rs.75.

Text book presents need and objectives of teacher education and discusses historical development of teacher education in India, U.K., U.S.A. and U.S.S.R in chronological order. It also discusses the concept of micro teaching and the functions and the role played by National Council of Educational Research and training in the development of Indian education.

KHERDE, R.L. and SAHAY, B.N. Role Performance and Role Prediction : An Application of Social System. National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1981, vi, 195p., Rs.80.

The system of village level workers under the Community Development Programme was introduced to work in the villages as the change agents who would transfer the new technologies to the farmers and bring about a desirable behavioural change in them. These agents served as an important link between the organisation of the Intensive Agricultural District Programme and the farmers and therefore their role became significant for implementation of the programme. This revised version of a Ph.D. thesis, based on data, collected from survey and interviews conducted in all the five blocks of the Union Territory of Delhi and seven blocks of Karnal IADP districts analyses role performance and role predictions of a village level worker with the help of the social system model. Nine elements of this model, namely ends, facilities, norms, sanctions, status role, social rank, power, belief (knowledge) and sentiments have been used to find their relationship with the role performance.

PATEL, Sujata The Construction and Reconstruction of Woman in Gandhi (Occasional Papers on History and Society, 49). Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, 1987, 62p., Paper.

This study analyses the Gandhian ideology as a set of ideas on, of and about woman which gives a significant role to women in contemporary society and a significant change in the image of woman. It discusses how Gandhi made possible not only the involvement of woman in politics, but made her realise that the national movement could not succeed without her involvement in the struggle.

QUDDUS, Mohammed A. Pakistan : A Case Study of Plural Society. Minerva Associates, Calcutta, 1981, xiv, 196p., Rs.75.

This book is about the problem of national integration in Pakistan. The author underlines four conditions which are conducive to attaining national integration in a plural society. In the context of Pakistan the conditions taken for discussion are: a) development of broad-based national political parties, b) impartiality of central power elite, c) accommodation of politically relevant ethnic groups in decision making roles, d) reasonably equitable distribution of material goods and opportunities among various ethnic groups. This study, by analysing these

conditions, shows how the central Government in Pakistan failed to discharge its responsibility of redressing the grievances of Bengalis in East Pakistan resulting in falling apart of the political system of Pakistan and emergence of Bangladesh in 1971.

RAMJILAL (Ed.) Communal Problem in India : A Symposium. Dyal Singh College, Karnal, 1988, xxii, 237p.

Collection of papers presented to a seminar organised by the Department of Political Science of Dyal Singh College in 1987 under the College Humanities Social Sciences Improvement Programme (UGC). The papers deal with various aspects and shades of communalism which have been striking at the roots of parliamentary democracy with special reference to the Punjab problem.

SINGH, R.G. Rural Modernisation : Contradiction and Change. Intellectual Publishing House, New Delhi, 1982, vi, 243p., Rs.80.

With special reference to two villages, Ahamadpur and Jamudih, of Jaunpur and Azamgarh districts respectively of Eastern Uttar Pradesh, this study deals with rural modernisation both at the individual and institutional levels. At the individual level, it measures attitudinal modernity and examines the factors which are related with it. At the institutional level, it analyses modernising trends in major rural institutions, viz; marriage, family, system of stratification, economic and power structure. It also examines interrelation between the changes in different aspects of social structure and their inter effects and reveals nature and bases of contradictions.

SUDHI, Padma, Aesthetic Theories of India V 2. Intellectual Publishing House, New Delhi, 1988, xxxiii, 224p., Rs.250.

This study of Indian Aesthetics is divided into three periods, viz. the pre-war concepts of aesthetics, aesthetical studies during world wars and those of the post-war period. In the first volume author deals with world-war concepts. This volume deals with studies during world-war and post-war period. The first chapter discusses the principles of aesthetics and the changing trends of peoples lives of the classical period and compares the differences in the approach of the study of aesthetics in the East and the West. Aesthetic concepts of Bhasa, philosophy of beauty of poet Asvagnosa and the aesthetic attitudes of Sudraka in his single composition Mrchakatika are discussed and analysed in Chapter II. The third Chapter, which is divided into three sections, sums up and enumerates all the aesthetic theories of India, prevalent from the time of Kalidasa to the 20th Century A.D. It also contains analyses and critical study of all the Poets who referred to the literature of Kalidasa in one way or the other in their discussions on aesthetics. The value of this excellent treatise is enhanced by the Glossary of Indian and Western aesthetics, chronologies of the Indian and Western authors who have written source books on aesthetics and critical comments on it, and a sanskrit index.

with authors and books consulted. The definitions of the words in the glossary are based upon works on Indian aesthetics by S.K. De and Coomaraswami. For western characters the author has adopted definitions based upon the book Vocabularies dela Philosophie by Andre Lalande and A history of Philosophy by B.A.G. Fuller.

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